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Shariah governance is a system by which Islamic financial institutions (IFI) 
ensure that there is an effective independent oversight of the Shariah compliance 
process. For some reason, Shariah governance is explored through its functional 
and organisational division rather than its fundamental background. The genesis 
of this field of research is somehow still lacking in effort as it is in its infancy. 
Currently, despite attempts have been initiated by some scholars, the members 
of the Islamic financial industry, whether they are practitioners, academics or 
policy-makers are giving more attention to industrial applications such as product 
structuring, managerial efficiency and market expansion. Without undervaluing 
those aspects of Islamic finance, this research is more interested in exploring the 
underlaying fundamentals of the Islamic finance namely on Shariah governance. 
To do so, this research applied doctrinal research method. The data is collected 
from documents relevant to research themes. It is then analysed inductively and 
deductively to formulate a fundamental epistemological characteristic of Shariah 
governance. As a result, this research emphasises that there are three main 
principles applied by the IFIs, the aqidatic worldview, Shariah compliance and 
akhlaq-based ethics. Those three fundamentals are then brought into real-world 
implementation through three mechanisms: the governing law, the Shariah 
supervision and the Shariah audit. The combination of those principles and their 
mechanisms has demonstrated a great deal of potential in terms of 
implementation as manifested by this research in the UK jurisdiction. 
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Chapter 1  
 
Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
This thesis is a study of the underlying principles of the Islamic version of 
corporate governance, known as Shariah governance.1 According to the Islamic 
Financial Services Board (IFSB), a Shariah governance system refers to a set of 
institutional and organisational arrangements through which Islamic financial 
institutions (IFI) ensure that there is effective independent oversight of Shariah 
compliance.2 This means, Shariah governance acts as a directive system that 
enables the institutions that are offering Islamic financial products and services, 
to be managed coherently within the principles derived from Islamic tenets. To 
accomplish this, Shariah governance has its own guidelines that prevent the IFIs 
from getting involved with noncompliant business activities that are considered 
prohibited by Shariah financial law such as the taking of usury or interest3 (riba), 
excessive uncertainty (gharar)4 and gambling (maysir).5 In this regard, the 
Shariah committee as an imperative organ of Shariah governance to move 
towards such a preference, is regarded as responsible and accountable for 
ensuring the products and services of the IFIs comply with what is required by 
Shariah. 
 
Since Shariah governance concerns about the adherence of the IFIs products 
and services with Shariah principles, the Shariah committee plays a pivotal role 
                                            
1 Some researchers such as Wilson and Hassan use the term of Shariah governance to 
address the discussion on Islamic corporate governance and for the purpose of this 
research, Shariah governance terminology will be used. 
2 IFSB, (Guiding Principles in Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services 2009). 
3 There was a debate as to whether riba relates to interest or usury, there now to be 
consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars that the term extends to all form of 
interest; Mervyn K Lewis and Latifa M Algoud Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 2001) 
2. 
4 Gharar is the excessive uncertainty in contracts where details concerning the sale item 
are unknown or uncertain, or there is lack of information or control in a contract. 
5 Feisal Khan, ‘How Islamic is Islamic Banking?’ (2010) 76 Journal of Economic 
Behaviour & Organization 805-820; Hussein Elasrag, ‘Corporate Governance in 
Islamic Finance: Basic Concepts and Issues’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442014> 
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in achieving this overarching mission.6 As assurance that it exercises its function, 
the Shariah committee is assisted by an internal Shariah department consisting 
of an Internal Shariah Compliance Unit (ISCU), Internal Shariah Review Unit 
(ISRU) and Shariah Audit. These components are structured within the IFIs in 
order to satisfy the requirement of complying with Shariah principles in both ex-
ante and ex-post stages.7 More importantly, during the occurrence of 
noncompliance whether it is in terms of product offering or operation, each 
Shariah governance organ should have the capability to rectify the surging issue 
diligently. 
 
It is worth mentioning that Shariah governance is about satisfying the interests of 
the stakeholders, especially Muslim stakeholders on Shariah compliance.8 In 
achieving this notion, IFIs as sought-after institutions are responsible to the 
Muslims who chose to reflect their religious beliefs in business and economics 
activities. Arguably, the stakeholders of the IFIs are comparable as to their 
conventional counterparts. They could be shareholders, customers, creditors, 
suppliers or governments. The main diversity might only be on their prescription 
of doing business. That is why their intention on utilising Shariah compliant 
finance could be perceived as wanting it to inherit an alternative way of business, 
where in this case the way it is taught by Islam.  
 
It is argued that most of the part of the Shariah governance system when applied 
in the real world application takes the same role as to the conventional corporate 
governance in the financial institutions, especially in areas regarded as unrelated 
to Shariah matters. By that, Shariah governance is an attribute of the task of 
setting the direction9 which is in correspondence with the function of the 
conventional counterpart. In the conventional interpretation, corporate 
governance refers to the method by which a corporation is directed and controlled 
as defined by Cadbury.10 This definition is highly likely to be in correlation with 
the IFIs despite of their uniqueness, in the light that IFIs are in fact corporations 
which are offering financial products and services. In a similar sense, Shariah 
governance has no less intention of increasing shareholder value and institutional 
                                            
6 Karim Ginena and Azhar Hamid, Foundations of Shari'ah Governance of Islamic 
Banks: The Role of Sharia Supervisory Boards, Internal Audit and Advisory 
Firms (John Wiley and Sons  2015) 254-256. 
7 ibid 329-335. 
8 Muhammad Umer Chapra and Habib Ahmed, "Corporate Governance in Islamic 
Financial Institutions" (Islamic Research and Training Institute 2002) 18. 
9 Donald Nordberg, Corporate Governance; Principles and Issues (SAGE Publication 
2011) 7. 
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sustainability. Perhaps, it could be concisely expressed as an Islamic version of 
corporate governance.  
 
Based on recorded literature, discussions on Shariah governance are relatively 
new, in contrast to its counterpart, which have been developed since the 1980s. 
Many debates and discourses on corporate governance have taken place over 
many years. It became the crux of the matter in the US and UK after the under-
par performance by ‘too big to fail’ corporations such as Enron and WorldCom, 
and in Asia after the East Asian countries financial crisis. Since then, the 
conception of corporate governance has gained popularity when more corporate 
failures happened due to insufficient and ineffective corporate governance. 
Asserting this, some researchers such as Tricker and Mallin argue that the factors 
behind the emergence of corporate governance include corporate fraud and 
corporate collapse, such as the cases of web fraud and deception involving big 
corporations in the US.11 Interestingly, more eyes have seemingly turned their 
attention to Shariah governance after the 2007 global economic crisis.12 
Following the Lehman Brother bankruptcy, regulators are looking for alternative 
approaches to govern business institutions by securing more control through 
regulatory regimes and ethical codes. 
 
However, it is imperative to note that the emergence of Shariah governance is 
not a reaction to the 2007 financial crisis but rather as a response to the strong 
growth of Islamic financial sectors fuelled by global consumer's demand for 
Shariah-compliant financial products and services.13 This could be seen in the 
rapid growth of the IFIs market itself. According to the IFSB, the assets of IFIs 
have grown significantly and reached double-digit rates during the past decade, 
from about USD200 billion in 2003 to USD1.6 trillion at the end of 201214 and 
USD1.89 trillion at the end of 201615. ICD-Thompson Reuters predicted that this 
market would be growing up to USD 3.7 trillion by 2022.16 Nevertheless, these 
numbers are still small compared to the global financial market as a whole. It 
should also be noted, it is vital to have the understanding that no matter how 
small the market is, it should be guarded with vigilance in order to foster its future 
prospects for decades to come.   
 
                                            
11 Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (OUP 2009). 
12 Ginena and Hamid (n 6). 
13 ibid 
14 IFSB, (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2013) 7. 
15 IFSB, (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2017) 7. 
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The growing amount of attentions given to Shariah governance is perceptible 
from the presentative expanding body of related literature on the subject since 
early this recent millennium. Researchers such as Umer Chapra, Habib Ahmed, 
Rodney Wilson, Abbas Mirakhor, Zamir Iqbal and Mervyn K Lewis are among the 
earliest writers who went through the details on what Shariah governance truly 
is. Because of their diverse backgrounds, the focuses vary greatly and reflected 
the experience and expertise held by each one of them. Meanwhile, many 
multilateral standard setters such as the IFSB and Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) have also taken initiatives 
towards empowering Shariah governance through the issuance of standards and 
codes of best practice of Shariah governance. As clearly stated by them, the 
attempts are to provide a set of universal principles and guidelines compatible 
and comparable with facilitation by IFIs globally. 
 
In the same vein, some writers like Iqbal and Mirakhor have explored the 
principles of Shariah governance by integrating it with conventional corporate 
governance theories. They argue that Shariah governance could be classified as 
a stakeholder-oriented system, which is to some degree has no significant 
contradictions.17 This argument is on the basis of two fundamental concepts of 
Islamic law; namely, the principles of property rights and the principles of the 
commitment to explicit and implicit contractual obligations that govern the 
economic and social behaviour of individuals, institutions, corporations, societies 
and states. These two principles provide strong justification for the notion of 
classifying Shariah governance as a stakeholder-oriented model.18 Furthermore, 
this idea seems to agree with the IFSB guidelines, which enlisted in details the 
stakeholders that are involved and effected in the IFIs business activities.19 
Moreover, some countries like Malaysia has implemented a two-tier Shariah 
board as their Shariah governance model to tackle Shariah matters, not only 
within the institutional level but also within the national level by having an internal 
Shariah Supervisory Board embedded within the central bank supervision 
structure.20 
 
Since the world economic crisis in 2007, discussions on Shariah governance 
have also deepened and broken the subject down into wider topics. For instance, 
the Islamic view on governance and Islamic governance instruments appeared 
to be of concern to the researchers. The idea is to suggest a special code of 
                                            
17 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, 'Stakeholder Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economic System' (2004) 11 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 43. 
18 ibid 
19 Ginena and Hamid (n 6). 
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governance21 or theories for the Shariah governance instead of staying with the 
conventional theories as suggested above. The latest development has shown 
that governance is no stranger to Islamic literatures. To exemplify this, Hassan in 
his research has come up with the notion that some Shariah governance organs 
have implemented the concept of shura or mutual consensus, and an audit which 
is comparable to hisbah.22 By looking at conceptual similarities, he asserted that 
corporate governance is a well implemented system in the Islamic world, despite 
the differences in terms of form. 
 
These developments are the factors that have triggered this research, which 
looks to perform a detailed exploration to excavate what are the principles that 
underlie Shariah governance. This is in part because the available standards, 
frameworks, guidelines or codes of conduct pertaining to Shariah governance to 
this end lack of comprehensive details of their Shariah principles. For whatever 
reason, this situation, it is believed could bring about difficulties in the 
implementation of a Shariah governance system, especially when it is involved 
with unconducive legal and regulatory features. It is rather detrimental for the IFIs 
if they are to expand their market. Furthermore, a lack of clarity around the 
mechanisms used to uphold the said Shariah principles is arguably jeopardising 
Shariah compliance processes and it is likely it could hinder the IFIs from their 
full potential. Whether it is to be applied in jurisdictions dominated by Muslim 
customers or otherwise, the obvious conclusion is that the IFIs have no choice 
but to ensure this substantial feature of their business is well understood.  
1.2 Research Questions 
The questions arise as responses to the abovementioned problem statement are 
various. As a result of the foregoing, this thesis poses the following questions: 
a. What is Shariah governance, in terms of its definition, characteristics and 
relationship to the corporate governance?  
b. How does Shariah views the existing corporate governance theories? 
c. How does Islamic literature develop the underlying principles that lie behind 
Shariah governance?  
d. What are the mechanisms of Shariah governance used to make its 
implementation possible?  
                                            
21 Aishath Muneeza and Rusni Hassan, 'Shari'ah Corporate Governance: The need for 
a special governance code' (2014) 14 (1) Corporate Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society 120. 
22 Zulkifli Hassan, ‘Shariah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, GCC 
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e. Are those principles compatible to be applied in UK jurisdiction? 
To answer these questions, this research explores relevant literature on Shariah 
governance, in order to interpret the underlying principles that lie behind it, within 
a new paradigm. At the same time, the literature on conventional corporate 
governance is collected and analysed in the light of searching for the answer of 
how far it correlates with the understanding of Shariah governance. Other than 
that, the real application as practised by the IFIs in such matters is also a concern 
of this research.  
1.3 Research Methodology 
This is a research study in law.23 It adopts doctrinal study to administrate a pure 
research of legal philosophy to explicate a multidisciplinary-built environment.24 
The aim is to synthesise the underlying normative principles of Shariah 
governance as practised by the IFIs.25 It is done, due to the small size of available 
literature, so that the principles of the corporate governance of the IFIs thus far 
are rather a vague and non-coherent doctrine. The fact that it is mostly described 
in a practical aspect owing to its development, which was closely contributed to 
the industry, has resulted in a lack of philosophical expressions to characterise 
the phenomenon. That is the reason why non-doctrinal study as in social legal is 
not a choice for this research. By looking at the researchers, most of whom have 
taken social sciences approaches, the articulations of what is the real deal of 
Shariah governance is its lack of comprehensiveness. Operating in an intuitive 
and arcane doctrinal paradigm, this research is attempting to articulate the 
genesis of the principles by projecting them from the relevant sources. In order 
to do so, this research is collecting the data by reviewing the documents from the 
primary and secondary sources of legal studies and Islamic studies as well as 
other disciplines, in relation to the emerging themes, especially Islamic finance. 
Those data will be analysed to formulate the conception at hand inductively and 
deductively.  
 
In terms of data collection procedure, in order to determine the documents 
relevant to the research, it is done by looking at the primary sources that are 
describing the pertinent themes. As for legal studies, law, statutes, case laws, 
reports and codes are collected for analysis. Meanwhile, the primary sources of 
Islamic studies, the Quran and the Hadith, are consulted to determine texts 
                                            
23 T Hutchinson & N Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal 
Research’ (2012) 17 (1) Deakin Law Review 83. 
24 Paul Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’ in Andrew Knight & Les Ruddock (eds), Advanced 
Research Methods in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell 2008) 28-38. 
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carrying the said themes. The secondary sources, which are substantive in 
understanding the primary sources, are also collected to be analysed; namely, in 
the case of they provide an interpretation and explanation of the primary sources. 
Therefore, interpretations of the Quran and Hadith, relevant articles in law 
journals, books and so forth are collected for analysis. To wrap up the discussion 
in a multidisciplinary built environment, other sources that are supportive and 
significant in strengthening the emerging themes are secured as one of the bricks 
of the research. That is why reports from central banks, financial institutions and 
related multilateral bodies are collected to fit this purpose.  
 
The collected data are then analysed inductively and deductively. The inductive 
approach is to formulate a fundamental epistemological characteristic of the 
Shariah governance. It is done by tracking down the theories to clarify which 
ambiguities lie within the sources and draw them up under correlative themes. 
This approach is mostly applied in the beginning chapters. Despite the fact that 
there are no specific chapters designated as the literature review in a direct 
manner, initial chapters serve the purpose; in a sense, they conceptualise the 
comprehensive understanding of Shariah governance by mapping it from the 
corporate governance narrative. The aim is to draw a fine line at a fundamental 
level between conventional corporate governance and Shariah governance 
bodies of knowledge. At the end of those chapters, conclusive remarks will be 
secured as a doorway to the explication of the principles of Shariah governance 
in the upcoming chapters. The inductive approach is applied to construct a 
dialogue that formulates the principles of Shariah governance, from the data 
collected. This process takes place in Chapter 6, as the answer to the questions 
remarked on the previous chapters. At some point, the chapter is also organised 
in a deductive manner answering prior remarks observed inductively. This double 
approach serves as a tool to secure an in-depth normative narrative of the 
Shariah governance, as though the title were ‘the principles of Shariah 
governance as normatively practised by the IFIs’.  
 
This process then will be followed by deductive approach. The objective is to 
conceptualise the mechanisms that allow the theoretical aspects of Shariah 
governance to find a solid ground in the practical spectrum. The selected themes 
for the mechanisms are deducted from the literature, sprinkled throughout the 
discursive comprehension of the subject. As a strategy to prove how this research 
secures a new body of knowledge on Shariah governance, there will be a 
dedicated chapter to demonstrate a case study. By adopting the principles of 
Shariah governance into the UK’s IFIs corporate governance system, the chapter 
will apply a comprehensive form of understanding the principles to deduce 
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1.4 Research Scope 
As mentioned above, this is a doctrinal research. By giving up a high regard on 
documentary analysis, this research has managed to engage with three primary 
and diverse fields of studies at once; the legal studies, Islamic studies and 
corporate governance. Other than that, it also has to engage with other minor 
subjects in those fields respectively to support the analysis. Due to this, a large 
amount of time is required in order to form a comprehensive discussion in every 
part of this research. It would have been better if the chosen approach were 
triangulated with a social legal approach, where data from fieldwork would be 
able to be collected. However, due to time constraints and the vastness of the 
resulting analysis if such an approach were taken, it is believed that a full doctrinal 
study is rather sufficient as far as the research objectives are concerned. In 
addition, this research assumed the school of Ahl Sunnah wal Jamaah in its 
explication on the Quran and the Sunnah and when it interacts with Islamic 
literature. Other schools such as Shi’i are out of the question since the majority 
of the IFIs are operating in the jurisdictions accommodating Sunni approach, as 
their Shariah legal approach. Furthermore, financial matters are not at the centre 
of the contradictions happen between two schools. If this research were to 
address all Islamic schools, a longer research term and bigger area of focus 
would be required which would hinder research feasibility. 
1.5 Chapters and milestones 
The discussions in this research are spreaded across nine chapters, collaborated 
from the data collected. All chapters are a developing models for newly found 
Shariah governance principles. The first chapter of this thesis plays as an 
introduction. It consists of the research background, problem statement, research 
questions, research methodology and the proposed chapters. It outlines the 
whole research direction and the core elements of this thesis. 
  
The first half of this research study, starting from the second chapter up to 
Chapter 5 is the exploration of the extensive literature review available on the 
subject of Shariah governance. Regarding this, the second chapter serves as an 
examination of Shariah governance. It provides a preamble discussion on the 
definition of Shariah governance and its characteristics.  The objectives of 
Shariah governance and the justifications of the need of the IFIs to adopt a 
resilient system to look after Shariah compliance are located at the end of the 
chapter. Chapter 3 then succeeds with the explanation of the development of 
Shariah governance. It starts with the emphasis on the genesis of the conception. 
It then introduces standard-setters, responsible for developing the codes of the 
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peculiar system. Available standards issued by the respective bodies are then 
analysed by offering viewpoints to be highlighted under the purview of this 
research. As a continuity from Chapter 3, Chapter 4 then offers discussions on 
the Shariah governance models. Then, the fifth chapter deals with the theories of 
corporate governance. One of the fundamental parts of this chapter explores the 
theories within corporate governance models from an Islamic perception to 
establish a distinctive analysis on which part of these theories adhere to Shariah 
and part do not.The objective is to bring the dialogue of the Shariah governance 
close to the corporate governane narrative, so it would be more easily understood 
and thus better appreciated. 
 
After reviewing the literature on the subject, the research continues with its main 
concern in Chapter 6. This chapter deals with the principles of Shariah 
governance. This chapter intends to explore the basic knowledge of Islamic 
precepts regarding to Shariah governance within its epistemological theological 
worldview, Shariah compliance rulings, and akhlaq-based ethics. Understanding 
the concept of human as a vicegerent of Allah is the first and foremost as an 
introduction to the basic for Islamic epistemological worldview. It gives the whole 
picture of how this world should be governed by humans as delegate 
representatives of Allah as God of the universe. Shariah-compliant rulings that 
are particularly related to business are the part of this chapter, composed by 
Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic contractual law, including the maqasidic 
approach to resolve disputes. An ethical code based on akhlaq will excavate, how 
the universal ethical concept proposed by Islamic thought is applicable in the 
diverse economic environments of multiple jurisdictions. 
 
Chapter 7 comes with the mechanisms to implement Shariah principles as per 
discussed in the earlier chapters. By looking at the governing law, Shariah 
supervision and Shariah audit, this chapter explains how these mechanisms work 
as the instrumental elements of Shariah governance in place. This chapter plays 
the role as the bridge to the implementation of theoretical principles exposed by 
this research. Then, Chapter 8 will take up the implementation of the principles 
of Shariah governance in a selected jurisdiction. By focusing on Shariah 
governance mechanisms, this chapter demonstrates what is to be done if Shariah 
governance is to be adopted by the IFIs in the UK’s jurisdiction. The UK is 
selected for this research since it has exhibited a great deal of interest in exploring 
Islamic finance and its regulatory regime has been flexible in adapting various 
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Chapter 2  
 
An Examination of the Shariah Governance 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, an introduction to what this research is about has been 
addressed. It has provided essential elements to be understood in order to 
anticipate the discussions of the upcoming chapters. Commencing from there, 
this chapter is going to be the doorway to the discussion of the principles of 
Shariah governance. The aim is to provide the opening answers to the first 
research question- what is Shariah governance?- in terms of its definition, 
characteristics and relationship to the corporate governance. By adapting 
corporate governance narrative, this chapter focuses on examining an 
introductory level of Shariah governance discourse.  
 
The terminology of the Shariah governance, which consists of two different 
words, will be excavated to unearth the topics underneath. It is worth noting that 
this corpus of research is rather in its infancy, thus, written literature on it has 
been, to some extent, rare.1 However, as recently seen, efforts to expand its 
breadth and depth have been done by scholars as well as various multilateral 
standard setters.2 Truthfully, Shariah governance is indeed remote to the 
mainstream audience, especially in the market where Islamic finance remains 
less-explored. Therefore, as this research is going to inductively formulate the 
principles of Shariah governance, excavating the essence of Shariah governance 
is considered as more than necessary.  
 
In this chapter, inductive approach will be applied to articulate an initial idea of 
Shariah governance. The themes revealed from analytical observation of the 
literature will be positioned in a logical manner. In this regard, this chapter begins 
with the understanding of Shariah governance, which consists of the meaning of 
Shariah, its characteristics and objectives, a discussion on corporations and the 
Shariah-related issues as well as the correlation between corporate governance 
and Shariah governance, mainly in the context of its interpretations. The 
                                            
1 Most of the discussions on Shariah governance topic are focusing on the Shariah 
committee, in terms of its functions, transparency and independence; see S 
Abdullah Saif Alnasser, ‘Introduction to Corporate Governance from Islamic 
Perspective’ (2012) 28 Humanomics 221. 
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discussion continues with the relevance of Shariah governance for the IFIs, which 
explains the purposes of the existence Shariah governance within the IFIs.  
2.2 Shariah Governance Preamble 
Shariah governance is a new terminology used by researchers to signal on a 
governance system of Islamic financial institutions or Islamic corporations.3 It is 
also known as Islamic corporate governance, but the preferred terminology for 
this research henceforth is the Shariah governance. Similar to corporate 
governance narrative, the concern of Shariah governance lies on the objectives 
of the corporation and its constituents.4 Furthermore, Shariah governance 
extends the discussion to how the governance system should be conducted, in 
order to ensure Shariah compliance5 within the corporation, trying to fill the gaps6 
left in the theories of corporate governance related to the corporations offering 
Islamic products and services. Therefore, in order to understand the discussion 
that will be addressed by this particular research, a clear overview on the subject 
of Shariah, in general, Shariah as law and corporation in the eye of Shariah are 
rather vital. 
2.2.1 The meaning of Shariah 
The word Shariah originates from the Arabic language. The Quran, as the source 
of Shariah law, has mentioned the word Shariah in many occasions such as 
‘Shir’atan’- ًةَعْرِش  -7 and ‘Shari’ah’- ًةَعيِرَش .8 Shariah means ‘begin’ as mentioned by 
Ibn Kathir. For example, shara’a fulan al-kitabah - ةَباَتِكلا ِيف ٌنَالُف َعَرَش  - meaning ‘a 
                                            
3 Those terminologies were commonly used by many researchers as seen in Rodney 
Wilson, ‘Shariah Governance for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2009) 1 (1) ISRA 
International Journal for Islamic Finance 59; Zulkifli Hassan, ‘Regulatory Framework 
of Shariah Governance System in Malaysia, GCC Countries and the UK’ (2010) 3 
(2) Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 82; Tadashi Mizushima, 'Corporate 
Governance and Shariah Governance at Islamic Financial Institutions: Assessing 
form Current Practice in Malaysia' (2014) 22 (1) Reitiku Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Studies 59. 
4 See Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic Corporate Governance' (2005) 9 (1) Review of Islamic 
Economics 5. 
5 Shariah-compliant refers to compliance to Shariah rulings and decisions issued by the 
SAC and Shariah Committee of the IFI respectively, and as determined by other 
relevant bodies. 
6 The implementation of the conventional corporate governance theories in the IFIs is 
lack of focus on features that peculiar to the needs of IFIs, especially on how 
governance constituents are to play the role to fulfil the Islamic business objective 
that ban interest-based products, gambling and excessive uncertainties.  
7 Quran: (5) 48; Quranic translations are referred to The Qur’an (trs) MAS Haleem (2nd 
edn OUP 2010). 
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person begins the writing’. Shariah also means the clear path.9 In a practical 
context, Shariah has been defined as the pathway for the water10, the path to the 
watering-place11, the clear path to be followed and the path which the believers 
have to tread in order to obtain guidance in this world and deliverance in the next. 
In its original usage, Shariah has been defined as the road to the watering place 
or a path leading to the water, such as the way to the source of life. In its common 
usage, Shariah refers to commands, prohibitions, guidance and principles that 
God has addressed to mankind pertaining to their conduct in this world and 
salvation in the next.12 
 
Terminologically, Shariah means the commandments from Allah to Mankind, 
which were revealed to the Prophet Muhammad PBUH (Peace and Blessing be 
upon Him), that guide the faith of humans towards Him as their Creator and the 
relationship of Muslims with their Muslim brothers as well as to the humanity and 
nature.13 In this regard, Auda has interpreted Shariah as the way of life14, which 
is in conjunction with the notion proposed by Ramadan.15 Al-Jurjani defined 
Shariah as the way of the religion.16 In the Islamic tradition of knowledge, Ibn 
Taymiyah defined Shariah as everything that commanded by Allah either in faith 
or in physical actions.17 Shariah is also known as a law that was revealed in the 
Quran, or through the teaching of the Hadith (traditions of the Messenger), in the 
context of inner faith, practical actions and good ethics.  
 
The inner faith or belief of a Muslim is called aqidah while the practical part of the 
Shariah or Islamic law known as fiqh. Aqidah is the things that must be believed 
by heart, things that bring the inner peace of the soul, a belief that is not mixed 
with slightest hesitation or doubt18. Strong faith in Allah is vital in a Muslim life 
where righteous faith will create a correct world view about the life in the world 
(dunya) and in the afterlife. Shariah covers and regulates humans’ entire life from 
                                            
9 Sulaiman Asyqar, Khasais al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (Maktabah al-Falah 1982) 11. 
10 Ibn Manzur, Lisan al-‘Arab (Dar Sadir 1993) vol 10 176. 
11 Arabic Language Academy, Mu’jam al-Wasit (Maktabah al-Syuruq al-Daqliyyah 2004) 
479. 
12 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Shariah Law: An Introduction (Oneworld 
publications 2008) 14. 
13 Muhammad Shaltut, Islam: ‘Aqidah wa Shari’ah (8th edn, Dar al-Shuruq 2001) 10. 
14 Jaser Auda, Maqasid al-Shari’ah as Philosophy of Islamic Law a Systems Approach 
(The International Institute of Islamic Thought 2007) 57. 
15 Tariqq Ramadan, To Be a European Muslim (Islamic Foundation 1999), 28. 
16 Ali al-Jurjani, Mu’jam al-Ta’rifat (Dar al-Fadilah 2004) 108. 
17 Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu’ Fatawa (King Fahd National Library 2004) vol 19 306. 
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the cradle to the grave, containing both doctrine and law19 as a guidance, as far 
as Muslims are concerned. According to this belief, the main function of Shariah 
is to guide actions performed by humans. 
 
As for fiqh understanding, it is defined as the Islamic law that is related to the 
actions of the mukallaf (the person who has passed puberty), which is derived 
from the specific provisions.20 To some extent, fiqh is recognised as legal science 
and can sometimes be used synonymously with Shariah. The two terms are, 
however, different in the way that Shariah is closely identified with divine 
revelation, the knowledge of which could only be obtained from the Quran and 
the Hadith as fiqh has, on the other hand, been largely developed by jurists and 
consists of rules which are mainly found on human reasoning and ijtihad.21 
Shariah is thus a wider circle, and it embraces in its orbit all human actions, 
whereas fiqh is narrower in scope and addresses mainly what is referred as 
practical legal rules.22  
 
Specifically, the terminology of Shariah used in a discussion related to the law 
specified for the actions of humankind, derived from the Quran and the Hadith, 
excluding the discussions on the inner faith which normally called as Usul al-Din, 
and the Islamic ethics that known as Akhlak.23 In the same vein, al-Qaradawi 
mentioned two main divisions of Shariah as a law, a division that fixed by the 
provisions of the Quran and the Hadith directly, and a division that being derived 
by the jurists from their understanding of the provisions from the Quran and the 
Hadith.24 It is worth mentioning that the formation of fiqh by the jurists is not 
merely initiated by their self-understanding of the provisions, but it is derived by 
a strict reasoning process formulated from the provisions itself.  
 
The instant example of this process was performed by the tradition of Prophet 
Muhammad PBUH as reported by Abu Daud. When the Messenger of Allah 
PBUH intended to send Muaz ibn Jabal to the Yemen, he asked him, ‘How will 
                                            
19 Etim E Okon, ‘Islamic Jurisprudence and the Primacy of Shariah’ (2013) 3 (1) 
International Journal of Asian Social Science 138-149. 
20 Yusuf al-Qaradawi, Madkhal li Dirasah al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (Muassasah al-
Risalah 1993) 22. 
21 Ijtihad or personal reasoning is a total expenditure of effort made by a jurist in order to 
infer, with a degree of probability, the rules of Shari'ah from their detailed evidence 
in the sources; See MH Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (The Islamic 
Texts Society Cambridge 2003) 315  
22 Kamali, Shariah Law: An Introduction (n12) 16. 
23 Asyqar, Khasais al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (n 9) 11. 
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you judge when the occasion of deciding a case arises?’ He replied, ‘I shall judge 
in accordance with Allah's Book’. He asked, ‘(What will you do) if you do not find 
any guidance in Allah's Book?’ He replied, ‘(I shall act) in accordance with the 
Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah PBUH.’ He asked, ‘(What will you do) if you 
do not find any guidance in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah PBUH and in 
Allah's Book?’ He replied, ‘I shall do my best to form an opinion and I shall spare 
no effort’. The Messenger of Allah PBUH then patted him on the breast and said, 
‘Praise be to Allah who has helped the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to 
find something which pleases the Messenger of Allah’.25 
 
The discussions of the fiqh have been divided by the jurists into five major 
sections, consisting of ibadat (law of worshiping), muamalat (financial law), 
munakahat (matrimonial law) and jinayat (criminal law) as well as qada’ and 
siasah (judicial and politics). Each of these sections are derived by the scholars 
using a robust discipline of Islamic jurisprudence to deduce laws from the texts 
of the Quran and the Hadith. Muslim scholars have generally regarded fiqh as 
understanding of the Shariah, and not the Shariah itself.26 To a certain degree, 
Shariah is considered as the precept general goal and fiqh as the pathway 
towards the goal.27 
 
In terms of governance, a question arises. Will the injection of Shariah law, as 
preference, into the modern banking system make the bank a religious 
institution? Essentially, it is vital to have the understanding that complying with 
Shariah in its general sense and Shariah financial law in specific, from the 
untrained eyes has no difference compared to other business counterparts. The 
expression of an Islamic bank is not to be interpreted as if it is a type of financial 
system that is strictly religious in the way which forbids dealing with non-
Muslims.28 For example, if it is a bank, it could still offers loans and mortgages as 
well as investments and fund-raising similar to the conventional banks, with the 
exception that all of those financial activities must be Shariah-compliant. The 
crucial point to be noted here is that governing the institutions within the 
perspective of Shariah does not represent a rigid system and only serves to 
pleasure God.29 Islam is a religion that promotes an ideal way of life, personally, 
                                            
25 Abu Dawud, Sunan Abi Dawud (International Ideas Home Inc. ND) no. 3592 
26 Kamali, Shariah Law: An Introduction (n 12) 16. 
27 Al-Qaradawi, Madkhal li Dirasah al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (n 20). 
28 Abdul Karim Al-Dohni, Islamic Banking in the United Kingdom: Is the Current Legal 
and Regulatory Framework Capable of Hosting an Islamic Banking Sector? (PhD 
Thesis University of Leeds 2008) 9. 
29 In fact, the actions that please God are the actions that fulfil the public interest, which 





- 15 - 
publicly or even in the context of international relationships. According to this, the 
objective of injecting the Shariah principles into the governance system is to 
ensure the business and transaction activities are run within the Islamic tenets. 
 
This is rather substantive since understanding Shariah transaction law 
(muamalat) is not a matter that is only authorised in the hand of the jurists, but it 
is also a general knowledge that should be mastered by all Muslims. In fact, Umar 
al-Khattab, the second caliph of Islam, said that one should gain knowledge prior 
to becoming a businessman. To ensure these business activities are Shariah-
compliant, the Islamic government places someone in charge to supervise 
market activities and to attend disputes between shoppers, customers and 
authorities. As recorded by jurists, the Prophet Muhammad PBUH walked in the 
market and had done the supervision by himself where he occasionally named 
capable persons to do the job.30 This system had been applied throughout the 
history of the Islamic empire for more than a millennium under hisbah institution.  
2.2.2 Shariah Characteristics as a Law: The Flexibility and Rigidity 
of Shariah 
As an Islamic version of law, Shariah has its own characteristics that distinguish 
it from other laws, whether they are derived from the common law,31 civil law,32 
or other religious beliefs. The major characteristics33 of Shariah, as enlisted by 
scholars, amongst others, is that it upholds the balance between flexibility and 
rigidity.  
 
On the one hand, some parts of Shariah are rigid and will not tolerate any effort 
to overrule the predetermined tenets. Commonly, they are considered as the 
pillars of Islam and the pillars of iman. This rigidity is necessary to ensure these 
pillars will remain intact upon the tests and hardship through one’s life. However, 
on the other hand, Shariah also provides elasticity in legislation to meet the needs 
                                            
30 The Prophet named a woman to administer the supervision, and her name was Nuhaik 
al-Asadiyyah. 
31 The Anglo-American corporate governance model is well known in the jurisdictions 
that have implemented common law such as the US, UK, Australia and many other 
countries including Malaysia, one of the countries prominent in its Islamic finance 
system developments. 
32 Germany’s corporate governance model works in the civil law environment; see Bob 
Tricker, ‘Reinventing the Limited Liability Company’ (2011) 19 (4) Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 384. 
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of the society rather than stick to divine law.34 Therefore, some areas of Islam are 
considered flexible, and left to humans to make sensible decisions. For instance, 
as Muslims, we are taught to dress in a decent manner. Our dress must cover 
the parts that referred as aurah by Shariah which is for a male, between the knees 
and the centre of the abdomen and for a female, all the body except the face and 
palms.35 After covering all of these parts with proper dress, we are however, free 
to choose the materials, colours, cuttings, design and fashions. In a broader 
sense, the dress is not limited to a certain dressing code such as the Arabic dress 
code as a sign of its Islamicity but the main characteristic is rather on how it 
covers the aurah in so far as that is the rigidity conducted by Shariah.  
 
In terms of Islamic transactions, the parts that are strictly forbidden are those that 
charge interest on debt, the contract that consists of extensive uncertainties, and 
the prohibited actions or substances such as the gambling and intoxicating 
substance.36 Besides that, a Muslim is, however, free to enter into any kind of 
transaction and contractual agreement as long as it is free from the 
aforementioned features. Furthermore, ‘presumption of validity and permissibility 
applies to all contracts and conditions’37 is one of the legal maxims implied in the 
business contract in Islam.38 Therefore, the legitimation of business transactions 
is regarded licit until there is evidence of being illicit.39 In the sense of business 
customs, Shariah gives mankind freedom to exploit the opportunities that lie in 
such a sector, domestically or internationally, under the maxim ‘customs is an 
arbiter’,40 which is regarded as one of the sources of Islamic legal formation. 
 
                                            
34 Malik M Hafeez, ‘Evolution of Corporate Entity in Islamic and Western Perspective’ 
South East Asia Journal of Contemporary Business’ (2013) 2 (3) Economics and 
Law 77. 
35 The discussion on the body parts are that considered as aurah and the concept of 
dressing manners could be traced in Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyah (2nd 
edn, 1986) vol 6 128. 
36 Engku Rabiah Adawiyyah Engku Ali, ‘Riba and Its Prohibition in Islam’ 
<http://www.maybank2u.com.my/iwov-resources/islamic-
my/document/my/en/islamic/scoe/knowledge-centre/research-paper/riba-and-its-
prohibition.pdf> accessed 25 April 2018. 
37 Muhammad Akram Laldin and others, Islamic Legal Maxims & Their Application on 
Islamic Finance (ISRA Publication 2013) 10. 
38 Shariah legal maxim is known as al-Qawa’id al-Fiqhiyyah is a predominant rule by 
which the ruling for particular cases can be directly known; ibid v. 
39 Munzir Kahf, ‘Islamic Banks: The Rise of a New Power Alliance of Wealth and Shariah 
Scholarship’ in CM Henry and R Wilson (eds), The Politics of Islamic Finance 
(Edinburgh University 2004) 17-36. 
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Shariah considers the need of individuals and the public accordingly. It will not 
tolerate the importance of an individual in the name of public interest as well as 
not neglecting the interest of the public over a personal matter.41 This particular 
characteristic of Shariah plays a crucial role in the development of Islamic 
financial industries in the world that tend to classify Shariah as a rigid law that 
rejects the flexibility of the industries. In this matter, Islam sees the economic 
activities as the instruments to move mankind towards prosperity; hence, creating 
economic equilibrium is essential in the eyes of Shariah. To achieve that, Shariah 
encourages fairness and justice in wealth distribution, by preventing the 
exploitation of the economic deficit units and the monopoly on the economic 
production factors by surplus economic units. At the same time, Shariah looks at 
the factors that contribute to economic instability as an illness that needs to be 
prevented from happening and cured if it has already spread into the system. 
Likewise, Shariah emphasises the importance of asset-based products, which 
are regarded as a certain and solid transaction because of the presence of the 
asset during the process.42 The presence of solid asset or the materiality43 is 
considerable as a security for the contracting parties if they decide to nullify the 
contract, in time of dispute or even when it is classified as a void. 
2.2.3 Shariah Characteristics as a Law: Maqasid Shariah 
As a law, other than being flexible in one hand and rigid in the other, Shariah also 
puts a high regard on the objective of the law derived from the sources. The 
objectives of Shariah or Maqasid Shariah as terminologically mentioned by the 
jurists, refer to the overall goals and meanings to be achieved by Shariah law 
under the principles of realisation of benefits and prevention of harm.44 In this 
vein, al-Fasi defined Maqasid Shariah as the end sought behind the enactment 
of each of Shariah law.45 His definition covers two spectrums, general objectives 
(amm) and specific objectives (khass). These objectives are achieved through a 
comprehensive understanding of the alluded meaning depicted by the texts and 
how the objective of each single law is deduced, respectively.46  
 
                                            
41 Al-Qaradawi, Madkhal li Dirasah al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (n20) 22. 
42 Karim Ginena, ‘Shariah Risk and Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks’ (2014) 14 
(1) Corporate Governance 86. 
43 Ahmad H Jum’ah, 'The Implications of Materiality concept on Accounting Practices 
and Decision Making' (2009) 5 (1) Inter Metro Business Journal 22. 
44 Under legal studies perspective, maqasid could be defined as the virtues of Shariah 
law. 
45 Alal al-Fasi, Maqasid al-Shariah al-Islamiyyah wa Makarimuha (Dar al-Gharb al-Islami 
1993) 7. 
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As said by scholars such as al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi, there are five general 
objectives of Shariah which are the preservation of faith, life, posterity, wealth 
and intellect.47 The five objectives are then categorised into three levels of 
implementation, the daruriyyat (necessities), the hajiyyat (needs), and the 
tahsiniyyat (luxuries) as firstly mentioned by al-Ghazali.48 To some extent, these 
objectives are regarded as the macro objectives that cover the whole system of 
human life. Under each general objective, there are many other specific 
objectives, possessing supportive functions to secure each element of the 
general objectives are achievable at the micro level and could cover the smallest 
part and parcel of an entire humans’ life. In other words, specific objectives are 
meant to assist the scholars to look into specific provisions to be applied for 
specific cases, so they could come up with the resolutions that uphold general 
objectives.49 In the case of Islamic finance, it is perceivable that the primary 
objective of the Shariah governance within the IFIs is to ensure Shariah 
compliance in wealth acquisition. It is in fact, the raison d’etre of the IFIs. Shariah 
compliance is the crux of wealth acquisition in Shariah law as to preserve the 
wealth and prevent it from being wasted. It is rather imperative due to the fact 
that it will determine the validity of the contract and thus the legal tittle of the 
transacting assets. Any non-compliant acquisition, will render the contract as null 
and void.  
 
Other than this, the essence of the Shariah governance arrangement is to ensure 
the value of Islamic transaction is well instilled within the IFIs. It is not merely 
about adhering to the technicality of the contract but also becoming involved with 
the objective of the Shariah law itself. By large, the objective of Shariah is to 
secure the realisation of benefit (maslahah) and the prevention of harm 
(mafsadah). In this vein, the Shariah scholars have determined that wealth is one 
of the five main necessities of human life which ought to be well preserved in the 
enactment of Shariah financial law. Therefore, it is of significance for each 
Shariah governance constituent to carry out such a duty diligently and 
responsibly so that Maqasid Shariah is achieveable. 
                                            
47 These five general objectives were suggested by al-Ghazali and al-Shatibi based on 
close observation on the texts from the Quran and the Hadith. They then ranked the 
objectives by looking at the impact of each objectives towards humans’ life 
respectively. Despite agreement between the scholars, these five objectives are not 
rigid and are open for discussion due to other variables. Many modern scholars such 
as Ibn Asyur and al-Raysuni have discussed Shariah law under maqasid approach 
to reveal the virtues of Shariah law so it would be comprehensible to modern law 
style of implementation.  
48 Audah (n 14) 3. 
49 Further discussion on the specific objectives of Shariah law will be held in Chapter 6 
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To conclude, it is conceivable that Shariah governance is about the existence of 
additional systems to ensure the compliance of the operations of the IFIs in 
Shariah matters. Shariah compliance in terms of contractual agreement seemed 
to be the main concerns of Shariah governance. However, it is worth mentioning 
that when we deal with Shariah matters in products and services, the knowledge 
of the objectives of Shariah is a crucial factor. Since composing Shariah 
resolutions is about striving for and seeking for the underpinning meanings 
behind the texts of Islamic sources, a deep understanding of the objectives of 
Shariah is inseparable from Shariah scholars who carry out such a duty.  
2.2.4 Corporations: A Shariah Perspective 
The understanding of corporation, as seen in the literature, has evolved 
simultaneously with the expansion of the corporate world, in terms of its 
objectives, functions, mechanisms and structure. Starting from the joint stock 
business activities between merchants and principals during the Middle Ages, the 
attempt to describe the relationship which existed amongst the relating parties 
has never been brought to astop.  Literally, the word corporation is derived from 
the Latin word corpus which means a group of people authorised to act as an 
individual and recognised in law as a single entity.50 Subsequently, the American 
Heritage Dictionary defines a corporation as an entity such as a business, 
municipality or organisation that involves more than one person but that has met 
the legal requirements to operate as a single person, so that it may enter into 
contracts and engages in transactions under its own identity.51 In a general 
manner, Sawyer has classified corporation as a fundraising entity by defining 
corporation as any person or group of people who turn inputs into outputs.52 
Sawyer, however, asserted that his definition is restricted to those organisations 
or individuals which produce marketable output and the exclusion of many forms 
of government activities as well.53 
 
Monks and Minow have described the corporation in a more practical way, as 
they define it as a mechanism established to allow different parties to contribute 
                                            
50 English Oxford Living Dictionary <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
corporation> accessed 210 September 2018 
51 The American Heritage Dictionary of English Language (5th edn, 2016) 
<https://www.ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?q=corporation&submit.x=43&sub
mit.y=16> accessed 25 September 2018. 
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capital, expertise, and labour, for the maximum benefit of all of them.54 This 
definition is in fact, coherent with the idea of the corporation that is simply a legal 
fictitious entity, which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships 
amongst individuals as defined by Jensen and Meckling.55 In this relationship, the 
investors ought to gain the chance to participate in a sharing profits of an 
enterprise without taking responsibility for the daily operations, whereas, the 
management get the chance to run the company without taking the responsibility 
of providing the funds. This mutual agreement is crucial for the respective parties 
as the objective of the corporation is to form a large joint stock entity to pursue 
trading and business toward maximisation of the shareholders’ value as well as 
the value of other affected stakeholders.56  
 
Historically, the significant turning point that triggered the rapid development on 
corporation was the formation of the East India Company, which was granted a 
Royal Charter in 1600, for merchants of London trading in the East Indies.57 The 
East India Company was not only representing the achievement of a joint stock 
corporation but was also the evolution of the idea of limited liability of the 
shareholders consequently throughout the centuries. Hence, according to 
Hafeez, in the nineteenth century, two developments related to the corporation, 
as well as the concept of limited liability, occurred in British corporate law: first, 
the enactment of the Joint Stock Companies Act 1844 which enacted that any 
company comprising more than twenty five members with transferable shares 
might obtain incorporation by registering a deed of settlement executed by its 
members; and second, the passing of the Limited Liability Act 1855 which 
provided limited liability to the members of a company.58 Both laws eventually 
recognised that the group of people who formed the corporation could act as one 
legal person and the shares of the corporation are transferable as well as the 
laws gave limited liability to all shareholders, whether they were involved in the 
management of the company or not.59 
                                            
54 Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (3rd edn, Blackwell Publishing 
2004) 9. 
55 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of The Firm: Managerial 
Behaviour, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 (4) Journal of Financial 
Economics 305. 
56 The question of the firm’s objective lies in between the two theories: firm should follow 
the principle of shareholder value maximisation in the long run; however, at the 
same time it should take also into account the stakeholders’ interests, which should 
be subordinated to the shareholder value maximisation objective. 
57 J Solomon, Corporate Governance and Accountability (3rd edn, John Wiley and 
Sons  2010) xxi. 
58 Hafeez (n 34) 80. 
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One of the most significant achievements of the corporation is the recognition of 
the notion of limited liability.60 Limited liability is regarded as the main feature of 
corporations that could make a corporation act as a person by law. Under the 
Limited Liability Partnerships Act 2000, limited liability is considered as a 
corporate body with a legal personality separate from that of its members.61 This 
limitation is a condition under which a partner of a business secures himself from 
bearing a loss greater than the amount he has invested in a corporation or 
partnership.62 In a bigger sence, this conception considers a corporation as a 
legal entity, which is somehow separated from the shareholders despite their 
stock ownership, hence providing a shielding condition for them in the case of 
loss and failure. At least, that is a part of the idea. Another part of this notion 
which has no less importance, is that the company could contract, employ, own 
assets, and incur liabilities, yet the shareholders are no longer responsible for the 
company’s debts.63 Moreover, the formation of an entity with a large amount of 
capital would allow them to penetrate bigger market with the higher potential of 
profits and the controlled risk could bring in better prospects of success without 
having concerns about loss of equity more than the invested amount. Limited 
liability in this part, makes it easier for a corporation to raise capitals for the 
enterprise because shareholders are assured that they will not be held personally 
liable for the corporation’s debts.64 
 
In the light of its positive impacts, Blair have identified four key functions of limited 
liability: providing continuity and a clear line of succession in property and 
contract; providing and identifying persons to serve as a central actors in carrying 
out the business activity; providing a mechanism for separating pools of assets 
belonging to the corporation from those belonging to the individuals participating 
in the enterprise; and; providing a framework for self-governance of certain 
businesses or commercial activities.65 All of these well-structured functions are 
indeed, products of a long term achievement of the idea of the corporation, and 
                                            
60 Many cases have shown that the court has been put in an exhaustive situation in order 
to pierce the corporate veil as seen in many cases such as Petrodel Resources Ltd 
v Prest [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 A.C. 415 
61 Limited Liability Partnership Act 2000. 
62 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law 
International 2002) 152. 
63 Tricker (n 32). 
64 Margaret M Blair, ‘Corporate Personhood & Corporate Persona’ (2013) 3 University 
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have been moulded since its emergence decades ago wherein the form of the 
corporation has evolved as a result.66  
2.2.4.1 Corporation: An Islamic View 
The IFIs are corporate entities offering financial products and services that 
comply with the Islamic prescriptions of doing business. It is because of that, that 
explaining the Islamic point of view in this case is not optional. Noted, the 
discussion of the conception of corporation in Islam should consist of two 
separate sub-issues, which are the status of corporation business activities from 
the Islamic perspective, and the legality of corporation as a fictitious entity under 
Shariah law. The former issue is related to the contractual form of the corporation 
and the latter issue is the key that holds the concept of limited liability as a 
corporation considered as a legal person. When a corporation is created and 
wanted to be run Islamically, these two fundamentals should be contemplated 
thoroughly in order to enlighten its permissibility under the persepctive of Shariah 
law. As mentioned by Mervyn, the fundamental difference between a legal 
structure that is incorporated and one that is not is the fact that the corporation is 
given contractual rights, just like an individual under law.67 Therefore, the 
recognition of the corporation as a person under a Shariah legal perspective is 
essential as without it IFIs will face a great challenge in the modern and dynamic 
economic system.68 
 
According to the Islamic legal maxim, the judgment is to be based on knowledge 
and understanding.69 To acquire the required understanding, scholars scrutinise 
the surrounding issues related to a concept, to anticipate the connections 
between the concept and the provisions from Shariah sources. It is perceivable 
that Shariah law is regulated after a deep contemplation and adequate 
interpretation on the subject matter, which plays a vital role in Shariah law 
literature, as almost every topic will address a thorough conceptual definition. 
 
It is worth noting that the development of the Islamic business system could be 
considered as lost from the sight of modern civilisation after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Caliph Empire. Mervyn claimed that the economic organisation and 
                                            
66 The evolution of the corporation has formed a complex ownership structure which 
originated from the concept of limited liability; See also Tricker (n 32). 
67 Mervyn K Lewis, 'Islamic Corporate Governance' (n 4). 
68 Maria Bhatti, ‘Development in Legal Issues if Corporate Governance in Islamic 
Finance’ (2009) 25 (1) Journal of Economic and Administrative Sciences 68. 
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commercial practices were inherited from Western colonial powers and therefore, 
the Islamic legal system lost its intellectual legacy and scholarship, instead it was 
left to the masses to interpret according to their own whims.70 Therefore, to 
understand the relationship that exists between the contractual parties within the 
corporation and the idea of limited liability under Islamic law, a journey should be 
taken to address the connection points, through the Islamic literature pertaining 
to corporations.  
 
In terms of contractual form, a corporation with a joint stock and partnership 
contract share has its similarity with Islamic contractual agreements which are 
called musyarakah71 and mudarabah.72The application of musyarakah and 
mudarabah are widely known as among the main underlying contracts implied in 
the Islamic world’s trading system. The jurists reported that the Prophet, His 
companions and generations after had entered into such contractual obligations 
which allowed them to trade either domestically or internationally.73 
 
Musharakah is defined as an arrangement between two or more people to do 
some type of work in order to make profit and such profit is distributed among the 
contracting parties as a dividend rather than salary.74 Under a musharakah 
agreement, the shareholders contribute their capital to a partnership to initiate a 
business entity called shirkah (company). The partners of the musharakah will 
name the amils or managers, who are capable and will be responsible for the 
shirkah, and who could be amongst the shareholders and, under some schools 
of fiqh, will enjoy a salary, along with the dividend.75 The profit and loss will be 
divided and distributed based on the share proportionately or with pre-agreed 
terms by the shareholders. The musyarakah agreement is also categorised into 
                                            
70 Bhatti (n 68). 
71 Musharakah refers to the partnership between two or more parties, which may take 
effect through contractual relationship or by operation of Islamic law, whereby all 
contracting parties will share the profit and bear loss from the partnership. 
72 Mudarabah is a contract between a rabbul mal and a mudarib under which the rabbul 
mal provides capital to be managed by the mudarib and any profit generated from 
the capital is shared between rabbul mal and mudarib according to mutual agreed 
profit-sharing ratio whilst financial losses are borne by the rabbul mal provided that 
such losses are not due to the mudarib’s misconduct, negligence or breach of 
specified terms. 
73 Wahbah al-Zuhaily Fiqh al-Islamic wa Adillatuh (2nd edn, Darul Fikr 1985) vol 5 836. 
74 Hafeez (n 34). 
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four different types; the syirkah inan, syirkah mufawadah, shirkah amal and 
shirkah wujuh.76 
 
Another form of company in Islam is the mudarabah based company. Some jurist 
such as al-Siddiqqi and al-Zuhaily, justified mudarabah as one of the type of 
shirkah77, whilst others formulated mudarabah as a stand-alone contract.  
Mudarabah is a contract whereby the principal who known as rabbulmal 
(principal) provides capital and the other party known as the mudarib (manager) 
contributes his labour.78 In contrast to musharakah, the manager of a mudarabah 
agreement is an unconnected person who will enjoy the benefit of profit if the 
venture succeeds and will not receive any financial benefit in the case of loss.79 
The real world application of mudaradah could be implemented in a form similar 
to today’s joint-stock company with limited liability wherein the traders contribute 
their capital in stocks and delegate their business activities to be executed by the 
appointed managers. The part that distinguishes those two contracts is the 
authority of the manager. The mudarabah manager has complete control to daily 
activities of the shirkah and the shareholders are not allowed to interfere. On the 
other hand, the musharakah manager, who could be among the shareholders, 
cannot avoid other shareholders from joining the management team of the 
shirkah if they see necessary.  
 
These partnership forms are not alien to the conventional corporate entities. The 
previous implementations of joint stock and partnership in European countries 
usually involved a merchant sea captain and one or more passive partners who 
would provide financing for a fleet of ships that would sail to some faraway place 
to purchase spices or other goods.80 On this level, the underlying contract 
between the merchant and the principle, which normally a joint stock company, 
is in resemblance with mudarabah agreement.81 When the ship returned, the 
                                            
76 All of these types of shirkah will be discussed further in Chapter 5. 
77 Muhammad Nijatullah Siddiqi Banking Without Interest (The Islamic Foundation, 
Leicester 1983) 15; Al-Zuhaily, Fiqh al-Islamic wa Adillatuh (n 73). 
78 International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, ISRA Compendium for 
Islamic Financial Terms (ISRA 2011) 288. 
79 In terms of salary, managers still enjoy a flexible payment based on generic formula 
used in the market; Zuhaily, Fiqh al-Islamic wa Adillatuh (n 73). 
80 Franklin A Gevurtz, ‘The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors’ (2004) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=546296> accessed 25 April 2018. 
81 However, the Islamic contracts are to some extent stagnant in terms of its modern 
develoment. Most cases exhibits their classical form and if we try to make 
comparison with modern conventional contracts along with their complexities, the 
Islamic forms are rather simplistic in many respects. See also Timur Kuran, The 
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merchandise acquired would be sold, the revenues would be divided and the 
partnership dissolved82 which coincides with the ultimate function of mudarabah. 
 
In terms of modern applications of mudarabah, Al-Zuhaily mentioned the potential 
diversities for modern corporate models to accommodate the ideal models 
proposed in the Islamic literature and previous applications.83 The attention lies 
on the distinguished features of both models, in order to find out their 
permissibility in Islamic law, since the Islamic legal maxim of contracts connotes 
that greater weight is given to intention and meaning than words and forms or 
substance over form.84 Eventually, the default status of Islamic law of any new 
developments in contractual formation is permissible which is rather flexible and 
open for innovation. However, another notion useful to clarify here is this; 
musharakah and mudarabah are actually the method of how Islamic literatures 
define the meaning of corporation itself, whereby the understanding of the 
corporation in Islam should not only pointing to its legitimation from the Shariah 
point of view but also to the readiness of Islam as a religion that promulgates the 
idea of economic prosperity and best codes of conduct in business activities. 
 
In terms of the concept of a legal person, the main issue is the legality of the 
concept that allows a corporation to hold its own liability within the Islamic 
perspective. According to Hassan,85 contemporary Muslim scholars such as 
Audah, Zarqa and Hasanuzzaman have accepted the concept known as 
shahsiyyah iktibariyyah (legal personal) based on principles of qiyas (analogical 
reasoning), istihsan (equity in Islamic law), masalih mursalah (consideration of 
public interest) and zimmah.86 Whilst advocating the legality of a legal person 
holding liability in Islamic law, Hasanuzzaman also mentioned the disapproval of 
the concept.87 Similarly, Siddiqi proposed, in parallel with the classical model of 
mudarabah, that the liability of a shareholder of the Islamic bank should be 
unlimited as if the bank suffers losses its capital is insufficient to pay its liabilities, 
the deficiency must be met by the partners from their personal assets.88 However, 
Hasanuzzaman has argued that limiting the liability of shareholders of a joint-
                                            
82 Blair, ‘Corporate Personhood & Corporate Persona’ (n 64). 
83 Al-Zuhaily, Fiqh al-Islamic wa Adillatuh (n 73). 
84 Laldin and others, Islamic Legal Maxims & Their Application on Islamic Finance (n 37) 
46. 
85 Zulkifli Hassan, ‘Regulatory Framework of Shariah Governance System in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK’ (2010) 3 (2) Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies 82. 
86 Zimmah is a capacity to hold an obligation or to be obliged; Al-Jurjani (n 16) 93. 
87 SM Hasanuzzaman, ‘Limited Liability of Shareholders: An Islamic Perspective’ (1989) 
28 (4) Islamic Studies 353. 
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stock company does not seem to be in conflict with any legal rule in Islam which 
would only require a careful examination of the legal position of a joint-stock 
company.89 
 
Likewise, a corporation’s legal personality could be compared to the existing 
Islamic financial bodies and activities such as baitulmal90 and waqf.91 Usmani, as 
one of the most prominent supporters of this notion, has appointed baitulmal and 
waqf as the Islamic version of legal entity. Usmani has justified his argument as 
firstly, if a property is purchased with the income of a waqf, the purchased 
property cannot become a part of the waqf automatically. The property so 
purchased shall be treated as property owned by the waqf. So, it is clearly meant 
that a waqf, like a natural person, can own a property.92 
 
Secondly, the jurists such as al-Mawardi has clearly mentioned that the money 
given to a mosque as a donation does not form part of the waqf, but it passes 
into the ownership of the mosque. As for the baitulmal, accroding to al-Sarakhsi, 
in the case if the head of an Islamic state needs money to give salaries to his 
army, but he finds no money in the kharaj department of the baitulmal he can give 
salaries from the sadaqah department, but the amount so taken from the sadaqah 
department shall be deemed as a debt on the kharaj department. In this regard, 
Usmani has argued that following on from this, not only the baitulmal but also the 
different departments therein can borrow and advance loans to each other. The 
liability of these loans does not lie on the head of state but on the concerned 
department of baitulmal. It means that each department of baitulmal is a separate 
entity where with the capacity to advance and borrow money, that may be treated 
a debtor or a creditor, and hence can sue and be sued in the same manner as a 
juridical person can.93  
 
The argument that a corporation is a model resembling the waqf and bailtulmal 
institutions has similarities with the origin of corporations in the West. The early 
corporations were formed with charters granted by the local lords or kings for the 
                                            
89 Hasanuzzaman (n 87); He referred to the Islamic legal maxim ‘profits are concomitant 
to risk’ and mentioned the case of renting out one’s house on the condition that the 
tenant would be liable to the value of the house if it is damaged to flood or 
earthquake, which is unlawful in Islam, whereas, the owner who is earning its rent 
has to bear the damage. 
90 Baitulmal is a public treasury of the Islamic government. See also ISRA (n 78) 222. 
91 It is to make a property the inalienable property of its owner while making its yield and 
usufruct a charitable donation to specified beneficiaries. 
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purposes of governing municipalities, churches and religious institutions in 
Europe during the Middle Ages.94 The idea of the granted charters was to give 
the institutions the entity shielding to hold ownership, power to sue and be sued, 
and be separated from the people who work as managers. After the authority of 
the monarch and parliament were no longer recognised in granting the charter, 
the task was taken over by state legislators, and thus, more different types of 
corporations were formed and in greater frequency than in the time of the King 
and Parliament.95 
 
On the other hand, Zahraa and Hasanuzzaman proposed that limited liability is 
recognised as zimmah in Islamic applications.96 Zimmah is a characteristic of an 
independent person, either as a real person or a legal person, such as baitulmal 
and waqf.97 According to Al-Kabashi, the term zimmah is synonymous with 
ahliyyah (capacity), which both represent the entities that have rights and bear 
responsibilities and obligations.98 The conception of zimmah is crucial in the 
application of Shariah law. Zahraa has asserted that Shariah scholars attribute 
the concept of zimmah to certain entities other than human beings such as waqf, 
baitulmal, schools, orphanages, hospitals, mosques and other charitable 
institutions and furthermore, modern Islamic scholars extended the concept of 
zimmah to commercial corporations as well.99 He added, in the case of waqf, the 
administrator of a waqf should act as an agent or representative worker on behalf 
of the waqf business for the benefit of its beneficiaries which resembles the 
relationship between managers and principals of a business corporation. All 
powers, rights and obligations of the administrators are designed to achieve that 
end.100  
 
To conclude the discussion, Shariah law does recognise a company as a fictitious 
entity. It can sue and be sued, own and transfer the ownership. This premise is 
vital to the body of knowledge of Shariah governance. Commencing from it, the 
question on the relationship between the IFIs’ stakeholders would be more clearly 
                                            
94 Blair, ‘Corporate Personhood & Corporate Persona’ (n 64). 
95 Philip I Blumberg, The Multinational Challenges to Corporation Law: The Search for 
New Corporate Personality (OUP 1993) 10. 
96 Mahdi Zahraa, ‘Legal Personality in Islamic View’ (1995) 10 (3) ALQ 193; 
Hasanuzzaman, (n 87). 
97 Al-Mausu’ah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyah (2nd edn, 1983) vol 21 276. 
98 Zurina Zainal and others, ‘Separate Legal Entity under Shariah Law and its Application 
on Islamic Banking in Malaysia: A Note’ (2009) 6 (2) International Journal of Banking 
and Finance 139. 
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answered. The person responsible for any actions or inactions of the Islamic 
corporations is also determinable. Under this purview, rather than personalising 
the IFIs’ directors as the agents or amils who work for the shareholders or rabb 
mal, the real agent is actually the respective IFI itself. Other than that, the 
shareholders of the IFIs too should not be regarded as the ‘owners’ of the IFIs 
but rather the ‘owners of shares’. 
2.2.5 Definition of Governance 
The word governance in Shariah governance terminology refers to the 
conventional definition of corporate governance. The proposed term of Shariah 
governance has signalled that the fundamental of Shariah governance concept 
is not a contrarian nor impairs the fundamental discussions of the corporate 
governance. Shariah governance ought to be an evolution of corporate 
governance and would be regarded as a contribution of Islamic literature to the 
body of knowledge of corporate governance transcending religious boundaries.  
Literally, the term governance derives from the Latin word gubernare, meaning 
to steer, usually applied to the steering of a ship, which implies that corporate 
governance involves the function of direction rather than control.101 In this matter, 
the Oxford English Dictionary provides a wider meaning of governance as to 
include any ‘act or manner of governing’.102 Minhas mentioned that governance 
is a method which an organisation adopts to ensure that components of the 
organisation follow the set rules, regulation, policies and processes.103 All these 
definitions present a wide meaning of governance as the term may cover areas 
of politics, economics, social justice and public administration. Put differently, the 
term governance in a sense means the style or way an organisation, institution 
or corporation is guided, steered and controlled. Meanwhile, our focus for this 
research is on the corporate governance system of business entities, with a 
specific attention in particular to the IFIs. 
 
Technically, Sir Adrian Cadbury, as the chairman of the Cadbury Committee, 
defined corporate governance as a system by which companies are directed and 
controlled.104 Pertaining to this, corporate governance could be characterised as 
a system wherein shareholders ought to have control, managers have a fiduciary 
duty to serve shareholder interests alone, and the objective of the firm ought to 
                                            
101 Solomon (n 57) xix. 
102 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/governance  accessed 10 September 
2018. 
103 Imran Minhas, ‘Shariah Governance Model (SGM) and Its Four Pillars’ (2012) Journal 
of Islamic Banking and Finance 30. 
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be the maximisation of the shareholders’ wealth.105 In order to achieve the 
aforementioned characteristics, corporate governance has to deal with those 
legal and organisational structures that look after the internal integrity of a 
corporation,106 to maximise the value of the shareholders within the border 
precept by the shareholders as the real owners of the corporation. This spectrum 
of definition, which basically lies on the shareholder primacy theory, narrowing 
the focus group only to the shareholders, is concerned with the directors of the 
corporation. The upshot is that it could increase the efficiency of the corporate 
governance system in the light that the directors can work more efficiently 
because they are focusing only on one objective and the interests of one type of 
investor.107 
 
In a similar notion, the OECD stated that corporate governance is a set of 
relationships between a company’s management, its board, its shareholders and 
other stakeholders which provides the structure through which the objectives of 
the company are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring 
performance are determined.108 The OECD has come with a functional 
definition109 and this definition too describes a wider focus group considering the 
importance of various stakeholders rather than focusing on the shareholders as 
stated in the definition given by the Cadbury Report.  
 
In the banking sector, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
described corporate governance as the manner in which the business and affairs 
of individual institutions are governed by their board of directors and senior 
management affecting how a bank sets its corporate objectives, daily business, 
and interests of the stakeholder, to align corporate activities to operate in a safe 
and sound manner and to comply with laws and regulations, and to protect the 
interests of depositors.110 While focusing on a particular sector, the BCBS 
concentrates more on the fiduciary duty of the directors and their definition also 
includes a few other stakeholders that need to be put into consideration in the 
                                            
105 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, 'Stakeholders Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economics System' (2004) 11(2) Islamic Economics Studies 43. 
106 Muhammad Ziaul Houge, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic Perspective’ (2006) 6 (2) 
International Journal of Business in Society 116. 
107 Andrew Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and 
Sustainability Model’ (2008) 71 (5) Modern Law Review 663. 
108 OECD, G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (OECD 2015) 9. 
109 Thomas Clark, Theories of Corporate Governance in Thomas Clarke (eds), Theories 
of Corporate Governance The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance 
(New York, Routledge 2004) 1. 
110 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, (Guidelines Corporate Governance 
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decision-making in the boardroom. The BCBS expands the term ‘stakeholders’ 
to include employees, customers, depositors, suppliers, supervisors, government 
and the community.111 Accordingly, the BCBS also advocates a governance 
structure composed of a board of directors and senior management.112 Indeed, 
the more the players are listed in the definitions, the wider the concern lies and 
by that there are a wider range of stakeholders that will be involved in the 
particular corporate governance system and the question related to the efficiency 
will be more complicated. As stated by Grais and Pellegrini, Tirole conveys that 
relying on enlarging management’s fiduciary duty to various stakeholders may 
leave it with too much power to pursue its own objectives.113  
 
According to these definitions, there is no single definition that has gained 
consensus among researchers to interpret the real meaning of corporate 
governance. This is because the development of the corporate governance 
corpus has been affected by theories from numerous disciplines including 
finance, economics, accounting, legal studies, and management and 
organisation behaviour.114 That is one of the reasons why the subject may be 
treated in a narrow or a broad manner, depending on the view point of the 
interpreters, whether he or she is a policy-maker, practitioner, researcher or 
theorist. The research in this field is still open for new discoveries and 
expansions. Seemingly, the existing definitions of corporate governance fall 
along the spectrum, with a narrow view on one end and more exclusive, broad 
views placed on the other.115 This spectrum stands on how to define the 
relationship between the managers and the shareholders as well as their 
relationship with other stakeholders. In this relationship, the directors tend to gain 
more authority in decision-making and less responsibility for the consequences, 
while the shareholders as well as other stakeholders are trying to obtain more 
control and security over their investment and interest, under the scope of 
fiduciary duty. It is broadly, as defined by Dyck, a complex set of socially defined 
                                            
111 Zulkifli Hassan, ‘Shariah Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK’ (DPhil Thesis, Durham University 2011) 14. 
112 Alnasser (n 1). 
113 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, ‘Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options’ (2006) World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper 4052 12. 
114 Hafeez (n 34) ; Clark Theories of Corporate Governance (n 107). 
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constraints that affect the willingness to make investments in corporations in 
exchange for promises.116 
 
Explaining corporate governance in the context of the financial services sector, 
Arun and Turner have mentioned the importance of ensuring capital and 
investment returns and protecting depositors as well as shareholders.117 In a 
broader manner, corporate governance in financial institutions to some extent is 
different to that of other types of business organisation, as it involves a larger 
group of stakeholders. With this position, Zulkifly asserted that financial 
institutions are much more regulated as compared with other commercial 
entities.118 Nevertheless, despite the diversity of the definitions of various bodies, 
the key role of corporate governance is still at a similar notion which is derived 
from the underlying principle of assuring the economic well-being of the whole 
community on the basis of universal brotherhood, justice, mutual accountability, 
truthfulness and transparency, protection of minorities, adequate disclosure and 
equitable distribution of wealth.119 Hence, it can be concluded here that corporate 
governance is a set of mechanisms that help in confirming, with fair and just 
dealing with all the stakeholders and to strengthening transparency and 
accountability.120 
2.2.6 Shariah Governance Definition 
Since the emergence of the Shariah governance corpus is rather in its infancy, 
there is no consensus definition to interpret the whole concept of Shariah 
governance. Thus far, the IFSB is the only standard setter that provides an 
operative definition of the Shariah governance. Others, such as Accounting and 
Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and Bank Negara 
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Malaysia (BNM) who have also issued their Shariah governance codes, 
happened to apply a similar definition to that given by the IFSB rather than 
proposing their own interpretation.  
 
According to the IFSB, a Shariah governance system refers to the set of 
institutional and organisational arrangements through which IFIs ensure that 
there is effective independent oversight of Shariah compliance.121 Clearly, 
Shariah governance could be an attribute to the job of setting the direction122 
which corresponds with the function of conventional corporate governance. 
However, IFSB’s definition has asserted the distinguished feature of Shariah 
governance is it should be focusing on how to verify the Islamic business entity 
activities run with the adherence to Shariah law. This understanding is in coherent 
with the description proposed by Ahmed. He described Shariah governance as 
the structures and processes in place to ensure that principles and requirements 
of Islamic law are fulfilled in all contractual and operational aspects of the IFIs 
from the perspectives of different stakeholders.123 
 
In order to carry out the required task, the IFIs must ensure the existence of a 
mechanism that will deal with Shariah issues and its must be administered by 
Shariah experts. Therefore, a Shariah committee has been introduced into the 
IFIs’ corporate governance structures, consisting of a combination of experts in 
Shariah, business and legal matters as practised by most of the IFIs around the 
globe.124 This internal organ can be constituted by a simple Shariah committee 
or extended to an internal Shariah entity composing a Shariah committee and an 
internal Shariah review unit or department to support the Shariah committee in 
performing its function.125 Since Shariah is the backbone and foundation for the 
existence of the Islamic banking and finance industry, Islamic finance experts 
                                            
121 IFSB, (Guiding Principles in Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering 
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assert Shariah governance should be considered as the single most important 
distinction between a conventional and an Islamic financial institution.126  
 
The definition given by the IFSB also illustrates the extensive duties that need to 
be carried out by the Shariah committee. It is observed that the prominent duty 
of the Shariah committee is to oversee and supervise the IFIs on Shariah 
compliance; as such, their competency is essential to form a robust committee. 
More importantly, the existence of a Shariah committee is crucial to the Shariah 
governance structure as the highest internal authoritative organ in ensuring 
Shariah compliance.127  
 
Looking to articulate what Shariah governance truly is, some researchers such 
as Muneeza and Hassan have argued that Shariah governance is an Islamic 
version of corporate governance.128 On the other hand, is it lso believed that it is 
how the conventional corporate governance with the same background and 
foundation works in an Islamic corporation, which has triggered contradictions 
and issues to be addressed to ensure the business runs Islamically.129 Muneeza 
and Hassan also suggested that Shariah governance is a governance system 
which derives its rules from the sources of Islamic law.130.Similarly, Hassan and 
Bhatti mentioned that the main difference between Shariah governance and its 
counterpart is that it uses the premise of Islamic socio-scientific epistemology 
premised on the divine oneness of God.131 
 
The crucial parts of this distinctive discussion are on the underlying worldview of 
both Shariah governance and the corporate governance, and how the goals of 
the corporations should be organised and achieved by the governance 
constituents. In this regard, Choudhury and Hoque described the primary 
epistemological worldview of Shariah governance as the oneness of God.132 As 
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asserted by Muneeza and Hassan, a corporation needs to have a Shariah-
compliant corporate governance structure in order for it to be an Islamic 
corporation owing to the fact that the concern of Shariah governance is on the 
religious aspects and the Islamicity of the activities of the IFIs. 
 
Furthermore, Lewis has described the meaning of Shariah governance by 
emphasising the essential art of decision making in governance, regardless of 
the theories and its applications, in three dimensions of decision-making,133 which 
are “by whom”, “for whom”, and “with what” or “to whom”. Explaining the “by 
whom”, he correlated the concept of shura or consultative council, quoting the 
reasons behind the shuratic decision-making process of which is it will promote 
the Islamic precept of justice by participating with whose most affected by the 
decision. “For whom” is considered straightforward in Islam as the starting points 
are from Allah. Meanwhile, hisbah as a core element of Islamic corporate 
governance, regarded as an institution that will safeguard the way towards Allah. 
Last but not least, is the “with what or to whom”, which is the process of religious 
supervision as a guarantee that all of the enterprise’s operations, contracts and 
procedures conform to the Islamic code.134 
 
Another perspective observed from the literature indicates that Shariah 
governance is a way for conventional corporate governance operates under the 
Islamic framework. Haqqi and Minhas have concluded that Shariah corporate 
governance is simply the alignment of corporate governance according to the 
Islamic principles.135 Uniquely, this approach has a clearer theoretical 
understanding since it has similarities of characteristics overview which only 
differs in term of a broader stakeholder participation. As the conventional 
corporate governance seems to be upholding the shareholder supremacy, the 
Shariah governance system is arguably a stakeholder-oriented model where 
governance structure and process, at system and corporation level, protect the 
rights of stakeholders who are exposed to any risk as a result of a firm’s 
activities.136 At some point, it is preferred as the way in which the boards oversee 
the running of a company by its managers, and how board members are, in turn, 
accountable to shareholders, stakeholders and the company.137 The 
accountability of Shariah governance elements are not only to the stakeholders 
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as enlisted traditionally but to the Divine as the Islamic law maker or Shariah 
itself. 
2.2.7 Overview of Islamic Financial Institutions 
An Islamic Financial Institution (IFI) refers to an institution that offers Islamic 
financial services, and includes finance houses that offer provide commercial and 
investment services.138 According to the IMF, Islamic finance represents the 
provision of financial services in accordance with Shariah.139 Islamic finance is a 
system that reflects financial business operated in adherence with the principles 
of Shariah140, which consist of the prohibition of interest141 (riba), excessive 
uncertainty (gharar)142 and gambling (maysir).143 This mode of financing system 
could be categorised as Shariah-compliant and Shariah-based.144 The most 
important part of this system is that the Islamic financial system promotes profit-
sharing in the conduct of banking business as well as prohibiting paying or 
receiving interest in any transaction as Shariah does not recognise interest.145 
Moreover, all transactions must be underpinned by real economic activities, and 
there must also be a sharing of risks in economic transactions.146 If the IFIs 
operate in the same society where conventional financial institutions are 
operating, they will correspondingly perform all those functions which are 
expected from a financial institution.147 The two systems are, however, 
philosophically diverse.  
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140 Jordan Islamic Bank (Annual Report 2015) 7; BIMB (Annual Report 2015) 9. 
141 There was a debate as to whether riba relates to interest or usury, there now seems 
to be a consensus of opinion among Islamic scholars that the term extends to all 
form of interest; See also Mervyn K Lewis and Latifa M Algoud Islamic Banking 
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In terms of business relationships, IFIs are distinguished from their conventional 
counterparts. The services provided by the conventional financial system, 
particularly conventional banks, rely on taking deposits from, and providing loans 
to, the customers. Therefore, the contractual relationship between banker and	
customers is as lenders and borrowers. The key aspect of conventional banking 
is the giving or receiving of interest, which is strictly prohibited by Shariah. On the 
other hand, the IFIs relationships with their depositors and other customers are 
based on partnership, whereby the main contractual agreement involved 
between those parties is on profit-lost sharing.148  
 
In terms of services and products, the IFIs introduced alternatives to interest-
based services and products as offered by the conventional financial institutions. 
Siddiqi distinguished the services offered by the IFIs into three categories: 
services which the IFIs renders on fee, commission or on fixed charges; 
investment of capital on the principles of partnership or mudarabah; and; free or 
uncharged services.149 In the same vein, the IMF mentioned that the products 
offered by the IFIs as classified by Hussain150 and others into three broad 
categories as well: 
a. Debt-like financing structured as sales, which could be sales with mark-up 
and deferred payments (murabahah) or purchases with deferred delivery 
of the products (salam contract for basic products and istisna’ contract for 
manufactured products), and lease (ijarah) with different options to buy. 
Pure lending is allowed only when benevolent (qard hasan) which is often 
used for current deposits. 
 
b. Profit-and-loss-sharing like financing with two modalities: (i) profit-sharing 
and loss-bearing (mudarabah)151 whereby the financier (investor or bank) 
provides capital and the beneficiary provides labour and skills. Profits are 
shared, but losses would be borne by the financier who does not have the 
right to interfere in the management of the financed operation, unless 
negligence, misconduct, or breach of contract can be proven; and (ii) pure 
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profit-and loss-sharing (musharakah)152 where the two parties have equity-
like financing of the project and would share profits and losses. 
 
c. Services, such as safe-keeping contracts (wadi’ah)153 as for current 
deposits, or agency contracts (wakalah),154 which are also increasingly 
used for money market transactions. 
 
The model of the Islamic financing system seems to be accepted by the 
customers and has gained its popularity. Historically, as could be witnessed from 
the last few decades, the IFIs have experienced escalated and constant growth. 
According to the IFSB, the assets of IFIs have reached double-digit rates during 
the past decade, from about USD 200 billion in 2003 to USD 1.6 trillion at the end 
of 2012155 and USD1.89 trillion at the end of 2016156. In 2017, the Islamic financial 
market passed the USD 2 trillion mark.157 ICD-Thompson Reuters predicted that 
this market would be growing up to USD 3.7 trillion by 2022.158  
 
Not only have IFIs shown a promising strength in growth, it also proved to be 
resilient in facing the world financial instability throughout the recent decade.159 
Nonetheless, despite excellent achievement, the plunge in the oil price has 
resulted in the volatile performance of the IFIs as most of the main IFIs players 
such as Iran (37.3% of global Islamic banking sectors), Saudi (19%) and Malaysia 
(9.3%) are oil-producing nations. Furthermore, downwardly a revised economic 
growth outlook, geopolitical conflicts, exchange-rate depreciations and an assets 
sell-off spree in emerging markets have also played a role in creating more 
challenges to the stability of this sector.160 
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To wrap up, Shariah governance is a corporate governance system peculiar to 
the Islamic corporation offering Shariah-compliant products and services. This 
governance arrangement plays the role of an assurance to the stakeholders that 
the IFIs are operating in accordance with Shariah precepts. In this notion, a 
Shariah committee, which consists of a group of Shariah scholars, was 
introduced within the IFI organisational structure. This board, acting as an 
advisory board will evaluate the products and services before its execution in 
case of any non-compliant aspects due to the Shariah rulings. The existence of 
such a committee is a crucial evidence of the IFIs’ endeavour to ensure the 
adherence of their products and services accordingly with their underlying 
principles. 
2.3 The Objectives of Shariah Governance 
Broadly speaking, the objectives of Shariah governance are not in contradiction 
with conventional corporate governance as practised by various corporations. 
Concurrently with its counterparts, the Shariah governance system plays a pivotal 
role in enhancing stakeholders’ confidence by promoting transparency and 
accountability in governing corporations. The only characteristic that differs 
between the systems is that, Shariah governance is a system that upholds the 
Islamic values of doing business. It is also in fact promoting independence and 
competency. Therefore, to understand this notion, there are three main objectives 
needing to be addressed: to ensure Shariah compliance, to optimise corporation 
value within the Islamic perspective and to ascertain corporate sustainability.  
 
Firstly, to ensure Shariah compliance, Shariah governance is a safeguarding 
system to ensure that the IFIs will always comply with the Shariah requirements 
in all parts of its operations, as per se, compliance with the Shariah requirements 
is what differentiates IFIs from their conventional counterparts.161 The most 
important mission for the IFIs is to meet stakeholders’ wishes in conducting their 
business so it is done in accordance with Shariah principles.162 Without a clear 
objective that appreciates the value of the teaching of Islam, the tenets of Islam 
would only be put as one of the business strategies, and may not be considered 
as a fundamental guidance to steer the direction of the IFIs. Technically, Shariah 
governance addresses the governance structure of the IFIs, and its functionality 
in the way to ensure Shariah compliance. To execute the said duty, a Shariah 
committee is set up to oversee the IFIs and certify the transactions.163 On top of 
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that, the Shariah committee is also advising the board of directors in Shariah 
matters, endorsing and validating relevant documentation pertaining to the 
products and services as well as the internal policies and manuals and marketing 
advertisements164. 
 
Secondly, to optimise IFIs’ corporate value Islamically. Economically, the IFIs are 
money generating bodies, similar to their conventional counterparts, but run 
based on the Islamic teachings. That is what gives them a unique interpretation 
of how a business entity should be governed. Other than that, the IFIs are mainly 
fashioned like the conventional financial institutions in many ways.165 Most 
importantly, the economic propeller of the IFIs is generated from an Islamic 
worldview. Under this worldview, the IFIs see the wealth as a trust handed over 
by God to humans to manage on His behalf. Hence, it should be acquired, 
managed and transacted in adherence with the law of the Owner.166 Additionally, 
Islam sees economic activities as instruments to serve the needs of society. This, 
to some extent seems to contradict capitalism, which puts the focus on wealth 
maximisation. On achieving their covenant feature, the IFIs requires a better 
preference on Shariah governance as the economic justice promulgated by Islam 
is also urges for fair distribution and prescribes a certain level of ethical codes. 
The final objective of those is to provide equal treatment for the deficit and surplus 
units of the economy. In fact, it is the duty of each Shariah governance organs to 
search for this economic equilibrium, so it could gain the sought-after 
stakeholders’ confidence. 
 
The third objective is to ascertain corporate sustainability.  It is noteworthy that it 
is a crucial responsibility of the directors to ascertain that the IFIs could sustain 
themeselves in the longest run possible. In the light of the Maqasid Shariah, IFIs 
ought to preserve the generated wealth and prevent it from any harm, so it could 
serve the ummah as stakeholders. Under the purview of this research, it could 
be done by adopting the principles of Shariah governance. In this regard, Minhas 
has suggested that the provision of adequate resources, system procedures, 
infrastructure and code of ethics for acceptance of business and its legitimacy 
according to Shariah governance entirely depends on the management.167 In 
terms of other Shariah governance organs, such as the Shariah committee, they 
are in need of having a sound and prudent standard operating system to tackle 
                                            
164 ibid 
165 Grais and Pellegrini (n 113). 
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multiple events that could jeopardise the IFIs’ corporate sustainability.168 Effective 
management responsibilities in providing adequate resources and capable 
manpower support to the function are involved in the implementation of Shariah 
governance.169 However, providing proper policies and systems will be 
inadequate if they are not implemented and supervised positively.170 The failure 
in governing this aspect could be disastrous to the IFIs as they would suffer the 
risks more than their counterparts would, the Shariah risk. Furthermore, this 
aspect of Shariah governance might well be the catalyst required by the IFIs to 
promote transparency and avoid mismanagement, especially on Shariah matters. 
  
As a conclusion, the objective of the Shariah governance is to optimise the value 
and to ascertain the sustainability of the IFIs in a way that comply with Shariah 
law. This is the ground that lies as the covenant of Shariah governance discourse 
which is meeting the need of today’s stakeholders without comprimising the 
future stakeholders in economic, environmental and social aspect.171 To some 
extent, it has similarities to the conventional corporate objective with a slight 
diversification. It is done in that way in order to demonstrate that this corpus of 
knowledge is not a complete stranger to the existing corporate governance body 
of knowledge. However, as would be repeatedly emphasised in this research, 
Shariah compliance is what fashions the IFIs corporate objectives under the 
Shariah governance flagship.  
2.4 The Need to a Robust Shariah Governance for the IFIs 
The hard experience learned from the global financial crisis has shown the need 
to develop and implement a comprehensive, uniform and globally accepted 
regulatory and supervisory framework.172 As for the IFIs, this framework is 
translated into the need for a good corporate governance system that represents 
a robust and resilient system. Good governance is termed as corporate 
governance when a business entity is operated, regulated and controlled by the 
well-designed risk management policies, processes, corporate regulations, rules 
and laws that lead the entity to achieve its ultimate goals.173 Since the emergence 
of the discipline, three decades ago, the discussions have focussed on the 
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understanding of the corporate problems in order to introduce improved 
mechanisms. Although the solutions come up from diverse approaches, the 
objective remains in a consensus alignment. In this notion, it is imperative to note 
that the Shariah governance is not in contradiction to the existing discipline. The 
only difference occurs within the question of ‘how’, which has created a unique 
approach guided by the Islamic tenets. In this sense, Shariah governance would 
be regarded as the brain of the Islamic financial industry.174 For the IFIs, there 
are many reasons why the need of Shariah governance is crucial, which are as 
follows: 
a. Ensuring Accountability and Transparency 
Accountability and transparency are likely to be the products of good corporate 
governance and seem to be considered as the benchmark sought by the 
stakeholders. The importance of transparency has been widely recognised by 
both academics and regulators, resulting in numerous rules and regulations being 
introduced over time to ensure timely and reliable disclosure of financial 
information, creating standards to which companies must adhere with.175 Many 
corporations have put their efforts into strengthening the governance system in 
order to achieve a certain level of accountability and transparency. It is argued 
that adherence to corporate governance codes, reveals a firm’s commitment 
towards maintaining transparency, accountability and proper risk techniques.176 
 
Recently, the G20/OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance have profoundly 
stated that the corporate governance framework should ensure the accountability 
of boards to the company and the shareholders.177 Accountability and 
transparency in the eyes of the Anglo-American system, is a condition whereby 
the manager is ready to share the information to satisfy the shareholders and run 
the corporation in-line with the idea of maximising shareholder value. As an 
assurance, the shareholders authorised a group of capable people, which are, in 
most cases selected from the shareholders to be the members of the board of 
directors, as stewards to ensure transparency and avoid information 
asymmetries. To enhance accountability and transparency, the single board 
model introduced Non-Executive Directors (NED) as board members. On the 
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other hand, under the European stakeholder models, the managers are not only 
accountable to the shareholder but also to the players who are affected and could 
be affected by the businesses run by the corporation. As a result, they introduced 
a two-tier board system, a board of directors and a supervisory board. The 
supervisory board in this model has broadened the fiduciary duty of the directors 
by enlisting other stakeholders that need to be addressed in the boardroom.  
 
The IFIs have, to some extent, adopted the proposed aspect that would 
contribute positively towards achieving accountability and transparency as 
promoted by the conventional corporate governance codes, especially the codes 
issued by the OECD.178 It has been argued that accountability is the icon of good 
governance, which is coherent with the values appreciated by the Shariah 
governance system. Nonetheless, the underlying principles between the two 
systems are distinguished, and, therefore, the Shariah committee as the main 
organ of Shariah governance has its own range of stakeholders to be accounted 
for. Accountability in Shariah governance terms somehow mostly relies on the 
Shariah committee. Regarding this, the Shariah committee shall be accountable 
to its own rulings and decisions. Accountability in this context is accountable to 
the board of directors as well as to the community, which is known as ummah or 
society179 as the stakeholders of the IFIs and to the Divine. One of the features 
peculiar to the IFIs is the presence of investment account holders (IAH). In spite 
of dispersed shareholding, IAHs bear the risk of poor performance of the 
investment pool, and are not excluded from misconduct on the part of the financial 
institutions,180 similar therefore to common shareholders. In this scenario, the 
Shariah governance mechanisms are deemed to be accountable and transparent 
to the IAHs, more or less, as to shareholders. 
b. Mitigate Shariah Risk181 
Shariah risk occurs when a corporation has failed to adhere to the guidelines 
pertaining to Shariah matters. In most occasions, the risk arises when the IFIs 
become unsuccessfully attempt to adhere to the rulings endorsed by the Shariah 
committee.182 The non-compliant aspects could be in operation, marketing, 
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product structuring and investments. It also occurs when a certain contract is 
applying a remote opinion of Shariah legal schools.183 In some cases, Shariah 
risk refers to the risk of non-compliance resulting from the failure of an IFI’s 
internal system and personnel.184 These non-compliance risks might well be 
contributing losses to the IFIs, financially and morally. The IFIs will suffer from 
the invalidation of the contracts, non-halal income, which will not be included as 
a profitable income for IFIs and capital adequacy ratio (CAR) impact, 
financially.185 At the same time, IFIs will be reckoned as running the business 
against the Divine law, contravening the enacted law in some jurisdictions and 
jeopardising its reputation in the eyes of the stakeholders, morally. Some 
researchers such as Ali have asserted that Shariah non-compliance could prompt 
excessive withdrawals of deposits, resulting in bank failure.186 Whether it is 
financial or not, the risk ought to be treated diligently by the IFIs before it could 
turn into a threat. It must be identified, measured, mitigated and reported through 
a standard operating procedure of risk management by the IFIs.  
 
Furthermore, Shariah risk can also be attributed to a lack in Shariah governance 
standards, which has the potential to mislead the divergent IFI governance 
system in different jurisdictions. Notably, a uniform and standard framework is a 
vital answer.187 Moreover, although effective Shariah governance is consistent 
with Islamic principles,188 and the IFIs have implied the Islamic teaching in their 
business activities, it does not mean that IFIs are immune from uncertainty in the 
future, because that is the nature of the financial business itself. In addition to 
this, it is vital to note that the risks faced by the IFIs do not only positively coincide 
with their counterparts,189 but there are also risks that are uniquely applied to the 
IFIs owing to their characteristics. Apart from the generic risks such as credit risk, 
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market risk, liquidity risk and operational risk, the IFIs also have to encounter the 
Shariah risk, rate of return risk, displaced commercial risk and equity investment 
risk.190 The major risk that needs to be taken care of most is, of course, the 
Shariah risk that could cause a domino effect as it has the potential to trigger 
other essential issues for the corporation. To mitigate such a risk, IFIs are in need 
for creating a governance structure and management process that would 
reassure the stakeholders on the Shariah-compliant aspects of all 
transactions.191 
 
One of the main organs of the Shariah governance that functions to mitigate the 
risks is the Shariah committee. This committee is membered by experts in 
Shariah matters and plays a pivotal role to minimise the risks by ensuring the 
adherence of the IFIs products and services with the Shariah law. The duty of the 
Shariah committee may vary according to the provisions stipulated in the articles 
of association of the institutions or by regulators, but this committee assures the 
customers that the IFIs drive their business in accordance with Shariah.192 
Mainly, it provides an ex-ante measure by introducing the rulings on policies and 
guidelines for operations, products and services, before execution. This process 
will be followed by the Shariah audit as an ex-post stage of the Shariah 
supervision by the Shariah committee.193 In the event of non-compliance, in some 
jurisdictions, the Shariah committee has the function to rectify the non-
compliances due to the Shariah precepts or to be duly approved by the board 
and endorsed by the Shariah committee.194 In order to execute these functions, 
the Shariah committee will utilise other Shariah governance organs such as the 
Internal Shariah Compliance Unit (ISCU), Internal Shariah Review Unit (ISRU) 
and other related management counterparts. The main concern of these organs 
is to assist the Shariah committee to ease Shariah non-compliance if it is a risk 
mitigation mechanism for the IFIs. 195 
 
To some extent, some researchers concluded that the financial turmoil that 
erupted since 2007 was attributed to the weakness of corporate governance 
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mechanism.196 The failure of risk management due to improper corporate 
governance systems is regarded as one of the factors that contributed to the 
eruption of the last decade’s financial crisis.197 Researchers pointed to the 
managers who have been greedy and potentially incompetent that encouraged 
or turned a blind eye to excessive risk-taking.198 This poor and lack of risk 
management practice is among other factors credited as one of the causes of the 
crisis.199 Shareholders and boards encouraged the management to increase 
shareholder return through aggressive risk-taking.200 Bankers and credit brokers 
used aggressive lending tactics working under the same notion.201 Ironically, this 
crisis occurred after extensive measures taken by the US government to 
strengthen the corporate governance mechanism via the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002.202  
c. Increasing stakeholders’ confidence. Investment Account Holders (IAH) 
Having a strong Shariah governance mechanism to mitigate Shariah risk not only 
could increase the probability of success for the IFIs, but are also crucial in the 
way it could raise the level of confidence of the stakeholders in the IFIs.203 Put 
differently, a robust Shariah governance is desired to augment the trust and 
confidence of the stakeholders in the IFIs.204 It is worth noting that the IFIs’ 
stakeholders are diverse as opposed to their conventional counterparts. Indeed, 
the Muslim community would choose the IFIs over the conventional institutions 
due to the religious factor, but the fact that the majority of their customer are non-
Muslim should not be eliminated from the equation and left unattended. In order 
to penetrate the non-Muslim market, an effective Shariah governance is 
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extremely useful to draw their attention. Furthermore, one of the dominant 
stakeholders of the IFIs is Investment Account Holders (IAH), who play an 
influential role by entering into a mudarabah contract that has allowed them to be 
recognised as shareholder-like stakeholders.205 
 
Conversely, poor Shariah governance system could carry heavy financial costs 
for the stakeholders.206 Numerous studies have shown positive relationship 
between good corporate governance and high profitability and investment 
performance measures. For instance, in 2004, Brown and Caylor research 
findings indicated that, after the passing of the Sarbane-Oxley Act in 2002, which 
increased the independence of boards of directors, nominating committees, and 
compensation committees, the firm was associated with good performance, 
eventually suggesting that these exchange requirements may facilitate 
improvement in terms of performance.207 Consecutively, Vo and Phan’s study 
indicated that elements of corporate governance such as the presence of female 
board members, the duality of the CEO, the working experience of board 
members, and the compensation of board members have positive effects on the 
performance of the firms, as measured by the returns on assets.208 These studies 
are maybe pointing at the conventional Anglo-American corporate governance 
system, but needless to say that these results are applicable to the IFIs as well, 
since the Shariah governance is also dealing with the familiar governance 
constituents.  
 
Meanwhile, in the UK, where stewardship corporate governance codes are 
popular with the notion of ‘comply or explain’, the aim for the issued codes and 
standards to be adopted are not only based on the regulation but also because 
companies, investors and the professions believe they make sense, rather than 
because they have to comply.209 Self-regulation under the ‘comply or explain’ 
flagship is believed to provide flexibilities, in terms of implementation of the code 
to the companies. It also would drive them towards compliance in the way they 
could and if not, sufficient explanation should be provided. According to the data, 
between 2012 and 2014, the number of FTSE 350 companies compling with all 
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provisions of the code increased gradually from 50% in 2011 to 61% in 2014, with 
the non-compliance aspects have been explained rather than left undiscussed. 
In 2015, 57% of FTSE 350 companies were fully compliant with the code.210 
Compared with 2014, this figure represents a slight drop from 61% as shown in 
the previous year; however, the non-compliances come with better 
explanations.211 The stewardship governance approach in the UK corporate 
governance codes is more than just voting. The investors are deemed to get 
involved in monitoring and engaging with the company matters such as strategy, 
performance, risk, capital structure and corporate governance, which  may 
include corporate culture and remuneration system.212 The bottom line is 
corporate governance is a crucial tool that could be facilitated by the investors to 
measure the risk that they are running and willing to take before considering their 
investment participation.  
d. Avoid Institutional Failure 
The studies of the practice of the Islamic financial system, has shown evidences 
of the possibility of the occurrence of financial crisis to the IFIs. The cases of the 
Ihlas Finance House in Turkey, the Islamic Bank of South Africa and the Islamic 
Investment Companies of Egypt and Malaysian Islamic Bank Berhad in Malaysia 
proved that despite its ideal code of business conducts and ethics, IFIs are not 
immune to crisis. Hirschman argued that under any economic, social or political 
system, individuals, business firms, and organisations in general are subject to 
lapses.213 Furthermore, the objectives that take place as the foundation that built 
the IFIs is rather coherent with the conventional financial institutions. The fact is, 
IFIs are the corporations formed to create wealth, to some extent, are exposed 
to the risk of greed, shareholder risky actions, market exploitation, economic 
instability, fraud and lack of governance mechanism. Likewise, the IFIs are no 
less prune to suffer from breaches of fiduciary responsibilities or the 
consequences of asymmetric information.214 As a mitigation element to reduce 
the causes of these crises, the need for an efficient and robust Shariah 
governance is inevitable. 
 
In the case of the Ihlas Finance House in Turkey for instance, control failure as a 
reference to failure in corporate governance and lack of internal as well as 
external checks and balances have been clarified as the key factors that caused 
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the event.215 It arises when decision-making becomes too centralised, when there 
is a rubber-stamp board of directors, when the board members are ignorant of 
financial and economic facts and the workings of the company, when board 
members are not motivated, when the bank staff lack relevant experience and 
training, and when things are run on trust without proper systems of internal 
control.216 Thus, it is essential that the Shariah governance plays its roles, to 
conform the adherence to the precept of Shariah law of business and work as a 
prevention mechanism for possible future failure. Nonetheless, to play with such 
a role, Shariah governance should not focus only on the compliance of the 
underlying contracts of the business but also expand its ability to create a 
prevention mechanism that will detect and come up with a potential solution to 
the problematic issues before they cause more damage.  
2.5 Conclusion 
As a conclusion, there are a few points need to be addressed as the headlines 
of this chapter. These points stand as the fundamental viewpoints on the issue in 
hand, the principles of Shariah governance, as it could secure a proper guidance 
towards understanding the chapters to come.  First, Shariah governance is a 
corporate governance system that is concerned with the functions of the 
governance constituents of IFIs in ensuring Shariah compliance. In a broader 
sense, the IFIs Shariah governance system has no difference to the conventional 
counterpart. It is concerned with accountability, transparency, enhancing 
stakeholders’ confidence and so on. However, since the IFIs are operating with 
a peculiar code of conduct known as Shariah compliance, Shariah governance 
organs are moving towards such a notion. It is due to this, the objective of the 
Shariah governance has diversified despite similar narratives as opposed to the 
conventional corporate governance. Second, due to the above-sense, the 
sensible objective of the Shariah governance as observed is to optimise the value 
and to ascertain the sustainability of the IFIs in a way that complies with Shariah 
law. This objective is formulated based on the worldview of the Islam on wealth, 
a subject to be further excavated by this research in the future discourse. 
However, it is imperative to note here that because of this reason, the IFIs cannot 
fully utilise the corporate governance codes published by multilateral standard-
setters without considering their Shariah requirements. In this sense, a 
comprehensive understanding of Shariah governance is pivotal as an additional 
code of conduct to ensure Shariah compliance. Third, Shariah is perceived as 
the fundamental teaching of Islam. It is sometimes conceived of the Islamic law, 
as well as the Islamic teaching as a whole. Both make irrevocable impacts to the 
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IFIs operating systems. Whether it is a law or a teaching, it is the concept fully 
upheld by the IFIs systemic and operational arrangement. As a result, the 
existence of the Shariah governance is a distinctive element for the IFIs as a way 
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Chapter 3  
 
Developments of Standard-setters and Codes of Shariah 
Governance 
3.1 Introduction 
After introducing the reality of Shariah governance in the last chapter, this 
research will continue the discussion to bring about an in-depth comprehension 
of the subject. In the conventional counterpart, corporate governance is an issue 
under the eyes of standard-setters, who normally develop codes of best conduct 
-an important part and parcel of a business corporation. The codes function as 
soft law to be adhered to by the corporation along with relevant local black letter 
regulations. The IFIs do nothing less in this regard. They are required to adopt 
such codes, while additional features regarding Shariah compliance processes 
are also to be incorporated.  
 
The development of the Shariah governance codes in their modern form is new 
to the IFIs. Islamic finance itself has been available for only around 50 years after 
the incorporation of Mit Ghamr Bank, Egypt and the Tabung Haji, Malaysia in 
1963.1 At that particular time, Shariah governance was not an issue at all, and 
corporate governance as we know it today did not yet exist either. Arguably, the 
subject of Shariah governance has only experienced significant development 
since the formation of the AAOIFI. Prior to that, Shariah governance was only 
reviewed under relevant corporate law without having any special treatment, as 
long as it could serve the Shariah compliance purpose. Since the rapid expansion 
of the Islamic financial market, the subject has gained popularity owing to the 
pressing demand on specific corporate governance mechanisms to tackle the 
IFIs’ peculiarities. Regarding this, in this chapter, we are going to explore the 
available governance codes that serve Shariah compliance purposes. It is to 
position the Shariah governance corpus within a well-structured comprehension 
as with the conventional corporate governance body of knowledge. Owing to the 
fact that those subjects are by and large pointing out similar corporate issues 
despite their peculiarities, a comprehensible narrative therefore, is believed to be 
useful in this level of discussion before we jump into a deeper dialogue in 
chapters to come. 
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3.2 Historical Overview of Shariah Governance in Islam 
When we are exploring the concept of Shariah governance, we need to realise 
that the concept is no stranger to the Islamic literature, in which it can be 
tracedback to the time of the Prophet-hood. However, we have to bear in mind 
that the forms of governance were considerably diverse and un-identical in 
comparison with the modern governance system. As more than likely happens in 
other systems, it has evolved due to time, places and circumstances. As long as 
it is compatible and comparable in terms of the principles and the idea, it is 
considerable as the same subject matter.  As mentioned by the path dependence 
advocates, the historic events in the past, determine future paths.2 Here are the 
stages of the Shariah governance development over a period starting from the 
time of the Prophet-hood to the most recent developments on the subject. 
3.2.1 The Time of Prophet-hood 
In the Islamic tradition, after the Quran, the Hadith is the second source of the 
law.3 The hadith contains amongst others, commands to be followed by Muslims 
on multiple occasions. As an example for the functions of the Hadiths, we can 
look at some of the actions of the Prophet as the ruler of Medina. During His 
PBUH’s lifetime, the Prophet applied Islam in all aspects of government and 
economics. In order to improve the economic activity of the citizens of Medina 
and the migrants, who came from Mecca, the Prophet PBUH set up a new market 
and encouraged them to get involved. He said:  
‘By Him whose hand myself is, to take your rope and gather firewood 
on your back is better for you than that you come to a man to whom 
Allah has given some of His favour and ask him so he gives to you or 
refuses’. 
 
 He also said:  
‘Nobody has ever eaten a better for you than that which one has 
earned by working with one’s hands. The Prophet Allah David used to 
eat from the earning of His manual labour’.4 
In terms of the market supervision practices, the Prophet Muhammad PBUH 
nominated his companions as muhtasib.5 In this case, Umar ibn al-Khattab was 
nominated as muhtasib in Medina, as Said ibn al-‘As in Makkah and Uthman ibn 
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al-‘As in Ta’if. The Prophet even named a woman to carry out the task by putting 
Samra’ bint Nuhaik al-Asadiyyah as a muhtasib, and she was recorded as using 
a stick, patrolling and supervising the market.6  The Prophet Himself was a 
supervisor of the market. It was told by Abu Hurairah, that the Messenger of Allah 
PBUH happened to pass by a heap of corn. He then thrust his hand in that (heap) 
and his fingers felt wetness. He said to the owner of that heap of corn, ‘What is 
this?’ He replied, ‘O Messenger of Allah! These have been drenched by rainfall’. 
He remarked, ‘Why did you not place this (the drenched part of the heap) over 
the corn so that people might see it? He who deceives is not of us’.7 
 
The conception of market supervision at this level, somehow, was at its early 
stage. However, the above-mentioned provisions were referred to by the 
following generations of jurists when explaining the Islamic governance system 
as in the works of al-Mawardi and al-Farra’. In this regard, both of Al-Mawardi 
and al-Farra’ authored two different books with an identical title, al-Ahkam al-
Sultaniyyah (The Law of Islamic Governance), as a manual for the Abbasid’s 
caliph.8 
3.2.2 The Time of the Caliphs 
The golden era of the Islamic empire lasted over a millennium and it saw 
tremendous achievements in sciences, economics, politics, and the military as 
well as the governance system for the succeeding generations. It is thought that 
the concept of hisbah as introduced during the time of the Prophet-hood had 
gained prominence over the centuries. The hisbah institution was one of the main 
organs of the caliphate governance structure, along with other institutions such 
as the judiciary, waqf, baitul mal and the army under the name of diwan.9 For 
example, the wealth of the caliphate was managed under baitulmal, as the 
government treasury. The sources of the baitulmal come from zakah, sadakah, 
ghanimah, usyur, kharaj, jizyah and other relevant sources of tax. The baitulmal 
funds are distributed using the instruments derived from the provisions of the 
Quran and the Hadith and shall be discharged by the government with 
accountability and transparency.  
 
In the private sector, waqf could be considered as the classic example of a former 
form of Islamic financial institution. Waqf is an endowment institution. It reached 
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its golden peak during the era of the Islamic empire. Known as one of the key 
players that contributed to the development of Islamic civilisation, waqf provided 
critical support to the functioning of the Islamic cities, which were far larger than 
any town in the West without direct involvement from the state10 or the 
government. Waqf also provided the drinking water system, paved streets, 
assistance to travellers, the financing of pilgrimages and even the wedding dress 
for brides.11 It served as a vehicle for financing Islam as a society, as mentioned 
by Marshall Hodgson.12 
 
The mechanism to govern these institutions was known as al-diwan and the 
prominent organ pertaining to the economics activities was diwan al-hisbah. Al-
Mawardi and al-Farra’ categorised the functions of diwan al-hisbah relating to the 
business activities, into three main areas: firstly, monitoring the market price of 
the goods.13 In some jurisdictions, based on the Shariah legal school of the local 
government, a muhtasib was authorised to take action under the law in certain 
circumstances related to the price, especially in the case of monopoly, price 
exploitation by hoarding and over-pricing of the goods classified as basic needs. 
Secondly, they were authorised for asserting measurements and scales. The 
hisbah institution was responsible for the standardisation of business tools, 
including the use of standard currency in transactions.14 In this regard, a muhtasib 
held the power to nominate an eligible person to assist him. Thirdly, they 
supervised business activities. Such a function was carried out by confirming the 
adherence to the business conducts of the Shariah precepts and preserving the 
consumers’ rights such as in the case of disputes due to fraud and negligence.15  
 
The scope of diwan al-hisbah did not stop at the level of business and market 
matters. The head of diwan al-hisbah was a member of the shura, the highest 
council of the government at the central level. Diwan al-hisbah was an 
independent body, and its accountability is beyond the caliph himself. It is argued 
that the expressed hisbah jurisdiction was, at least as stated in the provision, to 
remove a caliph if he seen as no longer fit for the post. By any means, diwan al-
hisbah was a vital governance organ within the Islamic empire that served as a 
supervisory and auditing institution. To some extent, this central power 
represents a model of a supervisory mechanism that is answerable to a higher 
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authority, which is God. In this sense, answerable to God, should not be regarded 
as answerable to an unclear authority, but rather interpreted answerable to the 
highest law of the state, which is the Shariah law. 
3.2.3 The Time of Modern Islamic Finance 
3.2.3.1 Development of Islamic Financial Institutions 
Historically, the developments of the IFIs are under a conventional setup. 
However, with the rapid growth of the Islamic financial industry, each jurisdiction 
has adopted a separate regulatory structure based on its institutional setup and 
market practices.16 To understand these circumstances, scholars in this area of 
research have divided the modern era of IFIs into phases. Prominently, Khurshid 
Ahmad mentioned that the development of the Islamic financial system has gone 
through three significant phases.17 
 
First Phase: The time of theoretical concept of interest-free banking   
After the collapse of the Ottoman’s caliphate, the final empire of Islam, no known 
formal institution offering business transactions with Shariah compliance. The 
Ottoman Empire had broken into several countries, each forming individual 
governments, either by claiming their independence or by being colonised by the 
Western civilisations. Not one of those countries seemed to be proclaimed as an 
Islamic country, implementing the same notions as the former empire, neither 
politically nor economically.  
 
By this time, the financial system introduced by the Western colonisers 
dominated the market and spread widely over all the regions previously known 
for their Islamicity. In fact, the Westernisation process had already taken place 
decades before that, which traceable by the formation of many banks in several 
localities throughout the Ottoman Empire. Since the 19th century, some Islamic 
regions started opening branches of foreign banks. For instance, in Egypt, the 
first conventional bank opened its doors in 1856 under the name Bank of Egypt, 
which was actually a branch of an English bank.18 In 1898, the National Bank of 
Egypt, was established and is still in operation today.19 These developments were 
followed by many other financial institutions, which finally created the need for 
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the Muslim community to create a similar banking system but under Shariah 
prescriptions.  
 
As mentioned by Siddiqi, the earliest writing on the subject of Islamic banking and 
finance dated back to the 1940s.20 At this stage, scholars were looking for an 
alternative system to overcome the domination of the interest-based finance 
which eventually triggered the possibility for modern IFIs to emerge, a few 
decades after that. There is no trace of any specific discussion on the subject 
relating to Shariah governance system. 
 
Second Phase: The emergence of the Islamic banks 
After almost two decades since the first idea appeared of an alternative financial 
model, the first batch of IFIs emerged in 1963 in Malaysia with the formation of 
Tabung Haji and in Egypt Mit Ghamr Bank as well as interest-free-based bank of 
Karachi. Amongst those three IFIs, the Tabung Haji is the only one that has 
survived throughout the decades. Truthfully, there was no specific body 
responsible to advise, supervise or monitor those IFIs on Shariah matters. The 
establishment of the first modern Islamic bank, Mit Ghamr in 1963, was made 
without setting up any Shariah body as part of its internal corporate governance 
structure.21 To this point, the need for a robust Shariah governance system was 
not an issue and moreover, the collapse of the other two IFIs were due to external 
factors: political factors, in particular. 
 
Early in the 1970s, came the Dubai Islamic Bank, which took deposits in current 
as well as investment accounts and engaged in profit-making activities directly 
as well as through working partners. Consecutively, the Islamic Development 
Bank, which started its operations in 1975, was designed to serve Muslim 
countries and communities by arranging finance for trade and development on a 
non-interest basis. By the late 1970s there were half a dozen more banks in the 
private sector in Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, and the Gulf states. The following decade 
saw rapid expansion bringing the number of banks into the dozens by the end of 
the decade. More importantly, with the commencement of the Dubai Islamic Bank 
and the Islamic Development Bank in 1975, neither had designated Shariah 
department within their governance structure. In order to resolve Shariah matters, 
they established relationships with several scholars for consultation on their 
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activities, transactions, products and services as well as asking for fatwas for 
specific questions and transactions22. 
 
Third Phase: Islamic finance expansion 
Scholars stated that, during that period of time, the IFIs had spread all around the 
world and many IFIs that were established in the early 1970s and 1980s are still 
in operation.23 The need for an alternative robust financial system due to 
repeating financial crises has encouraged the IFIs to grow. Along with this 
progress, the importance of a prudent and sound governance system to tackle 
the expansion of the institutions has intensified. This situation has resulted in the 
emergence of the Shariah governance codes and standards issued by several 
standard-setters at national or international levels such as the AAOIFI, IFSB and 
BNM. 
3.2.3.2 Emergence of Shariah Governance Codes 
In the last millennium, we could witness exponential growth in concern on Shariah 
governance, coinciding with the expansion of the Islamic financial industry, either 
theoretically or practically. The proliferation of the IFIs in the past decades has 
started to create multiple issues for policy makers and regulators.24 Notably, for 
the Shariah governance, various codes have been issued by numerous standard-
setters, nationally and internationally, to overcome the specific needs of the IFIs 
for a robust governance system. The objective is to sustain the credibility of the 
Shariah compliance mechanism, which is crucial and plays a pivotal role as the 
primary objective of the IFIs.25 However, this development is still in its early 
stages as compared to their counterparts and they have experienced several 
improvements since their first appearances during the 1980s.26 Over the years, 
Shariah governance has been discussed in the context of how to saddle the 
Shariah committee with duties that are capable of achieving the IFIs economic 
and religious objectives.27 Latest developments in the industry show that Shariah 
governance has gained more attentions and more efforts have been made to 
                                            
22 Munzir Kahf, ‘Islamic Banks: The Rise of a New Power Alliance of Wealth and Shariah 
Scholarship’ in CM Henry and R Wilson (eds), The Politics of Islamic Finance 
(Edinburgh University 2004) 17-36. 
23 Adnan M Abdeen and Dale N Shook, The Saudi Financial System in the Context of 
Western and Islamic Finance (John Wiley and Sons  1984) 167; Alharbi (n 18). 
24 Khan and others (n 16). 
25 See also Habib Ahmed, ‘Shari’ah Governance Regimes for Islamic Finance: Types 
and Appraisal’ (2011) 44 (4) Journal of Institute of International Economics 393. 
26 See also Bob Tricker, Corporate Governance: Principles, Policies and Practices (OUP 
2009). 
27 Malek Marwan Yousef Injas and others, ‘The Importance of Shariah Supervisory 
Boards (SSBS) in the Islamic Banking System’ (2016) 9 (2) 25 South East Asia 
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observe the complete Shariah compliance chain, due to the fact, non-compliant 
features with could injure IFIs and cause adverse effects on the industry.28 In the 
same vein, it is believed that the lack of a standard framework is also regarded 
as one of the factors that exacerbate the risk exposure to the IFIs.29 
 
It is argued that the most significant and well referred standards and codes were 
those issued by the AAOIFI, the IFSB and the BNM.30 The AAOIFI and the IFSB 
are carrying out the effort internationally. Both have published several standards 
and codes as guidelines and references for the national controlling bodies to 
adopt within their jurisdictions, regardless of their models. These codes have their 
own specialties, designed to cater for the needs of the IFIs on multiple occasions. 
All jurisdictions are at liberty to find out the best way to adapt the guidelines 
accordingly in conjunction with their own characteristics, legally or 
economically.31 In this regard, Malaysia is considered one of the most advanced 
markets that has implemented almost all, if not all, of the notions narrated by the 
guidelines. It is also worth mentioning that those guidelines and codes share the 
same notions with other corporate governance codes, especially those published 
by the OECD and the BCBS. Concerning this, Archer and others mentioned that 
the roles of AAOIFI, the IFSB and the BNM in the development of the Shariah 
standards, the frameworks or the guidelines for the Islamic finance industry differ 
in ome ways: AAOIFI is concerned with the substance of Shariah rulings at an 
international level; the IFSB is concerned with systems and procedures for 
compliance, but not the substance, also at an international level; and the BNM 
and the Malaysian SAC are concerned with both substance and systems and 
procedures, but on a national or jurisdictional level.32 
 
To conclude this section, we can see that Shariah governance is a new 
expanding Shariah compliance mechanism embedded within the IFIs corporate 
governance. It is a system formulated from the Islamic teachings. Despite the fact 
that the early IFIs were not utilising the concept, Shariah governance is not 
                                            
28 Muhammad Akram Laldin, ‘Overview of Shariah Governance in Malaysia and Globally’ 
(The International Shariah Audit Conference & Workshop, Kuala Lumpur, May 
2011). 
29 Edib Smolo and Abbas Mirakhor, ‘The Global Financial Crisis and Its Implications for 
the Islamic Financial Industry’ (2010) 3 (4) International Journal of Islamic and 
Middle Eastern Finance and Management 372, 373. 
30 Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) is used throughout as a direct translation for Malaysia 
Central Bank. 
31 See also M Ahmed and M Khatun, ‘The Compliance with Shariah Governance System 
of AAOIFI: A study in Islamic Banks Bangladesh’ (2013) 9 (3) Journal of Islamic 
Economics, Banking and Finance 177. 
32 Simon Archer and others, ‘Evolution of Shariah Standards and Guidelines For AAOIFI, 
IFSB And Bank Negara Malaysia’ (Islamic Commercial Law Report 2016, ISRA & 
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strange to Islam as the basis that built the IFIs. Coinciding with the expansion of 
the market, Shariah governance evolves by attending to the Islamic 
characteristics of the IFIs. In addition to that, Shariah governance also looks after 
the areas spared by the conventional corporate governance. Owing to that, 
Shariah governance is in a similar mode to the conventional counterpart in the 
sense it has to be standardised and monitored by a certain kind of body, either 
nationally or internationally.  
3.3 Standardisation of Shariah Governance Framework 
Standardisation refers to a formulation, publication and implementation of 
guidelines, rules and specifications for common and repeated use, aimed at 
achieving an optimum degree of order and uniformity in a given context, discipline 
or field.33 Standardisation has a crucial role in the global development of the IFIs 
as it could harmonise the divergences and peculiarities of the multiple policies of 
the jurisdictions, where a certain IFI operates. The existence of a recognisable 
and effective standard-setter is a consequential factor in order to secure the 
success of the IFIs in pursuing their Shariah compliance objective. To achieve 
the required expectation, the standard must be compatible and comparable with 
market dynamics. Most importantly, such a standardisation will help to regulate 
the transaction of the Islamic financial instruments which enable IFIs to enhance 
the possibility of cross-border transactions, strengthen global financial 
connections and maximise profitability.34 Conversely, the lack of standardisation 
could cause Shariah risks to the IFIs where it could potentially mislead the 
divergent IFIs governance system in different jurisdictions. As a result, a uniform 
and standard framework is a vital answer.35 
 
It is worth mentioning that an ineffectual internal Shariah arrangement or control 
could lead to inadequate Shariah compliance tools and disastrous side effects.36 
In order to mitigate such a risk, IFIs are in need to create a governance structure 
and management process that would reassure the stakeholders of the Shariah 
compliance aspects of all transactions.37 Some researchers such as Ali have 
                                            
33 <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/standardization.html> accessed 25 
September 2018. 
34 Said Bouheraoua, ‘The Concept and Practices of Standardisation’ in Islamic Finance 
(Islamic Commercial Law Report 2016) 48. 
35 Muhamed Zulkhibri Abdul Majid and Reza Ghazal, ‘Comparative Analysis of Islamic 
Banking Supervision and Regulation Development’ (2012) 6 (3) Money and 
Economy 113. 
36 Karim Ginena, ‘Shariah Risk and Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks’ (2014) 14 
(1) Corporate Governance 86, 94 
37 Wafik Grais and Matteo Pellegrini, ‘Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options’ (2006 World Bank Policy Research 
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asserted that Shariah noncompliance could prompt excessive withdrawals of 
deposits, resulting in bank failure.38 Stating a similar notion, Smolo and Mirakhor 
argued that many analysts believed that an appropriate and effective regulatory 
and supervisory framework could be one of the main factors to ease the current 
global financial instability.39 
 
As for the corporate governance system, the IFIs have their characteristics as 
compared to the conventional counterparts. As a result, the IFIs are subject to 
multiple regulations.40 As financial institutions, they ought to follow standards and 
governance codes issued by the OECD and the BCBS.41 Simultaneously, they 
are deemed to adopt Shariah governance standards as required by the AAOIFI 
and the IFSB as well as the local central bank. As a matter of fact, the 
implementation of the Shariah governance codes competes with other 
conventional codes especially on the parts whereby the codes tend to be in 
convergence with each other. Therefore, the prior presumption in the 
commitment to follow the IFSB codes, for example, is that international standards 
in general, and the IFSB standards in particular, will be concurrently adopted.42 
Diagram 1 (below) shows the multiple jurisdictional overlap on the adoption of the 











                                            
38 Ahmad Mohamed Ali, ‘The emerging Islamic financial architecture: the way ahead’ 
(The Fifth Harvard University Forum on Islamic Finance, Centre for Middle Eastern 
Studies, Harvard University, Cambridge 2003) 147. 
39 Smolo and Mirakhor (n 29) 380. 
40 See also discussion presented by Rodney Wilson, Legal, Regulatory and Governance 
Issue in Islamic Finance (EUP 2012).  
41 See also Bedj Bedj Toufik, ‘The Role of Shariah Supervisory Board in Ensuring Good 
Corporate Governance Practice in Islamic Banks’ (2015) 2 (2) International Journal 
of Contemporary Applied Sciences 109. 
42 Peter Casey, ‘Comparative Study on the Implementation of Selected IFSB Standards’ 




























These are the purposes of each governance frameworks in multiple level as 
applied by the IFIs: 
 





The OECD principles of 
corporate governance 
 
Draw the universal codes of 
good governance for 
business institutions 
BCBS guidance on banking 
supervision on enhancing 
corporate governance for 
banking organisations. 
Codes of corporate 
governance in the financial 






IFSB guidelines on corporate 
governance for institutions 
offering Islamic financial 
services. 
Promulgating Shariah 
governance principles which 
are regarded as a specific 
need for the IFIs due to 
universal principles 
promoted by OECD and 
BCBS. 
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AAOIFI standards which consist 
of 7 governance standards in 
multiples aspects of financial 
requirements 
Emphasises the existence of 
the unified mechanism of 
Shariah review and 
accounting standards in the 






General guiding principles 
for financial institutions 
which suite the jurisdictional 
needs. 
Shariah governance framework Guidelines for the IFIs in a 
national level jurisdiction. 
Table 1 : Purposes of Governance Frameworks in Multiple Level 
 
On the basis of the above discussion, this section of the chapter will discuss the 
codes of Shariah governance issued by three Shariah governance standard-
setters which are the AAOIFI, the IFSB and the BNM.43 The codes will be 
analysed and compared as well as correlated with the codes related to the 
corporate governance principles produced by the OECD and BCBS. Arguably, 
the OECD and the BCBS corporate governance principles are well-accepted 
codes, implemented all over the globe where the IFIs are doing nothing less. 
Furthermore, IFIs have their own corporate governance system known as the 
Shariah governance codes, which have their own characteristics of governance 
principles and practices. All of these diverse codes were compressed into a single 
system presumed to be accommodated by the IFIs. To some extent, the AAOIFI 
the IFSB, and the BNM guidelines work as complementary requirements for 
those which proposed by the OECD and the BCBS.  
3.4 The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions Shariah Governance Codes  
The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) was created on 26 February 1990 to ensure that participants conform 
to the regulations in Islamic finance.44 The AAOIFI is an Islamic international 
                                            
43 The Shariah governance framework issued by BNM is chosen in the light of the fact 
that the development of the legal structure of IFIs in Malaysia is considered ahead 
of the rest of the world, as well as its Shariah governance framework with its holistic 
approach; Muhammad Naim Omar and others, ‘The Implementation of Shariah 
Governance Framework of 2010: Advantages and Constraints’ (2014) 8 (13) 
Australian Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences 684. 
44 Ines Nur Latifah and others, ‘History and Development of IFRS and AAOIFI and Their 
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autonomous non-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, auditing 
governance, ethics and Shariah standards for Islamic financial institutions.45 
Since the AAOIFI was established for the purpose to satisfy the peculiar needs 
of the IFIs, the standards issued by the AAOIFI serve as guidelines that reflect 
the unique characteristics of the IFIs and as a practical tool to ease such needs.46 
In terms of the Shariah governance, since its inauguration, AAOIFI has issued 7 
Governance Standards for IFIs (Governance Standards): Shariah Supervision 
Body, Appointment, Composition and Report (1997); Shariah Review (1998); 
Internal Shariah Review (1999); Auditing and Governance Committee for Islamic 
Financial Institutions (2002); Independence of Shariah Supervisory Board (2005); 
Statement on Governance Principles for Islamic Financial Institution (2005), and; 
Corporate Social Responsibility Conduct and Disclosure for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (2009).47 The AAOIFI Governance Standards approach is concerned 
more with the individual aspects of the IFIs, in terms of the Shariah compliance 
mechanism. As international and general standards, the AAOIFI Shariah 
governance standards are compatible to be accommodated by various 
jurisdictions. At the same time, it is also comparable to other widely accepted 
international governance standards, such as that of the OECD and the BCBS. It 
is said that the AAOIFI has been actively seeking for an alternative to reconcile 
international accounting standards with the specific Islamic accounting standards 
and provides useful guidance on the Shariah standards.48 
3.4.1 Shariah Supervision Body, Appointment, Composition and 
Report Standards (GSIFI No.1) 
The objective of the GSIFI No.1 is to establish standards and provide guidance 
on the features regarding to the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB).49 It envisages 
the definition of the SSB, the appointment procedures of its members, the 
member composition and the format on reporting the compliance of the IFI’s 
products and services in all of its dealings and transactions. The SSB is defined 
by the present standards as an independent body of specialised jurists in fiqh al-
Muamalat or Shariah financial law. Interestingly, the standards also include those 
who are experts in the field of Islamic financial institutions with the knowledge of 
                                            
45 E Oz, ‘Regulatory and Supervisory Framework in Islamic Financial Services Industry 
(IFSI) from the Perspective of Risk Management’ (3rd Meeting of the COMCEC 
Financial Cooperation Working Group October 2014). 
46 Adel Mohammed Sarea and Mustafa Mohd Hanefah, ‘The Need of Accounting 
Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2013) 9 (2) International Management 
Review 50, 50 
47 See also Umar A Oseni and others, ‘Corporate Governance and Effective Dispute 
Management in Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2012) 6 (11) Australian Journal of 
Basic and Applied Sciences 361. 
48 Nasser Saidi, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic Finance’ (Chapter 33 of Islamic 
Wealth) 433, 433. 
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fiqh al-Muamalat.50 This inclusive understanding has widened the choice of 
experts who are eligible to be considered as members of the SSB to a bigger, if 
not all, range of talents. The GSIFI No.1 also mentions the entrusted duties of the 
SSB which include directing, reviewing and supervising the operations of the IFIs 
in ensuring that those business activities are in compliance with the Shariah 
principles.51 Most importantly, the GSIFI No.1 underscores that fatwas and the 
rulings of the SSB are binding on that particular IFI. 
3.4.2 Shariah Review (GSIFI No.2) 
The GSIFI No.2 provides a detailed process for the SSBs to perform the Shariah 
review in order to ensure compliance to the fatwas issued by them. According to 
the GSIFI No.2, the Shariah review is an examination of the IFIs’ compliance in 
all of their business activities with the Shariah law.52 It includes contracts, 
agreements, policies, products, transactions, memoranda and articles of 
association, financial statements, reports and circulars.53 The reason is to ensure 
Shariah requirements such as certified fatwas are followed by their representative 
IFIs. The uniqueness of the GSIFI No.2 is it specifies the management as the 
governance constituent that is responsible to carry out the task to comply with 
Shariah. Each SSB is required to assist the management to work effectively by 
giving advice and to review the execution by expressing their opinion. It is argued 
that an effective Shariah review process will be able to assist the Shariah 
committee in forming their opinion with the appropriate evidence either of the 
Shariah-compliant or non-compliant aspects.54 In this regard, two-way 
communication is vital for both constituents, whereby the SSB should provide 
guidance to the relevant managerial parties and the management is to provide 
sufficient information concerning the Shariah matters to the SSB. 
3.4.3 Internal Shariah Review (GSIFI No.3) 
The internal Shariah review includes the details of the requirements of the 
independent internal Shariah review department or any appropriate arrangement 
to be established within the IFIs as a complement mechanism to assist the SSB. 
It is essential for the IFIs to have such a governance organ, to examine and 
                                            
50 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 1: Shariah Supervision Body, Appointment, 
Composition and Report Standards in AAOIFI (eds) Shariah Standards (Dar 
Almaiman for Publishing and Distributing, Manama 2015). 
51 ibid 
52 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 2: Shariah Review in AAOIFI (eds) Shariah 
Standards (Dar Almaiman for Publishing and Distributing, Manama 2015). 
53 ibid 
54 Mohd Hairul Azrin Besar and others, ‘The Practice of Shariah Review as Undertaken 
by Islamic Banking Sector in Malaysia’ (2009) 5 (1) International Review of Business 
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evaluate the extent of compliance with the fatwas issued by the SSB.55 This 
internal organ is meant to ensure that the management has discharged their duty 
in relation to the implementation of the Shariah rulings as determined by the SSB. 
The GSIFI No.3 emphasises the features of the internal Shariah reviewers as to 
be independence and objectivity.56 To ensure that, the Guiding Principles-3 
recommend that the organisational status of the internal Shariah review should 
not be lower than the internal audit department and the representative personnel 
must have an independent attitude.57  
3.4.4 Audit and Governance Committee for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (GSIFI No.4) 
The purpose of the GSIFI No.4 is to define the role and responsibilities of an Audit 
and Governance Committee (AGC) for the IFIs. It also highlights the prerequisites 
for an effective AGC arrangement. The AGC is essential for the IFIs as its role is 
to achieve the fundamental objectives of the IFIs by enhancing greater 
transparency and disclosure in financial reporting and enhance public confidence 
towards the IFIs by legitimising the authenticity of its compliance with the Shariah 
principles.58 The regarding notions are obtained by assisting the board of 
directors to carry out an independent and objective monitoring system by 
preserving the integrity of the financial report; safeguarding the interest of 
shareholders, investors and other stakeholders; providing a higher reliabilities of 
financial information presented to the board; and acting as independent link 
between the management and IFIs’ stakeholders. 
3.4.5 The Independence of the Shariah Supervisory Board (GSIFI 
No.5) 
Independence is key to customers’ confidence in that it is one of the credential 
elements. In terms of Shariah compliance matters, such a confidence is deemed 
to be earned by the IFIs through a sound Shariah governance arrangement. 59 To 
this point, the GSIFI No.5 is a guidance for the SSB of the IFIs regarding its 
independence on how to monitor such independence along with the rectification 
actions to resolve any issues relating to independence. It is rather intriguing to 
realise that the present standards provide a clear understanding of independence 
                                            
55 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 3: Internal Shariah Review in AAOIFI (eds) 
Shariah Standards (Dar Almaiman for Publishing and Distributing, Manama 2015). 
56 The similar concept applied to the internal audit practices. See also Besar and others 
(n 54) 302. 
57 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 3 (n 55). 
58 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 4: Audit and Governance Committee for Islamic 
Financial Institutions in AAOIFI (eds) Shariah Standards (Dar Almaiman for 
Publishing and Distributing, Manama 2015). 
59 See also Hussain G Rammal, ‘The Importance of Shariah Supervision in Islamic 
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for the SSB members to perceive. It is an attitude of mind which does not allow 
the viewpoints and conclusions of its possessor to become reliant on or 
subordinate to influence or pressures of the conflicting interests. To achieve that 
is through an organisational status and in an objective way.60  
 
Additionally, the GSIFI No.5 also envisages that the SSB members ought to be 
objective. Such an open-ended conception is also quantified by the standards 
where it is defined as an independent mental attitude which SSB members should 
maintain while performing a Shariah supervision.  The SSB members are not to 
subordinate their judgment on the Shariah supervision matters to that  of others.61 
In order to maintain the demanded attitude, the SSB members should 
continuously assess their relationships with their IFIs to identify any situations 
that may impair independence and resolve it or report to the SSB such situations 
in which an issue of independence impairment is present or may reasonably be 
inferred, and how to resolve it. Any independence impairments such as financial 
involvement of affairs with clients and personal or family relationships should be 
documented and reviewed internally with the SSB.62  
3.4.6 Statement on Governance Principles for Islamic Financial 
Institutions for Islamic Financial Institutions (GSIFI No.6) 
The GSIFI No.6, issued in 2009, is considered as the latest version of the AAOIFI 
governance standards in terms of the conceptualisation of the Shariah 
governance for the IFIs’ implementation. The statements of the present standards 
as the successor are rather comprehensive compared to the prior standards. The 
purpose of the GSIFI No.6, amongst others is to lay down the key principles and 
concepts relevant to the IFIs’ governance system.63 It is also to establish the 
foundation upon which the development of future governance or compliance 
standards will take place. In order to do so, the present standards seek to ensure 
that those charged with governance and those employed by an IFI, as well as 
those associated with an IFI in any important functional capacity shall perform 
their respective roles effectively and in a manner that is consistent with Shariah. 
As with its predecessors, among the characteristics of the GSIFI No. 6 are 
enhancing the confidence of the industry towards the IFIs and to ensure Shariah 
                                            
60 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 5: Independence of Shariah Supervisory Board in 
AAOIFI (eds) AAOIFI Shariah Standards (Dar Almaiman for Publishing and 
Distributing, Manama 2015). 
61 ibid 
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compliance.64 To obtain such notions, the Guiding Strandard-6 somehow has 
been the first standards enlisted with the principles of the Shariah governance. 
 
Principles Annotations 




An IFI should establish an effective structure for 
ensuring the Shariah compliance.  Such a structure 
should cover effectiveness of the role played by BOD, 
SSB, management, and auditors in so far as they relate 
to Shariah compliance. 
 
Principle 2:  
Fair treatment of 
equity holders 
An IFI should provide the equity holders with voting 
rights, adequate opportunity to have a dialogue with the 
institution, ability to select members of the governing 
BOD and SSB and also ensure fair disclosure of 
financial and banking practices adopted to allow them to 
make appropriate decisions regarding their investment 
in the IFI.  
Principle 3:   
Equitable 




An IFI should ensure equitable and unbiased treatment 
of fund providers and other significant stakeholders and 
associated investments as well as in relation to the 
provision of adequate financial and non-financial 
information to allow them to take appropriate decisions 
regarding their dealing with the institution. 
Principle 4:  




An IFI should lay down a set of criteria to govern the 
appointment of persons to serve on the BOD and SSB 
as well as for appointment of management.  
Principle 5:  
Effective oversight 
The BOD should play an effective role in leadership, 
direction and monitoring the implementation of its 
policies as well as in promoting a sound control of the 
Shariah-compliant culture within the IFI. 




An IFI should have an audit and governance committee 
whose role and responsibilities are set in appropriate 
terms of reference which should include, among other 
matters, the process for financial reporting, internal 
controls, internal audit oversight, external audit 
oversight and Shariah compliance. 
Principle 7:  
Risk management 
The BOD of an IFI should be actively involved in setting 
the risk appetite and should make sure that there are 
appropriate policies and systems for identification, 
measurement, analysis, reporting and mitigation of 
risks.  










An IFI should set appropriate governance structures to 
ensure that members of BOD, members of SSBs, 
management and staff as well as external parties, such 
as external auditors, rating agencies, and other parties 






An IFI should set appropriate governance structures in 
relation to remuneration policies for the BOD, SSB and 
management. Compensation policies should be 
developed on an independent and transparent basis.  
Principle 10: 
Public disclosures 
An IFI should adopt high standards of reporting and 
satisfy the information needs of owners, investment 
accountholders, other counterparties, regulatory,  
Zakah and other related  agencies. The IFI should 
maintain high standards of transparency and market 
discipline to build trust with shareholders and other 
stakeholders. Accurate, adequate, timely and fair 
reporting of financial and non-financial performance 
measures should be ensured.  
Principles 11: 
Code of conduct 
and ethics 
An IFI should adopt policies, procedures consistent with 
Shariah to promote a code of ethical and responsible 
behaviour by members of BOD, members of SSB, 







An IFI should have a mechanism to ensure that the 
principles and standards on governance are adhered to 
and monitored. 
Table 2 : The GSIFI No.6 Shariah Governance Principles Annotations 
 
3.4.7 Corporate Social Responsibility Conduct and Disclosure for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (GSIFI No. 7) 
The corporate social responsibilities (CSR) of the IFIs refers to the activities 
carried out by the IFIs to fulfil their religious, legal, economic, ethical and 
discretionary responsibilities as financial intermediaries.65 Essentially, the CSR 
that are implemented by the IFIs do not implement completely similar approaches 
as compared with their conventional counterpart. The GSIFI No.7 disclosed the 
peculiar characteristics of the IFIs’ CSR implementation onto achieving such 
responsibilities. The intriguing part of the present standards is that it has broken 
                                            
65 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 7: Corporate Social Responsibility Conduct and 
Disclosure for Islamic Financial Institutions in AAOIFI (eds) Shariah Standards (Dar 
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down those responsibilities into mandatory and recommended. In terms of the 
religious perspective, as the Shariah compliance is the highest concern of the 
IFIs, the adherence with Shariah principles ought to be a mandatory.66 The IFIs 
are even responsible to ensure that their potential client’s business criteria 
comply with the notion underscored by the Shariah principles. To do so, the IFIs 
should arrange a proper and sound screening mechanism executed by the SSB 
on such a matter.67 In the same vein, any prohibited earning and expenditure 
through their operations are also the subject mentioned by the GSIFI No.7. 
Appropriate measures and the organs in-charge should be clearly stated by the 
IFIs to carry out those responsibilities. 
3.4.8 Viewpoints on the AAOIFI Standards 
The primary purpose of the standards published by the AAOIFI is to support the 
development of sound and prudent governance practices within the IFIs. To do 
so, the approach of the AAOIFI standards is stand on a ‘comply or explain’ basis. 
This notion is perceived by the IFIs as an obligation, whereby if they do not 
comply, they have to come up with sensible and reasonable explanations.68 Such 
an approach, it is believed could provide flexibility in terms of the implementation 
and mechanism to assess the compliance aspects.69 Owing to the multiverse 
jurisdiction complexities, the AAOIFI employ a vigilant notion as promoted by the 
OECD. The OECD principles as soft law are non-binding and do not aim at 
detailed prescriptions for national legislation.70 This ‘comply or explain’ is 
embedded in the implementation process of the standards in order to ensure that 
the provisions recommended by the standard-setters are workable and flexible 
for any kind of regulatory requisites. This implementation method is also the key 
to arouse the concern of the IFIs regardless of their jurisdiction regarding the best 
way to deploy the recommended provisions. A process that will provide the 
AAOIFI with reliable responses and suggestions that are to be made use in the 
future. 
 
The AAOIFI Shariah governance standards do not favour any single corporate 
governance theories either. However, the likelihood is that the standards put 
more emphasis on the stakeholders as the relationship between the IFIs and their 
stakeholders is rather diversified as compared to the conventional counterparts. 
                                            
66 See also Nasser M Suleiman, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks’ (2000) Arab 
Gateway 98. 
67 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 7 (n 65). 
68 See also Andrew Keay, ‘Comply of Explain in Corporate Governance Codes: in Need 
of Greater Regulatory Oversight?’ (2014) 34 (2) Legal Studies 279, 287 
69 See also David Seidl and others, Applying ‘Comply or Explain’: Conformance with 
Codes of Corporate Governance in the UK and Germany (Centre for Business 
Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper no. 389) 
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Since the IFIs utilise the mudarabah instrument on their contractual agreement 
with the shareholders as well as to some customers, such as in the case of the 
IAHs, the stakeholders of the IFIs are the only ones with something at stake, but 
some of the customers somehow share the same risk akin to the shareholders. 
In this regard, the IFIs’ governance model, to some extent, is a stakeholder-
oriented model as mentioned by Iqbal and Mirakhor.71  
 
In terms of the Shariah governance structural models, none of the AAOIFI 
standards mentioned any specific model that is considered the best and most 
favourable. Additionally, all standards have recognised the peculiarities of each 
jurisdiction by recommending universal guiding principles, not only to fulfil the 
IFIs’ requirements, but also those promulgated by other standard-setters, either 
internationally or nationally. Most importantly, the IFIs must strive their effort to 
follow the recommendations consequently based on their legal stipulations, 
institutional arrangement, market flexibility and their capability to absorb the 
modifications.72 Essentially, the guiding standards have no intention of imposing 
a single model to fit all the needs of the multiple jurisdictions, as far as they put 
their commitment towards the betterment of the Shariah compliance governance 
mechanism. 
 
One of the main concerns of the AAOIFI standards, especially the GSIFI No. 6, 
is equal treatment for the equity-holders or the shareholders. As emphasised by 
the BCBS best practice of corporate governance, each shareholder is to be 
treated equally regardless of the size of their shares.73 The primary reference of 
the both, BCBS and the AAOIFI seem to be in agreement when dealing with 
multiple sizes of shareowners. However, for the IAHs of the IFIs, this notion is 
imperative and rather more significant, as they hold the rights akin to the 
shareholders to obtain timely financial or non-financial information concerning the 
IFIs business progress to allow them to make sensible decisions. A unique 
governance challenge has eventually emerged due to the specific nature of the 
IFIs including the recognition of the IAHs as one of the shareholder alike 
stakeholders.74 
 
                                            
71 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, 'Stakeholders Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economics System' (2004) 11(2) Islamic Economics Studies 43. 
72 See also Ahmed and Khatun (n 31). 
73 BCBS, (Guidelines Corporate Governance Principles for Banks 2015) 
74 Alejandro Lopez Mejia and others, Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks (IMF 
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3.5 The Islamic Financial Services Board Shariah Governance 
Codes 
Another prominent standard-setter for Islamic finance is the Islamic Financial 
Services Board (IFSB), based in Kuala Lumpur. The IFSB was officially 
inaugurated on 3rd November 2002 and started operations on 10th March 2003.  
Since then, the IFSB has issued several guiding principles and standards for the 
Islamic financial industry to ensure its soundness and stability.75 The IFSB serves 
as an international standard-setter of regulatory and supervisory agencies with 
interest in ascertaining the soundness and stability of the Islamic financial 
services industry, which is defined broadly to include banking, capital market and 
insurance. In advancing this mission, the IFSB promotes the development of a 
prudent and transparent Islamic financial services industry through introducing 
new, or adapting existing international standards consistent with the Shariah 
principles, and recommends them for adoption.76 It plays a remarkable role in 
developing prudential standards and guiding principles unique to the Islamic 
financial industry.77 To this end, the work of the IFSB complements that of the 
AAOIFI as the international standard-setting body for the IFIs, as well as the 
OECD and the BCBS as the international corporate governance best practices 
advocates. 
3.5.1 The Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance for 
Institutions Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-3) 
The Guiding Principles of Corporate Governance for Institutions Offering Only 
Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-3), published in 2006, is the first document 
pertaining to Shariah governance guiding principles issued by the IFSB. It is the 
third set of guiding principles produced by the respective body, which comes after 
Guiding Principles of Risk Management for Institutions (other than Insurance 
Institutions) Offering Only Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-1) and Capital 
Adequacy Standard for Institutions (other than Insurance Institutions) Offering 
Only Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-2). This document excluded the Islamic 
Insurance (Takaful) institutions and the Islamic mutual funds from its scope as 
those forms of institutions will be mentioned in other documents. 
 
The IFSB-3 Guiding Principles was designed to achieve the objective of 
facilitating the IFIs in establishing and implementing effective corporate 
governance practices.78 It is said that a sound and prudent governance 
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formulated from Shariah and ethical perspective is rather crucial for the proper 
functions of the IFIs.79 Most importantly, the IFSB-3 aims to complement the 
corporate governance principles issued by the OECD, the BCBS and other 
international standard-setting bodies.  
 
Each consecutive part of the IFSB-3 are summarised as below;80 
Parts Principles Annotation 
Part 1: General 
Governance 
Approach of IFI 
Principle 1.1: IFI shall establish a comprehensive 
governance policy framework which sets out the 
strategic roles and functions of each organ of 
governance and mechanisms for balancing the IFI’s 
accountabilities to various stakeholders. 
Principle 1.2: IFI shall ensure that the reporting of 
their financial and non-financial information meets the 
requirements of internationally recognized 
accounting standards which are compliance with 
Shariah rules and principles and are applicable to the 
Islamic financial services industry as recognized by 
the supervisory authorities of the country. 
Part 2: Rights of 
Investment Account 
Holders (IAHs)  
 
Principle 2.1: IFI shall acknowledge IAHs’ right to 
monitor the performance of their investments and the 
associated risks, and put into place adequate means 
to ensure that these rights are observed and 
exercised. 
Principle 2.2: IFI shall adopt a sound investment 
strategy which is appropriately aligned to the risk and 
return expectations of IAH (bearing in mind the 
distinction between restricted and unrestricted IAH), 
and be transparent in smoothing any returns. 
Part 3: Compliance 
with Shariah Rules 
and Principles  
 
 
Principle 3.1: IFI shall have in place an appropriate 
mechanism for obtaining rulings from Shariah 
scholars, applying fatāwā and monitoring Shariah 
compliance in all aspects of their products, 
operations and activities.  
Principle 3.2: IFI shall comply with the Shariah rules 
and principles as expressed in the rulings of the IFI’s 
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Shariah scholars. The IFI shall make these rulings 
available to the public. 
Part 4: Transparency 
of Financial 
Reporting in Respect 
of Investment 
Accounts  
Principle 4: IFI shall make adequate and timely 
disclosure to IAH and the public of material and 
relevant information on the investment accounts that 
they manage. 
Table 3 : The IFSB-3 Principles Annotations 
 
3.5.2 Viewpoints on the IFSB-3 
The IFSB-3 comes with two approaches. It emphasises the structure and process 
of the related governance organs and then followed by the recommendation of 
best practices.81 Each approach is designed to achieve the primary objective of 
establishing a Shariah-compliance supervision mechanism in the IFIs corporate 
governance systems. In this respect, the IFSB-3 recognises the magnitude of 
such a notion as to ensure and enhance the confidence of the customers of the 
IFIs. 
 
There are four significant features that could be credited as the characteristics of 
the IFSB-3 as the first Shariah governance codes, disclosed and disseminated 
by the IFSB. First, the IFSB-3 introduces the viewpoint embraced by the IFIs 
towards other related corporate governance codes, especially those which 
published by the OECD and the BCBS. The IFSB stand is monotone with that of 
the OECD and the BCBS as well as other Islamic finance standard-setters like 
the AAOIFI. It is worth mentioning that any ideas proposed for the betterment of 
the operation of the IFIs as business institutions are acceptable in the event that 
they do not contravene with any Shariah principles. Therefore, it is the obligation 
of the IFIs to confirm such intent to be embedded within their governance system. 
However, any peculiarities which exist are recognisable by all codes, as one size 
does not fit all and there is no single model that could satisfy all the necessities. 
This approach is believed to be more adaptable regardless of their jurisdictions 
or market flexibilities or the size of the firm and its annual growth.82  
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Second, as one of the foundations of a set-up of a more sophisticated Shariah 
governance system, the IFSB-3 mentions the processes for obtaining rulings 
from Shariah scholars, applying fatwas and monitoring Shariah compliance.83 
The processes include both the ex-ante and the ex-post aspects of all financial 
transactions carried out by the IFIs that is, to ensure the Shariah compliance of 
the contracts and, later, the performance of obligations under the contracts; and 
the operations of the IFIs, including aspects such as the Shariah compliance 
review, investment policies, disposal of Shariah non-compliant income and 
charitable activities. At this point, a prudent internal Shariah compliance reviewer 
should act as a catalyst for the Shariah committee to carry out their duty more 
effectively.84 Both members of the Shariah committee and internal assisting 
constituents ought to acquire ‘fit and proper’ criteria to carry out their task.85 It is 
considered the factor that will strengthen public confidence in the Shariah 
compliance process of the IFIs.  
 
Third, as the introduction of an additional layer of governance of the IFIs, the 
IFSB-3 comes with solutions to rectify possible redundancies. As we know, 
Shariah governance is somehow new and has only emerged recently compared 
to its counterpart. As a result, many elements and roles of this additional feature 
may duplicate or overlap with the existing governance system. Therefore, the 
IFSB-3 recommends the IFIs establish the Governance Committee to oversee 
such an issue. The Governance Committee comprises three personnel, a 
member of the audit committee, a Shariah scholar and a non-executive director. 
This committee is meant to coordinate and integrate the implementation of the 
IFSB-3 policy framework and provide the board of directors with reports and 
recommendations based on their findings in the exercise of their functions.86 It is 
to be noted that the Governance Committee works for the interest of the 
stakeholders, not for the shareholders alone.87 On the other hand, the audit 
committee places their attention on the shareholders, as it ought to be.  
 
Fourth, the IFSB-3 emphasises the relationship between the IFIs and the 
Investment Account Holders (IAHs). IAHs are more akin to shareholders than 
stakeholders. The mudarabah financial instrument utilised in regard of the IAHs’ 
investment account contract means they bear the risk of losing the invested 
capital, in a similar way as the shareholders. Despite the fact they do not invest 
the capital to own the shares, the contract has elevated their position that as the 
owners of the respective IFIs to a certain point and they bear the risk of poor 
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performance of the investment pool, and are not excluded from misconduct on 
the part of the financial institutions.88 This arrangement is one of the peculiarities 
of the IFIs that need a thorough engagement in terms of their governance 
mechanism. The list of the stakeholders of the IFIs are not fully congruous with 
the conventional financial institutions. Other than that, more prudent investment 
strategies are applicable to the management of the IFIs to appropriately align the 
risk and the return, as expected by the IAHs.89 The degree of transparency 
somehow outweights the typical governance arrangement as the IAHs also hold 
the right to access information with a high degree of transparency regarding their 
investment necessities.90 However, to some extent, it is rather impractical to 
provide the IAHs with all documents and information that go to the shareholder.91 
3.5.3 Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10) 
The Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services (IFSB-10) is expected amongst others to highlight in 
more detail the supervisory authorities and the components of a sound Shariah 
governance system, with regard to competence, independence, confidentiality 
and consistency of Shariah committees.92 The IFSB-10 sees the Shariah 
governance as referring to structures and processes to oversee the Shariah 
compliance matters. It also defines what Shariah governance truly is. According 
to the IFSB-10, Shariah governance is a set of institutional and organisational 
arrangements through which an IFI ensures that there is effective oversight of 
Shariah compliance over certain structures and processes.93  
 
In terms of the Shariah governance structures, IFSB-10 envisages the 
importance of the Internal Shariah Compliance Unit (ISCU) in assisting the 
Shariah committee in carrying out the day-to-day operation of the IFIs. The 
Shariah committee is also to be assisted by the Internal Shariah Audit or Review 
Unit (ISRU) in order to verify that the Shariah compliance has been satisfied 
within the IFIs’ operations. Any incident of non-compliance will be recorded and 
reported and, if possible, addressed and rectified by the ISRU as a similar 
governance component as the internal audit committee. It is the first appearance 
of such an organisational arrangement by a Shariah governance code despite 
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the similar notion already being well-embedded in prior codes, such as the IFSB-
3. 
 
As for the Shariah governance processes, the IFSB-10 gives an emphasis on the 
procedure to issue a Shariah pronouncement or a fatwa and the dissemination 
process of relevant Shariah-related documents to the operative personnel of the 
IFIs. Such a task would be executed by the ISCU. Because of the characteristics 
of the processes, the task must be undertaken by a designated department or 
well-equipped officers with a certain set of skills, with relevant and specialised 
Shariah knowledge as well as monitoring techniques.94 In relation to the Shariah 
pronouncement, the IFSB-10 interpreted the connotation of the Shariah scholars, 
who are the members of the Shariah committees. The word ‘scholars’ has been 
preferred by the IFSB-10 as a translation for alim, which refers to a person who 
is learned and expert with a specialised level of Shariah financial law or fiqh 
muamalat, rather than the general knowledge of Shariah or other areas of Islamic 
studies.95 A ‘fit and proper’ criterion has been imposed on the members of the 
Shariah committee as an assurance of competency, whilst they carry out their 
duties.96 It is the duty of the management, especially the board of directors, to 
cultivate Shariah-compliant culture within the IFIs operations and organisational 
behaviours.97  
 
Each consecutive part of the IFSB-10 are summarised as follows;98 
Part I relates to the general approach to a Shariah governance system, 
whereby various ex-ante and ex-post processes considered as 
essential parts of good governance practices in other 
internationally recognised governance standards, such as the 
precise terms of reference for Shariah boards, appropriate 
alignment of incentives, proper record-keeping, adoption of a 
professional code of ethics, etc., are adapted in order to strengthen 
the Shariah governance system. 
Part II in the area of competence, suggests various measures to ensure 
reasonable expertise and skill-sets in Shariah boards, and to 
evaluate their performance and professional development. 
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Part III aims at safeguarding the independence of Shariah boards, 
particularly from the management of IFI, by highlighting various 
issues arising from potential conflicts of interest and 
recommending how they should be managed. 
Part IV emphasises the importance of observing and preserving 
confidentiality by the organs of Shariah governance. 
Part V focuses on improving consistency in terms of the professionalism 
of members of the Shariah board, which would be crucial in 
enhancing their credibility and confirming their integrity through a 
set of best practices. 
Table 4 : The IFSB-10 Executive Summary 
 
Parts Principle Annotations 










Principle 1.1:  
The Shariah governance structure adopted by the IFI should 
be  commensurate and proportionate with the size, 
complexity and nature of its business .   
Principle 1.2:  
Each IFI must ensure that the Shariah board has :  
clear terms of reference regarding its mandate and 
responsibility ;  
well-defined operating procedures and lines of reporting; 
and  
good understanding of, and familiarity with, professional 
ethics and conduct .  
Part II: 
Competence   
 
Principle 2.1:  
The IFI shall ensure that any person mandated with 
overseeing the Shariah  Governance System fulfils 
acceptable fit and proper criteria .  
Principle 2.2: 
The IFI shall facilitate continuous professional development 
of persons serving on its Shariah board, as well as its ISCU 
and ISRU, 
Principle 2.3:  
There should be a formal assessment of the effectiveness of 
the Shariah board as a whole and of the contribution by each 








Principle 3.1:  
The Shariah board should play a strong and independent 
oversight role , with adequate capability to exercise objective 
judgement on Shariah-related matters. No individual or group 
of individuals shall be allowed to dominate the Shariah 
board’s decision-making .  
Principle 3.2:  
In order to fulfil their responsibilities, the Shariah board 
should be provided  with complete, adequate and timely 




Principle 4.1:  
Shariah board members should ensure that internal 
information obtained in  the course of their duties is kept 





The IFI should fully understand the legal and regulatory 
framework for issuance of Shariah 
pronouncements/resolutions in the jurisdiction where it 
operates. It  should ensure that its Shariah board strictly 
observes the said framework and, wherever  possible, 
promotes convergence of the Shariah governance 
standards. 
Table 5 : The IFSB-10 Guiding Principles Annotations 
 
3.5.4 Viewpoints on the IFSB-10 
As a universal code of the Shariah governance, adaptable to all sorts of the 
Shariah governance models, the IFSB-10 has provided many prominent features 
that need to be addressed vigilantly. First, as its most prominent features, it 
describes an explicit definition of the Shariah governance.  It refers to the set of 
institutional and organisational arrangements through which the IFIs ensure that 
there is effective independent oversight of Shariah compliance.99  As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, to this point, the Shariah governance could be an attribute 
of the job of setting the direction.100 This definition also implies that the institution 
of the Shariah committee is crucial to the Shariah governance system as an 
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authoritative body ensuring Shariah compliance.101 Most importantly, the 
definition given by the IFSB is a cutting-edge effort in understanding what the 
Shariah governance is really about. 
 
Second, the IFSB-10 promotes the approach of ‘no single model’ or ‘one size fits 
all’ which somehow matches not only with the IFSB-3 but also to that of the OECD 
and the BCBS codes. This approach is rather vital for the Shariah governance 
codes, so it is implementable, regardless of the jurisdictional characteristics. 
According to Part I, the guiding principles of IFSB-10, the codes are adaptable to 
any sort of Shariah governance models.102 Sole argued that the introduction of 
the IFIs in the conventional legal system has aggravated the supervisory 
authorities.103 Therefore, it is imperative to the regulators of the related markets 
to choose an appropriate Shariah governance structure so that it could safeguard 
the fulfilment of fiduciary duties including good faith, care, skill and diligence 
towards the stakeholders.104  
 
Third, the IFSB-10 explicitly lists the primary functions of the Shariah governance 
components in ensuring Shariah compliance which have no contravention with 
other governance standards. It enhances and strengthens the functions of the 
Shariah committee and the relating constituents to ensure Shariah compliance.105 
Those functions divided into the ex-ante and the ex-post processes. The ex-ante 
process refers to the consideration that should take place during the development 
of the products before it can be offered to the customers.106 At this point, the role 
of the members of the Shariah committee is extremely critical because such a 
stage includes the issuance of Shariah pronouncements or fatwas and the 
compliance checks. If this Shariah certification process is well-managed, by 
anticipating potential impacts of the products or services to the customers, 
possible rejection from the targeted market could be prevented.107 Regarding 
this, reputable and credible Shariah committee members, the support system by 
the internal Shariah department and the officer and sufficient number of members 
of the Shariah committee are considered the primary concern of the IFSB-10. 
Meanwhile, the ex-post process refers to the consideration that should be given 
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to observe the product-offering stage.108 The affirmation of the implementation of 
the designated fatwa applicable to the products is the primary topic of the 
observation. Other than that, this stage is also essential to monitoring the 
consistency of the compliance and the effectiveness of the Shariah risk 
management during product offering.  
 
Fourth, the IFSB-10 underscores that the mandated person to oversee the 
Shariah compliance should be competent or fulfill the ‘fit and proper’ criteria.109  
Such criteria are meant to be acquired by the members of the Shariah committee 
as well as the Shariah officers of the ISCU. Each member ought to present a 
good characters, one of honesty, integrity, fairness and reputation, and he/she 
also needs to show competence, diligence, capability and soundness of the 
judgement. One of the keys to quantifying the required competencies is, the 
members of the Shariah committee should demonstrate the capacity to carry out 
such an exhaustive responsibility successfully during the designated tenure.110 
As for the ISCU, amongst other things, Shariah officers should acquire adequate 
training in Shariah, possess of additional qualifications in the relevant areas, and 
demonstrate good communication skills to work effectively and good 
organisational skills to work with other governance constituents.111 The notion is 
to put the members of the Shariah committee in a challenging position, to 
ascertain their accountability and independence in discharging their duty, or 
otherwise the function of Islamic religious ideology to act as an incentive 
mechanism to reduce inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information and 
moral hazard will be gone in vain.112 It is worth mentioning here that the ‘fit and 
proper’ notion in the IFSB-10 also quantifies most of the open-ended features 
proposed by the superseded IFSB-3 as well as the AAOIFI standards.  
 
Fifth, in order to ensure consistency of the competencies, the IFSB-10 urges the 
IFIs to have continuous development and training in relating skills for the relating 
Shariah governance constituents. To this end, IFSB-10 recommends the IFIs to 
develop in-house training for the Shariah committee members and the Shariah 
officers of the ISCU and the ISRU, as the mechanism to confirm that they have 
acquired and consistently possessed the minimum level of competencies.113 It is 
believed that knowledge of Shariah depends on the scholars, as well as the 
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officers that have undergone rigorous and proper studies and training.114 Hence, 
the IFIs are also urged to adopt a proper mechanism to assess the effectiveness 
of those respective parties. This kind of assessment is crucial as assurance for 
the IFIs whether to reappoint their members or to nominate new members and it 
is closely related to the notion of ‘fit and proper’ criteria as mentioned beforehand. 
 
Sixth, to avoid information asymmetry, the IFSB-10 stresses to the management, 
the obligation to provide adequate documentation to the Shariah committee 
timely and in advance of each meeting. In relation to this matter, the IFSB-3 as 
the preceding code, recommended that the IFIs should develop comprehensive 
procedures and policies for the Shariah committee to have access to the relevant 
documents and information. To ensure governance efficiency, this aspect should 
be complied by the IFIs, cautiously. However, it is also to be dealt with diligent to 
avoid excessive exposure of sensitive documents and information to the Shariah 
members as the external parties. This is because a weak and feeble processing 
of such a matter would jeopardise the confidentialities of the respective 
documents, especially when it consists of strategic business information. In this 
regard, the IFSB-10 also reminds the Shariah committee members to ensure the 
internal information is kept confidential. However, in some cases, the respective 
IFI would be better off through greater transparency on their ‘intellectual 
properties’ as those innovations might also somehow be benefitted by others in 
the way it could possibly increase trade volumes as well as market activities.115  
3.6 Malaysian Shariah Governance Codes 
In the conventional corporate governance realm, the UK is one of the jurisdictions 
that took a distinguished lead on the issuance of codes of best practices, from 
the Cadbury report in 1992 to the UK Corporate Governance Code in 2016.116 
Similar development appears to have taken place in Malaysia, in terms of the 
development of the Shariah governance codes. As the hub for the global Islamic 
financial industry, Malaysia has an advanced legal system and operational 
mechanisms to accommodate Islamic finance as compared to other jurisdictions, 
especially the Middle-East countries.117 Those advantages were acknowledged 
by the 2016 Islamic Finance Development Indicator report, in which Malaysia was 
highlighted as one of the best countries along with Bahrain and Pakistan in terms 
of its governance of the IFIs.118 In this regard, Malaysia’s endeavour has 
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contributed a number of reputable documents to the Shariah governance 
framework. There are two codes of best practices regarding to the Shariah 
governance, which are Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee 
of the Islamic Financial Institution (GPS-1) and the Shariah Governance 
Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions (SGF). Prior to those documents, in 
1983, Malaysia regulated the IFIs to include the Shariah committee in their 
articles of association to oversee their operation through the Islamic Banking Act 
1983 (IBA 1983), which could be regarded as an advance approach as opposed 
to the other Islamic financial players. The BNM has been playing an important 
role in ensuring that the overall Islamic financial system operates in accordance 
with the Shariah principles. Such a role is to be carried out by the two-tier Shariah 
governance model, comprising two indicative components, which are a 
centralised Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) nationally, formed since 1997, and 
Shariah committees within each respective IFIs institutionally.  
3.6.1 Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee of 
the Islamic Financial Institution 
The proliferation of Malaysian Shariah governance arrangement started from the 
issuance of specific guidelines for Shariah governance in 2004 which known as 
the Guidelines on the Governance of the Shariah Committee of the Islamic 
Financial Institutions (GPS-1).119 The objectives of GPS-1 were to set out the 
rules, regulations and procedures in the establishment of a Shariah Committee; 
to define the role, scope of duties and responsibilities of a Shariah Committee; 
and to define the relationship and working arrangement between a Shariah 
Committee and the SAC of Bank Negara Malaysia.120 It also provides guidance 
to the IFIs on the relationship and working arrangement between a Shariah 
committee and the SAC of the BNM.121 
 
According to GPS-1, IFIs are required to establish a Shariah Committee 
consisting of at least three members.122 The members of the Shariah committee 
are appointed by the board of directors upon recommendation of the IFI’s 
nomination committee and shall obtain prior written approval from the BNM.123 
The proposed member of the Shariah Committee is at least either to acquire the 
qualification of necessary knowledge, expertise or experience in the Islamic 
jurisprudence or Islamic financial law. It is imperative to mention that, to ensure 
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accountability and transparency, the IFIs are not allowed to appoint any member 
of the SAC at the central bank to serve for their Shariah Committees. They also 
should not appoint any member of a Shariah Committee of another IFIs in the 
same industry at the same moment.124 
 
The GPS-1 emphasised the duties and responsibilities of the Shariah committee. 
The Shariah committee is responsible, amongst other tasks, for advising the 
board on Shariah matters and provide Shariah opinions. In order to support the 
Shariah committee to carry out such duties, the IFIs are obliged by the guidelines 
to refer all Shariah issues to the Shariah Committee and to adopt the Shariah 
committee's advice.125 The key element of the GPS-1 is on the list of tasks that 
should be executed by the Shariah committee rather than focusing on the 
structural functions of each Shariah governance constituents. Therefore, the 
formation of the internal Shariah department was not required by the GPS-1. The 
relationship between the institutional Shariah committee and the central bank 
Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) emphasised by the GPS-1 by mentioning the 
legal status of the SAC resolutions. As the sole Shariah authority, the SAC will 
be referred to by the court or arbitrator in disputes or litigations involving Shariah 
matters with the IFIs.126 
3.6.2 Shariah Governance Framework 
To enhance the effectiveness of the Shariah committee as proposed by the 
preceding guidelines, and to cater to the market demand for a comprehensive 
Shariah supervision model, the BNM issued other guidelines pertaining to the 
Shariah governance in 2010 known as Shariah Governance Framework for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (SGF). The SGF has been implemented by the 
Malaysian IFIs since early 2011.127  
 
As argued by Ramli, the introduction of the SGF is to achieve its primary 
objective, which is to enhance the role of the board, the Shariah Committee and 
the management in relation to Shariah matters.128 The SGF superseded the 
GPS-1 by amplifying the functions of the Shariah committee and emphasising the 
responsibility of the stakeholders to ensure that the operations of the IFIs are 
                                            
124 BNM, (Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 2010) 32; 
This will be known as SGF 2010 hereafter. 
125 BNM, Guidelines 2004 (n 119). 
126 ibid 1. 
127 Hassan and others (n 121). 
128 Nathasa Mazna Ramli and others, ‘Shariah Governance Disclosure Index and 
Institutional Ownership of Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia’ (paper 
presented at the 5th Asia-Pacific Business Research Conference 17-18 February 
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conducted in compliance with Shariah.129 The significant features that exist in the 
SGF include a wider range of Shariah governance constituents. It includes the 
board of directors and the management of the IFIs, instead of only focusing on 
the Shariah committee. The SGF sets out new requirements for the IFIs to 
ascertain a proper Shariah governance structures, processes and arrangement 
in order to fulfil its fiduciary duty to supervise the conformity of the IFIs in Shariah 
matters. The SGF also puts a heavy emphasis on the functions of Shariah review, 
Shariah audit, Shariah risk management and Shariah research.130  
 
As compared to the GPS-1, the SGF emphasises the functions of the internal 
Shariah department, which are, to some extent, in coherence with the IFSB-10. 
In this regard, it is argued that Malaysia has tailored a corporate governance 
framework under the guiding principles of the IFSB and in view local 
circumstance, to specifically address the issues of the IFIs.131 Technically, the 
SGF addresses 8 Shariah governance subjects of board of directors (BOD), 
Shariah supervisory board (SSB), internal Shariah review (ISR), Shariah audit 
(SA), Shariah risk management (SRM), Shariah research (SR), management 
(M), and Shariah secretariat (SS).132 The functions and connections of each 
Shariah governance mechanisms enshrined by the SGF, depicted by diagram 
2.133 
                                            
129 Izyan Farhana Zulkarnain and Rosni Hassan, Shariah Governance Structure of IBF 
in Malaysia, Indonesia and Kuwait (Lambert Academic Publishing 2014) 37 
130 Hassan and others (n 121). 
131 Khan and others (n 16). 
132 Ramli, and others (n 128) 5. 








Each consecutive section of the SGF are summarised as below;134 
Sections Annotation 
Section I:  
General 
requirements 




It is the duty and responsibility of an IFI to establish a sound 
and robust Shariah governance framework with emphasis 
placed on the roles of key functionalities in ensuring effective 
implementation of the Shariah governance framework 






An IFI shall set out the accountability and responsibility of 
every key functionary involved in the implementation of 
Shariah governance framework. 
                                            
134 ibid 7-27. 








Independence of the Shariah Committee shall be observed 
at all times in exercising their duties to make objective and 
informed judgment 
Section IV:  
Competency 
Principle 4 
Any person bearing responsibilities outlined in the Shariah 
governance framework for an   IFI shall possess the 
necessary competency and continuously enhance their 
knowledge and understanding on the Shariah as well as keep 





Internal and privileged information obtained by the Shariah 
Committee members in the course of their duties shall be 
kept confidential at all times and shall not be misused.  
Principle 6 
Professional ethics, judgment and consistency shall be 
maintained in ensuring Shariah compliance  






There shall be a robust Shariah compliance function, 
comprising review and audit functions, supported by risk 
mana gement control process and internal research capacity 
Table 6 : The SGF Principles Annotations 
 
3.6.3 Viewpoints on Malaysian Shariah Governance Guidelines 
The SGF is strongly influenced by its Malaysian banking system background, 
which is a dual financial system, whereby conventional and Islamic financial 
systems co-exist and operate in parallel under the supervision of the BNM. The 
approach of the SGF is coherent and complies with the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) for Licenced Institutions, issued by BNM as well. 
The code was formulated based on the fundamental concept of responsibility, 
accountability and transparency as promoted by the OECD and equal treatment 
to the shareholders as promulgated by the BCBS codes.135 Furthermore, the SGF 
is upholding all the promoted notion as far as it has not contravened with the 
Shariah principles of governance and focuses on emphasising the specific 
governance features, peculiar to the IFIs. The SGF has the potential as a 
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reference for similar market systems especially for those upholding a parallel 
banking system. 
 
Furthermore, Malaysia enacted the Islamic Financial Services Act (IFSA 2013) in 
2013. This Act provided a clear division for the Shariah Governance, an action 
that has elevated some elements of the Shariah governance guidelines from soft 
law to hard law. The key point of this division is the appointment of the Shariah 
committee. The IFSA 2013 has clearly states that the division of the Shariah 
governance, by which includes; functions and duties of the board of directors, 
senior officers and members of the Shariah committee of an institution in relation 
to compliance with Shariah; fit and proper requirements or disqualifications of a 
member of a Shariah committee; and internal Shariah compliance functions136. 
 
To a certain degree, the IFSA 2013 resembles the previous IBA 1983, which was 
enacted to allow the establishment of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). 
However, the IFSA 2013 has enshrined the Shariah governance aspects of the 
IFIs whereas the IBA 1983, as an initial act, only underscored the establishment 
of the Shariah committee.137 However, the IBA 1983 could be considered as one 
of the earliest measures has taken by Malaysia that shares the idea of the 
Shariah governance system for the IFIs. The IBA 1983 clearly stated that an 
Islamic bank may seek the advice of the SAC on Shariah matters relating to its 
banking business and the Islamic bank shall comply with the advice of the 
SAC.138 
3.7 Conclusion 
Shariah governance is an evolving subject. Despite its infant modern form, 
market supervision conception is however traceable from classical application 
through rich historical and vast literature proves. Modern Shariah supervision as 
seen in the Shariah committee is a rejuvenation of the hisbah institution to 
oversee economic activities to be in compliance with the Shariah law. As 
happened to the conventional corporate governance counterpart, Shariah 
governance codes are formulated to enhance stakeholders’ confidence. The 
difference, however, is on the focus, which is by assuring the stakeholders that 
their investments are managed Islamically. During the early stages, there was no 
dedicated code, and Shariah governance requirements were left to the existing 
corporate law. 
 
                                            
136 Islamic Financial and Services Act 2013 (Malaysia) s 28. 
137 ibid s 30. 
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Arguably, all Shariah governance codes use the ‘comply or explain’ notion as the 
basis. Therefore, even if the IFIs are subject to multilayer Shariah governance 
codes, to some extent, there would not be significant contradictions. One of the 
reasons is the codes are coherently putting the focus on the formation of Shariah 
committee as the main Shariah governance organs. Other than that, supportive 
constituents are also addressed in a detailed manner namely on their functions.  
As addressed in the viewpoints of this research on the available codes, thus far 
they are considered to be in correspondence with each other. Nevertheless, 
rooms for improvement are acknowledged. One potential improvement 
addresses the underlying principles of the codes, so it could be more 
comprehensible by the stakeholders. Other than that, deep understanding on the 
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Chapter 4  
 
Shariah Governance Models 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a continuity of the previous chapter. By applying the same 
methodological approach, this chapter will describe the existing models of 
Shariah governance as practised by the IFIs. As happens in conventional 
corporate governance, the main reason for those models to be diversified is 
jurisdictional preferences. The IFIs operate in three main modes, which are fully 
Islamic system such as in Iran and Sudan, parallel systems such as in Malaysia, 
Pakistan, Brunei and many others as well as conventional system such as in 
Singapore and the UK.1 Under those multiple jurisdictions, Shariah governance 
models have evolved accordingly in order to fulfil all the IFIs peculiarities as well 
as following the needs of local regulations. However, all models express the 
importance of the Shariah committee as the main constituent that functions as 
the safeguard for the IFIs to operate within the Islamic tenets as we will see in 
the upcoming chapters.  
4.2 Shariah Compliance Process 
Before we go through the prominent issues of this chapter, it is important to have 
an overview of the Shariah compliance process. Shariah compliance process is 
a standard procedure of ensuring the products and services offered by the IFIs 
adhere to the Shariah standards as stipulated by a designated group of experts 
in Shariah and other related areas. Regarding this, Adawiyah has proposed 7 
essential steps of the Shariah compliance process: inception and 
conceptualisation of Islamic instruments; structuring the product according to 
Shariah; legal documentation; execution and implementation of Islamic 
instruments; audit and review; restructuring (if needed); recovery mechanisms 
and dispute resolution.2 However, in terms of its implementation, it is still not in a 
full scale. Researchers have found evidence that the Shariah compliance practice 
is still in its infancy and there is room for improvement in terms of its methods of 
adopting such practices. On this score, Shafii reported that Malaysia, one of the 
main Islamic financial leaders, has only fulfilled 3 of those compliance steps, 
which are inception and conceptualisation of Islamic instrument; structuring the 
product according to Shariah; legal documentation. Another 4 steps are still an 
                                            
1 See also M Hussain and others, ‘An Overview of Islamic Finance’ (IMF Working Paper 
WP/15/20 2015). 
2 Engku Rabiah Adawiyyah Engku Ali, Shariah Framework for Shariah Compliance 
Review (Paper presented in Workshop on Shariah Review, Audit and Governance 
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on-going process.3 However, the recent development of the Central Bank of 
Malaysia Act 2009 (CBMA 2009) and IFSA 2013 in the Malaysian legal system 
have provided more possibilities for the remaining steps to be adopted by the 
IFIs. For instance, according to CBMA 2009, in the case of a dispute, the judge 
shall refer to the interpretations and resolutions of the SAC in Shariah matters.4 
Other than Malaysia, other Islamic finance players are still in the on-going stage 
of adopting those Shariah compliance processes since some of them are merely 
in the early stage of introducing a more complicated Shariah governance model.5 
 
To conclude, perhaps it is appropriate to bring forwards the Shariah compliance 
process, as observed from the published codes. There are five steps of Shariah 
compliance process.6 It starts from the formation of institutional article of 
association (mu’ahadah), which is then followed by supervision (muraqabah), 
audit (muhasabah), rectification (muaqabah) and ends with continuing 
improvement (mujahadah). To realise the process, there must be functional 
governance organs and supporting mechanisms in place. All of those processes 
are supported by the Shariah governance components on each level. But 
amongst others, three main mechanisms that are significant enough to be 
thoroughly addressed: namely, governing law, Shariah supervisory, and Shariah 
audit.7  
 
                                            
3 Zurina Shafii and others, ‘Management of Shariah Non-compliance Audit Risk in the 
Islamic Financial Institutions vie the Development of Shariah Compliance Audit 
Framework and Shariah Audit Programme’ (2010) 3 (2) Kyoto Buletin of Islamic 
Area Studies 3, 8. 
4 Central Bank of Malaysia Act 2009, s 56 (1). 
5 This will be discussed further in the upcoming topics. 
6 See also the following process in diagram 3. 
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4.3 IFIs’ Shariah Supervision Structure 
Shariah supervision structure is another topic to be addressed before we jump 
into the discussion on the existing models of the Shariah governance. It is 
essential to have initial knowledge of the basic organisational arrangement of an 
IFI to carry out Shariah compliance assurance functions. As discussed, the 
primary objective of the IFIs as business entities, is to ensure the stakeholders 
can secure their objectives to optimise their value Islamically.8 In achieving that, 
IFIs have the responsibility to accommodate a system that is upholding Shariah 
law.9 In this regard, the functions of the Shariah governance are fashioned based 
on such an objective which must be suitable for the said interconnected profit and 
non-profit demands respectively.10  
                                            
8 The notion of carrying out the economic activities Islamically connotes to those that are 
in adherence to the Shariah financial laws. 
9 See also Habib Ahmed, ‘Shari’ah Governance Regimes for Islamic Finance: Types and 
Appraisal’ (2011) 44 (4) Journal of Institute of International Economics 393. 
10 Malek Marwan Yousef Injas and others, ‘The Importance of Shariah Supervisory 
Boards (SSBS) in the Islamic Banking System’ (2016) 9 (2) South East Asia Journal 
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In order to do so, other than having a regular structure, such as a board of 
directors as shareholders’ proxies to oversee the management, the IFIs are also 
in need of an extra layer of governance organs to carry out the duty of supervising 
the business under a strict conformity with the Shariah law and the expectations 
of the Muslim community.11 That is what has been referred to by the IFSB as a 
set of institutional and organisational arrangements to ensure effective 
independent oversight of Shariah compliance.12 Note that the notion of Shariah 
compliance does not mean that the IFIs’ operate outside the norms established 
for the conventional counterparts, neither in terms of the overall models and 
structures nor the regulation enforcements.13 The primary concern of the Shariah 
governance as practised by the IFIs is about the existence of a prudent 
mechanism in their governance system, which would guarantee Shariah 
compliance characteristics. This is because, the impact of Shariah non-
compliance is rather vital for the IFIs. In terms of financial impacts, Shariah 
noncompliance means the invalidation of contracts, un-permissible income and 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR).14  Therefore, the IFIs have to put their efforts into 
establishing and enhancing a robust monitoring mechanism in order to carry out 
the Shariah supervision task. 
 
It is believed that having a proper Shariah governance framework is the 
augmentation of compliance with the Shariah principles.15 Regarding this, the 
regulators ought to be reassured that the banks perform their fiduciary duty by 
complying with these principles.16 Furthermore, the existence of a prudent 
Shariah supervision regime has a significant weight in determining the Islamic 
Finance Country Index (IFCI) for the global Islamic Finance Report (GIFR).17 
Because of the need for a Shariah compliance process, the Shariah governance 
models and structures are subject to an additional layer of governance 
mechanism.18 The core element of Shariah governance models and structures is 
                                            
11 Bedj Bedj Toufik, ‘The Role of Shariah Supervisory Board in Ensuring Good Corporate 
Governance Practice in Islamic Banks’ (2015) 2 (2) International Journal of 
Contemporary Applied Sciences 109, 115. 
12 IFSB, (Guiding Principles in Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services 2009). 
13 Yusuf Talal Delorenzo, ‘Shari’ah Compliance Risk’ (2007) 7 (2) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 397, 398. 
14 See also Mohd Nazri Chik, ‘Shariah Audit: Shariah Perspective’ (International Shariah 
Audit Conference and Workshop, Kuala Lumpur 9 Mei 2011) 
15 Hichem Hamza, ‘Sharia Governance in Islamic Banks: Effectiveness and Supervision 
Model’ (2013) 6 (3) International Journal of Islamic and Middle East Finance and 
Management 226, 226. 
16 Ahmed (n 9). 
17 GIFR, (Global Islamic Finance Report 2016) 44-58. 
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the existence of the framework of the Shariah supervision,19 monitoring and 
review mechanism to ascertain Shariah compliance requirements. To carry out 
such a duty, as mentioned by the Shariah governance codes, the IFIs have 
formed the external Shariah committee and the internal Shariah compliance 
department.  
4.3.1 Shariah Committee  
As mentioned earlier, the Shariah committee is one of the structural mechanisms 
accountable to Shariah compliance. It has been considered as one of the most 
powerful institutional arrangements for Shariah governance.20 According to the 
AAOIFI, the Shariah committee is an independent body entrusted with the duty 
of directing, reviewing and supervising the activities of the IFIs in order to ensure 
that they are in compliance with Shariah law.21 These include the advisory 
process of issuing the Shariah resolution (fatwa), supervision and monitoring 
(raqabah) of the compliance aspects and reviewing and auditing (muhasabah).22 
In order to carry out these tasks, the Shariah committee is assisted by the internal 
Shariah compliance department.  
 
The members of the Shariah committee are required to acquire ‘fit and proper’ 
criteria or to accomplish a sufficient level of expertise in Shariah, finance and 
regulations.23 Each Shariah committee has to have a sufficient number of 
members to carry out its duty. To manage the disagreements, an odd number of 
members is normally used. If there are multiple opinions on a single Shariah 
issue, each member of the committee is qualified to the right to cast a vote. To 
some extent, a higher Shariah authority is also constituted at the central or 
national level as a final decision-maker if the disagreement is irreconcilable 
institutionally. 
 
                                            
19 Ahmed (n 9). 
20 Rihab Grassa, ‘Shariah Supervisory Systems in Islamic Finance Institutions Across 
the OIC Member Countries’ (2015) 23 (2) Journal of Financial Regulation and 
Compliance 135, 138. 
21 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 1: Shariah Supervision Body, Appointment, 
Composition and Report Standards in AAOIFI (eds) Accounting, Auditing and 
Governance Standards (Almainan Publication and Distribution, Manama 2015) 885. 
22 See also Zulkifli Hassan, ‘A Survey in Shariah Governance Practices in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK’ (2011) 4 (1) International Journal if Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management 20, 35; Toufik (n 11); Grassa (n 20) 138. 
23 One of the keys to quantify whether the members of the Shariah committee 
demonstrate sufficient required knowledge is through continual assessment and 
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The functions of the Shariah committee involve the ex-ante and the ex-post 
Shariah supervision processes.24 Normally, during the ex-ante process, the 
Shariah committee is involved in product research and development and will 
formally certify compliance by means of fatwa.25 This fatwa endorsement, 
conducted by the Shariah experts, is a crucial means to enhance the confidence 
of the customers that such a product or service has already gone through a due 
diligence process and that it is in adherence not only to the related governing 
laws but also has been scrutinised by the experts on its compliance with Shariah 
law.26 This process is rather sensible to the customers as a fatwa has the capacity 
to immediately relieve an ordinary customer of the burden of having to make such 
due diligence procedures for himself.27 In terms of the ex-post compliance 
process, the survey conducted by Hassan showed that many Shariah committees 
did not conduct the ex-post process as their main concern is more over the ex-
ante aspect of the Shariah matters.28 
 
Other than ensuring the products and the services offered by the IFIs are Shariah-
compliant, the Shariah committee is akin to mitigating the Shariah risk of the IFIs 
as well. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Shariah risk, amongst others, 
including Shariah non-compliance, return rate risk and reputational risk, ought to 
be identified, categorised and mitigated. To perform that, the experts of the 
respective areas are required to assist the Shariah committee to carry out their 
duty. Being able to identify and to anticipate the Shariah compliance risk is an 
important step to providing a consistent framework for managing the risks.29 
Therefore, it is argued that the existence of the internal Shariah compliance 
department to execute such a task is compulsory for the IFIs. 
4.3.2 Shariah Compliance Department 
Apart from Shariah committee, there is the Shariah compliance department, as 
another structural mechanism of the Shariah compliance supervision function. As 
discussed above, Shariah committee will verify transaction compliant aspects to 
its adherence to the endorsed fatwa. It then will be followed by the reviewing and 
auditing process which is executed by an internal Shariah department. Regarding 
this, according to the IFSB-10, it is a requirement for the IFIs to have a designated 
Shariah compliance unit or department or at least a Shariah compliance officer. 
This Shariah compliance department has to be well equipped with the monitoring 
skill and relevant knowledge of Shariah, whether by having a single person who 
                                            
24 IFSB, IFSB-10 (12) 5. 
25 Delorenzo (n 13) 399. 
26 See also Injas (n 10). 
27 Delorenzo (n 13) 398. 
28 Hassan (n 22) 36 
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has both the sets of skills or by assembling a team of staff with a different sets of 
skills.30 
 
During the ex-post Shariah compliance process, internal Shariah compliance 
department roles are more concerned with the implementation of certified fatwas. 
In Malaysia and other countries with established internal Shariah compliance 
departments within the IFIs, the Shariah committee delegates the conducting 
power of such a function to the Internal Shariah Audit, Internal Shariah 
Compliance and Internal Shariah Review units.31 Other than checking on fatwa 
implementation, the ex-post Shariah supervision also includes the task to 
internally disseminate the information on Shariah resolutions to the operative 
personnel within the IFIs. It also has to monitor day-to-day operations of the IFIs 
in order to ensure that they are in compliance with the certified fatwas of the 
Shariah committees. In this vein, for the purpose of the successful management 
of Shariah compliance in all steps, Shariah committee ought to work closely with 
management throughout the process of product development and its cycle.32 
 
The IFIs are also obligated by the IFSB standard to have a designated internal 
Shariah compliance review or unit, to verify the internal Shariah compliance 
process. The internal Shariah review has an established function similar to the 
internal audit unit. The main difference between those two auditory units is on the 
accountability chain. The internal audit report verified by the board of directors, 
and the report of the internal Shariah review certified by the Shariah committee. 
In the event of non-compliance, the internal Shariah review will recommend the 
management of the IFIs on how to address and rectify the issues.33 
4.4 Shariah Governance Supervision Models 
Despite peculiar organisational arrangements such as mentioned above, Shariah 
governance models are mostly influenced by local regulation. In this sense, 
managers of the IFIs are subject to a dualist system of governance, based on the 
principles of the conventional corporate governance imposed by the international 
corporate and financial regulations and by the Islamic version of the governance 
system desired by stakeholders.34 It is worth saying that, in a general sense, the 
IFIs do not to avoid implementation of the universal standards but rather have an 
additional layer of the system to ascertain that such an intertwined requirement 
                                            
30 IFSB, IFSB-10 (12) 3. 
31 Rosni Hassan and others, ‘Report on Empirical Study on Shariah Governance 
Framework (SGF 2010)’ (ISRA Research Paper 68/2014) 1. 
32 Hamza (n 15) 228. 
33 IFSB, IFSB-10 (12) 3. 
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is satisfactory. Accordingly, as asserted by Cadbury, corporate governance is 
affected partly by the law, partly by the participants themselves and by society.35 
Put differently, regulatory provisions from conventional frameworks as well as 
Islamic counterparts have an indicative role in the structural determination of the 
Shariah governance.  
 
As Shariah supervision is a vital duty of the IFIs’ Shariah governance 
constituents, a framework of the functions of a Shariah committee and its 
supportive organs has become the primary concern of the standard-setters.36 
Concerning this, Ahmed mentioned that there are four main approaches of the 
Shariah governance framework: regulatory constructed, robust, passive and 
market-driven.37 From the regulatory view, there are two kinds of Shariah 
supervision models implemented by the IFIs in various jurisdictions.38 On one 
hand, some jurisdictions such as Pakistan and Malaysia require a centralised 
Shariah committee with a handful of power to oversee the institutional Shariah 
committees. It is known as a two-tier Shariah committee model. On the other 
hand, some jurisdictions such as Jordan require only one Shariah committee 
which is the institutional Shariah committees, to carry out the duty of Shariah 
supervision; this is known as a single Shariah committee model. Other than those 
models, there are jurisdictions that have no specific focus on introducing a 
compulsory Shariah committee, neither institutionally nor nationally, but rather 
leaving such arrangements to the demand of the market such as in the UK and 
Saudi Arabia or to their full established Islamic regulatory systems, such as in 
Iran. 
4.4.1 Two-tier Shariah Committee 
The notion of the two-tier Shariah committee implies a requirement for the 
existence of both internal and the external Shariah compliance mechanisms. The 
internal mechanism includes the Shariah committee and Shariah compliance 
department at the institutional level, which are embedded within the IFI’s 
governance structure. However, the external Shariah compliance mechanism 
includes the formation of the centralised Shariah committee at the central bank 
or the existence of an independent national Islamic authority such as a national 
fatwa council that has a certain level of jurisdiction on IFIs Shariah matters. The 
present model is mostly accommodated by the countries with high interference 
                                            
35 Adrian Cadbury, ‘Highlights of the Proposals of the Committee on Financial Aspects 
of Corporate Governance’ in DD Prentive and PRJ Hollad (eds) Contemporary 
Issues in Corporate Governance (2003 OUP). 
36 See also Samy Nathan Garas and Chris Pierce, Shari’a Supervision of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (2010) 18 (4) Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 
386. 
37 See also Ahmed (n 9). 
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from the regulatory authorities.39 It is believed that providing regulatory guidelines 
to the banks will ensure the quality and the consistency of the fatwa certification 
of the Shariah committees at the institutional level.40 It is also has the advantage 
of harmonising the variations in the Shariah opinions of the scholars.41 Arguably, 
the key objective of having such a double-layer mechanism is to enhance 
transparency and accountability of the institutional Shariah committees. 
 
The features of the present model are varied. Firstly, the standardisation of the 
compliance process of the committees addresses the primary concern of both 
central and institutional constituents, which is the assurance of the Shariah 
compliance. The idea is the institutional Shariah committees of the representative 
banks are monitored by a single Shariah committee at the central bank level. The 
main difference is the job prescription of each. The institutional Shariah 
committees are concerned with the adherence of the products and services from 
a particular IFI, without possessing any jurisdiction on other IFIs. The central 
Shariah committee, meanwhile, is granted the jurisdiction to interfere and deal 
with general Shariah compliance issues as well as to rectify the conflicting 
Shariah matters between the Shariah committees or the members of the same 
committee, especially a disagreement or dispute caused by fatwa variations on a 
single Shariah matter. Under this model, the central Shariah committee is entitled 
to codify the applicable Shariah instruments. Therefore, it is believed that it could 
ease the differences in Shariah interpretation.42 As both the central bank and the 
institutional Shariah committees refer to the same Shariah standard, through a 
clear chain of governance, potential disagreements between the internal Shariah 
advisors could also be pacified. 43  
 
The second feature of the present model is the independence of the institutional 
Shariah committee members. The institutional Shariah committees are not under 
the influence of the board of directors but rather under the central Shariah 
committee, which is the central or the highest authority. Institutionally, these 
elements of independence are identified through the appointment, remuneration, 
                                            
39 Hassan (n 22) 34. 
40 Rodney Wilson, ‘Shariah Governance for Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2009) 1 (1) 
ISRA International Journal of Islamic Finance 59, 73. 
41 Alejandro Lopez Mejia and othes, ‘Regulation and Supervision of Islamic Banks’ (IMF 
Working Paper WP/14/219 2014), 14 
42 Muhammad Umer Chapra and Tariqullah Khan, Regulation and Supervisoon of 
Islamic Banks (Islamic Development Bank 2000). 
43 Anne-Sophie Gintzburger, ‘An Analysis of Global Trends and Regional Pockets in 
the Application of Islamic Finance Contracts in Malysia and the Gulf Corporation 
Council’ (Paper presented in International Conference on Islamic Banking & Finance, 
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the mandate and the means of mitigation of conflict of interest.44 In this regard, 
AAOIFI standard requires that the members should be appointed by the general 
meeting.45 In some cases, institutional Shariah committee members were 
appointed by the board of directors with the consent of the central bank as in 
Malaysia and by national religious council as in Indonesia.46 Due to this, it is 
believed that this model could strengthen the position and the independence of 
the institutional Shariah committees.47 The likelihood is that the central Shariah 
committee holds the key on effectiveness of the institutional Shariah committees 
by monitoring the functionality of the respective committees.  
 
Thirdly, the present model is also believed to be capable of mitigating Shariah 
risks. From a business standpoint, leaving the Shariah governance appliance 
only at the bank level could diversify the risks that could adversely affect the 
stability and growth of the industry.48 Muslim stakeholders such as consumers, 
investors and depositors are keen on Shariah compliance matters, because of 
the demand of the consumption of good and wholesome by Shariah.49 Failure to 
meet such an underpinning principles of the Islamic finance would give rise to 
Shariah risk and damage the credibility and the reputation of the IFIs in the eyes 
of the stakeholders, causing a serious loss of trust.50 Therefore, IFIs have to 
ensure that they operate accordingly to the Shariah guidelines. Shariah risks 
such as the Shariah non-compliance risk could affect stakeholders’ confidence in 
the IFIs and exposes the IFIs to other risks such as reputational risk that could 
also hit the IFIs’ asset values severely and trigger bank failure.51  
 
In terms of its implementation, the present model is effectively exemplified by 
Pakistan, the UAE, Malaysia, Indonesia and Sudan. Those jurisdictions feature 
the centralised Shariah committee at the central bank. The UAE, which had 
favoured the single-tier Shariah committee model has also adopted the same 
path as the present model at the moment. In Indonesia, the Majelis Ulama 
Indoensia (MUI) works independently as an authoritative body to endorse fatwa 
on Shariah matters, where it will be followed up by the central bank. In Pakistan, 
the government amended the law to accommodate the IFIs and enacted the 
                                            
44 Hassan (n 22) 39. 
45 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 1 (n 21). 
46 BNM, (Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Financial Institutions 2010); The 
Act of Republic of Indonesia (21/2008) Concerning Sharia (Islamic) Banking. 
47 Hamza (n 15) 226. 
48 Ahmed (n 9) 405. 
49 Delorenzo (n 13) 398. 
50 Muhammad Umer Chapra and Habib Ahmed, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic 
Financial Institutions’ (Islamic Research and Training Institute 2002). 
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Banking and Financial Services Ordinance (1984). Similarly, the State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) established the central Shariah Board (SB) to guide the IFIs in 
Pakistan regarding Shariah matters. The functions of SB include reviewing and 
approving Shariah-compliant products proposed and submitted by the IFIs. 
Despite the fact that the SB does not possess any legislative power, it is still 
entitled to approving or disapproving of the proposal made by the IFIs on their 
products or services. 
 
In Malaysia, it is explicitly regulated by law that the IFIs must appoint a group of 
experts in Shariah to oversee Shariah matters institutionally. Such a notion is 
traceable in the Islamic Banking Act (IBA1983) and later on in the Islamic 
Financial and Services Act (IFSA 2013).52 In terms of the central Shariah 
committee, the Malaysian Central Bank or Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) 
established the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) in 1997 as the highest authority 
to encounter Shariah matters in Islamic finance.53 In this regard, the Malaysian 
Shariah supervision mechanism has two components, the internal Shariah 
committee formed within each IFIs, and the centralised SAC at the BNM.54 
According to IFSA 2013, it is the responsibility of the IFIs through their Shariah 
committees to guarantee that their products and services are in compliance with 
the SAC’s rulings. As a matter of fact, the BNM is entitled to specify standards on 
Shariah matters and to give effect of the SAC’s rulings on the IFIs. At this point, 
BNM uses the SAC as the mechanism to scrutinise all new products submitted 
before endorsing any approval or disapproval.55 In the event of noncompliance, 
the IFIs are obliged to notify the BNM, cease the non-compliant products or 
services and then, within a certain time-period, submit to the BNM the rectification 
plan addressing the particular noncompliant aspects. Other than being entitled to 
attend to Shariah matters, the BNM may also attend to Shariah governance 
matters that do not require views from a Shariah perspective. These include the 
functions of the Shariah committee and the requirements of the Shariah members 
as well as the internal Shariah compliance functions.56  
 
 
                                            
52 Islamic Banking Act 1983 (Malaysia) s 13A; Islamic Financial and Services Act 2013 
(Malaysia) s 31-33. 
53 <www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=en_about&pg=en_thebank&ac=439&lang=en> 
accessed 15 January 2017 
54 Nathasa Mazna Ramli and others, ‘Shariah Governance Disclosure Index and 
Institutional Ownership of Islamic Financial Institutions in Malaysia’ (paper 
presented at the 5th Asia-Pasific Business Research Conference 17-18 February 
2014, Kuala Lumpur) 3. 
55 Central Bank Act 2009 (Malaysia) s 52. 
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In Sudan, the government of Sudan established a Shariah committee within the 
central bank in 1992, known as the Higher Sharia Control Commission (HSCC).57 
The HSCC is appointed by the President of the Republic, in consultation with the 
Minister.58 According to the Banking Business Act 2003, the HSCC provides 
fatwas or ‘Sharia edicts’, recommendations and consultancy for the IFIs.59 The 
main concern is to unify the Shariah instruments for the use of the IFIs. The 
Commission, amongst others, shall have the functions to consider, and express 
opinions, in such matters as may be submitted by any IFIs. If there are any 
problematic issues faced by the IFIs, the HSCC will suggest the solutions. In 
addition to that, the HSCC shall also consider the disputes over Shariah matters, 
as may arise between the IFIs. In order to ensure IFI compliance to the opinions 
from the HSCC, in the case where there are different opinions from the scholars, 
it possesses the power to give a final decision, and is a binding procedure for the 
particular IFI.60 
 
Indonesia has a similar but unique approach. The uniqueness lies in the authority 
of the fatwa stipulation. The Indonesia Sharia (Islamic) Banks or any conventional 
commercial banks with Shariah Business Units (UUS) are obliged to form their 
own institutional Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). Members of the SSB are 
appointed by the general meeting of the shareholders on the recommendation of 
the Indonesian Ulama Council known as Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI). The 
MUI is an independent body, authorised by Bank Indonesia to look at the 
regulation of the Shariah principles.61 According to the Act of Republic of 
Indonesia (21/2008) Concerning Sharia (Islamic) Banking, Shariah principles are 
defined as the Islamic law principles in the banking business based on the fatwa 
issued by the institution having the authority in stipulating fatwas in Shariah 
matters. The main duties of the SSB are to give advice and recommendations to 
the boards of directors and supervise its representative bank activities, to ensure 
its adherence with the Shariah principles endorsed by the MUI. To follow up the 
fatwa of the MUI, a centralised Shariah committee was set up internally in the 
Indonesia Central Bank, consisting of representatives from Bank Indonesia, the 
Religious Department and community elements with a balanced composition.62 
Such an external committee is a forum comprising experts in multiple related 
fields whose duty is to assist Bank Indonesia in implementing the MUI’s fatwa 
into the Bank Indonesia Regulations.63 In terms of the approval of the Shariah 
                                            
57 See also Hamza (n 15). 
58 <http://www.cbos.gov.sd/en/node/434> accessed 15 January 2017 
59 The Banking Business Act 2003 (Sudan) s 15. 
60 ibid 
61 The Act of Republic of Indonesia (21/2008) Concerning Sharia (Islamic) Banking 
62 ibid 
63 Nurhastuty Wardhany and Shaista Arshad, ‘The Role of Shariah Board in Islamic 
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compliance products and services, the SSB in Sharia (Islamic) Bank or 
Commercial Bank with UUS works as the intermediary between those banks and 
the Bank Indonesia Shariah committee. The suggestion will come from the 
institutional Shariah department to the board of the representative banks which 
eventually will bring the proposal of certain products or services to the SSB. The 
Bank Indonesia Shariah committee will then endorse the approvals of the 
proposals to the SSB of the banks.64  
 
The UAE is one of the most recent jurisdictions that joined the two tier Shariah 
governance model.65 Article (5) of the UAE Federal Law no-6 of 1985 mentions 
that the Higher Shariah Authority (HSA) shall be formed by a cabinet, 
incorporating Shariah, legal and banking personnel. The HAS will undertake 
higher supervision over the banks, institutions and investment companies which 
involved with Shariah compliance activities to ensure the legitimacy of their 
transactions according to the provision of the Shariah principles. It is also to offer 
opinions on Shariah matters which those agencies may come across while 
conducting their activities. More importantly, the law also mentions that the 
opinions of the HAS shall be binding on the said agencies.66 At the institutional 
level, article (6) of the same law mentioned that every Islamic banks, financial 
institutions and investment companies should clearly stipulate their Shariah 
Supervision Authority (SSA). The SSA is to render the represented institution’s 
transactions and practices in accordance with the provision of the Shariah 
principles. The law also mentioned that the article of the association of each 
institution shall determine the way in which the SSA shall be formed, the manner 
of which it will discharge its duties and other relating terms of reference.67 
 
In the case of Kuwait, the Central Bank of Kuwait Law of 1968 stipulates that the 
IFIs should have the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) of at least three members 
appointed by the General Assembly. 68 In the case of conflict of opinions among 
the members of the SSB, the bank may transfer the matter to the Fatwa Board of 
the Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs, as the final authority. According to this, 
the Fatwa Board could be considered a national Shariah committee.69 Despite 
                                            
Finance in a Challenging Economy: Moving Forward 2nd ISRA Colloquium, Sasana 
Kijang, Bank Negara Malaysia 27th November 2012). 
64 ibid 11. 
65 <www.thenational.ae/business/economy/uae-cabinet-approves-sharia-authority-
launch> accessed 15 January 2017. 
66 Federal Law no-6 of 1985 (UAE) art 5. 
67 ibid art 5. 
68 Central Bank of Kuwait Law of 1968 s 9. 
69 Rodney Wilson, Shari’a Governance for Islamic Financial Institutions (Presented at 
the Meeting Re-Imagining the Shari’a: Theory, Practice and Muslim Pluralism at 
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the availability of central authority in this regard, Ahmed categorised Kuwait as 
having a passive central supervision. He emphasised that there is no specific 
provision of the law for the higher Shariah authority to approve the products.70  
4.4.2 Single-tier Shariah Committee 
The single-tier Shariah committee model refers to the jurisdictions that do not 
require the existence of a centralised Shariah committee at the central bank or a 
national fatwa council that is entitled to oversee Shariah matters in Islamic 
finance. It is important to note that the IFIs are obliged to have an institutional 
Shariah committee and follow general regulations as to other financial 
institutions. The functions of the Shariah committee are relatively similar without 
any significant interference from a higher authority in the Shariah matters.71 
Normally, any Shariah disputes or disagreements will be brought to the national 
fatwa council as to seek independent advice on the said matter, where the council 
does not acquire any judicial power on the institutions. 
 
Having a diverse approach compared to the two-tier model, which is centralised 
in nature, the single-tier Shariah committee model has rather decentralised 
Shariah compliance functions. It is believed that it could persuade institutional 
Shariah committees to be more independent in the exploration of new 
applications of Shariah instruments implanted within their products and services. 
Since the interference from the central bank in Shariah matters is rather passive, 
the institutional Shariah committees ought to have more creativity in how they 
adhere with Shariah compliance requirements. On this score, Hassan has 
reported, despite the fact that there is less interference from the regulatory 
authorities, that IFIs in GCC countries such as the UAE and Kuwait, the countries 
that were accommodating the present model, have pro-actively developed their 
own Shariah governance mechanisms to handle Shariah matters.72  
 
The present model is best exemplified by Jordan and GCC countries such as 
Bahrain. The number of jurisdictions with the implementation of the present 
model has recently decreased. As reported by Grassa and Hassan, there were 
more GCC countries with such a model, and some of them also regarded as 
having a passive central supervision.73  
                                            
70 Ahmed (n 9) 402. 
71 Grassa considered the existence of the religious councils at national level as sufficient 
to be regarded as a centralised model. Meanwhile, Ahmed addressed the degree of 
interference by looking at whether the central institution has to deal with the approval 
or disapproval of certain Shariah standards. 
72 Hassan (n 22) 34. 
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In Jordan, the Central Bank of Jordan Law no 28 of 2000 mentioned that the 
Islamic banks shall comply with the conditions and restrictions on their operations 
and activities within the recognised opinions endorsed by the designated Islamic 
Jurisprudence Supervision Board (IJSB). The IJSB members are appointed by 
the general assemblies of the shareholders. The IJSB will discharge the duties of 
monitoring the compliance of the operations and activities of the IFIs with Islamic 
jurisprudence rules, giving opinions on the text of contracts required for the 
operations and activities of the IFIs and considering any matters referred to 
specific orders from the Central Bank of Jordan.74 However, at the moment, there 
is no specific provision concerning the formation of the national IJSB at the 
Central Bank of Jordan. 
 
In Bahrain, the IFIs have been practicing self-regulation Shariah compliance 
mechanisms on their operations. There is no indication of a centralised Shariah 
committee of the central banks in the Central Bank of Bahrain Rulebook, volume 
(2), Islamic Banks.75 However, the Governor of the Central Bank of Bahrain, 
Rasheed al-Maraj said that they are in progress of setting up a central Shariah 
board to oversee the IFIs as it is an increasingly favoured model across the 
globe.76  
4.4.3 The Market-Driven Model 
The market-driven model is the formation of the Shariah compliance supervision 
mechanism based on the demand of the market without ignoring the Shariah 
compliance requirements. In the present model, there is no Shariah committee 
required by regulation neither within the financial institutions nor the central bank. 
The only reason of the existence of the Shariah committee is driven by the 
demands of the stakeholders.  
 
In Saudi Arabia, despite its acknowledgement of Shariah as the rule of law, where 
the expectation is that the IFIs will be the preferable choice, Islamic finance for a 
matter of fact is merely a realistic logical alternative to conventional banking 
system. According to article (2) of Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the 
Saudi financial regulatory system somehow has decided interest free is the norm 
of its monetary system rather than only as a regulation. Therefore, the SAMA 
1952 and the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) 2003 have no interest in identifying 
                                            
74 Banking Law of 2000 (Jordan) art 58 (A). 
75 CBB Rulebook, volume (2). 
76 Bernardo Vizcaino, Bahrain to Develop Central Sharia Board for Islamic Banks, 
Reuters 2nd Dec 2014 <www.reuters.com/article/bahrain-islam-regulations-
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Shariah supervision as one of its responsibilities. Each IFI operating in the Saudi 
Arabia banking ecosystem is free to recognise its Shariah characteristics, and 
most importantly, the Shariah committee is an acceptable concept.77 There is no 
designated Shariah committee on the central bank level. There are institutional 
Shariah committees within the IFIs which are only influenced by the Shariah 
standards of the International Islamic Fiqh Academy.78 From the perspective of 
jurisprudence, the International Islamic Fiqh Academy is involved in establishing 
legal norms and the treatment of subject’s differences.79 
 
In the UK, the Islamic financial system is operating under a secular financial 
environment and dealing with a relatively small market as compared to its 
conventional counterpart.80 According to the UK’s company law, there is no 
explicit requirement for a single board system for the companies and Shariah 
governance is an irrelevant issue. However, the UK’s traditional corporate 
governance structure is basically a single-tier board model.81 Regarding 
additional governance organs to support Shariah compliance mechanism, the 
main concern, to date, is more on the clarity whether the Shariah committee has 
an executive role or simply an advisory one rather than looking at which Shariah 
governance model is compatible for the UK.82 More importantly, it is to be 
understood that the corporate governance framework implied for IFIs in the UK 
still resembles those facilitated by the conventional industry without any 
significant concern to comply, at least at the moment, with the IFSB or other IFIs 
standards83. 
                                            
77 Reem M Asaad, ‘The Regulatory Framework of Islamic Banking in Saudi Arabia’ 
<http://cibafi.org/ControlPanel/Documents/Library/Pdf/A85.pdf> accessed 9th 
August 2018. 
78 International Islamic Fiqh Academy is an academy for the advanced study of Islam 
based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Besides the traditional Islamic sciences, the 
academy also seeks to advance knowledge in the realms of culture, science and 
economics. 
79 Hamza (n 15) 232. 
80 Asad Khan and others, ‘Comparative Analysis of Regulatory and Supervisory System 
of Islamic Banks: Evidence from Pakistan, Malaysia, Bahrain and United Kingdom’ 
(2015) 6 (6) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 629, 638. 
81 Abdul Karim Al-Dohni, ‘Islamic Banking in the United Kingdom: Is the Current Legal 
and Regulatory Framework Capable of Hosting an Islamic Banking Sector? (DPhil 
Thesis, University of Leeds 2008) 130. 
82 Michael Ainley and others, Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges 
(Financial Services Authority 2007) 
83 Chowdhury Shahed Akbar, ‘Shariah Governance Framework for Islamic Banks: An 
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4.4.4 Fully Regulated Model84 
The fully regulated model refers to a market with Shariah principles as their point 
of reference in terms of the financial regulatory system. The present model 
exhibits an Islamic financial ecosystem wherein the IFI operates within the tenets 
of the Shariah law. Shariah not only refers to stipulating terms and conditions, but 
also well embedded in their financial culture and environment.  
 
The historical record has given the evidences of the determination of Iran and 
Pakistan to bring about the Islamisation of their financial system.85 Both countries 
have gone through the process properly and Iran has made tremendous 
achievements and has been crowned as one of the world’s Islamic finance 
leaders.86 Iran is also the country which has accommodated such a model of the 
Shariah governance. In 1983, the Islamic Majlis of Iran passed the Islamic 
Banking law of Iran. According to this law, the Iranian banks could only participate 
in the interest-free transactions after interest or usury was considered forbidden, 
as mentioned by Shariah law.87 Under the articles of the Usury Free Banking Act 
1983, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, the Bank Markazi Iran (BMJII) 
or the Central Bank of Iran possessed the power to intervene and supervise the 
banking and monetary activities of the financial institutions.88 With full Shariah 
compliance in financial law, the intervention and the supervision procedures not 
only have to do with the financial activities, but also without any doubt Shariah 
matters. Most importantly, the act has no indication of any specific committee to 
carry out the task. The example presented by Iran in terms of its fully fledged 
Shariah law implementation in the financial system is, to some extent, considered 
the benchmark for the predominant Muslim markets. Many features could be 
learnt and adopted despite the peculiarities of the jurisdictions. However, for non-
Muslim predominant markets, other models are more compatible as far as this 
research is concerned. 
                                            
84 Some might argue that the jurisdictions discussed are not fully Islamic. However, detail 
discussions on the Islamicity of the relating jurisdictions especially Iran is not the 
concern of this research. 
85 Some may argue that Iran and Pakistan are not the real example of full version of 
Islamic finance, this research credited the both based on their endeavour to offer 
such a model to stand as the only system rather than looking at the perfectionity of 
the concept in terms of the implementation. See also Muhammad Anwar, ‘Islamic 
Banking in Iran and Pakistan: A Comparative Study’ (1992) 31 (4) The Pakistan 
Development Review 1089. 
86 Based on the annual reports by various bodies, Iran has consistently proved itself as 
the leader of the Islamic financial sector with more than a 30% share the global 
Islamic finance market. 
87 S Hussain Asyraf and Ali Alizadeh Giashi, ‘Islamic Banking in Iran’ (2011) 1 (2) Kuwait 
Chapter of Arabian Journal of Business and Management Review 31, 33. 
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4.5 Conclusion  
To conclude this chapter, it is imperative to have an understanding that Shariah 
governance is about ensuring Shariah compliance. Therefore, in terms of 
corporate structure, there must be designated organs to carry out such a function. 
To do so, the Shariah committee and internal Shariah department are introduced 
into the IFIs’ organisational arrangements in order to execute the Shariah 
compliance process. However, when it comes to the implementation, a few 
models are available to appreciate local regulatory requirements proportionately. 
Regarding this, four models have been thoroughly addressed in this chapter. 
Those models could be classified into centralised and decentralised approaches. 
Regardless of the approaches, all models are working towards similar notion, 
which is to ensure that there is an independent mechanism to oversee the 
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Chapter 5  
 
Corporate Governance Theories in Perspective 
5.1 Introduction 
By focusing on applying the same methods as in the last chapters, this chapter 
continues to knit a discursive analysis in order to excavate the understanding of 
the Shariah governance dialogue under corporate governance narrative. The 
said narrative is chosen so it could steer the discussion onto a less-grey area 
rather than wandering around in a fully uncharted one. The dialogue is somehow 
representing an Islamic perspective on the narrative. To some extent, this could 
be perceived as an original contribution from this research to the corporate 
governance body of knowledge. As mentioned in the research methodology, in 
this chapter, we will apply an inductive approach to construct the Shariah 
governance dialogue. It is also to generate the themes for the narrative 
incorporated into the conventional corporate governance. The selected themes 
as revealed from analytical observation of the literature, would be the theories of 
corporate governance. The respective narrative will be invariably observed by a 
dialogue as the way to exhibit inherent similarities and differences.  
 
Since this chapter is applying the conventional narrative, bringing up conventional 
corporate governance theories is inescapable. Fundamentally, the descriptions 
of the corresponding theories will explore the overlapping as well as the 
contradictory features from the Shariah perspective. It is observed that, there are 
also theories that already described the fundamental aspects of Shariah 
governance from the Islamic finance point of view, as an addition. It is imperative 
to note that the question is not about which theory is better or closer to the 
Shariah. Most importantly, under Shariah purview, each theory introduced are 
acceptable as far as it is in compliance with its teachings. In the case of any 
potential areas that could be regarded as in contradiction, reconciliation is highly 
favourable by scholars rather than rejection. However, it is worth mentioning that 
such contradictories need to be either amended or revised. 
5.2 Corporate Governance Theories: A Shariah Dialogue 
To date, various theories have been defined, discussed and even debated by the 
researchers, practitioners and authoritative bodies as the articulation of their 
understanding on what corporate governance truly means and what mechanism 
ought to be in place. Some have put their focus on the relationships between all 
governance constituents where company serves as the nexus of the contract, 
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previous century.1 Many debates have occurred, which mostly could be seen 
between the shareholder theorists and the stakeholder theorists. However, thus 
far, none seemed to be won by any school of thought. Likewise, as for the IFIs, 
similar attempts have been done by many researchers in the early part of the 
present century.2 Two prominent theories have gained popularity at the moment, 
which are the stakeholder-oriented theory3 and the tawhid and shura theory.4 
What has happened in the Shariah governance corpus might be not as 
overwhelming as its counterpart, but the capability of this corpus to escalate and 
endure the same experience is highly likely, eventually. Therefore, the attempt to 
investigate the potential area of improvement is rather consequential. 
5.2.1 Conventional Corporate Governance Theories 
Corporate governance theories are about the understanding of the existing 
relationship between the principal or the owner and the agent or the manager of 
the corporation. To justify this relationship, theorists from distinct areas of studies 
have been proposing various ways of explanation based on their backgrounds 
and experiences, which are rather diversified.5 Some theorists tend to pay 
attention to the functions of those relationships by emphasising the objective of 
the company is towards the shareholder’s primacy whereas some have the 
tendency to show consideration for the other affected parties or the stakeholders. 
The debates on this matter have happened for almost a century, and it has mostly 
occurred between the shareholder wealth maximisation theory and the 
stakeholder theory. 
 
In this part, the shareholder wealth maximisation theory and the stakeholder 
theory will be encapsulated in a compressed discussion on their descriptions as 
                                            
1 See also A Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 HLR 1049; EM 
Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 HLR 1145; M 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits The New 
York Times Magazine (New York, 13 September 1970); RE Freeman, Strategic 
Management: A Stakeholder Approach (CUP 1984) 
2 See also Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, ‘Stakeholder Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economic System’ (2004) 11 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 43-63; MK 
Lewis, ‘Islamic Corporate Governance’ (2005) 9 (1) Review of Islamic Economics 1-
30; Abu Tapanjeh, ‘Corporate Governance from the Islamic Perspective: A 
Comparative Analysis with OECD Principles’ (2009) 20 Critical Perspectives of 
Accounting 556-567. 
3 Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, ‘Stakeholder Model of Governance in Islamic 
Economic System’ (2004) 11 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 43. 
4 Masudul Alam Choudhury and Muhammad Ziaul Hogue, ‘Corporate Governance in 
Islamic Perspective’ (2006) 6 (2) Governance: The International Journal of Business 
in Society 116.  
5 The articulation of the corporate governance has been addressed by many researchers 
from business, finance, law and regulation as well as by many authoritative bodies 
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well as the arguments on their strengths as argued by the advocates. The point 
of reference of the discussion is mainly the objective of the firm as it is in 
correlation with the trajectory of this research. After the narrations of those 
corresponding theories, dialogues under Islamic perspectives will take place in 
order to investigate part and parcel of such theories that are in compliance as 
well as those which are considered to contravene Shariah. It is important to note 
here that the selection of both theories is purely because of their reputation not 
only to the IFIs but also to the conventional system. Both theories have been 
classically defined, discussed and debated as well as most of the governance 
features being already well embedded by many advocates and opponents in their 
propositiond concerning those theories. In fact, most IFIs are operated in 
accordance with one of those theories. Meanwhile, other theories such as the 
stewardship theory, agency theory, transaction cost theory, firm ascertaining 
theory and many more, might be less of a concern here as most of them are the 
by-products or the hybrids of the first two.  
 
On the other hand, it is worth noting that the emergence of the Shariah 
governance corpus is rather new, not only to the global financial market, but also 
in the Islamic financial market itself. To date, there is a growing amount of 
literature attempting to articulate the underlying theories behind Shariah 
governance to cater to all the features peculiar to the IFIs in terms of its corporate 
governance system. Some researchers such as Iqbal and Mirakhor connoted the 
existing theories of corporate governance, paying special attention to the 
stakeholder theory to interpret what Shariah governance system really is.6 
Meanwhile, some other researchers such as Choudhury and Hoque suggested 
the concept of tawhid and shura as the basic principles of Shariah governance.7 
Eventually, at the moment, none of those approaches have gained the threshold 
of adequacy in order to be championed as the sole theory to explain the 
phenomenon. Therefore, this chapter will provide an academic counterbalance 
to those approaches in the light of investigating their pros and contras for the 
purpose of addressing the potential improvements to be proposed at the end of 
this research.  
5.2.2 Shareholder Wealth Maximisation Theory 
The shareholder wealth maximisation theory applies mostly in Anglo-American 
jurisdictions and Australia. The fundamental of this theory is moulded on the 
promise made by the directors to the shareholders of the company that their 
primary objective is to maximise the wealth of the shareholders.8 Directors are 
                                            
6 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 3). 
7 Choudhury and Hogue (n 4). 
8 Andrew Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and 
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the agents of the shareholders - who are the principals - and are employed to run 
the company’s business for the shareholders who do not have the time or ability 
to do so, and it is therefore the shareholders who are best suited to guide and 
discipline directors in the carrying out of their powers and duties.9 This principal 
and agent notion emerged from an idea proposed by Alchian and Demstez and 
Jensen and Meckling, who explained the corporation as the nexus of contracts 
among individual factors of production.10 Such a dichotomous corporate structure 
is depicted by Jensen and Meckling in contractual terms: 
The agency contract or a contract under which one or more person 
(principal(s)) engages another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decisions 
making authority to the agent.11 
 
The shareholder wealth maximisation advocates articulate the theory based on 
four inter alia arguments,12 which are the agency problem, shareholder 
ownership, shareholders as residual claimants and simply because it is more 
efficient.13  
 
First, it is argued that the separation of ownership and control between the 
shareholders as the owners and the managers and the agents for the 
shareholders has caused the agency problem.14 Commencing from this, 
shareholder wealth maximisation theorist inherent Smithian moral assumption on 
human behaviour assuming that managers are self-interested agents or in other 
words, they cannot be trusted to achieve shareholders primary objective.15 This 
                                            
9 John Matheson and Barent Olson, ‘Corporate Law and the Long-term Shareholder 
Model of Corporate Governance’ (1992) 76 Minnesota Law Review 1313. 
10 Thomas Clarke, ‘Theories of Governance-Reconceptualising Corporate Governance 
Theory After the Enron Enterprise’ in Thomas Clarke (eds), Theories of Corporate 
Governance the Philosophical Foundations of Corporate Governance (New York, 
Routledge 2004) 5. 
11 Michael C Jensen and William H Meckling, ‘Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
Agency Cost and Ownership Structure’ (1976) 3 (4) Journal of Financial Economics 
305, 308. 
12 Many debates have ooccurred mainly between shareholder value and stakeholder 
value advocates throughout the centuries. The classic example is denoted by in 
Berle vs Dodd. The post-modernisation debate happened in Friedman vs Freeman 
and the most recent debate can be witnessed in Sundaram and Inkpen vs Freeman. 
13 Sundaram and Inkpen proposed the recent arguments of the present theory and 
advocated more about the efficiencies of the shareholder theory. Their arguments 
ignited further debate with the stakeholder theorist as each points were put across 
with the comparisons towards the stakeholder theory. 
14 Anand K Sundaram and Andrew C Inkpen, ‘The Corporate Objective Revisited’ (2004) 
15 (3) Organization Sciences 350, 350. 
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argument is based on the premise that bringing together business and ethical 
codes is oxymoronic as those two premises are inherently incoherent. Such 
assumptions are also represented in the conflicting goals between individual level 
and organisation level, which in this case is between the company owned by the 
shareholders and its managers.16 Likewise, directors of the companies, 
managing other people’s money, are unlikely to be expected to watch over it with 
the same vigilance with which they watch over their own.17 Moreover, the 
shareholders as the risk bearer at most can only depend on their right on the 
residual claims from the company’s earnings after the managers settle the 
promised payoffs to all the contractual claimants.18  
 
One of the distinctive feature that has gained some interest of the agency problem 
debates is information asymmetric. According to the advocates of the theory, 
shareholders who have delegated day-to-day decision-making to the directors, 
could only rely on limited access of information and at the same time the directors 
know the details of company’s day-to-day operations.19 In fact, the shareholders 
are at disadvantage in contrast to those who manage the company.20 In this 
relationship, as argued, directors could have the tendency to shirk or self-deal to 
maximise their personal benefit by taking actions that are advantageous to 
themselves but could have detrimental effects for the shareholders’ value. Put 
differently, the directors will not always act in the best interest of the principals as 
the view of the directors as to how the business should be managed somehow 
might well be different, and contradictable to that of the shareholders. 21 Most 
importantly, this shirking behaviour is to be monitored and controlled by 
appropriate incentives, where it could possibly increase the agency cost 
expenditure of a company. This includes the cost of structuring, monitoring and 
binding contracts between agents with conflicting interests.22 To this point, Mallin 
asserted that agency theory views corporate governance mechanisms, especially 
the board of directors, as being an essential monitoring device to try to ensure 
that any problem that may be brought about by the principal-agent relationship 
are minimised.23 
                                            
16 KM Einsenhardt, ‘Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review’ in T Clarke (eds), 
Theories of Corporate Governance The Philosophical Foundations of Corporate 
Governance (New York, Routledge 2004) 78, 83. 
17 Tricker (n 15) 217. 
18 Eugene Fama and Michael C Jensen, ‘Separation of Ownership and Control’ in 
Thomas Clarke (eds), Theories of Corporate Governance the Philosophical 
Foundations of Corporate Governance (New York, Routledge 2004) 64, 64. 
19 Jensen and Meckling (n 11).  
20 Christine Mallin, Coporate Governance (4th edn OUP 2010) 17. 
21 Jensen and Meckling (n 11) 308. 
22 Fama and Jensen (n 18) 65. 
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Second, the advocates of shareholder wealth maximisation theory also stated 
that the shareholders are the real owners and a corporation only exists as a 
vehicle to make money for their shareholders.24 The origin of this presumption 
has a close relationship with the understanding of property rights.25 Berle, as one 
of the preeminent advocates, asserted that the power given to the agents of the 
companies at all times is exercisable only for the rateable benefit of all the 
shareholders as their interest appears26 in so far as the company was made up 
of assets which come from the capital that was the private property of the 
shareholders. Therefore it should provide them with a mission that would 
maximise their value.27 In this regard, Allsop’s analysis concluded that any action 
taken by the directors to fulfil anyone else’s interests other than those of the 
shareholders’ could be interpreted as a blatant breach of those shareholders’ 
rights and would result in the directors being held in breach of trust.28 Thus, the 
focal point of the director’s fiduciary duties is merely to ensure the company run 
solely on the interest of making money for those shareholders. To some extent, 
Allsop regarded this argument as of the strongest argument put forward by those 
who advocate shareholder primacy, whereby the directors have a duty to act in 
accordance with their best interests.29 
 
Third, in order to support their argument, the advocates of the shareholder wealth 
maximisation also argued that shareholders are residual claimants of the profit 
produced by the positive performance of the company. In other words, the 
company must be run for the benefit of the shareholders while still solvent.30 As 
the nexus31 of the complex set of explicit and implicit contracts,32 the company is 
a centre of a collective interest of the stakeholders and most of them are non-
shareholders who enjoy the benefit of fixed claims from the contracts between 
them and the company. In this sense, it is argued that the contracts entered into 
                                            
24 Laura Allsop, ‘Should Companies Be Run Purely to Serve the Interests of 
Shareholders?’ (2012) 1 (1) UK Law Student Rev, 61. 
25 Harold Demsetz, ‘Towards a Theory of Property Rights’ (1967) 57 (2) The American 
Economic Review 347. 
26 Adolf Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 HLR 1049. 
27Julia Bistrova and Natalja Lace, ‘Defining Key Factors to Sustain Maximum 
Shareholder Value’ (2012) Journal of Financial Studies and Research 1. 
28 Allsop (n 24). 
29 ibid 62. 
30 Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective’ (n 8) 667. 
31 Coase argued that companies are the nexus of contracts to minimise the transaction 
costs of the market; See also Ronald Coase, ‘The Nature of the Firm’ (1937) 4 
Economica 386. 
32 Jonathan R Macey, ‘Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Non-
shareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective’ (1999) 84 Cornell 
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by non-shareholder groups such as employees, managers, and creditors are 
explicit contracts entitling them to fixed payments, such as salaries and interest 
payments. On the other hand, the shareholders only rely on the implicit contract 
that entitles them to the remainder of the claim after the company has met its 
explicit obligations and paid its fixed claims.33 Therefore, the focus of the directors 
as the agents who work for the shareholders must be on maximising the value of 
the claims. Macey said that as the residual claimants, shareholders have the 
greatest stake in the outcome of the company’s performance.34  They will gain a 
positive benefit if the company performed well but will suffer if the company has 
negative financial performance. Furthermore, as they are only eligible to the 
claims if the company remains solvent, the shareholders are the only claimants 
who will act in their best effort to maximise the total value of the company.35 
 
Fourth, part and parcel of the shareholder value maximisation theory is efficiency. 
The theorist emphasises the directors would be more efficient only if they were a 
single group who are at the highest stake to be favoured. 36 Another side of this 
argument is that it is more efficient as the directors execute the business only to 
maximise shareholders’ wealth, in the light that the least cost is expended in 
doing so.37 By providing the managers a clearer goal on managing the company, 
the task is also more likely to succeed.  
5.2.2.1 The Counterbalance 
As a start to the counterbalance aspect of this theory from Shariah perspective, 
it is worth noting the background that forms the method of our dialogue. In this 
sense, Islamic jurists look at realism as the way to perceive the existing 
circumstances and compare it with the ideal conceptual teachings that are 
available in the Islamic sources. When there are circumstances, the first step 
taken is to figure out the compliance aspects of the subject as well as its non-
compliance, which is then followed by discussions over whether that would be 
the best proposal to deal with such.  
 
As for the shareholder wealth maximisation theory, despite the fact that it urges 
the directors to serve their purpose as agents to maximise the shareholder’s 
                                            
33 Frank Easterbook and Daniel Fischel, The Economic Structure of Company Law (HUP 
1991) 36-39. 
34 Macey (n 32) 1267. 
35 Sundaram and Inkpen (n 14) 353. 
36 Thomas Donaldson and Lee E Preston, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence and Implications’ (1995) 20 (1) Academy of Management 
Review 65, 78. 
37 Thomas A Smith, ‘The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neo-traditional 
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wealth by putting less consideration on morality,38 there are several aspects that 
could be regarded as in agreement with certain provisions within Shariah 
principles. First, the Shariah financial law recognises the ownership of 
shareholders of the company. By deploying mudarabah and musharakah 
agreements, shareholders are regarded as rabb-mals, the owners of the property 
or the principal.39 Meanwhile, companies as fictitious entity is the agent for the 
rabb-mals known as mudarib.40 At the same time, directors serve as agents of 
the respective companies who are bounded with agency contract called 
wakalah.41 The rabb-mals as the shareholders, through the company, delegate 
the directors with managerial power over the principal for the shareholders’ 
benefit. In this relationship, the directors who were appointed by shareholders, 
ought to manage the business in accordance with their will as the owner has 
stated in the company’s article of association. Directors could not take any 
business decisions and actions that would have potentially jeopardised the 
invested principal. Reasonable business risks are accepted but it has to be with 
the consent of the shareholders. Considering the company as the private property 
of the shareholders might be naive in modern circumstances.42 However, such 
an interpretation still holds its ground if it is going to be used as the way to 
articulate a small and developing company. 
 
Second, as the owners, shareholders have the right to put necessary controlling 
mechanisms on directors. In this regard, through agency and mudarabah 
contracts, Shariah financial law provides directors with the power to manage day-
to-day business without any interference from the shareholders as silent 
partners.43 In fact, shareholders only have the rights of the overall decision-
making for the primary purpose of such contracts.44 Moreover, the shareholder’s 
primary objective is to enable them to invest without exposing themselves to 
liabilities in access to capitals; meanwhile, the managers to gain freedom in 
                                            
38 Some have credited Friedman with the ‘business is business’ notion, which could be 
regarded as one of the most extreme arguments by the advocates of the present 
theory. However, many other advocates argue that moral values is essential and 
unavoidable in order for the company to survive and prosper.  
39 Muhammad Nijatullah Siddiqi, Banking without Interest (The Islamic Foundation, 
Leicester 1983) 15. 
40 This is based on the accepted opinion that the company is an independent entity as 
per discussed in Chapter 2. By this, company is entitled to perform contractual 
obligations as if it were a living entity. 
41 Usman Hayat and Adeel Malik, Islamic Finance: Ethics, Concepts and Practice (CFA 
Institute Research Foundation 2009) 32. 
42 Tricker (n 15) 225. 
43 Mahmoud A ElGamal, Islamic Finance: Law Economics and Practice (CUP 2006) 118. 
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managing the entrusted capitals.45 However, such freedom is not to be left 
unattended. In this matter, Shariah law protects the shareholders’ rights to 
enclose a safe-guarding mechanism to mitigate the risk of self-maximising, short-
termism and self-dealing process by the directors especially to ascertain the 
sustainability of the company.  
 
Third, Shariah law also honours the company as the nexus of contracts. 
Commencing from the shareholder-director agency contract, directors will then 
enter into another collective contractual agreement with other business parties 
as they see fit.46 Each one of those agreements, such as employees, customers 
and suppliers has a standalone contract that would bind each party to fulfil the 
stipulated obligations. The main task of the directors is to configure the need of 
each claimant for the best benefit of the business and to ensure that the company 
entrusted to them will remain solvent and earn profit, so the shareholder as a 
residual claimant could claim her/his share.  
 
Fourth, shareholders are the residual claimants of the profits gained by the 
company. It is important to note that the mudarabah and musyarakah agreements 
attested that the shareholders are the risk-bearers since those contracts stipulate 
that in the case of loss, it would be bore by the principal.47 Regardless of profit or 
loss, other residual claimants are given priority to make claims especially those 
who are contractual claimants. In order to ensure that there is ‘residue’ to be 
claimed, shareholders are allowed to put necessary mechanisms capable of 
mitigating the risk and enhance the possibility of success for the company.48 
Thus, addressing the shareholders as the director’s main concern and needing 
to be diligently served might not be an over-statement. 
 
On the other hand, notwithstanding that there are features of the shareholder 
wealth maximisation theory concurred by Shariah, it is still contended in several 
ways. First, under the Shariah perspective, an agent should be treated as a 
trustee unless he/she commits negligence and fraud.49 This notion stands as a 
                                            
45 Frank E Vogel and Samuel L Hayes, Islamic Law and Finance: Religion, Risk and 
Return (Kluwer Law International 1998) 130. 
46 Shariah law sees all the contracts involved by the company independently from the 
formation of company’s partnership to each contractual agreement between the 
company with the employees, customers, creditors and other constituents. Shariah 
law upholds the obligations disclosed within every contracts. 
47 Hennie Van Greuning and Zamir Iqbal, Risk Analysis for Islamic Banks (The World 
Bank 2008) 24. 
48 ibid 126. 
49 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law 
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fundamental notion of agency contract under Shariah law. If directors are 
untrustworthy, how is it possible for the shareholders to name them as their 
agents to manage the property on their behalf? Such assumptions have also 
attenuated the moral value of business and could be credited as one of the factors 
behind demoralising business activities by modern society, which is rather in 
contrast with the Islamic teachings. Moreover, this claim also somehow has 
provided the shareholders with the justification, as the sole owner, to pursue their 
own interest that could violate the rights of other stakeholders, who are to some 
extent also affected by the existence of the company from the beginning.50 In fact, 
a director should be a person that could be trusted to ease the conflicting 
objectives of the collective governance constituents and bring them into an 
equilibrium configuration within a contractual framework.51  
 
Second, claiming that business and moral value being together is an oxymoron 
is far beyond the teaching of Islam. The idea proposed by the separation thesis,52 
assuming that ethics and economics can be neatly and sharply separated, is 
unacceptable in many respects.53 This view also downplays the language of 
morality and moral complexity. Since Islam is the way of life that emphasises the 
important role of ethics, business and ethics are considered as inseparably 
intertwined. The link of the both is irrevocable. Each stakeholder has moral 
responsibility regardless of their positions. The shareholders and the directors for 
instance, should be responsible morally for whatever business decisions and 
actions they choose to take. In addition to that, shareholders also ought take 
action by withdrawing their share if they see the managers run the business 
without moral consideration. Similar power also should be utilised by other 
stakeholders accordingly. Most importantly, those who are affected because of 
the operations of the company should not be ignored whether they come in 
humanity, constitutional or environmental forms. It is worth noting that business 
from the Islamic perspective is not only about making money for those who own 
the capital, but it is also about creating a better life for the stakeholders.54 The 
easiest way to determine business success might be through the amount of 
wealth that is created by the particular business. However, how that wealth could 
                                            
50 R Edward Freeman and others, ‘Stakeholder Theory and “The Corporate Objective 
Revisited’ (2004) 15 (3) Organisation Scince 364, 365. 
51 Jensen and Meckling (n 11) 311. 
52 The separation thesis is the idea that business and morality could be separated in a 
certain way, where is has been rejected by many as argued by Sanberg: See also 
J Sanberg, ‘Understanding the Separation Thesis’ (2008) 18 (2) Business Ethics 
Quarterly 213. 
53 Jared D Harris and R Edward Freeman, ‘The Impossibility of the Separation Thesis: 
A Response to Joakim Sanberg’ (2008) 18 (4) Business Ethics Quarterly 541. 
54  Toseef Zaid and others, ‘Theory of The Firm, Management And Stakeholders: An 
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bring prosperity for the ummah is essential in Islamic teachings and should not 
be taken for granted.  
 
Third, the notion of private property rights is diversely articulated by Shariah law 
as opposed to that of capitalism.55 In the Islamic view, Allah is the Creator, hence, 
He is the absolute owner of everything that exists in this world. This notion of 
belonging does not mean that the human has no rights to privately possess the 
property. For the matter of fact, private property rights, whether for a Muslim or 
non-Muslim, are protected by Shariah law, and nobody has the rights to violate 
such provision unless it comes with acknowledged transactions.56 It is important 
to note that humans as His vicegerents are merely trustees of the property.57 
Therefore, they are obliged to utilise and manage the property in accordance with 
the Shariah law.58 This means that whatever business decisions and actions 
taken by the shareholders and the directors, it should be in compliance with such 
an obligation. The ultimate goal of this notion is to keep the balance between the 
rights of the individuals, society and the state.59 All parties are responsible for 
each action they have taken and the subject under Shariah law especially when 
they trespass the rights of others. There is no such thing as absolute ownership 
by certain groups, i.e., shareholders that could not be questioned simply because 
it is privately owned by them. 
5.2.3 Stakeholder Theory 
The stakeholder theory is mostly implemented in Continental European countries 
such as Germany and it is well applied in Japan. Commencing from the premise 
of the objective of the company, Donaldson and Preston explained the theory as 
the inherently managerial task of the directors, as supported by Freeman, the 
pioneer of this school of thought.60 It is articulated as such, in the way that it 
reflects and directs how managers ought to operate a company to achieve 
company’s objectives. The sole purpose of the firm is, in the view of the present 
theory, to serve as a vehicle for coordinating stakeholders’ multidimensional 
interests.61 Essentially, there are two fundamental questions asked by the 
advocates of this theory, which are ‘who are legitimate stakeholders?’ and ‘how 
to manage those who are the stakeholders?’ The accuracy of the stakeholder 
                                            
55 Usmani (n 10) 10. 
56 Hayat and Malik (n 41) 15. 
57 Abdel Hameed M Bashir, ‘Property Rights in Islam’ (3rd Harvard University Forum on 
Islamic Finance: Local Challenges, Global Opportunities, Harvard University 
October 1999) 71. 
58 Iqbal and Mirakhor (n 3) 50. 
59 ibid 53. 
60 Freeman and others (n 50); Donaldson and Preston (n 36). 
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identification process is considerably overreached in this theory as it holds the 
key of the success of the second question. It possesses the tips of how directors 
should act to serve the interests of those stakeholders at best. Likewise, the both 
identify and manage processes are intimately intertwined and crucial.62  
 
In their way of identifying who and what should be entitiled stakeholders, the 
advocates of the theory have been defining the stakeholders in many forms. 
Freeman defined stakeholders as any group or individual who can affect or is 
affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives.63 He also cited the 
1963 Stanford Research Institute memo, the document that used the phrase 
‘stakeholder’, which defined first as those groups without whose support the 
organisations would cease.64 In similar intent, Hill and Jones have considered the 
constituents with a legitimate claim on the firm as the stakeholders.65 Later on, 
Donaldson and Preston stated that stakeholders could be identified through the 
actual or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate 
experiencing as a result of the firm's actions or inactions.66 Despite the fact that 
most of these definitions have come with a fairly wide array of explanations,67 the 
point of reference of this identification is primarily on the key stakeholders that 
hold the intrinsic value of the company. They are also identified by their interests 
in the corporation, whether or not the corporation has any corresponding 
functional interest in them.68  
 
In this regard, multiple models have been suggested to carry out the task, as 
could be seen in many writings.69 However, by large, to enquire who and what 
matters neither complex nor sophisticated to be discovered. Stakeholders could 
be employees, customers, suppliers, stockholders, banks, environmentalists, 
governments and other groups who can help and hurt the corporations. Some 
researchers like Hill and Jones are classified stakeholders based on their 
                                            
62 Fran Ackermann and Collin Eden, ‘Strategic Management of Stakeholders: Theory 
and Practice’ (2011) 44 Long Range Planning 179. 
63 R Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (CUP 1984) 46. 
64 ibid 
65 Charles WL Hill and Gareth R Jones, Strategic Management: An Integrated Approach 
(9th edn 2008 Cengage Learning) 16. 
66 Donaldson and Preston (n 36) 85. 
67 Samantha Miles, ‘Stakeholder: Essentially Contested of Just Confused?’ (2012) 108 
(3) Journal of Business Ethics 285. 
68 Hill and Jones (n 65) 347. 
69 See also John M Byron, ‘What to Do When Stakeholders Matter: Stakeholders 
Identification and Analysis Techniques’ (2004) 6 (1) Public Management Review 21; 
Jeffrey Cummings and Jonathan P Doh, ‘Identifying Who Matters: Mapping Key 
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priorities either externally or internally to the company.70 Some others have 
divided those stakeholders into primary stakeholders, secondary stakeholders 
and the key stakeholders. Ackermann and Eden, used the stakeholder theory to 
identify the stakeholders for a certain corporation and the dynamics of their 
relationships and to answer the question of how to attend to the needs of those 
stakeholders who are diverse strategically. 71 In this regard, they suggested that 
each stakeholder is identified and managed by the mapping of their level of 
interest and power that could affects the company.72 This is one of the examples 
of many other approaches. 
 
After considering which stakeholders matter and count, for the sake of the 
company, the present theory addresses managerial strategies that should be 
brought into action. At this point, the theory revolves around the idea of managing 
the broader interests of the stakeholders, rather than merely focussing on the 
shareholders.73 In doing so, the advocates acknowledge, inter alia, ethical codes 
as part and parcel of the stakeholder theory. In order for a business to be 
successful, they believe that companies should not only be viewed as a money 
generators, but also needs to be viewed as a social service, which has a profit-
making function.74 Therefore, the separation thesis is incompatible as it sees the 
business affairs should be dealt away from ethical affairs.75 Regarding this, the 
normative theorist said, the directors ought to consider the affected parties in their 
business decision and actions.76  
 
On the real occasion, most of our daily business activities require the 
maintenance of basic ethical standards to be presented by all parties, such as 
being honest, not taking unreasonable advantage of other parties, respecting 
each other, especially workers and clients, and cooperation with colleagues.77 
For instance, the directors should be endowed with the ability to acquire sufficient 
knowledge of what is demanded by the customers before they decide what sort 
                                            
70 Hill and Jones (n 65) 374. 
71 Ackermann and Eden, ‘Strategic Management of Stakeholders’ (n 62). 
72 Fran Ackermann and Collin Eden, Making Strategy: Mapping Out Strategic Success 
(2nd edn Sage Publications 2004) 256-262. 
73 Lynn A Stout, ‘Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’ (2002) 75 
Southern California Law Review 1189, 1189. 
74 E Merrick Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 HLR 1145, 
1148. 
75 R Edward Freeman, ‘Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future Directions’ (1994) 
4 (4) Business Ethics Quarterly 409, 420. 
76 Darryl Reed, ‘Stakeholder Management Theory: A Critical Theory Perspective’ (1999) 
9 (3) Business Ethics Quarterly 453. 
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of products to be offered to the market. To execute this mission, the directors are 
obligated to anticipate the effects of their decision to offer such products to the 
shareholders, suppliers, employees and so on. They ought to ensure that all 
those who are at stake have been attended to accordingly by balancing the best 
offer that could be delivered for each of them while keeping the company solvent. 
This task is rather tough, but not impossible as it has been proven by Cadbury78, 
Apple Inc.79 and many more across the globe. 
  
In terms of its implementation, the stakeholder theory could be credited as one of 
the widest theory accepted as reference of corporate governance systems. There 
are several reasonable explanations for the present theory holding its ground as 
a prominent theory describing such phenomenological issues in the company. 
Essentially, it is simply because the stakeholder theory recognises humans’ value 
and has articulated the right ways of doing business to the managers. In contrast 
with the shareholder value maximisation advocates, Freeman and Evan 
emphasised the notion of fairness by spreading the profit among the 
stakeholders, which extinguishes the separation thesis out of the discussion.80 In 
his later debates, Freeman, together with another advocates, asserted that the 
economic value that is created by people who voluntarily come together and 
cooperate to improve everyone’s circumstances.81 It is the reality of our modern 
economics environment that underscores the importance of all relating 
governance constituencies. 
 
The stakeholder theory also provides the right way of dealing with business 
parties. One could not deny the actual fact about managing a company, where 
we are actually dealing with people with faces, names, families and so on, who 
would affect and affected by any decision made by the directors. To deal with 
this, the present theory provides them with the solution so close with humanity 
and it is certainly the right way to conduct business. As in the UK, despite the fact 
that the enlightened shareholder theory does not mention implementing the 
                                            
78 Cadbury Schweppes established relationships with their stakeholders by consulting 
regularly with their employees, responding positively to their needs and aspirations 
and generally treating them well. Cadbury Schweppes also maintains a close 
relationship with its consumers to ensure it is making products that meet their needs. 
Listening to consumers in this way helps the company to maximise its investment in 
product research and development and grow its market share. 
79 Apple Inc. offer a wide range of support for the customer if they are having problems. 
On the Apple website they have a service which gives a number of different ways to 
contact Apple. This helps Apple to research the most common problems in their 
products are and it helps them to see more ways they can improve through customer 
feedback. 
80 Evan and Freeman 1993 




- 120 - 
stakeholder theory, it could not resist the importance of the stakeholders.82 There 
is ample descriptive evidence, some of it already cited, that many managers 
somehow believe themselves, or are believed by others, to be practicing the 
stakeholder-based management,83 implicitly, under the model that favours the 
shareholder value maximisation. It simply means that, as humans, the directors 
could not avoid the value of humanity.  In this regard, Freeman once asked how 
else could a manager create shareholder value other than by creating products 
and services that customers are willing to buy, offering jobs that employees are 
willing to fill, building relationships with suppliers that companies are eager to 
have, and being good citizens in the community?84  
 
Last but not least, the stakeholder theory comes with the notion of recognising as 
many constituencies as we can, especially when we come across with the 
definition given by Freeman. Implicitly, this notion has included the shareholders 
as one of the constituents that are at stake because of the company’s decisions 
and actions. Dividing the shareholders and the stakeholders into different groups 
of concern is roughly the logical equivalent of contrasting apples with fruit. 
Creating the value for the stakeholders creates the value for the shareholders.85  
5.2.3.1 The Counterbalance 
In terms of the Islamic perspective on the present theory, some researchers have 
upgraded the theory into a new dimension which combines it with those of Islamic 
values.86 In this sense, Oseni argued that it is undoubtedly that the present theory 
has exhibited some modicum of Islamic understanding of justice, transparency 
and ethics in doing business.87 Like the previous theory, the present theory also 
shares the pros and contras with the values promulgated by Shariah. 
 
As for the similarities, first and foremost, Shariah law values stakeholders as the 
present theory does. Business is not only about creating wealth for the owning 
shareholders but also the constituents that are at stake because of the company’s 
business decisions and actions into a reasonable consideration. Non-
shareholder stakeholders such as the employees, customers, suppliers and 
                                            
82 Collins C Ajibo, ‘A Critique of Enlightened Shareholder Value: Revisiting the 
Shareholder Primacy Theory’ (2014) 2 (1) Birkbeck Law Review 37. 
83 Donaldson and Preston (n 36) 75. 
84 Freeman and others (n 50) 366. 
85 ibid 
86 It is known as the stakeholder-oriented Shariah governance approach and it will be 
discussed further in this chapter consecutively within the forthcoming subtitles. 
87 Umar M Oseni and others, ‘Corporate Governance and Effective Dispute Management 
in Islamic Financial Institutions’ (2012) 6 (11) Australian Journal of Basic and Applied 




- 121 - 
others share similar attention accordingly from the present theory and Shariah 
law. The main task of the directors is to configure a strategy that could cater to 
the needs of those stakeholders in order to create equilibrium.88 
 
Second, the present theory has a similar perspective to Shariah in the way it 
values morality and ethics, whereby the separation thesis is far beyond 
recognition. Humanity is a natural moral instinct and trying to separate those 
features from its host is disastrous. It is not only putting the stakeholders at stake, 
but could also eventually victimised the shareholders in the similar way that they 
victimised others in the light of a neutral moral value premise.89 As argued by 
Harris and Freeman, dichotomising business and ethics is a fool’s errand that is 
not useful, helpful or even meaningful or in other words is impossible.90 
 
On the other hand, the stakeholder theory does have its controversial aspects 
when it comes to the Shariah perspective. As a starter, despite the fact that the 
present theory values morality, it is still contended in terms of how to define such 
a notion. Moral value itself holds a universal definition that is fairly diverse from 
one civilised society to another and has no time limitation. As Reed argued, it has 
been about the employment of different ethical traditions to elaborate different 
normative stakeholder theories.91 In this regard, the potential dispute is 
undeniable and irreconcilable when it comes to a multicultural application.92 In 
our multinational globalised business world, forming such a value into a 
singularity is quite impossible and if the directors are meant to deal with this, it 
could potentially cause the overriding focus not only on the shareholder but also 
other stakeholders, which eventually divert them from their ultimate goals.93 At 
this rate, the notion of balancing the needs of the stakeholders is no longer a 
matter for them.94 If having more than one objective function could create 
confusion in decision-making,95 as argued by the opponents of the present 
theory, how about having those unclear multidimensional moral values?  
 
                                            
88 Jensen and Meckling (n 11) 311. 
89 See also Andrew Abela, ‘Adam Smith and the Separation Thesis’ (2001) 106 (3) 
Business and Society Review 187, 190. 
90 Harris and Freeman (n 53) 542. 
91 Darryl Reed, ‘Employing Normative Stakeholder Theory in Developing Countries: A 
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Second, there are no clear and substantive suggestions on how to manage the 
affected stakeholders. As argued, the question of which stakeholder should 
matter or matter more is left unanswered, whereby it is rather wishful thinking to 
suggest that directors must juggle those multiple goals in a complex hierarchy of 
collective contractual relationships.96 Many advocates have suggested different 
approaches to identify which constituents should be counted and given priority 
as the key stakeholders; however, they seem to be open for further debates. To 
some extent, this is a fairly strong argument put across by the opponents of this 
theory. It is argued that because of this unclear notion, the company is seemed 
to be ruled by too many masters, which could have caused the inefficiency and 
the managers are not accountable to a specific person, where it may lead to an 
escapism. 97 This problem is grounded from the failure to form a universality on 
how to configure such an issue. It is argued that the present theory has been 
interpreted with a wide array of definitions, discussions and focus.98 At the first 
glance, it could be regarded as a positive sign; however, in terms of the 
implementation, it seems to provide too many options that eventually may lead to 
confusion. 
 
Third, in conjunction with the previous argument, Shariah law has a fairly different 
connotation to a contractual agreement between bank and its customers. This 
argument is essential since this research is going to be implemented into the 
financial institutions. In many circumstances, especially in the conventional 
systems, customers at some point are creditors to the bank.99 It could be seen 
when both of the abovementioned theories applied to the banking companies, 
customers will be seen as money lenders that could charge interest at a certain 
rate to the bank for each penny deposited. In contrast, Shariah law prohibits100 
such contractual agreement and it is regarded as one of the factors that put the 
shareholders and the directors in an unfavourable situation. As argued, the 
uncertain amount of interest charge to be paid by the bank, to some extent, has 
put the creditors as non-shareholding shareholders. What makes it worse is that 
the rights of creditors to claim the credited amount along with the interest are 
above the rights of the shareholders who could only be considered as the residual 
claimants. Such a situation has positioned the creditors at the top of the 
stakeholder pyramid,101 even higher than the owners, no matter whatever theory 
is employed especially when the company is or nearly insolvent. 
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To conclude this part of the present chapter, it is clear here that even the 
mentioned theories are not from Shariah origin, they are not fully unacceptable. 
This is a substantial point of reference to be emphasised as it could be the starting 
point to find similarities between those theories under the Islamic dialogue. 
Having said that, there are features agreed by the Shariah to be implemented by 
the IFIs in their corporate governance systems along with additional Shariah 
governance mechanisms. We could also say that the Shariah perspective 
provides a new way of viewing the issue, other than the existing corporate 
governance school of thoughts. The result might be different in many ways, but 
apparently it widen the horizon of the corporate governance body of knowledge. 
5.3 Shariah-Based Governance Theories 
The discussions on the Shariah governance theories are considered to be in their 
infancy. The used of ‘Shariah governance’, the phrase itself, only started from the 
writing of the IRTI guidelines issued in 2002 by Ahmed and Chapra. The point of 
reference of the Shariah governance topics is somehow diverse as opposed to 
the corporate governance, in terms of the interpretation of the objective of the 
firm. The Shariah governance was formed based on the objective of the IFIs to 
meet its stakeholder’s desire to conduct their financial business according to 
Shariah law.102 Therefore, the Islamic financial standard-setters and the IFIs 
practitioners tended to fix their lens on the mechanism that could improve them 
to achieve their peculiarities on the Shariah compliance needs, not only on the 
mechanism to maximise the value of the institutions. 
 
There are two primary versions of discussion discovered from the literature, the 
pure Shariah based and conventional oriented version. For the Shariah based 
theory, there is the Tawhid and Shura theory proposed by Choudhury and Hoque. 
Meanwhile, Iqbal and Mirkahor proposed the stakeholder-oriented theory, a 
conventionally oriented version.  
5.3.1 Tawhid and Shura Theory 
Many researchers have credited Choudhury and Hoque for the tawhid and shura 
theory of the Shariah Governance.103 In conjunction with this notion, Grassa 
mentioned that this theory could be regarded as the first model of corporate 
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governance in the Islamic finance.104 The present theory has normative features 
in describing the notion of the Shariah governance, by which it is fundamentally 
moulded based on the principle of the tawhid or the oneness of God and the 
shura or consultation. Those intertwined conceptions provide the foundation of 
the Shariah governance wisdom.105 The concept of tawhid, has been expressed 
by Choudhury and Hoque as the unity of knowledge that stands as an 
epistemological element of the Shariah governance. In addition to that, they 
referred to shura as a total organic process and the medium of discovering the 
unity of knowledge through systemic interrelationships, by which considered as 
an organic relational epistemology.106 
 
Each constituent of the Shariah governance is immersed in a discursive cognitive 
understanding of tawhid or the unity of knowledge as a long-life learning process 
of decision-making. The complementary elements of that knowledge could be 
attained using the interactive, integrative and evolutionary (IIE) process through 
systemic stimulation and realisation.107 The IIE process steers all constituents 
towards the interacting environmental factors: the principle of fairness and justice, 
the principle of productive engagement of resources in social and economic 
activities and the principle of recursive intention.108 In this regard, Hassan argued 
that the present principle of tawhid derives important realisations of concepts of 
vicegerent, trustworthiness and justice conception for all governance 
constituents.109 Those elements emerge from the decisions and actions made in 
compliance with the Shariah law as the main preference of the Shariah 
governance system. 
 
On the other hand, shura is considered a medium for all organic constituents and 
with their cognitive capabilities, after the attainment of discursive understanding 
of the unity of knowledge, to come together and participate in the real issues with 
the goal of reaching a relational unification.110 To this end, all constituents have 
the responsibility to get involved in order to achieve a consensus through their 
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collective contractual relationship. Each affected stakeholder has their right to be 
considered with the goal of far-reaching social wellbeing.111  
5.3.1.1 The Counterbalance 
The present theory is a prominent concept to interpret the worldview of Muslims 
of how to understand the phenomenon of corporate governance. This method 
provides reasonable explanations of the variety and sometimes contradictory 
articulations on familiar subjects by different parties. It is simply rooted from the 
fundamental expression of a diversified worldview on a certain issue. 
Notwithstanding, the present theory is based on a similar view as shared by this 
research, that there is still room for improvement, which would be valuable, if it 
could be brought into this discussion.  
 
First and foremost, the present theory is rather unclear and fairly ambiguous in 
terms of how it could be adopted and implemented in the current corporate 
governance system.112 The concept of unity of knowledge has been articulated 
without any definition of which knowledge must be mastered by the constituents. 
When all related constituents are about to gain consensus through shura, the 
capability and the efficiency of certain information is required. In this regard, not 
only the Islamic knowledge, but also other complementary aspects of information 
are demanded, which could assist the right choice during decision-making. 
Regarding this, a Shariah committee as the most recent form of shura within the 
IFIs also faces a similar issue. The members of the Shariah committee are 
expected to be well equipped with contemporary scholarship, especially in both 
the Shariah and on the matter of business strategies.113 
 
Second, the present theory is also lacks of mechanisms that would make the 
implementation of the theory an eventuality. The Islamic literature is full of 
references that could be deployed in order to bring the present theory into action. 
Beside the epistemological aspects of tawhid and shura, there are numerous 
applicable mechanisms available, addressing those notions.114 The only obstacle 
is how to adopt the theoretical form of them into our modern multidimensional 
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corporate models: a process that requires not only a brief understanding, but also 
an in-depth insight into such mechanisms. 
5.3.2 Stakeholder-oriented Shariah Governance Theory 
The stakeholder-oriented Shariah governance theory is a theory that utilises the 
features proposed by the stakeholder theory in a way that it could possibly be 
implemented by the IFIs. In other words, they are discussing the same 
stakeholder theory, but from the Islamic perspective which is why some might 
see this part of the disucssion contents similarities to the theory respectively. As 
with its counterpart, it is a managerial theory for the IFIs corporate governance 
system, as mostly practised in the market. According to this theory, the principal 
objective of the company is not only to maximise shareholder’s wealth but also to 
maximise the welfare of all affected stakeholders. Iqbal and Mirakhor as 
introducing this intriguing model, argued that governance structure and process 
at systemic and company levels are the mechanisms that protect the rights of the 
stakeholders, who are exposed to any risk as a result of the company’s 
activities.115 Concerning this, they defined a stakeholder as the one whose 
property rights are at stake or at risk due to voluntary or involuntary actions of the 
company.116 This means, if someone’s rights are threatened by the result of a 
company’s decisions and actions, those individuals, groups, or communities will 
become stakeholders for the particular company.  
 
The present theory follows the steps of the stakeholder theory in the light that the 
foundation of such a model could be found in Islamic principles. It has been 
argued that the foundations of this theory are observable within the Islamic 
principles of property rights and the commitment to explicit or implicit contractual 
obligations.117 Most importantly, this theory emphasises the importance of 
protecting the interests of all stakeholders. With regard to this matter, the Shariah 
committee is considered a consequential governance structure peculiar to the 
IFIs that ascertain Shariah compliance in all of the IFIs products and services. At 
the same moment, the board of directors is responsible to protect the financial 
interest of the shareholders, as well as to perform all contractual obligations, 
explicit or implicit, to other stakeholders. Conjointly, regulatory and supervisory 
authorities are considered the providers of a regulatory and supervisory 
environment in order to enable such a governance system performing its 
functions accordingly.118 
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In terms of property rights, it is important to note that there are differences in how 
the concept of property rights are defined by the present theory as compared to 
that of capitalism, which could be the basis of the conventional corporate 
governance theories. Above all others, as a Divine law, the Shariah declares 
Allah is the absolute owner of wealth including property, and humans are merely 
trustees to manage it as His vicegerents.119 This understanding implies the 
obligation for Muslims to use and manage the entrusted property in accordance 
with the Shariah law.120 The rules that define the property rights in Islam deal with 
the rights of ownership, acquisition, usage and disposition of the property.121 The 
principle of property rights under Shariah law also clearly provides a 
comprehensive framework to identify, recognise, respect and protects the 
interests and rights of each individual, community, state and corporation.122 As a 
the matter of fact, rights of ownership, acquisition, usage and disposition of the 
property itself are considered property that has beneficial use and value.123  
 
As further discussed, the concepts of the stakeholder-oriented theory from the 
Islamic perspective are understood through the way the Shariah put the balance 
between individual and collective rights on a particular property. Social interest 
and the collective dimensions of human life demands individual freedom to be 
kept within certain borders, which could possibly bring balance to the individual, 
to society, and to the state where each of them has legitimate claim on the 
property, explicitly or implicitly.124 As mentioned by Iqbal and Mirakhor, none of 
the property rights of these three agents should come into conflict with one 
another, nor should the exercise of those rights by any one of these agents 
jeopardise the exercise of rights by the others.125 Each element of God’s creation 
has been endowed with certain rights and each is obliged to respect and honour 
the rights of others.126 
 
In terms of explicit and implicit aspects of contractual agreement, the advocates 
of the present theory have chosen the spectrum of company as a nexus of 
contracts. According to them, a contract in Shariah law is a bounding instrument, 
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whereby each party is obliged to fulfil stipulated covenant and trust in order to 
achieve the objectives of the contract.127 Any valid contractual terms are 
protected by Shariah law, no less securely than the institution of property.128 
Shariah law does not authorise any rights to the state to invalidate or change a 
contract by unilateral action, whether such an action taken by administrative, 
judicial or even legislative.129 The explicit element of the contract is usually clearly 
expressed and applied as reference during dispute. In addition to that, the implicit 
element of the same contract has similar influence. For instance, explicitly, a 
company that offers products to the customers has the obligation to fulfil all the 
stipulated terms in the contract whether it is directly relates to the product or to 
the transactional agreement, wherein the customers are bound to fulfil their 
obligations by paying the desired amount as the price of the products. Implicitly, 
both parties are obliged to respect each other and offer or demand only products 
that would not bring harm to them both, or to any other stakeholders that might 
be at stake because of their transaction.130 Despite the fact that the decisions and 
actions taken by the contracted parties concerning their transaction need are 
solely based on free will, they are answerable to whatever consequences caused 
by such a transaction to other affected stakeholders. 
 
In this regard, the advocates realise the implication of the emphasis placed on 
the contracts in Islam is that it makes the members of the society and economic 
agents aware of the obligations arising from their contractual agreements. The 
applications of this concept are implied in all Islamic contractual agreements 
whether they are verbal or written, explicitly or implicitly. The principles of property 
sharing rights or collective rights are implicit contracts to preserve and protect the 
rights of others and thus establish a wide spectrum of implicit obligations.131 
Within this understanding, some parts of the stakeholder theory are considered 
as the reflection of the Islamic methods of corporate governance.  
 
5.3.2.1 The Counterbalance 
The present theory advocates applied the understanding of the stakeholder 
theory to establish a similar model of corporate governance. This notion is rather 
a convergence of the Shariah law into the stakeholder theory and is actually 
realistically implementable by the IFIs as for the most of the current IFIs the 
governance system is still based on the existing conventional theories. 
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Notwithstanding those features, the present theory still endures loopholes that 
are opened for improvements.  
 
First and foremost, there are no discussions on the mechanism implementing 
such a theory in a real-world corporate application. The differences between the 
present theory and the stakeholder theory have been articulated clearly; 
nevertheless, the detailed explanation of the mechanism that could bring those 
understandings into action is left unclear. Whether the existing conventional 
governance mechanism is adequate or not has not been discussed thoroughly. 
As mentioned above, there are several applications available within the extensive 
literature of Islamic knowledge. Offering an alternative description of how to 
articulate a certain issue, without any suggestions on the methods to ensure such 
understanding could be implemented, would result in another open debate. On 
one side, it could be viewed positively; however, on the other side, such loopholes 
should not be left uncovered.  
 
Second, the advocates of the present theory did not put across the importance 
of their model to the Shariah compliance issues for the IFIs. The reason might 
be, it is opened to be implemented irrespectively by any kind of business models. 
However, reconciling Shariah compliance issues would be one of the primary 
points of reference of the Shariah governance system. Whatever business 
models are involved here, it should emphasises the Shariah compliance notion 
since each business shares the same attention under the Shariah law. The 
prohibition of interest-taking (riba), extensive uncertainty (gharar) and gambling 
(maysir) are still applicable regardless of the nature of the business involved. 
Moreover, businesses that engage more in transactions have something peculiar 
to some extent within the Shariah law. Addressing the need for a Muslim to avoid 
any transactions that involve goods and activities classified as prohibited 
(haram)132 is not to be ignored lightly. 
5.4 Conclusion  
As a conclusion to the dialogue of the respective narratives, it should be 
understood that not all of the conventional corporate governance theories are 
eliminated from the equation. The dialogues on the respective narratives have 
procured aspects, some of which are within the acceptable borders and some of 
which are not. Some seem to be elemental and some other supplemental. More 
importantly, this part of the research has located the dialogue of the Shariah 
governance within the breadth of corporate governance discourse. Be reminded 
that it is the objective of this research to present the answers to the highlighted 
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ambiguities in the upcoming discourses. From the beginning of this research, we 
have seen many aspects of Shariah governance, either in conjunction with 
conventional corporate governance or otherwise. Having said that, starting from 
the next chapter, the chapters to come will excavate the underlying principles of 
Shariah governance in order to shine light on all of the similarities as well as the 
differences referenced in prior chapters. There are three angles of explanation 
chosen to explicate the principles, and three mechanisms to be used as a way to 
bring those principles into action. Bear in mind that the upcoming discussion 
could be normative in approach of some respects as well as descriptive to some 
extent. This is due to the fact that some part the principles are already in action 
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Chapter 6  
 
Principles of Shariah Governance 
6.1 Introduction 
Since the beginning of this research, we have been excavating the fundamental 
features of the Shariah and the corporate governance. Leading from that, we 
have encapsulated the conventional corporate governance theories and their 
compatibilities in relation to IFIs. We also have discussed what a Shariah 
governance system really is and how it is might different from the conventional 
corporate governance system. As a conclusion, we could say that the Shariah 
governance system is an additional layer in addition to the conventional corporate 
governance with the function of fulfilling the peculiarities of the financial 
institutions which to offer Shariah compliance products and services. As happens 
to the conventional corporate governance, the Shariah governance system is 
guided by numerous standards and codes of best conduct, with most offering 
details of suggested organisational and operational mechanisms to ensure 
Shariah compliance. Apart from that, we could also see how Shariah governance 
is a living system rooted in Muslims’ lives and has been accommodated diversely 
throughout the history.  
 
Broadly speaking, it is observed that the IFIs’ boards duty in many respects is no 
less than to that of conventional institutions. In addition to that, the fiduciary duty 
of the board ought to be in line with the Shariah compliance notion, the raison 
d’être of Shariah governance. Put differently, other than conventional fiduciary 
duty, ensuring Shariah compliance is also a fiduciary duty to be discharged by 
the boards of directors of the IFIs. As a result, by securing Shariah compliance 
functions, what are considered the duty of care and the duty of loyalty of the 
boards are somehow elevated into another level. To execute this, the IFIs have 
put on another layer of organisational arrangement to assist their boards to carry 
out the task; this arrangement is the Shariah committee. Arguably, this committee 
is an indication of power delegation delivered by the board to a specific group of 
experts with ‘fit and proper’ criteria, to discharge a specific range of duties, 
ensuring compliance in Shariah-related matters.1 In this context, the board is akin 
to the primary stakeholder of the Shariah committee as they inherit first-hand 
consequences from any actions or inactions of the Shariah committee. 
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From an organisational view, the task of Shariah committee is to assist the board 
to achieve the objective of the institution: compliance with the Shariah law. As a 
supportive element to the board, the Shariah committee to some extent bears a 
similar fiduciary duty as the board. The members of the Shariah committee ought 
to perform duty of care and loyalty as if they are the members of the board itself. 
They shall work for the best interests of the institutional stakeholders, especially 
the shareholders. On top of that, they also ought to deliver a critical eye on 
business matters that have merit from the Shariah perspective. However, in a 
plain language, the way the Shariah committee executes its duty is rather unique 
and peculiar. Due to this, the discussion on it will be further encapsulated in the 
upcoming chapters. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the objective of the Shariah governance is to optimise the 
value and to ascertain the sustainability of the IFIs. It closely interacts with the 
Islamic worldview, which is in contrast with the worldview of other theories. It is 
worth mentioning that the struggle amid the theories of corporate governance 
essentially circulate in this circumstance in many respects. For many reasons, a 
well-discussed theory is the reflection of such a struggle, where one corporate 
governance theory is distinguished from another in the manner in which it 
recaptures the relevant worldview. For instance, we could see the worldview of 
the shareholder theory advocates, which puts the emphasise on the shareholders 
ownership ending up with the strengthening effort of the legal aspect to assert 
their rights and the disregard of morality in pursuit of their primary objective of 
wealth maximisation. Similarly, this notion seems to be applicable to other 
theories. This part of this research, however, is not to seek the conclusion of 
which one is on the right path or consider which is the best school of thought to 
follow. It is rather a medium of discussion of another principles, to articulate the 
subject in parallel with that are already well-covered by prominent researchers. 
 
It is argued that, the articulation of the principles of the Shariah governance is 
propelled by an in-depth comprehension of the teaching of Islam. As far the IFIs 
are concerned, Shariah is a modus vivendi that is practical for everyone and 
compatible with any sort of dynamic human lifestyle in all respects. As a divine 
way of life for humans to embrace, the teachings of Shariah, revealed through 
the Quran and the Hadith, somewhat consist in a sense of both rigid and flexible 
dimensions. By accommodating the both features, this chapter will illustrate the 
derivation of the principles of the Shariah governance from those sources. It is 
rather important to apprehend such a notion since we have seen its 
consequences in the comparative scrutiny regarding the theories of corporate 
governance in the previous chapters. Complying with the Shariah precepts is the 
essence of the counterbalances that have come from a comprehensive 
understanding of the prevailing principles. It is also based on the discursive 
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on describing the right norm that ought to be followed by humans in economic 
activities: namely in this case, the governance of economic financial corporations.  
 
On the account of this, this chapter will explore the crux of the concept of the 
Shariah governance, namely Shariah compliance. It will elucidate the principles 
that have been followed by the IFIs which have enabled them to enter the 
financial market with their own identity. These principles will provide the rationale 
for why some of the features in the conventional corporate governance system 
are acceptable and some others are objectionable. This chapter will thoroughly 
explore this notion through three primary divisions of Shariah governance. It will 
reveal the worldview of the IFIs, their comprehension of the Shariah compliance 
and the akhlaq-based governance ethics that underpin the whole concept of 
corporate governance in the eye of the Shariah. These principles will be the brace 
that shapes the canvas of the Shariah governance corpus. It substantiates the 
fiduciary duty of the IFIs’ governance constituents, especially the boards’ duty of 
care on Shariah compliance, and the influence that shapes the ethical business 
judgement in the IFIs’ operation. 
 
This chapter is substantial in the light that it will employ the underpinning 
principles applied to the discourse of the principles of Shariah governance. To 
serve as an answer to the discussed issues in the previous chapters which are 
constructed from the existing literature with its lack in idealistic domain, it is 
imperative to be situated in the middle of the whole discussions. To some extent, 
it bridges the two separated spectrums of the research, which are what is there 
and what is supposed to be there. Despite the infancy of this topic, it seems to 
gain more attention from many stakeholders, particularly those who have interest 
in the Shariah compliance financial system. Bear in mind, our point of reference 
henceforth will deepen into three primary themes deduced from the 
comprehension of the previous integral discussions. These three fundamental 
and essential elements are inherently embedded in the Shariah sources. It is 
worth mentioning that, to apprehend a deep comprehension, one not only 
requires exceptional knowledge of Islam, but also it is demanded one 
experiences as a true believer of the given notion.  
6.2 Epistemological Worldview of Shariah Governance 
By saying epistemological, the first part of the present chapter is dealing with the 
worldview of Islam which is believed not merely an invention of humans’ 
comprehension fabricated from the observation of the surrounding realm or what 
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deducing from the revealed sources with the righteous interpretation.2 It is argued 
that the epistemological worldview of Shariah gives the answers to the 
fundamental questions asked by humans. Where did we come from? What is the 
purpose of our existence? Is there life after death? This part of the present 
chapter however is not about answering all those questions. It is more inclined to 
the explanation of why this epistemological concept gives impetus to the scholarly 
path of the Shariah governance and how to appreciate it in our modern 
governance sense of logic. 
 
However, note here that there are several corporate governance themes relevant 
to this discussion. It will explain how Islam views private ownership, resources 
manipulation and the objective of wealth maximisation. The comprehension of 
these relationships will allow us to contemplate the board’s fiduciary duty towards 
the task of adhering to the notion of Shariah compliance. Other than that, this part 
is also essential to calibrate the Islamic morality with business activities. All these 
are due to the fact that, as a Muslim, Islam is a religion to be believed, so it could 
become a propellant to guide the way of one’s life, both legally and morally. The 
submission of Muslims to the teachings of Islam, in fact, is what constitutes their 
worldview and is the sole reason why the idea of Shariah compliance really 
matters. 
 
Before we go deeper, it is necessary to grasp the basics of this topic. Worldview 
or Weltanschauung3 is a sense of our ability to understand and represent the 
world that we experience in our mind.4 It could be inspired by religious tenets or 
other philosophical or moral principles that are independent of any religion. The 
Oxford English Dictionary defines worldview as the philosophy of life or 
conception of the world.5 To some extent, it is a set of beliefs about fundamental 
aspects of reality that ground, and influence all of one’s perceiving, thinking, 
knowing and doing.6 In relation to Shariah governance, it is literally about how 
those institutions which offer Shariah compliance products and services are 
supposed to conceive the world around them: specifically, the resources and the 
wealth available on earth. One fact for certain is that there are impairments 
between the worldview of the IFIs as opposed to their conventional counterparts 
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in many respects. Some may argue that Islam is a religion of morality and 
therefore IFIs are operating under a strict morality regime. 
 
Since the financial institution is regarded as one of the units in the economic 
framework, the importance of the rules of economic philosophical dimensions is 
undeniable. To this extent, it is worth mentioning that in regulating a 
comprehensive understanding of the Shariah governance, we should 
differentiate between the distinctive underlying philosophy or ideology by 
reference to which the sphere of an institution is delimited and an explicit 
mechanism employed for resolving problems and regulating its actions.7 The fact 
that conventional corporate governance theories are discussed within the 
capitalism or socialism spectrum is obvious. The better the understanding on 
such concepts, the easier it becomes to divest oneself from the uncertain. 
Therefore, to comprehend the notion of the Shariah governance, we should put 
ourselves into the worldview of Shariah, or Islam in a broader sense, for such a 
discussion. It is rather imperative to do so, as it could lead us to decipher the 
Shariah algorithmic thinking of the Shariah experts8 and the function of Islamic 
morality on the upcoming topics. One way to perceive the reason why a Muslim 
upholds the concept of Shariah compliance is by deciphering the underpinning 
system of belief and faith of Islam and what is the role of such a system in a daily 
devotion as to the life of a Muslim. 
 
The Shariah epistemological worldview encompasses both dunya and akhirah. 
Dunya is the present realm that we are in at this moment. It is the vision of reality 
and truth that appears before our mind’s eye, revealing what existence is all 
about.9 Economically, it is the world where humans are typically in pursuit of 
wealth that is visible to their naked eyes to see and senses to enjoy. The 
akhirah10, on the other hand, is the world of heaven and hell which could have 
never been seen by eyes, perceived by thought or befall on someone’s heart.11 
Such connotation is given by the Prophet PUBH as it is a world untangled from 
space and time, which is beyond the humans’ capabilities to apprehend. As our 
present realm is limited in space and time, the possibility of such a world existing 
                                            
7 Main M Nazeer, The Islamic Economic System: A Few Highlight (Pakistan Institute of 
Development Economics, 1981) 1. 
8 Shariah expert term refers to Shariah scholars who member Shariah committee. On 
the other hand, Shariah scholar refers to scholars with general knowledge of Shariah 
law and other area of Islamic studies. 
9 Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islam: A 
Exposition of the Fundamental Elements of the Worldview of Islam (ISTAC 1995) 1. 
10 Al-Akhirah it is a derivative Arabic word meaning for the final-destination. 
11 This hadith is narrated by Al-Bukhari as reported from Abu Hurairah; Muhammad bin 
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has transcended the logical explanation of our observation. To be exact, we are 
restricted by our own limited capabilities.  
 
In relation to this, it is borne in the minds of all Muslims that Islam teaches there 
is no bifurcation or separation of the worlds in Islam.12 The dunya aspect must be 
related in a profound and inseparable way to the akhirah aspect.13 As far as 
Muslims are concerned, actions that they take in this life, are always in correlation 
with the afterlife. There is no such thing as separation thesis. Everything is 
connected. Their economic actions for instance, cannot be separated from ethical 
consideration as all actions are going be taken into account, for the sake of their 
own well-being, in the akhirah. For a real devoted Muslim, the short term of life in 
the dunya is worth nothing, compared to the value of the afterlife in the akhirah 
for eternity. However, one thing to be aware of is that this is not an escapist 
excuse not to work for the betterment of the present realm. It in fact plays as the 
primary reason for Muslims to pursue the life in the dunya with their best efforts. 
Muslims are urged to pursue success in daily prayer addresses through adhan.14 
For Muslims, it is believed that the commitment given in the dunya will be 
gathered in the akhirah. Therefore, as exemplified by the work of farmers, to 
procure the best harvest is to grow the best seed we could acquire and deploy 
the most effectual means to hand to cultivate it. 
 
It is the nature of humans to believe in the divine as they are creations that 
possessed the ability to observe the visible world in physical form along with the 
invisible (ghaib), which is metaphysical.15 In fact, other than having the ability to 
apprehend the science of the physical world, humans are also capable of sensing 
elements that are invisible to the naked eyes. For instance, they could observe 
the changing states of the cosmos and come up with scientific discoveries. At the 
same time, they are also able to sense the changes of the invisible surroundings 
such as consciousness and cognitive abilities but could not yet come up with the 
tangible explanation of those elements, despite sensing them within their selves. 
As described by Usmani, there are areas in which human reason could not 
produce proper guidance or was at least susceptible to errors.16  
 
                                            
12 Abdullah and Nadvi (n 6) 271. 
13 Naquib al-Attas (n 9). 
14 One of the lines in the prayer address, the addresser says ( حالفلا ىلع يح ) hayya ala al-
falah or ‘hasten to success’. 
15 The Quran mention one the fundamental Islamic beliefs is belief in the ghaib, the 
unseen being, such as angels, devils, good dead, sin, heaven and hell, and so on. 
See also Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir v.1 trs al-Mubarakpuri (Darussalam 2000) 113. 
16 Muhammad Taqi Usmani, An Introduction to Islamic Finance (Kluwer Law 
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To appreciate such a conception of the surrounding world, humans need to be 
consciously realise that, as the greatest creation of God, they are inherently pure 
in nature. Each soul at its conscious level is benevolent and benign, free from 
any ill-natured or evil-minded intention. As said by the Prophet PBUH, every child 
is born with pure instinct or fitrah, and it is the parent who decides for them 
whether to be a Jew or a Christian or a Zoroastrian.17 This means that every 
single person is like a pure canvas, spotless and faultless. It is the people, 
surroundings and environment that shape their worldview, whether to believe that 
they are untrustworthy and greedy or benevolent and whole-hearted by nature. 
Islam however, does not put humans into the state of denial about their ill-nature. 
Instead of encouraging it, Islam has come with solutions to control the negative 
side and stimulates as well as cultivates the positive values, systematically. 
Therefore, Islam has never treated humans as untrustworthy, as Smithians would 
argue, yet it prepares precautious measures in their system of life, so human 
cannot harm one another. Instead of disregarding human nature by condemning 
them as untrustworthy, Islam chooses to see their potential and provides 
guidance accordingly. Like the gravity that holds the universe in its proper and 
systematic manner, Islam is a constructive belief system adopted into humans’ 
productive lives as their central nerve in moving forwards towards a genetically 
programmed goal: meeting the Creator. 
 
6.2.1 Islamic Belief System 
6.2.1.1 Tawhid System 
The Islamic belief or aqidah is based on the principle of tawhid. Literally, tawhid 
means unification, union or consolidation.18 It is the unification or asserting the 
oneness of God or, as mentioned by scholars such as al-Attas,  as the oneness 
of God and the unity of God.19 As argued by Hashi, tawhid is an advance version 
of monotheism which is scripture-based, not merely a conclusion perceived from 
the speculative theological debates.20 Other than working as the philosophy of a 
Muslim’s life, how does this fundamental belief system affect the essence of the 
Shariah governance system? 
 
                                            
17 This hadith is narrated by Al-Bukhari as reported from Abu Hurairah; M Bukhari, Sahih 
al-Bukhari (5th edn, Dar Ibn Kathir 1993) vol 1 no 1292, 456. 
18 Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic (4th eds J Milton Cowan, Otto 
Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1979) 1236. 
19 Muhammad Umer Chapra, Islam and Economic Development (The International 
Institute of Islamic Thought and Islamic Research Institute, 1981), 5 
20 For further discussion, see also Abdurezak A Hashi, ‘Between Monotheism and 




- 138 - 
The oneness of God is a revealed understanding that reveres Allah as the only 
God, the only Creator and the Supreme Lord of the universe.21 Allah alone is the 
Sovereignty, humans as His creation are considered His subjects that hold the 
job as His vicegerents to manage the world on His behalf.22 For every Muslims, 
the oneness of God is declared by a testimony called as shahada, through which 
the believers testify their submission by saying this essential faith declaration: ‘I 
bear witness there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad PBUH is the Messenger 
of Allah’.  This testimony is one of the pillars of submission, known as arkan al-
Islam.23 It is a method to quantify the presence of humans’ ‘inner acceptance’, 
based on their inquisitive nature, that Islam is their way of thinking, what defines 
good and bad norms, the source of answers to metaphysical nature invisible to 
their naked eyes, reference for scientific discoveries and, most importantly, their 
way of life. It is not merely a recognition of the reality of human nature, but in fact, 
it is an active response to that nature.24 This ‘inner acceptance’ is known as arkan 
al-Iman or the pillars of faith.25 The point of reference to the concept of the 
oneness of God is on the absoluteness of Allah as the one and only God that 
should be worshiped and the declaration of His lordship of the universe. It is borne 
in the mind of Muslims that Allah is One, without partner in His dominion and 
without rival in His divinity and in worship.26 It is imperative to say here that the 
belief in any others described as associates to Allah is considered an act of shirk 
and could jeopardise one’s testimony.27  
 
Accordingly, the concept of tawhid is fixed in the unity of God resolved as the 
substantial element that underpins the epistemological worldview of Muslims 
towards the surrounding world that is sensible to humans’ physical senses as 
well as to the invisible world. The unity of God means realising and maintaining 
Allah’s unity in all of humans’ actions, directly or indirectly related to Him.28 
Everything in this realm, humans and surrounding resources are connected to 
                                            
21 Abdullah and Nadvi (n 6) 272. 
22 See also ibid 
23 Arkan al-Islam or the pillars of submission include giving testimony that ‘none has right 
to be worshipped but Allah and Muhammad the messenger of Allah’, offering prayer 
or salat, paying compulsory alms or zakah, fasting during the month of Ramadhan 
and performing pilgrimage or Hajj for those who are capable. For further discussion, 
see also Abdur Rahman Hammad, The Religion of Truth (Maktaba Dar-us-Salam, 
1991). 
24 Chapra, Islam and Economic Development (n 19) 5. 
25 Arkan al-Iman or the pillars of faith include believe in Allah, the Messengers of Allah, 
the books of Allah sent to the Messengers, His Angels, the day of judgement, and 
the fate and Divine decree; Hammad (n 23). 
26 Bilal Philips, The Fundamentals of Tawheed (2nd eds, International Islamic Publishing 
House, 2005), 17. 
27 Shirk is constituting God with associates. 
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God as the Creator. As discussed by Choudhury and Hoque in the earlier chapter 
on this concept, Shariah governance constituents should feel the connection of 
knowledge: namely, the informative aspect of governance with the sense of His 
presence.29 The related parties should be mindful of the Muslims belief that God 
is All-Knowing and All-Seeing. Apart from being responsible for the tasks given 
by the institutions, they are answerable to God for any considerations, strategies 
and actions executed due to the fact that they are in search for the real attention 
of the Divine sources. As argued by Iqbal and Mirakhor, since the IFIs are akin to 
Shariah compliance, God as the Lawgiver of Shariah is considered as one of the 
stakeholders.30 
6.2.1.2 Belief in God as Humans’ Nature 
It is argued that belief in the existence of a supreme being that possessed the 
power of creation and to sustains what is created is innately human. This is 
imaginable as we have not seen any group throughout recorded human history 
who have lived without having their own way of thinking to account for 
unexplained phenomena, a supreme power and life after death, and so forth.31 In 
this regard, each group has its own way, regardless of the truth, based on their 
worldview. We also could see some groups of humans, who care nothing for 
religious issues, whose lives are driven by materialism.32 This, however, does not 
mean that they do not believe in anything or whatsoever. Most importantly, either 
way of thinking somehow has its legitimacy for the respective group as the source 
of norm creation and in the long run as their legal source. This is how the Islamic 
belief system affects the value judgement system of the IFIs. They choose to 
belief in business approaches that appreciate the Shariah legal system. 
 
Having said this, the IFIs as business institutions believe that as the Creator and 
the Sustainer of the universe, God created the earth for humans to prosper and 
utilise its resources. In this vein, humans as the vicegerents of Allah are entrusted 
to manage and govern the world in the approved way.33 To carry out such tasks, 
humans are empowered, within their genetic make-up, with a specialty that was 
not given to other organic creatures of God: cognitive abilities (‘aql). The cognitive 
abilities or the process of knowing is a specific quality that distinguishes humans 
from most of God’s other creations. It has made learning and gaining new 
                                            
29 See also Masudul Alam Choudhury and Muhmaad Ziaul Hogue, ‘Corporate 
Governance in Islamic Perspective’ (2006) 6 (2) Governance: The International 
Journal of Business in Society 116. 
30 See also Zamir Iqbal and Abbas Mirakhor, ‘Stakeholder Model of Governance in 
Islamic Economic System’ (2004) 11 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 43. 
31 Muhammad Youssef Moussa, Islamic and Humanity’s Need of It (The Supreme 
Council for Islamic Affairs 1993), 17. 
32 ibid 18. 
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knowledge a possibility for humans where they could utilise it for the sake of all 
humankind or the surrounding world. Human’s actions at their animalistic level 
are propelled by basic instinct. It somehow transcends from this level to another, 
due to the possession of cognitive abilities. Therefore, humans are called ‘talking 
animals’ in some philosophical statements, if they rule out cognition as the nature 
of humanity.34 Accordingly, the Quran mentions how God Himself taught Prophet 
Adam PBUH the names.35 The only obstacle towards maximising humanity’s 
learning curve is its own negativity.  
 
As the highest creation of God, humans are also empowered with the liberty of 
free choice. Nourished by cognitive abilities to acquire knowledge, humans can 
freely and wisely determine the meaning of good and evil as well as right and 
wrong where all the choices are answerable to God. It is something that could 
not be imagined as present in the actions of other organic creatures. In addition 
to this, humans are granted the capabilities of overpowering other creations so 
that they can use them for their own benefit. However, it is imperative to bear in 
mind that such capabilities could also bring about disastrous changes to the earth 
as described by the Quran.36 Despite vast capabilities, humans could not claim 
to have unlimited power to reach the absolute truth since most of their lives are 
spent under the shadow of spatial and temporal factors,37 hence, they are in need 
of guidance from the absolute source to shed some light.  
6.2.2 Humans as Vicegerents 
6.2.2.1 Who are the Vicegerents? 
Literally, vicegerent means a person exercising delegated power on behalf of a 
sovereign or a ruler.38 From the Islamic perspective, humans are God’s 
vicegerents or the caliph of Allah on earth which underscores the notion of 
humans as trustees of God managing the available resources on earth for their 
benefit in the way considered the best manner taught by God Himself. The 
entitlement of humans as vicegerents is stated in the Quran as follows: 
And when your Lord said to the angels: I am making a caliph on the 
Earth. They said: Are You making therein one who corrupts it and 
sheds blood, while we hymn Your praise and sanctify You? He said: 
Surely I know that which you do not know. 39 
                                            
34 Ali al-Jurjani, Mu’jam al-Ta’rifat (Dar al-Fadilah 2004), 35. 
35 Quran (2 :31) 
36 Quran (2: 30) 
37 See also Usmani (n 16) 10. 
38 Oxford Dictionary of English < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ vicegerent> 
accessed 10 September 2018. 
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The original word used in the passage was ‘caliph’. In its literal context, the word 
caliph connotes the meaning of ‘being the successor’.40 The Quranic 
commentators such as Ibn Kathir mention that this name refers to the nature of 
humans that breed and pass their legacy through inheritance, generation by 
generation.41 It is also refers to the task carried out by humans, the children of 
Adam and Eve (peace and bless be upon them), as God’s trustees to manage 
the earth as well as to bring prosperity and justice on His behalf.42 It is observed 
from the above Quranic passage that from the beginning of the creation of Adam 
PBUH, humans wer created to manage the earth. 
6.2.2.2 Vicegerent’s Task 
The task as His vicegerent is not merely an honour to humans as His best 
creation.43 As a matter of fact, it is an extremely heavy burden can never 
imaginably be undertaken by other creations. The fact that Prophet Adam PBUH, 
the first ever created human who was taught the names of creations44 by God 
Himself is the factor of this entitlement.45 
…We have honoured the children of Adam and carried them by land 
and sea; We have provided good sustenance for them and favoured 
them specially above many of those We have created… 
 …We offered the Trust (of succession, caliphate) to the heavens and 
the Earth and the mountains, yet they refused to undertake it, and 
were afraid of it. And (but) the mankind undertook it-they have always 
been very inept and rash…46 
 
As His stewards to manage the world, humans are provided with the manual of 
how to live in this world in the best manner. This manual portrayed by the 
teachings of Islam, which are considered as ‘din’, the word denotes the way of 
life that promulgated by God. 47 Through the course of human’s history, there are 
many prophets sent by God, starting from Prophet Adam PBUH to Prophet 
Muhammad PBUH. All those selected individuals are the conveyers of 
revelations, from the Creator to the humans as His creation, to bring the revealed 
                                            
40 Wehr (n 18) 297. 
41 Ibn Kathir (n 5) 182-183.  
42 ibid 
43 Quran (17:62) 
44 Names are the connotation of the capability of Adam PBUH and his descendants to 
acquire knowledge. 
45 Quran (2:31) 
46 Quran (33: 72) 
47 Din representing the meaning of way of life that is favoured by God. See also al-Jurjani 
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divine teachings to the earth for humans to follow. As far as Muslims are 
concerned, Islam is not only about the relationship of a man to his God through 
rituals and dogmatic faith, as usually perceived from the concept of religion, but 
also the whole way of life for humans, which covers personal and public 
relationship, either between a man to another or a human to other creations of 
God.48 
 
From the Islamic perspective, the task of prime importance as vicegerent is to 
bring justice. It is the nature of humans to seek justice in their lives which is, in 
fact, one of the primary goals for sending of the chain of Prophets.49 With regards 
to this, Islam is designed to attend to humans’ well-being by compensating the 
material needs of humans with morality, and the actualisation of economic justice 
and brotherhood in society.50 Since humans have limited capabilities of 
determining what justice really is as an absolute definition; to achieve such a 
noble notion, they would not be able to execute the task by merely reliance on 
reasoning and empirical observations. Somehow, humans are incapable of 
proposing an ultimate meaning of justice that is acceptable to all. Most attempts 
ended up with the solution that a certain concept of justice was only acceptable 
in certain circumstances due to the dynamic and variations of their surroundings, 
which to some extent has a significant role in nurturing their worldview. Adversely, 
such attempts had also caused chaotic results as can be seen in the colonial 
historical records. When the colonials came, the values of the superior 
newcomers were somewhat immersed by the weaker natives, irrespective of their 
indefinite truth. 
 
Justice is defined as a state of true equality and fairness.51 In the eye of Islam, 
justice is a harmonious condition or state of affairs whereby everything is in its 
right and proper place.52 It is to be justified by the sources of Islam for its general 
rules which essentially function as the foundation that could unify the humanity 
regardless of their various backgrounds. For a Muslim, justice is considered as 
the closest virtue to piety (taqwa).53 More profoundly, justice refers to the 
harmonious and correctly balanced relationship between man and himself, and 
                                            
48 Mohamed Aslam Mohamed Haneef, ‘Islam, the Islamic Worldview and Islamic 
Economics’ (1997) 5 (1) IIUM Journal of Economics and Management 39, 40. 
49 Quran (57:25) 
50 Muhammd Umer Chapra, Towards A Just Monetary System (The Islamic Foundation, 
1986) 14. 
51 Timur Kuran, ‘On the Notion of Economic Justice in Contemporary Islamic Thought’ 
(1989) 2 (2) International Journal of Middle East Study 171, 172. 
52 Naquib al-Attas (n 9) 25. 
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secondarily, to that between him and others.54 In this sense, human’s economic 
interaction involves a significant portion of the view of Islam, in the way that 
economic equilibrium is justified in Islam. The IFIs, an economic unit with Shariah 
as its genetic make-up, is a vessel to uphold the notion of justice as promulgated 
by the Shariah. 
 
It is argued that Islam never condemns the human tendency for wealth 
acquisition. It is innately human. Therefore, pursuing economic value 
maximisation through production is recognised and promoted by Islam. Perhaps, 
the valid argumentation here is about how to channel the pursuit so it can prevent 
humans from causing harm and injustice to each other.55 The love of wealth and 
the acquisition for its own sake in the light of excessive attention to materialistic 
desires, without considering the negative impact or giving the positivism on 
others, is what opposed by Islam.56 As far as Islam is concerned, wealth is a trust 
given by God to humans as vicegerent to manage on His behalf. The core 
element of this divine task is how to execute their duty in the way that is in 
adherence and compliance with the notions predefined by the Shariah, the law 
of God. 
6.2.3 Wealth as Trust for Vicegerent to Manage  
Wealth is defined as all that could be acquired by actions whether it is a corporeal, 
such as gold and silver (money), animals and plants, or incorporeal, the ability to 
enjoy the benefits of the corporeal assets such as the right to ride, to wear and 
to stay.57 It is rather philosophical and vague as compared to the technical terms 
as understood by modern financial theories and practices. However, to realise 
the sole reason of human existence, it is imperative to prevail the concept to such 
a philosophical level that the diverse dynamic of human life throughout the world 
could be sheltered under the same umbrella. Wealth should not only be 
understood in terms of financial stability, which is one of its rules, but also as a 
tool towards humans’ well-being. 
 
As God’s vicegerents, humans ought to appreciate the surrounding resources as 
tools to execute their divine task in this world. As mentioned above, from the 
beginning of human creation, they are branded as trustees who are capable of 
managing the available resources on earth on behalf of God. In this vein, Muslims 
                                            
54 Naquib al-Attas (n 9) 25. 
55 Muhammad Akram Khan, An Introduction to Islamic Economics (International Institute 
of Islamic Thought and Institute of Policy Studies) 5. 
56 Zulkifli Hassan, ‘Treatment of Consumption in Islamic Economics: An Appraisal’ 
(2005) 18 (2) L.KAU: Islamic Economics 29-46, 42; See also Saiful Azhar Rosly, 
Critical Issues on Islamic Banking and Financial Markets (Author House, 2005) 7. 




- 144 - 
see the world as the bridge to the life in the hereafter where they will be tested 
by God through the beings existing in this realm, to distinguish between those 
who are the righteous and those who are not. The test is simply to follow His 
commands and avoid what is prohibited. In the light of Shariah governance, the 
relevant question centres on how to strive towards well-being (falah), the 
postulated Islamic economic equilibrium, in the hereafter through the economic 
means of this life.58 
 
To accomplish wellbeing, humans ought to manage the measured sources in the 
manner permitted by God, the Owner, and not step on the prohibited areas. To 
execute this task, theoretically, the areas considered as prohibited by Shariah in 
the economy are rather limited since the presumption of validity and permissibility 
applies to all contracts and conditions.59. The main theme of the Shariah 
compliance in financial activities involves only the prohibition of riba, uncertainty 
and the involvement with activities that are contravened with the Shariah law such 
as gambling, cheating, bribery, hoarding, monopoly, and so forth. The elimination 
of interest through prohibition of riba might be the most controversial policy of the 
IFIs, since it has been the heartbeat of the financial market for quite a long period 
of time.60 Apart from that, other emphasises are considered as resemblance, if 
not exactly, to what have been perceived as economic causes of injustice. 
 
Furthermore, wealth management in the view of Shariah includes the wealth 
creation process, the distributive instruments and most importantly, the 
redistribution mechanisms of the idle wealth possessed by those who are rich to 
those in need to achieve equilibrium.61 Given this, the question of scarcity is 
inevitable and Shariah encourages any attempt to understand such an economic 
phenomenon since it could contribute accordingly to the better delivery system of 
Islamic economic notions. For some reason, it somehow plays a significant role 
in Islamic economic corpus, where two differing approaches emerged from the 
debate of how to define Islamic economics.62 However, no one chooses to defy 
that the objective of the economic activities according to Shariah is to achieve 
wellbeing as omentioned earlier.  
                                            
58 See also Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Islamic Economics: Nature and Need’ (1984) 1 
(2) Journal of Research in Islamic Economics 51. 
59 Muhammad Akram Laldin and others, Islamic Legal Maxims and Their Application in 
Islamic Finance (International Shari’ah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, 
2013)10. 
60 MH Mohsin, ‘Islamic Interest Free Banking: A Theoretical Analysis’ (1986) 33 (1) 
Palgrave Macmillan Journal 1, 2.  
61 Chapra, Islam and Economic Development (n 19) 6. 
62 For further discussion, see also Amir Wahbalbari and others, ‘The Concept of Scarcity 
and its Influence on the Definitions of Islamic Economics: A Critical Perspective’ 
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As far as Shariah is concerned, wealth is neither to be accumulated, hence left 
idle, nor to be recklessly utilised without considering the logical reasoning behind 
it. Wealth is not to be excessive, exceeding in respect of the right objects 
expenditure, called isra,f or in a manner other than in obedience of God, whether 
little or much, known as tabdhir.63 Additionally, it is also not to be withheld from 
obligatory, approved or permissible pursuits or bukhl.64 This notion of wealth 
management is due to the way Shariah addresses ownership. The reason why 
humans are obligated to follow this how-to doctrine is simply because they are 
not the absolute owner of the wealth. As they are deemed to be accountable to 
the shareholders, they are also held accountable to the Creator of the wealth 
Himself. 
6.2.4 Theory of Ownership in Islam 
The discussion on the ownership is rather imperative to the Shariah governance 
discourse. It will shed the light on the accountability of the Shariah governance 
constituents which is somewhat diverse as compared to the conventional 
counterpart. It will also manifest a different concept of ownership, distinguished 
from what is commonly understood by the conventional corporate governance, 
especially to the shareholders or the shareholer alike stakeholders.65 
 
Under the Shariah law perspective, ownership is a legal right on assets or legal 
right to take benefit from assets, that renders those with the right to take benefit 
of the asset whether by possession or transactional means.66 It is a dominion of 
a person on an asset that would hinder acquisition from others where the owner 
enjoys the right to dispose of the asset absolutely as far as it is permissible by 
the Shariah law.67 In this case, the right of ownership of particular asset is 
acquired by the means of, amongst others, asset transaction as in sale and 
purchase, benevolent acquisition as in charity and free giving, biological right as 
in inheritance and occupying as in land occupying or capturing an animal.68 
Whoever possesses an absolute right of ownership enjoys the power to enter 
transactional activities with no restrictions as far as it is Shariah compliance and 
his dominion is without any time limitation.69 By saying this, any parties who 
                                            
63 Sayyid Muhammad Yusuf, Economic Justice in Islam (SH Muhammad Asraf Kashmiri 
Bazar, 1971) 56. 
64 ibid 
65 Those who are entering into mudarabah and musharakah agreements such as the 
shareholders and the Investment Account Holders (IAH). 
66 Shihabuddin AI-Qarafi, al-Furuq, (Dar al-Salam 2001) 1009. 
67 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (n 57) vol 4 2893. 
68 Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyyah (1st eds Dar al-Safwa 2000) vol 39 38. 
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intend to transact the right or to transfer the legal title of the asset must get into 
permissible procedures with the consent of the relevant parties.70 It is worth 
mentioning that the consent of the parties involved is the essence of Islamic legal 
transfer. In this regard, as an example, the Shariah law put a distinctive concern, 
in the case of legal transfer for the bedridden, in order to avoid any possibility of 
disregard or manipulation.71  
 
In terms of the ownership of the asset, the Shariah acknowledges private as well 
as public ownership, respectively. In the light of this, humans’ propensity to 
possess and obtain property is essentially recognised. Humans are free to 
acquire wealth and maximise the value of the acquired wealth through Shariah-
compliant means and as far as it is not bringing about harm to the public 
interest.72 Additionally, Shariah law recognises and protects the implied or 
expressed terms construed in contracts by the parties involved regardless of their 
religious beliefs. The Quran, in fact, mentions that humans are made with love of 
desires, of women and sons and hoarded treasures of gold and silver and well-
bred horses and cattle and tillage.73 Furthermore, Shariah views production and 
labour as the utmost way to wealth creation and the possession of private 
property. For a Muslim, being able to be productive by working with their own 
hands given them by God is an honour as said by the Prophet PBUH; 
By Him whose hand myself is, to take your rope and gather firewood 
on your back is better for you than that you come to a man to whom 
Allah has given some of His favour and ask him so he gives to you or 
refuses.74  
Nobody has ever eaten a better for you than that which one has earned 
by working with one’s hands. The Prophet Allah David used to eat from 
the earning of His manual labour.75 
 
It is imperative to note here that Shariah also puts a certain amount of restrictions 
on private property acquisition. The intended objective is to protect the public 
interest76 by putting controls on certain properties from being monopolised by 
                                            
70 Quran (4: 29) 
71 In the case of a patient with a potentially fatal illness, any transaction by the patient 
must not equal more than one third of the whole possession to avoid any question 
of mislead consent. 
72 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (n 57) vol 4 2893. 
73 Quran 3:13 
74 This hadith is narrated by Al-Bukhari as reported from Zubair Al-Awwam; M Bukhari, 
Sahih al-Bukhari (5th edn, Dar Ibn Kathir 1993) vol 2 no. 1402 535. 
75 ibid no.1967 730. 
76 The consideration of public interest or maslahah mursalah is one of the legal sources 
in Shariah law. The authority has the right to take an action based on the reason to 
fulfil public interest especially in providing necessities that are essential to ease 
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private sectors. Under this provision, Shariah law put in public ownership 
properties that provide social services - such as a school, mosque or road - 
properties that exist naturally without humans’ intervention - such as minerals, 
water, grass and fire - and the state property - such as the wealth of the treasury. 
The source of law for these state interventions into private acquisition is the hadith 
of the Prophet PBUH on the common ownership of public natural necessities 
such as water sources, grass and fire, as well as other natural resources that are 
needed by living creatures by nature.77 Commencing from this, the Shariah 
scholars assess other resources by employing analogical reasoning or qiyas to 
other properties with similar ratio decidendi.78 In this regard, Shariah 
compensates the ownership of individuals, societies and the state. The state has 
the right to nationalise those common resources for the sake of the society to 
withdraw any hardship from their daily lives based on the consideration of public 
interest (masalih mursalah). 
 
Islam also has instruments to encourage the process towards nationalising 
individual ownership by private sectors such as waqf. Waqf is an endowment 
grant to transfer private legal ownership of tangible or intangible assets to God 
for the benefit of the public beneficiaries.79 In many circumstances, Muslims use 
waqf to nationalise their private property that has the potential to ease the need 
of the public such as land, water or grass. It is a benevolent act that played a 
significant role during the Ottoman Empire, whereby most of the private services 
for the travellers were Waqf based.80 Other than waqf, Shariah also provides 
zakat or compulsory alms as a redistribution instrument of idle wealth from the 
rich to the specific predetermined eligible receivers. As mentioned by the Quran, 
they are the poor (fuqara), the vulnerable (masakin), administers who collect 
zakat (amilin), those whose heart are to be won over (muallaf), those freeing of 
human beings from bondage, those overburdened with debts (riqab), those that 
struggle in the God’s cause (fi sabilillah) and wayfarers (ibn sabil).81 Apart from 
these, Shariah also encourages benevolent charity or sadaqah to ease each 
other’s burden and hardship, on the basis of synergy and coorperative action. 
 
                                            
hardship inflicted on the people because of a certain law implementation must be 
prevented. See also Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic 
Jurisprudence (The Islamic Texts Society Cambridge 2003) 351. 
77 This hadith is narrated by Ibn Majah as reported from Ibn Abbas; See also Ibn Majah, 
Sunan Ibn Majah (Al-Ma’arif Publication) no. 2472 422. 
78 This will be discussed further on the next subtopic. 
79 Transferring ownership to God means returning the ownership of what was once a 
private property back under public administration. 
80 Timur Kuran, ‘The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origin and Persistence’ 
(2005) 53 AJCL 14. 
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As far as Muslims are concerned, Islam as a way of life is moderate or 
wasatiyyah. It embraces moderation and intertwines with the middle course. In 
this regard, Islam blends the concept of justice with freedom, equality with 
incentive, liberty with limits and acquisition with sharing.82 There is no extreme 
spectrum upheld in the teaching of Islam. The action of the state in an economy 
must not trespass private initiatives, whereas maximisation of output by the 
private sectors joins with constructive redistribution governed by the state. This 
is how both sectors flourish in the economic ecosystem where conflicting issues 
between them should not exist based on rivalry but rather on companionship and 
supportive competition. The reality is, neither state nor private sector could stand 
alone without the presence of the other. 
 
It is important to realise that the understanding discussed above is the product of 
the Muslim worldview on the concept of the absolute Owner of the universe. Allah 
as God of the universe is the One and only Owner of everything ever to exist in 
the universe. The reason is simple. He is the Creator and, therefore, He owns 
everything of His creations, including humans. Technically, everything in this 
universe has been made subservient to Him.83 However, He is also without the 
need for His own creations. So, what is the purpose of all the creations? He 
expresses the answer to that question in one of the Quranic passages by saying 
that there is no purpose for the creation of jinn and humans except for them to 
obey Him.84 It is important to mention here that by saying obedience to the 
commands of the God, it is not merely restricted to ritual activities. He sent His 
manuals to the humans by revealing it to the chosen ones amongst the humans 
as His prophets. The message is clear: testify His Divineness and live the life as 
you wish, as long it is in compliant with His commands. 
 
Under the premise that the absolute owner of all property is God Himself, Shariah 
condemns the concentration of ownership to a small group of rich and powerful 
people hoarding and squandering of wealth for self-interest. In this view, God 
mentions that all those redistributions is to hinder the circulation of wealth within 
the rich amongst them to achieve economic equilibrium.85 The state of equilibrium 
in Islamic economic system includes justice and fairness in wealth distribution, 
which is in terms of material achievement, as well as the tranquillity or the state 
of mental and spiritual peace.86 Therefore, Islamic economic discussions do not 
deal merely with the question of wealth creation and distribution methods or 
economic decision-making variables and so on, as occurred in scarcity debate, 
                                            
82 Nazeer (n 7) 3. 
83 ibid 5. 
84 Quran (51: 56) 
85 Quran (59: 7) 
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but also in terms of morality and human values. Additionally, wealth is not 
something to be grabbed and chased by all possible means, but rather a medium 
to enrich the state of one’s life and give it to those in need. It is imperative to note 
here that by saying that wealth is to be given to others does not mean one should 
completely put aside one’s own interest. 
 
Despite the fact that wealth is desired by humans to fulfil their necessities, it is 
regarded as a tool to acquire Godly tasks rather than merely a worldly objective 
for one’s life. Therefore, the race of Muslims towards wealth creation is not about 
wealth value maximisation only, but also supersedes such a short-sighted 
objective. The question of how to acquire, preserve and utilise the wealth is not 
restricted to a human perspective, where it will take into account the pertinent 
commands given by God. Craving the wealth for self-seeking privilege, especially 
without considering the aspect of Shariah compliance and its negative impacts in 
the community is what is considered as a disapproved way of wealth creation. 
 
Shariah emphasises the function of wealth as an instrument to get a better live 
which is to sustain a strong, stable and united society. Any discussion on wealth 
will end up with how to ensure the possession of the wealth is done in adherence 
with Shariah as well as its distribution. This is because Shariah condemns any 
act of hoarding the wealth without spending or dispersing it for the sake of 
economic sustainability. Wealth is only renowned as genuine wealth after it serve 
the purpose of human wellbeing.87 Therefore, this is the comprehension of what 
Shariah compliance really is, rather fundamental and doctrinal to apprehend 
Shariah governance discourse. 
 
As a conclusion, one aspect that needs emphasising here is the impacts of the 
Islamic epistemological worldview regarding the ways of the IFIs should deal with 
economic activities. First of all, IFIs with the genuine intention to uphold Islamic 
teachings would never deem the managers as untrustworthy and waste their 
labour production talents. Secondly, the IFIs should also be delicate and creative 
in business strategies, as they are the dedicated vicegerents of God managing 
the available resources entrusted to humans. Thirdly, the IFIs should serve as an 
economic agent to achieve economic equilibrium by wealth-sharing and balance 
ownership. The last but not least, the IFIs should promotes this notion to their 
conventional counterpart and find out the way to merge both systems for 
everybody’s benefit. 
 
                                            
87 See also Mark Anielski, Genuine Wealth Accounting: Measuring Sustainability of 
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6.3 Shariah Compliance 
Shariah compliance, the notion that has been emphasised by this research is the 
raison d’être of Shariah governance. The word ‘compliance’ means the state or 
fact of according with, or meeting rules or standards.88 In this sense, ‘Shariah 
compliance’ is perceivable as to meet the standards required by the Shariah law. 
Despite wider application in other subjects, this connotation is mostly implied in 
Islamic finance. It is due to the fact the IFIs are accommodating a sizeable 
number of contracts admissible under the Shariah law. Therefore, it is imperative 
for the IFIs, as the biggest players of the Islamic financial market, to apprehend 
the variables that indicate compliance with the respective law. In this regard, the 
notion of Shariah compliance refers to the concept of financial activities in 
adherence with the tenets prescribed by Shariah. In other words, all products and 
services offered by the IFIs are fabricated from the idea that Shariah is the 
reference of the norm creation to prescribe what is right or wrong, licit or illicit, as 
well as what is lawful or unlawful. Each dispute or litigation, if any, will employ 
Shariah as the source of authority, hence the governing law, disregarding 
whatever terms are used. It is reflected by the existence of the Shariah committee 
as the primary structural constituent. The Shariah committee is a governance 
organ that executes the duty of care and loyalty in their way to comply with 
Shariah matters. The notion brought about by the duty of this respective organ 
plays as the banner of the IFIs in a way how they ensure that each products and 
services had gone through a deliberation of critical and delicate procedures under 
the supervision of a group of experts with ‘fit and proper’ criteria, before being 
offered to the market.  
 
It is worth mentioning in this regard that on most occasions, Shariah will come 
with a general prescription of ‘what ought’ or ‘what ought not to be’. This part will 
form the principle law as a normative preference for the relevant cases, under the 
same chapter. By referring that, Shariah law expands the ruling to the events that 
are currently occurring. If the event adheres to the principle law, it is admissible 
and the decision made is regarded as the law as well. For example, in the case 
of the Shariah financial law, there are three main principle laws, that work as 
normative preferences, which are the prohibition of riba, the avoidance of 
uncertainties and the abolition of non-permissible business activities.89 These 
three laws are ‘what ought’ or ‘ought not to be’ deemed to be considered by 
Muslims in their business. Business arrangements that are operated by business 
counterparts, are regarded as admissible, if they are complying with the three 
principle laws. The Islamic contractual arrangement, for instance, such as 
                                            
88 English Oxford Living Dictionary < https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ 
compliance> accessed 10 September 2018. 
89 Other writers might categories this aspect with a different arrangement, however, the 
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mudarabah, musharakah, wadi’ah, wakalah, and so on, are the list of the 
occurring cases that happened to be deduced by the Shariah scholars. They are 
the products that have prevailed over the general characteristics and have been 
submitted by the Shariah scholars as the listed Shariah-compliant contracts, 
known as the uqud musamma.  
 
As an extension to what has been discussed in Chapter 2 on the meaning and 
the characteristics of Shariah, this part will focus on how Shariah law is derived, 
not merely the description of its features and objectives. Shariah as the law of 
Muslim lands, provides the depictions of human’s starvation to a higher 
interpretation of norm. By nature, Shariah does not come to draw all human life 
in detail, from the biggest to the tiniest part and parcel of life, so it could put a full 
control on humans to ensure that they behave as they ought to under the Shariah 
framework. The Quran and the Hadith as the sources that come from God, the 
Creator, rather enlighten the weak spectrum of human capabilities and 
strengthen its strong spectrum. As data centric sources, many topics are well-
addressed in the Quran and the Hadith, in which a collection of legal aspects, 
known as the Shariah law, is also well encrypted. During the time of Prophet 
Muhammad PBUH, the companions had gone through a fully structured 
educational process for 23 years, from the Prophet PBUH himself; hence they 
could see the data presented by the sources in a coherent mind. This skill has 
been transferred to many generations afterwards and has been expanded 
exponentially by multiple Shariah legal schools during the golden age of Islamic 
knowledge. 
 
As the experts, it is rightfully the duty of the members of the Shariah committee 
to deduce the rulings on the operation of the IFIs under Shariah law. This 
procedure known as ijtihad. Ijtihad is a law-deducing procedure to figure out the 
principle laws from the sources, then apply them to the cases brought upon them. 
This task is of prime importance and exhaustive since it is the configuration of 
‘what ought’ or ‘ought not to be’ and ‘what is’ of Shariah law.90 
6.3.1 Shariah Compliance Characteristics in Finance 
As far as the IFIs are concerned, there are three primary characteristics to be 
applied to ensure Shariah compliance in Islamic finance, i.e the prohibition of riba, 
avoidance of uncertainties and the abolition of non-permissible business 
activities. These three characteristics are deduced by Shariah scholars from the 
Quran and the Hadith and stand as the point of reference to determine whether 
a certain contract is in compliance with Shariah law or otherwise.  
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6.3.1.1 Prohibition of Riba 
6.3.1.2 Definition of Riba 
The word riba is the connotation for interest and usury in Arabic.91 It is a noun 
derived from the word rabaa ( ابر ), yarbu ( اوبري ) and rabwan ( اوبر ). Literally, it means 
to increase, to grow, to exceed and to raise.92 In this regard, Al-Mawdudi asserted 
riba is commonly associated with an excessive amount of wealth and an addition 
to the principal.93  
 
Terminologically, the understanding of riba is closely related to the practice of 
Arabs during the time of jahiliyyah or the darks age of Arabs. This is due to the 
fact the alluded meaning (isharah al-nass) of the provision of the Quran pertaining 
to this notion is in a definitive form, signalling to a specific understanding of the 
time of revelation. The Quran says, ‘God has permitted trade and has forbidden 
interest’. The word form of riba in the Quran is mentioned in a singular form of 
noun, preceded by the definite article of ‘al’. From an Arabic lingual perspective, 
this form of word literally means ‘the riba’, a well-known subject, the form of 
interest charged over credit provided. As a result, it is observed that the Quranic 
interpreters will always narrate the form of riba widely practised by the Arabs 
during the time of the Quranic revelation. The Arab jahiliyyah merchants used to 
give credit to a person in return for an additional amount from the principal that 
would be paid after a certain tenure. When the date approached, the payment 
tenure would be extended to a new date and the amount of the debt raised due 
to the new tenure.94 In short, the amount would multiply and it is reported that 
some of borrowers ended up becoming slaves to the debtor due to the unpaid 
debt.95 This form of credit practice is also known as riba jahiliyyah. Since our 
modern economic system is connected on a vast scale to credit activities, the risk 
of riba as an excessive premium imposed on the borrower in a loan transaction96 
is, highly likely, unavoidable. 
 
                                            
91 See also Masudul Alam Choudhury and Uzir Abdul Malik, The Foundation of Islamic 
Political Economy (M Macmillan 1992) 103. 
92 Wehr (n 18) 347. 
93 Abu A’la al-Maududi, First Principles of Islamic Economics trs AS Hashemi eds K 
Ahmad (The Islamic Foundation, 2011) 144. 
94 AR al-Jazairi, Kitab al-Figh ala al-Mazhab al-Aba’ah (eds 2 Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah 
2003) vol 2 222. 
95 Those who were enslaved because of indebtment are eligible to receive zakah funding 
so they could be freed. 
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Besides riba jahiliyyah, the Prophet Muhammad PBUH explained the application 
of riba in other variants. As reported by Abu Said al-Khudry, the Prophet PBUH 
said, 
[Exchange] gold with gold, silver with silver, wheat with wheat, barley 
with barley, dates with dates, salt with salt in equal quantities and spot. 
Anyone who increases the quantity or asks for increase indulges in 
riba.97 
 
According to this, apart from being the excess or increasing amount over the 
principal credited, riba is also occurred in barter transaction of certain 
commodities due to excess amount or deferment in acceptance.  
 
Having this as the point of reference, Shariah scholars came up with numerous 
operational definitions. The classical works of the Hanafi school defined riba as 
a compensation without due consideration on specific goods based on standard 
matrix made conditional for either party of the contract.98 In one of the celebrated 
legal books of the Shafie school, riba is referred to as a contract of specific goods 
without due of return based on a standard matrix, during transaction or with a 
deferred transfer of either one or both items.99  
 
As observed from the aforementioned definitions, to contemplate whether the risk 
of riba has taken place in a transaction or not, three characteristics should be 
taken under consideration, i.e. the transferred items, the means of transaction 
and the paid amount. Leading by these characteristics, note that not all 
transactions are deemed to bear the risk of riba. The risk of riba, by and large, is 
only present in the transactions of ribawi100 items. As clearly said by the text, with 
a definitive meaning, the items included as ribawis are gold, silver, wheat, barley, 
dates and salt. Other than that, riba only occurrs if those items are not transacted 
according to the proposed way of transactions. Additionally, riba also happens in 
barter transactions of subjects with a single genus, if the paid price and the sale 
article are uneven in terms of weight. Regarding this, one of the fundamental 
questions under discussion here is how to trade the ribawi items without being 
involved in prohibited actions. To answer that, this part of discussion will 
                                            
97 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Abu Hurairah; Muslim bin Hajjaj, 
Sahih Muslim (Dar al-Fikr 2003) no 3959 778. 
98 Riba is defined by the scholars of Hanafi school as ( طورشم يعرشلا رايعمب صوصخم ضوع نع لاخ لضف 
ةضواعملا يف نيدقاعتملا دحال ): See also M Ibn Abidin, Radd al-Muhtar ala al-Dar al-Mukhtar (Dar Alam 
al-Kutub 2003) vol 7 398. 
99 Riba is defined by Shafie school scholars as  ( رايعملا يف لثامتلا ريغ صوصخم ضوع ىلع دقع  دقعلا ةلاح يعرشلا
امهدحأ وأ نيلدبلا يف ريخأت عم وأ ): See also M Khatib Shirbini, Mughni al-Muhtaj ila Ma’rifat Alfaz al-
Minhaj (Dar al-Ma’rifah 1998) vol 2 30. 
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encapsulate an in-depth discussion of riba, especially in the area that is crucial 
to bringing about understanding of the complexity of its implementations.  
6.3.1.2.1 Proofs on Riba Prohibition 
Shariah scholars are in consensus on the prohibition of riba.101 The proofs of riba 
prohibition are resolved from the Quran and the authentic Hadiths. Both sources, 
especially, the Quran are revealed to the Prophet PBUH in a gradual manner, 
which took place over a period of 23 years. Regarding this, some of the passages 
of the Quran were revealed on an occasional basis, such as the texts relating to 
the proof of riba prohibition. This is due to the fact riba is a well-rooted tradition 
of the Arab jahiliyyah economic system and hardly eliminated without causing 
detrimental effects to the system as a whole.  
 
The proofs of riba from the Quran are concluded in four levels, as follows: 
a. First level 
… whatever you lent out in usury to gain value through other people’s 
wealth will not increase in God’s eye… 102 
 
The Quranic interpreters like Ibn Abbas, Ibn Jarir, Tawus and Mujahid mentioned 
that this text alludes to a hibah (gift) that is given with the intention of receiving 
benefits from the receiver.103 In this case, the intention of the donor is not 
benevolent but rather to seek advantage in return.104 By the way of inference 
(dalalah al-nass) to a greater intention, this text does not directly mention the 
regulation regarding excess amounts charged over the debt, but more on drawing 
the attention of the society to the morality of giving and its added value in the 
eyes of God. Despite interest not being prohibited by this text, it emphasises how 
wealth generated from interest charged is not blessed by God.105 
 
b. Second level 
For the wrongdoings done by the Jews, We forbade them certain good 
things that had been permitted to them before: for having frequently 
debarred others from God’s path; for taking usury when they had been 
forbidden to do so; and for wrongfully devouring other people’s 
                                            
101 Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (n 57) vol 5 3700. 
102 Quran (30: 39) 
103 Muhammad ibn Ahmad Al-Qurtubi, al-Jami’ li Ahkam al-Quran (Dar al-Kutub 2002) 
vol 7 361. 
104 Al-Tabari, Jami’ al-Bayan ‘an Ta’wil al- Qur’an (Dar al-Salam 2007) vol 8 6529. 
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property. For those of them that reject the truth we have prepared an 
agonising torment. 106 
 
This passage was revealed in the early days after the event of the hijrah 
(migration) of the Prophet PBUH and his companions from Mecca to Medina. 
During that time, Medina was the settlement of numerous Jewish tribes. Since 
the Quran is the latest testament from God, it mentions how the former 
generations reacted to the testaments that came before the Quran. In this case, 
God started to give indications as to what happened to former generations due 
to their unwillingness to follow the guidance. As mentioned in the text above, God 
had forbidden the Jews what was once permitted for them because of their act of 
charging interest over credit.107 This is the reminder from God for them not to 
follow such an example, as far as Muslims are concerned. 
 
c. Third level 
...you who believe, do not consume usurious interest, doubled and 
redoubled. Be mindful of God so that you may prosper…108 
 
This text was revealed during the second year after hijrah. As stated by Mujahid, 
it is a clear message from God to those who charge doubled and multiplied 
amounts of interest on credit activities.109 Unlike the first two texts relating to riba, 
this text indicates the regulatory aspect of riba. The used of do not consume (  ال
اولكأت ) is a derivative form of command to omit the action of consuming interest. 
However, the focal point of this command of this level was on interest with 
doubled and multiplied charges. 
 
d. Fourth level 
…but those who take usury will rise up on the Day of Resurrection like 
someone tormented by Satan’s touch. That is because they say: 
‘Trade and usury are the same’, but God has allowed trade and 
forbidden usury. Whoever, on receiving God’s warning, stops taking 
usury may keep his past gains - God will be the judge-but whoever 
goes back to usury will be an inhabitant of the Fire, there to remain. 
God blights usury but blesses charitable deeds with multiple increase: 
He does not love an ungrateful sinner. Those who believe, do good 
deeds keep up the prayer, and pay the prescribed alms will have their 
reward with their Lord; no fear for them, nor will they grieve. You who 
                                            
106 Quran (4: 160-161) 
107 Syed Qutb, Tafsif fi Zilal al-Quran (Dar al-Syuruq) 803. 
108 Quran (3: 130) 
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believe, beware of God: give up any outstanding dues from usury if 
you are true believers. And if you do not, then be warned of war from 
God and His Messenger. You shall have your capital if you repent, and 
without suffering loss or causing others to suffer loss. 110 
 
These texts are the conclusion of the regulation of riba resolved from the Quran. 
In the Shariah regulatory point of view, the quote ‘God has permitted sale and 
forbidden riba’ is a direct exclamation to clarify the regulatory statute of riba in the 
eyes of Shariah law. As far as the IFIs are concerned, the word forbade solidifies 
the prohibition of riba with an explicit meaning (ibarah al-nass). This command is 
derived from definitive proof with a definitive meaning pointing out the prohibition 
of riba in Shariah law. In addition, the later part of the texts also indicates the 
magnitude of this prohibition. Those who defy this order are similar to those who 
are at war with God Himself. Such a great condemnation.  
 
Apart from the Quranic texts, the prohibition of riba is also deduced by authentic 
hadiths as partly the abovementioned. Broadly speaking, the hadiths function as 
supportive proofs for the mentioned cases from the Quran. There are also hadiths 
associated as determiners to what had been said by the Quran by providing 
further explanation, the qualified over the absolute meaning or the 
particularisation of general meaning of the Quran. Other than that, hadiths could 
deliver rulings that are silenced by the Quran.111 In the case of riba, the relevant 
hadiths to riba prohibition are as follows: 
 
"Avoid the seven destructive things." It was asked: (by those present): 
"What are they, O Messenger of Allah?" He replied, "Associating 
anyone or anything with Allah in worship; practising sorcery, killing of 
someone without a just cause whom Allah has forbidden, devouring 
the property of an orphan, consuming of usury, fleeing from the 
battlefield and slandering chaste women who never even think of 
anything touching their chastity and are good believers."112 
 
The Messenger of Allah PBUH cursed the one who accepts Ar-Riba 
(the usury) and the one who pays it.113 
 
                                            
110 Quran (2: 275-279) 
111 Wahbah al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (2nd edn Dar al-Khayr, 2006) vol 
1 222. 
112 This is narrated by Muslim as reported from Jabir; Muslim, Sahih Muslim (Dar al-Fikr 
2003) no 3984 783. 
113 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Jabir; Muslim, Sahih Muslim (Dar 
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To some extent, these hadiths are examples of how the hadiths function as the 
supportive proof to the Quran. In this context, these hadiths are illustrating how 
Shariah perceives riba. Riba is something to be avoided and even cursed by the 
Prophet PBUH. The commanding words such as ‘avoid’ and condemnation words 
such as ‘cursed’ indicate the dictation of command to omit the acts.114 As a result, 
these texts are considered as definitive proofs for the prohibition of riba, as far as 
the Shariah scholars are concerned. 
 
Other than the aforementioned hadiths, there are also hadiths that illustrate the 
technical aspect of riba, as follows: 
Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley 
by barley, dates by dates, and salt by salt, like for like and equal for 
equal, payment being made hand to hand. If these classes differ, then 
sell as you wish if payment is made hand to hand.115 
Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley 
by barley, dates by dates, salt by salt, like by like, payment being made 
hand to hand. He who made an addition to it, or asked for an addition, 
in fact dealt in usury. The receiver and the giver are equally guilty.116 
 
Unlike the previous hadiths, these hadiths specify the general indication of riba 
mentioned by the Quran. Based on the hadiths above, there are six items listed 
as having the risk of riba.  They are evidently mentioned in an explicit narrative 
with a definitive meaning. As a result, the Shariah scholars established those 
items as ribawis, and they stand as the point of reference for ijtihad procedure in 
relation to riba matters. Other than establishing these ribawi items, the Prophet 
PBUH also stipulated the way how those items should be traded to avoid the risk 
of riba. 
6.3.1.2.2  ‘Illah of Riba Prohibition 
The insight of the ‘illah (effective cause) of riba is crucial to allow Shariah 
committee to contemplate relevant Shariah legal aspects of the deals entered by 
the IFIs. It is as a direct result of the fact that the presence of riba in trade could 
render the contract null and void. Under Shariah law, such a prohibition could 
also revoke the legal title of the assets as it is obtained through a non-admissible 
action which is by charging riba. Apart from that, the dynamic of financial 
instruments has allowed the transformational forms of riba to excel. Thus, a 
quantifiable description is required to elucidate the substantial rationales of riba 
                                            
114 Abdul Karim Zaydan, Al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh (Muassasah al-Risalah 2014) 279. 
115 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri; Muslim, Sahih 
Muslim (Dar al-Fikr 2003) no 3954 778. 
116 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri; Muslim, Sahih 
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prohibition. It is to play the role as the tangible basis in articulating the Shariah 
legal ground for any cases related to riba using the valid analogical reasoning.  
 
Before any further discussions on riba, it is important to note that the 
comprehension of this topic relies on the understanding of qiyas (analogical 
reasoning) owing to the fact that ‘illah is one of the elements of qiyas. Qiyas is an 
ijtihad process of the extension of the Shariah value from an original case to a 
new case, in the light of the latter having the same effective cause as the 
former.117 As mentioned by al-Amidi and Ibn Hajib, it is an equalisation of the new 
case with the original case due to the similarity of their ratio decidendi.118 This 
definition is deduced by Isnawi based on the given definition by al-Baidawi. Al-
Baidawi addressed qiyas as the affirmation of the ruling of the original case on 
the new case due to the proven association of ratio decidendi.119 To deploy qiyas, 
Shariah scholars will scout for four elements that are deemed to be compulsory. 
These elements are the original case (asl), the new case (far’u), the ruling (hukm) 
and the effective cause (‘illah).120  
 
In terms of its validity, qiyas is unanimously agreed by scholars as one of the 
sources of Shariah law.121 The proofs of this argument are the Quran and the 
authentic hadiths. One the celebrated proofs is the hadith narrated by Abu Dawud 
on the conversation of the Prophet PBUH and Muaz ibn Jabal when he intended 
to send him to Yemen. The Prophet PBUH asked him, ‘How will you judge when 
the occasion of deciding a case arises?’ He replied, ‘I shall judge in accordance 
with Allah's Book’. He asked, ‘(What will you do) if you do not find any guidance 
in Allah's Book?’ He replied, (I shall act) in accordance with the Sunnah of the 
Messenger of Allah PBUH. He asked, ‘(What will you do) if you do not find any 
guidance in the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah PBUH and in Allah's Book?’ 
He replied ‘I shall do my best to form an opinion and I shall spare no effort’. The 
Prophet PBUH then patted him on the breast and said, ‘Praise be to Allah who 
has helped the messenger of the Messenger of Allah to find something which 
pleases the Messenger of Allah’.122 
 
                                            
117 Kamali (n 76) 264. 
118 Jamal al-Din Al-Isnawi, Nihayah al-Sul fi Syarh Minhaj al-Wusul (Dar Ibn Hazm 1999) 
vol 2 792. 
119 Nasiruddin A al-Baidawi, Minhaj al-Wusul ila ‘Ilmi al-Usul (Dar Ibn Hazm 2008) 189. 
120 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (n 111) vol 1 238. 
121 There were schools such as Zahiri and Muktazilah who opposed qiyas as a tool to 
regulate rulings of Shariah law. Despite its extinction, it is important to mention this 
opinion due to the fact some of the contradictions of the scholars on Shariah matters 
were caused by this jurisprudential distinction: See also Kamali (n 76) 265. 
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The ‘illah is deemed to coexist in both old and recent cases before the qiyas is 
deployed.123 It is an aggregate description of the rationale of the original case, 
which is ostensibly available in the new case.124 As discussed by Hashim Kamali, 
‘illah refers to the rationale of injunction or ratio decidendi in Shariah rulings. It is 
an attribute of the original case, which is constant and evident and bears a proper 
relationship to the law of the text.125 Despite differences in details, ‘illah also has 
its similarities with cause (sabab) in many respects. As far as this research is 
concerned, ‘Illah is more than merely a cause or rationale of the rulings. It is a 
tangible outline of reasoning which could be understood by the mujtahid to make 
use of qiyas for the unprecedented cases by referring to the original cases 
depicted by the Shariah sources. 
 
The justification of ‘illah in the case of riba is utterly imperative. The fundamental 
of this notion is the alluded meaning conferred by the word riba in the Quran. The 
Quran has mentioned riba in a singular form of noun, preceded by the definite 
article of ‘al’, as an indication of generalisation (‘amm), without providing 
specification (khass), neither from other Quranic texts nor hadiths to elaborate its 
real meaning. Regarding this, from the Shariah jurisprudential perspective, the 
general form generalises the implementation of the mentioned word.126 In the 
case of riba, this word form indicates that the ruling of riba is applicable to others, 
without ostensive restriction. Moreover, in spite of the hadith that mentioned the 
number of specific items that fit as ribawis, Shariah scholars unanimously opined 
the implied meaning of ribawi is extended beyond the said list in a more general 
manner.127  
 
It is important to note here that there is no specific provision stating the ‘illah of 
riba.128 Therefore, in seeking the ‘illah of riba, Shariah scholars employed the 
process known as takhrij al-manat, or the extraction of the ‘illah that is silent in 
the texts.129 As a result, there are contradictory of views occurred amongst the 
Shariah scholars about what is the valid ‘illah of riba. In order that an ‘illah fits as 
a valid reference, it must be tangible, quantifiable, and applicable to other sort of 
                                            
123 Abdul Wahhab Khallaf, Ilm Usul al-Fiqh (ar al-Fikr al-Arabi 1996) 72. 
124 al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (n 111) vol 1 239. 
125 Kamali (n 76) 275. 
126 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (n 111) vol 2 49-50. 
127 Ibn Rusyd, Bidayah al-Mujtahid wa Nihayah al-Muqtasid (Bayt al-Afkar al-Dawliyyah 
2007) 656. 
128 In some cases like the prohibition of alcoholic drink, the ‘illah of its prohibition was 
clearly stated by the hadith as muskir (intoxicant). Commencing from this, any 
intoxicating substance is deemed to be prohibited. 
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cases.130 For the purpose of legal consideration, these jurisprudential 
characteristics are decisive in respect to the role of an ‘illah as legal basis for a 
Shariah law deduction. There is an opinion, for instance, that depicted zulm 
(injustice) as the ‘illah of riba.131 However, the concept of injustice is 
unquantifiable. How to put a tangible definition of injustice? If we simply say, as 
a certain party obtained more in terms of financial gain compared to other parties 
of the same agreement as a justified ‘illah, we will end up with implicating those 
who stand as the principals of our economic units. Moreover, we will see those 
who are blessed with wealth as deprivers rather than entrepreneurs.  
 
As of this, the Shariah scholars have come up with two main categories of ribawi 
items by compiling gold and silver into a single group, and wheat, barley, dates 
and salt into another group. As for gold and silver, the Hanafi school and one of 
the opinion of the Hanbali school argued that the rationale for those items to be 
ribawis is that they are scaled and estimated by measure and weight.132 The 
unanimous agreement of scholars from the schools of Maliki, Shafie and one of 
the opinions of Hanbali school asserted that the effective cause of ruling for gold 
and silver as ribawi items is the medium of exchange.133 As for wheat, barley, 
dates and salt, the Hanafi and the Hanbali schools judged them as items scaled 
and estimated by measure and weight, the Maliki school as edible food and life 
sustenance and Shafie school as humans’ edible food.134 These distinctions have 
caused disagreements between the Shariah scholars to impose ribawi to the 
extended items. For instance, in the case of those who deduced everything that 
is scaled by weight as ribawi items, other items such as steel and metal are 
reckoned as the derivation of ribawis, but fiat money made of paper and not 
measured by weight is not. The same principles applied to those who see medium 
of exchange as ‘illah. In this case, fiat money is ostensibly a ribawi item. 
Regarding this, as decided by the contemporary Shariah scholars, such as the 
International Fiqh Council and the AAOIFI, fiat money is a ribawi item due to the 
fact it has taken the function of gold and silver as the medium of transaction, in 
parallel with the opinion of the unanimous ancient Shariah scholars.135 
 
                                            
130 Khallaf (n 123) 65-67. 
131 Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (n 50) 38. 
132 Abdullah al-Nasafi, Kanz al-Daqaiq (Dar al-Bashaer 2011) 231: Abidin(n 98) 403: See 
also al-Jazairi (n94) 225. 
133 Muhammad Dusuqi, Hashiyah al-Dusuqi ala al-Syarh al-Kabir (Dar Ihya’ al-Kutub al-
Arabiyah) vol 3 47; Muhammad al-Zuhri al-Ghamrawi, al-Siraj al-Wahhaj (Dar al-
Ma’rifah) 177-178; See also al-Jazairi (n94) 225. 
134 As the implication of the primary traded items in finance, the focus of this research is 
more on the ‘illah of gold and silver 
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6.3.1.2.3 Types of Riba 
The risk of riba exists in sale and debt transactions of ribawi items. It could occur 
in the transaction of ribawi items with delayed payment or excess amount in one 
of the counter values. Regarding this, riba in delayed payment is known as riba 
al-nasiah whereas riba in the excess payment is known as riba al-fadl.  
 
a. Riba al-Nasiah 
Literally nasiah means credit and delayed payment.136 Riba al-nasiah refers to 
the extra charged on credit because of the delay in payment.137 Terminologically, 
it is an additional premium to be paid to the debtor as a payment for the deferment 
in return of the loan given to the borrower.138 It is considered as in equivalent with 
the practice of charging interest in the modern financial system. This type of riba 
commonly happens in debt-based transactions, as in loans and sales with 
deferred payment.  That is the reason why it is known as riba al-duyun (interest 
on debt) on several occasions. Ibn Qayyim addressed riba al-nasiah as riba-jalli 
(explicit) because of its blatant end-result of debt-based transactions, which is 
the additional amount to be paid on top of the principal due to the payment 
tenure.139 This type of riba is exemplified by A who borrowed from B an amount 
of GBP100 with the promise of payment within 3 months. B as the debtor asked 
A to pay him an additional amount of money based on, let say x% per annum of 
the principal, as a charge for his kindness in lending the money for the stipulated 
tenure. If A cannot fulfil his promise to pay within the tenure, x% per annum will 
be recalculated and a new tenure will be applied. Under common circumstances, 
this type of riba appears in debt transactions or purchasing with deferred 
payments associated with price increment due to time. The tenure and the 
percentage of the charged amount are in correlation.  
 
The indication for riba al-nasiah is resolved from the Hadiths of the Prophet’s 
PBUH, as follows: 
Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley 
by barley, dates by dates, and salt by salt, like for like and equal for 
equal, payment being made hand to hand. If these classes differ, then 
sell as you wish if payment is made hand to hand.140 
                                            
136 Oxford Arabic Dictionary (OUP 2014) 803.  
137 Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Buhuth fi Riba (Dar al-Fikr 1986) 19. 
138 Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyyah (2nd eds Dar al-Safwa 1992) vol 22 57. 
139 Ibn Qayyim, I’lam al-Muwaqqi’in li Rabb al-‘Alamin (Dar Ibn al-Jawzi 2002) vol 3 397.  
140 This hadith is by Muslim as reported from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri; Muslim bin Hajjaj, 
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There is no Riba except when it is not done from hand to hand.141 
 
b. Riba al-Fadl 
Literally, fadl means excess and surplus.142 Riba al-fadl refers to the excess 
amount to be paid in credit and trade. Terminologically, it is an unbalanced 
amount that occurs between the price and sale article in the case of the trade of 
the ribawi items with a single genus. In this sense, the semblance of this type of 
riba is more distinctive to barter trade of the ribawis. This type of riba is 
exemplified by A buying from B 1000kg of process wheat paid for by 1200kg of 
raw wheat to be paid in a said time and place. In this example, the fact that both 
items are in a single genus has caused riba to occur regardless of the quality. 
 
The indication of riba al-fadl is resolved from the Hadiths of the Prophet’s PBUH, 
as follows: 
Gold is to be paid for by gold, silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley 
by barley, dates by dates, salt by salt, like by like, payment being made 
hand to hand. He who made an addition to it, or asked for an addition, 
in fact dealt in usury. The receiver and the giver are equally guilty.143 
6.3.1.2.4 Trading Ribawi Items 
After considering the types of riba and how it could occur in the transaction, it is 
worth addressing how to avoid the occurrence of such a forbidden feature. 
Regarding this, there are three conditions to be considered when we deal with 
ribawi items respectively i.e. the genus of the items, the amount of the transacted 
items and the delivery methods.144 The genus of the items reflects the ‘illah whilst 
the amount of exchange conjectures the possibility of riba al-fadl and the delivery 
method holds the potential risk of riba al-nasiah. Firstly, if the transactional 
counter-values are in a single genus, they are to be traded hand to hand with 
equivalent measure or weight. For instance, a 1kg of gold bar is to be traded hand 
to hand with a 1kg of gold coin or a credit of GBP 100 is to be paid by GBP 100. 
Secondly, if the transactional counter-values are not in a single genus yet in a 
similar group, they are to be transacted hand to hand with no consideration on 
the measure or weight. For example, a 1kg of gold bar is to be traded hand to 
hand with a 2kg of silver bar, or GBP 100 is to be traded hand to hand with USD 
                                            
141 This hadith is narrated by Al-Bukhari as reported from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri; M Bukhari, 
Sahih al-Bukhari (5th edn, Dar Ibn Kathir 1993) vol 2 no. 2069 762. 
142 Wehr (n 18) 841. 
143 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Abu Sa’id al-Khudri; Muslim, Sahih 
Muslim (Dar al-Fikr 2003) no 3955 778. 
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120. This type of transaction is simiar to the nature of forex trading (sarf).145 
Thirdly, if the transactional counter-values are neither in a single genus nor group, 
they are free to be traded without giving consideration, neither on delivery method 
nor on measure or weight. Therefore, a 1000kg of wheat can be traded with any 
currency counter-values equivalent to its economic value, using any delivery 
method the traders see fit. Meaning, the purchasing of wheat paid for by money 
is the subject of deferment and price fluctuation. In regard to the riba items that 
are transferred with or purchased by other riba items with no resemblance in the 
effective cause of ruling, the aforementioned conditions are inapplicable.  
 
One way to demonstrate how this Shariah requirement is brought into practice, 
is by looking at the forward foreign currency exchange transactions. In conducting 
a forward foreign currency exchange, which to some extent seems impossible for 
the IFIs to execute, the Shariah committee proposed the adoption of a unilaterally 
binding promise by one party (wa’ad mulzim).146 In this sort of transaction, the 
customer agrees to make a unilateral promise to buy foreign currency from an IFI 
that will be settled at a specified date. As risk mitigation, the customers have to 
compensate the actual amount of losses suffered by the bank in the event of 
default.147 In this model, the real transaction will only occur on the promised date 
and the made promise is not tantamount to a contract. In the event of deferred 
payment, which holds the potential risk of riba al-nasiah, the T+2 case seems to 
properly demonstrate the IFIs’ practice. In this case, the Shariah committee has 
put an exemption for transactions of the items in the case of non-avoidant 
deferment as takes place in spot foreign currency exchange. In a spot 
transaction, the payment is settled on T+2 or two days after the transaction date. 
To resolve this issue, the Shariah committee have considered its permissibility 
by giving consideration that such a duration is required by the relevant parties to 
confirm the trade transaction, where it is an accepted and recognised method of 
settlement in business practice.148 
 
As a conclusion, what is to be understood here is the dynamic of product offering 
procedure should be broadened to comply with Shariah law. It is not merely the 
feasibility and flexibility of the Shariah financial contracts, but the respective 
financial products should also be more tolerable and adaptable to the Shariah 
requirements which somehow demand a creative and innovative mind from the 
Shariah governance constituents. 
                                            
145 ibid 93. 
146 AS al-Manea, Buhuth fi Iqtisad Islami (al-Makatabah al-Islamic 1996) 140. 
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6.3.1.2.5 Reasons of Riba Prohibition 
There are many reasons why riba or interest as the cost of borrowing money 
ought to be paid by the borrower and the excess of payment in trade of certain 
goods is unlawful and prohibited by the Shariah law. The primary theme of the 
prohibition, as stated by many researchers such as Chapra is injustice, 
exploitation and instability, both socially and economically.149 Leading from these 
themes, the reasons of riba prohibition have come to light.  
 
Firstly, as far as Shariah law is concerned, the excess payment paid by the 
borrower to the debtor is an injustice (zulm). This credit compensation is obtained 
without due consideration. In other words, such an extra payment is paid out of 
nothing in return. In the light of this notion, the idea of borrowing and lending 
money in the eyes of Shariah is rather a benevolent act instead of an 
economically motivated act: benevolent credit under the Shariah financial law 
known as qard hasan. This credit facility is based on morality and has no financial 
benefit for the debtor. This sort of credit arrangement is due to the fact that under 
common circumstances, borrowing activities are related to deficit economic units 
whereas the lenders are the surplus economic units.150 How could we expect 
those who are in need and would have a negative amount of money to pay more 
than what they have taken whilst on the other side who possessed idle amount 
of money, which somewhat undesirable, to get more than what they have given?  
 
Regarding this, if we see loan as an instrument to facilitate investment, Shariah 
prefers such a facility to be carried out based on profit and loss sharing, not as a 
window of opportunity to exploit the potential gain without bearing the risk of loss. 
A Shariah legal maxim stipulates that benefit goes with liabilities (al-kharaj bi al-
daman).151 One might argue that the debtor also bears the risk of loss in the case 
of default due to the lack of business performance. However, the consequence 
of loss that could potentially occur in debt-based investment is not a subject to 
be shared in a fair manner but rather to be endured by one party, the borrower, 
who would already experience loss if the business is under performaning. 152  This 
double impact has increased the liability on the shoulder of the borrower out of 
necessity but not the debtor. Therefore, Shariah distinguishes credit activities for 
desired necessities with investment initiatives for value generation. As an 
alternative, credit with benevolent (qard hasan) is suggested as a credit facility 
                                            
149 Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (n 50) 25. 
150 RH Abdrurrahman, Mawqif al-Shariah al-Islamiyyah Min al-Bunuk, al-Muamalat al-
Masrafiyyah wa al-Ta’min (Dar al-Salam 2005) 16. 
151 Laldin and others, (n 59) 156. 
152 M Mashkoor, ‘The Meaning of Riba and its Prohibition in Islam’ (2010) 16 Research 
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for personal purpose whilst symmetrical profit and loss sharing investment 
instruments such as musharakah and mudarabah are commonly utilised as 
investment instruments for business purposes.153 
 
Secondly, riba is also regarded as an exploitation of the labour force, while a free 
enterprise corporative system is maintained.154 This notion is due to the fact that 
the borrowers, regardless of the attention of the loan, are vulnerable and at risk 
of manipulation by the surplus units. Islamic morality upholds the concept of 
courtesy and kindness (ma’ruf) as it also denounces exploitation.155 As a 
preventive measure, any action that could bring about the exploitation of the 
labour force is subject to this prohibition. Chapra asserted that the prohibition of 
riba would help to minimise the manipulative elements of money demand which 
somehow promote greater efficiency out of scarce economic resources.156 
Moreover, this exploitative initiative also narrows the circulation of wealth. By 
having interest charges on each penny borrowed for production purposes, any 
output produced by the labour force is entitled to additional cost to be paid to the 
debtor. Out of resources scarcity, these desperate deficit units who are already 
short in options have to bear the cost of lending on top of other business 
expenses. This exploitative initiative to some extent has reduced efficiency and 
could diminish the productive factors of the both sides of economic units.157 The 
charge of riba in credit facilities, it is also believed, has encouraged people to get 
involve with debt-based economic activities instead of the real economic scheme 
that build based on trade and equity.  
 
Thirdly, it is argued that riba is one of the factors to cause instability of the financial 
system. Since the conventional financial system is highly entangled with debt-
based financing, fluctuations in the interest rate is considerably influential. This 
debt-based financial system mitigates the risk of using risk transfer mechanisms, 
which is mostly borne by borrowers, not the risk-sharing mechanism.158 This 
financial instability exacerbated under the recessionary economy. This is due to 
the fact that the riba-based system is incapable of allocating the liquidity among 
                                            
153 ibid 
154 Masudul Alam Choudhury, ‘Principles of Islamic Economics’ (1983) 19 (1) Middle 
Eastern Study 93, 96. 
155 Abdrurrahman,, (n 150) 16. 
156 Muhammad Umer Chapra, ‘Monetary Management in an Islamic Economy’ (1996) 4 
(1) Islamic Economic Studies 1, 28. 
157 Muhammad Arif and others, ‘Free Riba Economic System’ (2012) 2 (6) International 
Journal of Humanities and Social Science 141, 143. 
158 The Islamic financial system promulgates equity-based financial products under profit 
loss sharing flagship. However, debt-based financial products are not to be 
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the firm and society according to the consideration of efficiency, productivity and 
growth. It is asserted that public demand for money has proven to be more stable 
in the absent of interest-based financial systems.159 
 
Other than that, this instability is also stimulated by the commoditisation of 
currency. Under Shariah perspective, currency is merely a medium of exchange 
to obtain genuine wealth. It is believed that the risk of speculation inspired by 
currency trading also could destabilise the floating value of money. By having riba 
as mechanism to value money out of money, the real value of certain currency in 
the long run is technically diminished.160 This consequential concept of trading 
somehow has situated the value of productive output contributed by labour force 
into an unbalanced circumstance. Through floated currency trading, the 
economic gap between surplus and deficit economy units has widened. The 
Asian monetary crisis during the end of 1990s manifested itself as a living proof 
of this instability. Many developed nations suffered severe economic damage as 
their wealth drained overnight due to currency depreciation resulting from 
irresponsible speculation.161  
6.3.1.3 Avoiding Gharar  
6.3.1.3.1 Definition of Gharar 
Literally, gharar means risk, hazard and danger.162 Shariah scholars are in 
disagreement on the terminological meaning of gharar. Jurjani defined gharar as 
something that has an obscure outcome, whether the desired result is possible 
or not.163 Similarly, according to Ramly, gharar refers to the possibility of two 
things occurring where the likelihood is the one you fear happening.164 Dusuqi 
viewed gharar as the oscillation between two things, one of which is the subject 
matter.165 Evolving from this, Sarakhsy mentioned that gharar is the result when 
the consequences of the deal are concealed, or as said by Ibn Taymiyah, it is the 
unknown consequences.166 It is to be noted here that the disagreement of the 
                                            
159 Habib A Zubeiri, ‘Interest Free Banking and Economic Stability’ (1992) 31 (4) The 
Pakistan Development Review 1077, 1085. 
160 Zahrah (n 137) 56. 
161 See also Zulkifli Hassan, ‘The 1997-98 Financial Crisis in Malaysia: Causes, 
Response and Results’ (2002) 9 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 1. 
162 Wehr (n 18) 782. 
163 al-Jurjani (n 34) 135. 
164 Ibn Shihab al-Din al-Ramli, Nihyat al-Muhtaj ila Sharh al-Minhaj (Dar al-Kotob al-
Ilmiyah 2003) vol 3 405. 
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scholars on the meaning of gharar is mostly because it offers a wide range of 
context and is rather not straightforward.167 
 
In relation to this, it is argued that gharar has a close meaning with other 
connotations such as jahalah, ghabn and tadlis.168 Explaining this, Qurafi 
resolved to differentiate gharar and jahalah. According to him, gharar is an event 
with obscure outcome whilst jahalah is something with definite outcome but the 
details are in disguised. For instance, future selling of a certain currency if it drops 
to a certain value is a gharar due to the fact that the possibility of such a prize 
being reached is obscure. Whereas the buying of a customised manufactured 
product with no exact reference from the manufacturer is a jahalah because of 
the ambiguous details of the product. However, the definition pointed out by 
Sarakhsy and Ibn Taymiyah asserted that gharar includes both, the uncertainty 
of an event’s occurrence and the unknown details of the deals, which is to some 
extent, fairly in difference as compared to what had offered by Qurafi.169 This 
understanding is rather in alignment with this research to explain the nature of 
Shariah governance, which not only addresses the uncertain business events but 
also the asymmetric information of all business deals entered into by the IFIs. 
 
Speaking of the Shariah governance, as currently said, the contemporary 
economic definition points out gharar as asymmetric information.170 In this sense, 
gharar is considered as exposing oneself to excessive risk and danger in a 
business transaction as a result of uncertainty about the price, the quality and the 
quantity of the counter-value, the date of delivery, the ability of either the buyer 
or the seller to fulfil his commitment, or ambiguity in the terms of the deal; thereby, 
exposing either of the two parties to unnecessary risks.171 It could be a risk, 
uncertainty or even anything that could have threaten the business. In this vein, 
the closest meaning of gharar as suggested by Badawi is uncertainty which is 
rather wider than risk.172 This is based on the definition offered by Knight.173 
According to Knight, risk is obtained if the randomness facing an economic agent 
                                            
167 Abdul Karim al-Dohni, ‘A Quest for a Better Legal and Regulatory Framework for 
Islamic Banking’ (2015) 17 Ecclesiastical Law Journal 15, 20. 
168 Jahalah (ignorance) is an action without due efficient knowledge of the details, ghabn 
is short in details and tadlis is enshrouding the details, especially the defects of the 
products. 
169 Siddiq Muhammad al-Dareer, ‘Al-Gharar in Contracts and Its Effect on Contemporary 
Transactions’ (Eminent Scholar’s Lectures Series no. 16) 10 
170 <http://iei.kau.edu.sa/Pages-E-JournalCGlossary.aspx> accessed 8 May 2018. 
171 ibid 
172 See also Z Badawi, ‘The Question of Risk’ (1998) 32 Islamic Banker 16. 
173 There are many other debates regarding risk and uncertainty. See also Abdul Rahim 
al-Saati, ‘The Permissible Gharar (risk) in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence’ (2003) 
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can be expressed using specific probability judgment whilst uncertainty arises 
when the agent cannot assign real probabilities to the alternative possible 
occurrences.174 As a conclusion, the precise meaning of gharar depends on the 
angle of the viewer. If they see it in a broader sense, it offers an indefinite and 
random possibilities with uncertain results. However, if they narrow down the 
angle, it could be seen as a measurable risk or a quantifiable uncertainty. 
6.3.1.3.2 Proof of Gharar Abolition 
In terms of its legal status, gharar is ostensibly prohibited by Shariah law. One of 
the main proofs of gharar prohibition is the following hadith: 
Abu Huraira (Allah be pleased with him) reported that the Messenger 
of Allah forbade a transaction determined by throwing stones, and the 
type which involves some uncertainty.175 
 
According to the aforementioned text, the word forbade ( aََى ) that appears in the 
hadith is considered as a definitive form of a prohibition to render a definite 
subject which is also explicitly mentioned by the text.176 Interestingly, whilst 
gharar, which is inherently unavoidable in business is prohibited, Shariah law 
does not render a full abolition of business deals. Regarding this, it is believed 
that the financial market is about the right configuration of numerous variables 
which contribute various possibilities to business to be successful or otherwise. 
The fact that the understanding of gharar is intertwined with business practices 
has made this subject even more intriguing in terms of its application in the 
corporate governance. Perhaps the real issue of the utmost relevance here is not 
the prohibition of gharar itself, but rather the comprehensive explication of what 
gharar really is. Thus, according to this, it is not an overstatement to argue that 
the proof of gharar prohibition indicates a strong recommendation from the 
Shariah to avoid gharar and if not, minimise it in the business deals. It is also 
implied the need for a gharar determination module through identification, 
assessment and mitigation. 
 
In this vein, the Shariah scholars have rendered minor gharar as permissible 
based on istihsan (equity) and maslahah (public interest).177 The basis of this is 
the reported case that mentioned the Prophet PBUH and his companions when 
they arrived in Medina. They noticed that one of the business practices of Medina 
                                            
174 See also Frank H Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (The Riverside Press 
Cambridge 1921). 
175 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Abu Hurairah; Muslim, Sahih 
Muslim (Dar al-Fikr 2003) no 3699 736. 
176 Al-Zuhayli, al-Wajiz fi Usul al-Fiqh al-Islami (n 111) vol 1 352. 
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people was the Salam contract.178 The problem with the later practice of Salam 
was the ambiguity in the terms of the deal, especially the date of delivery and the 
weight of the item purchased. Therefore, at the first glance, this type of business 
arrangement was non-permissible by the Shariah law. However, considering the 
maslahah of the people, and by applying istihsan, the Prophet PBUH was 
reported to say, ‘those who pay in advance for anything must do so for a specified 
weight and for a definite time’.179 Apart from that, it is also reported that Ibn 
Abbas, when he joined a mudarabah business venture, he will stipulated that the 
merchant must not travel with the merchandise across the sea without decent 
vessel, pass through the desert without a proper camel and climb to the 
mountainous ridge without well-prepared means.180 Based on the 
aforementioned texts, it is clearly stated that the original standard of gharar is 
non-permissible. However, it is rendered by Shariah scholars to permissibility 
when the unavoidable gharar is a necessity and it is mitigatable. 
6.3.1.3.3 Effective Gharar 
To understand how gharar could bring about effectual implication to the deals, it 
is important to note the types of gharar. Gharar is distinguished by the Shariah 
scholars into major (fahish) and minor (yasir).181 Both types render the legal 
aspect of the deal in a different manner. 
 
For a gharar to be considered as effective to render a deal as null and void, it 
must be a substantive gharar. Shariah scholars enlisted the conditions to quantify 
a substantive gharar. A gharar ought to be major and extensive, auxiliary to the 
contract, respectively, occurring in a contract with no definite need and the deal 
must be transactional.182 A major gharar is prohibited and must be avoided. It is 
a type of gharar that has a decisive effect on influencing the outcome of the deal. 
On the other hand, if it is a minor gharar with an indecisive power to dictate the 
upcoming result, it is permissible. The consideration is also given if the gharar 
and the respective contract are auxiliary to each other and could affect the 
principal elements of the deals. Meanwhile, an external gharar is regarded as 
acceptable if it is not substantive. Other than that, if the contract is important to 
meet the economic needs of the people, and the occurred gharar is minor and 
                                            
178 Bayʿ al-salam, which refers to a sale contract in which payment is made in advance 
by the buyer and the delivery of the goods is deferred by the seller. The date of 
delivery and accurate description of goods must be given in the contract. 
179 This hadith is narrated by Muslim as reported from Ibn Abbas; Muslim, Sahih Muslim 
(Dar al-Fikr 2003) no 4010 789. 
180 This hadith is narrated by Al-Baihaqi as reported from Ibn Abbas; A Al-Baihaqi, al-
Sunan al-Baihaqi (Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyyah 2003) vol 6 no 11611 184. 
181 Ibn Taymiyah, Majmu al-Fatawa (3rd edn, Dar al-Wafa’ 2005) vol 29 18.  





- 170 - 
manageable, the Shariah status of such an existing gharar is also considerably 
tolerable since necessity begets facility (al-darurat tubihu al-mahzurat).183 Finally, 
the gharar is only effective if it occurs in transactional and commutative deals as 
asserted by the Maliki school. However, this opinion is in a minority as opposed 
to the unanimous opinion of the Shariah scholars from other legal schools, who 
see gharar to be potentially existed not only in transactional deals, but also in 
other types of deals.184 
 
It is observed that the discussion on gharar indicates that despite the prohibition 
of gharar, Shariah provides flexibilities for this peculiar feature of business. It is 
argued that trading in gharar is not a definite prohibition since business deals are 
inherently full of uncertainties. This is due to the fact the available evidence in 
relation to gharar suggests that the uncertainty is only prohibited if extensive.185 
In this sense, the questions under discussion are how to assess the degree of 
gharar permissibility and how to manage these uncertainties. These questions 
are also correlated with the gharar determination module, as addressed before. 
In this vein, it is imperative to note that, one of the main tasks of Shariah 
governance constituents on this respective topic in fact is on the quantification of 
gharar fahish (major) and gharar yasir (minor).186 The IFIs, as financial entities, 
could not afford the occurrence of gharar fahish out of poor anticipation of 
potential losses and disputes.187 
6.3.1.4 Abolition of Non-Permissible Activities 
Broadly speaking, transactions of legal title are permissible by Shariah law. This 
permissibility is mentioned by definite proofs with a definite meaning from the 
Quran. For instance, God says, ‘God has permitted sale and forbidden riba’ using 
word sale ( عيبلا ) in a singular form of noun, preceded by the definite article of ‘al’, 
as an indication of generalisation (‘amm). This form indicates that all kind of sales 
are permissible in under Shariah law. However, there are other evidences with 
indications forbidding the sale with certain conditions such as in the case of sale 
with uncertainty (gharar) or the sale that involves an interest charge. In these 
cases, the later proofs come as the specification (takhsis) for the general 
permissible act.188 This part will manifest examples in the non-permissible sale 
                                            
183 Muhammad al-Zarqa, Sharh al-Qawaid al-Fiqhiyyah (2nd edn Dar al-Qalam 1989) 
185. 
184 Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyyah (n 182) vol 31 150-154. 
185 This is due to the fact that gharar is only prohibited if it is fahish, or extensive. 
186 See also Sami al-Suwailem, ‘Towards an Objective Measure of Gharar in Exchange’ 
(2000) 7 (1-2) Islamic Economic Studies 61. 
187 Mahmoud A Elgamal, ‘An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Gharar in 
Classical Islamic Jurisprudence’ (2001) 8 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 29, 30. 
188 See also AA al-Ba’ly, al-Qawaid wa al-Fawaid al-Usuliyyah (Sunnah 
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activities apart from the case of riba and gharar, specified by the Shariah law, 
after rendering the general permissibility of sale. 
 
The non-permissible activities include financial and non-financial as prohibited by 
Shariah law. The prohibited financial activities such as payment and taking of riba 
and involvement with gharar are the essence of the Shariah compliance notion. 
Other than that, practices such as gambling, cheating and bribery are also 
regarded as significant, and have the potential to render the contracts entered by 
the IFIs as unlawful. According to this concept, anything that is prohibited for a 
Muslim to consume is not permitted to be traded. Therefore, there are forbidden 
commodities to be taken into account, such as liquor or alcoholic drink, pork and 
dead meat or that are not managed in the way deemed permissible under Shariah 
law. 
 
In this vein, the primary focus of the Shariah governance constituents of the IFIs 
is to ensure that they are not getting involved with this particular substance. Since 
the IFIs are financial institutions, their involvement might not be in the form of 
offering products with such a substance as an ingredient. The real trick is whether 
the customers who seek financial instruments are involved or not with what are 
prohibited. The task of primary concern of the Shariah committee would be the 
invocation of ijtihad on the case basis to come up with the best solution, for the 
best sake of the stakeholders. 
6.3.1.4.1 Prohibited Activities 
a. Gambling 
Gambling is the action of taking risk in the hope of a desired result.189 It engages 
with wild financial speculation, for the sake of possible financial advantage.190 
Gambling is about risking something of value on an uncertain event in hopes of 
winning something of greater value. Therefore, commonly, it will involve a wager. 
Using the wager, the players will put their bet on the outcome of the game. In this 
sense, gambling is reckoned as the action to bet with conditions stipulated that 
all contestants are to put an amount of money, and the stake yielded would be 
the prize for the winner.191 Jurjani defined betting as a game that required the 
players to risk the wager as the prize to be owned by the winner.192 The winner 
determined by who has come up with the right prediction and collect the bet whilst 
                                            
189 Oxford Dictionary of English (2nd edn OUP 2003) 710. 
190 The Chambers Dictionary (11th edn Chambers Harrap Publisher 2008) 624. 
191 Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyyah (n 68) vol 39 407. 
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the losers loss the bet. Depends on the type of the game, there could be more 
than one winner. 
 
The proof of this prohibition is the Quranic text, as mentioned below: 
O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, stone alters, 
and divining arrow are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid 
it that you may be successful. 193 
 
Based on the Ibn Umar, the word maysir is the Arabic word of gambling.194 
Gambling used to be famed among Arabs during the time of jahiliyah. It came in 
many forms. One known version was azlam (divining arrow) which was used as 
a lottery for decision-making.195 Other than that, it was also called qimar, which 
is to some extent similar to betting.196 
 
As asserted by Ibn Taymiyah, Shariah law prohibits gambling as it is related to 
the possession of what belonged to others without admissible transaction and 
getting involved with nonsense activities.197 From the Islamic standpoint, 
gambling is neither an investment nor a substantive speculation. It is rather an 
assumption with hopes of gaining something without concrete evidence of 
probability. It plays with luck and fortune without due consideration. In many 
cases, gambling resolved the relating parties with loss.  
 
It is worth mentioning that the crux of the prohibition is the use of a wager as the 
winning prize.198 The Shariah law does not ban fair competition. It is rather 
encouraged by Islam, especially if it is beneficial for physical health. The 
technicality of the competition, however, must be free from gambling nature. No 
betting allowed. Furthermore, the financial sources of the prize for the winner 
must come from a third party who has no direct financial relation to the 




                                            
193 Quran (5: 90) 
194 al-Qurtubi (n103) vol 3 623. 
195 Ibn Kathir, Tafsir Ibn Kathir (trs al-Mubarakpuri Darussalam 2000) vol 3 255. 
196 See also the translation in Oxford Arabic Dictionary (OUP 2014) 1262. 
197 Ibn Taymiyah (n 181) 15. 
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b. Monopoly 
In Shariah law, monopoly is known as ihtikar ( راكتحالا ). It is an action to restrain 
the goods to control the price.200 Shariah scholars defined monopoly as 
purchasing and restraining the sustenance goods such as food in order to gain 
the benefit from a price increment.201 In this vein, business entities use their 
privilege on the access to collect and store goods to manipulate price. This 
business practice in a way is a strategy to boost the profitable revenue, but at the 
same time, would jeopardise customers’ right on having access to certain goods, 
especially that of life sustenance. Pertaining this, Hanafi, Shafie and Hanbali 
schools mentioned that the restrained goods must be the sustenance foods whilst 
Maliki schools opined that the prohibition applied to all sort of goods that could 
bring about hardship to the community.202  
 
Other than goods monopolisation, Ibn Qayyim mentioned about joint monopoly 
and brand monopoly. Joint monopoly is an action to control the price of goods or 
the payment of service by a group of business entities with similar business 
natures. Meanwhile, brand monopoly refers to a situation where a single brand 
controls the whole market. These two types of monopolistic practices are also by 
definition, as asserted by Ibn Qayyim rendered under the same regulation.203 To 
some extent, the abolition of monopoly practices in Islam is not as different as 
described by anti-trust law, competition law or anti-monopoly law which is to 
promote fair competition. The basis of the law might well be originated from 
difference sources, the objective however is in resemblance in many respects. 
Regarding this, the primary objective of this Shariah anti-monopoly law is to avoid 
hardship from the people because of the limited access of the goods due to higher 
offered prices.204 For the customers, it is the right of every soul to gain access to 
necessities in the market with an appropriate price. As for business entities, it is 
their right to have a fair ground of business competition. 
6.3.1.4.2 Prohibited Commodities 
Literally, anything that is created by God and suitable for human consumption is 
permissible. This is based on the Quranic text that mentions ‘Eat from the good 
things with which We have provided you’.205 The word ‘eating’ here refers to the 
general reason for food possession. The alluded meaning of the text is literally 
generalised to all sort of activities benefited from the possession, including 
                                            
200 al-Jurjani (n 34) 13. 
201 Khin and others (n 144) 42. 
202 al-Jazairi (n94) 225. 
203 Al-Mawsuah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyyah (2nd eds Dar al-Safwa 1983) vol 2 94. 
204 ibid 91. 
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trading.206 Based on the harmonious meaning (mafhum muwafaqat) of the text, 
everything that is consumable is also permissible for transaction. However, there 
are some sustenance, such as dead animal, flesh of swine and intoxicate drink 
are prohibited for humans’ consumption. The Quranic texts also emphasise that 
any permitted substance is not to be prohibited unless it is done by referring to 
the texts as well. In this regard, the texts also come up with a specification on a 
certain group of food for that reason. 
 
The ratio of the prohibition of these commodities is due to the fact that they are 
considered by Shariah law as ‘dirt’ and ‘non-beneficial’ items.207 The rulings on 
such matters are contradictory in most cases, on the ground that the prohibited 
commodities with definite proofs are rather small in number. Other than 
intoxicating substances, pork or porcine by-products and dead meat, which were 
explicitly mentioned by definite proofs, most of the commodities under the same 
regulation are affected by spatial and temporal factors. Regarding this, it is the 
task of the local and contemporary Shariah scholars to do ijtihad and adopt the 
alluded meaning of the texts and come up with the rulings based on the cases. 
Notably, the illah of the cases is the existence of the meaning of ‘dirt’ or ‘non-
beneficial’ in the referred cases. 
 
a. Intoxicate Substance (khamr) 
The prohibition of intoxicate substance is based on the prohibition of khamr ( رمخلا ). 
It is a type of wine, made of grape through brewing process. The reason of the 
name is speculated on the fact that such a drink could cause mental impairment 
to humans, as mentioned by another hadith.208 Since, the preservation of mental 
health is one of the primary objective of Shariah law, it is intolerant with such a 
substance.209 
 
In the Quranic text, God says; 
O you who have believed, indeed, intoxicants, gambling, [sacrificing 
on] stone alters [to other than Allah], and divining arrows are but 
defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may be 
successful.210 
 
                                            
206 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Tafsir al-Munir (n 109) vol 1 444. 
207 Rusyd (n 127) 652. 
208 This hadith is narrated by Ibn Majah as reported from Ibn Umar: I Majah, Sunan Ibn 
Majah, (Al-Ma’arif Publication) no. 3390, 569. 
209 Further discussion is in Chapter 2 on Maqasid Shariah. 
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The command to ‘avoid’ is perceived as a definite indicator on the ruling of the 
mentioned actions and substances. Accordingly, al-Qurtubi concluded that this 
Quranic text is the specification proof towards the general meaning of permissible 
substance in another texts.211 One of the Quranic texts mentions that ‘Eat from 
the good things with which We have provided you’.212 This text renders that,  
generally speaking, any creation that is suitable for humans’ consumption is 
permissible. However, there are some sustenance, such as dead animal, flesh of 
swine and intoxicate drink which are prohibited for humans’ consumption. 
 
 As far as Muslims are concerned, the issue of intoxicate drink is rather imperative 
because there is a definite proof from the text of hadith mentioned about the curse 
upon ten group of people in relation to khamr. It is reported that the Prophet 
PBUH said: 
Wine is cursed from ten angles: The wine itself, the one who squeezes 
(the grapes etc), the one for whom it is squeezed, the one who sells it, 
the one who buys it, the one who carries it, the one to whom it is 
carried, the one who consumes its price, the one who drinks it and the 
one who pours it.213 
 
b. Pork and Porcine By-products 
Pork refers to the meat or flesh of pig or swine. Literally, Shariah law prohibits 
Muslims from consuming such a dietary substance. Apart from that, the porcine 
by-products or products manufactured from swine, also fall under the same 
regulation.214 This prohibition is based on the Quranic text as below; 
He has only forbidden to you dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine, 
and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah.215 
 
Since, there is no clear evidence from the texts, stating the ratio decidendi of the 
prohibition, other than as ‘dirt and non-beneficial’, many Muslim scholars have 
come up with the speculative rationales to justify this prohibition from medical 
                                            
211 Al-Qurtubi (n 103) vol 3 22. 
212 Quran (2: 172) 
213 This hadith is narrated by Ibn Majah as reported from Ibn Umar: I Majah, Sunan Ibn 
Majah, (Al-Ma’arif Publication) no. 3380 568. 
214 Under Shafie and Hanbali legal schools, the transformation of porcine into a 
completely different by-product falls under the same regulation as if it is in the 
original form. However, the Hanafi and Maliki legal schools opined that, porcine by-
product that has gone through a complete transformation from its original form is 
admissible. On the account of this, it is the duty of the Shariah committee to deploy 
ijtihad based on the cases, to endorse the opinion, prevailed by the institution. 
215 Quran (2: 173): the similar text appears in another chapter with the same expression; 
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perspective. In terms of its legal aspect, the unanimous Shariah scholars 
deployed qiyas khafi (hidden analogy) on the text, concluding that, the swine is 
completely prohibited.216 The mentioning of ‘flesh’ is due to the fact of the main 
part of its body that provides the most benefit is the flesh itself.217 It does not 
mean that, it is the only reason of selling or purchasing. One of the benefit of flesh 
is for consumption. However, that is not the only benefit possible. 
 
c. Dead Meat 
In Islam, warm-blooded land animals that are permissible for consumption should 
be slaughtered beforehand. This is what is known as Halal Meat in today’s market 
trend. The slaughtering process must also comply with the requirements, such 
as, the slaughterer must be a Muslim, or the people of the book (ahl kitab).218 
During the process, there must be a clean slaughtering, which ends up with a 
clean cut of the prescribed veins and arteries, and not by strangling or knocking-
out. Otherwise, the dead animal will be considered as dead meat or carcase 
(mayyit) and non-halal for consumption. This prohibition is based on the Quranic 
text below: 
He has only forbidden to you dead animals, blood, the flesh of swine, 
and that which has been dedicated to other than Allah.219 
 
Such a prerequisite in meat management is due to the fact that Islam has a high 
demand for the human diet to be hygienic. However, it is worth mentioning here 
that the exemption of a number of ‘dead meats’, which include sea creatures and 
the grasshopper, is mentioned in another authentic hadith.220 
6.4 Akhlaqic Ethical Codes 
The discussion of the principles of Shariah governance is now expanding to 
include the third part of the whole concept. This part is another essential element 
that makes the comprehension of these principles a holistic set of ideas which 
only work if collectively deployed; it is about the ethical principles of Shariah 
governance. This ethical aspect is what is commonly perceived as the religiosity 
                                            
216 The Zahiri school, an extinct school of fiqh, suggested that the prohibited part of the 
swine is the flesh, not others. Therefore, any swine by-products, produced from a 
certain process is not to be rendered under the same ruling. 
217 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Tafsir al-Munir (n 109) vol 3 426. 
218 Al-Zuhayli, Al-Fiqh al-Islami wa Adillatuhu (n 57) vol 4 2758. 
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see also Quran (16: 115) 
220 This hadith is narrated by Ibn Majah as reported from Ibn Umar; See also Ibn Majah, 
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of a religion in general, and Islam in particular. However, if we look deeper, the 
Islamic ethic has more significance than that. 
6.4.1 Concept of Akhlaq (Islamic Ethics) 
Akhlaq is Islamic term for morality and ethics.221 It is the plural form of the word 
khulq.222 As literally defined, it means good manners, ethics and morality.223 
Many discussions on akhlaq refers to the values of human behaviour, whether it 
is good or bad, and right or wrong.224 The determination of right and wrong is in 
regard to the revelations of the Quran and the Hadith. In terminological terms, 
akhlaq is an internal personal quality that naturally emanates physical actions 
without consideration or deliberation. If the emanated actions are acceptable, the 
person is considered as a person of good behaviour (husn al-khuluq), and if it is 
otherwise, they are known as a person of bad behaviour (suk al-khuluq).225 In this 
sense, akhlaq is considered as the Islamic model for determining ethical codes 
and morality, a collection of ideas of right and wrong in the eyes of Islam. 
In behavioural studies, morality refers to the rules of conduct that are associated 
with certain distinctive psychological and social attributes.226 Humans in their best 
state have the capability to determine the concepts of right and wrong. They 
somehow come to an understanding on the general concept of morality. In this 
sense, it might be the product that comes about in part through a complex 
process of socialisation, learning and inculcation.227 At its initial stage, morality 
could be propelled by a descriptive comprehension of the respective values, 
which are then incorporated as normative rules of morality, after being collectively 
accepted. The later stage is the stage where what was embodied as the nature 
of good or bad, turned into a concrete legalised rule, providing praise to those 
who obey and sanction to those who choose otherwise. No matter what the 
discourse is of the confluence between morality and law, one cannot defy the 
historical facts of the link between both,at the early stage of the modern legal 
form.228 
 
                                            
221 There is no clear consensus amongst scholars on what distinguishes ethics and 
morality. Most philosophers, such as Kant, describe the words as similar in meaning. 
For the purposes of this research, the words ethics and morality are going to be 
used interchangeably.  
222 Wehr (n 18) 299. 
223 R Baalbaki, Al-Mawrid (Dar el-Ilmi Lilmalayin 17th eds 2003) 776. 
224 SA Azim, Khuluq al-Muslim (Dar al-Qimah 2004) 6. 
225 al-Jurjani (n 34) 89. 
226 Steven Shavel, ‘Law versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct’ 2002 (4) 2 American 
Law and Economics Review 227, 230. 
227 ibid, 231. 
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To possess the best of character in oneself is one of the main concerns of a 
Muslim.229 Having a good akhlaq is not only about the feeling of virtue, or guilt if 
it is otherwise, but it is considered as the good deeds of the Muslims for God. 
Akhlaq in Islam is not only about the decency that beautifies the person who 
expresses it, but also a commitment to fulfil the obligations of one’s life. To some 
degree, it is about the educational objectives of obediences and the commitment 
to be decent in daily life that could make one’s life stand in kindness and 
goodness.230 Those commitments will be quantified by ethical manners that could 
be seen by the naked eyes of others.  
 
Good akhlaq in oneself is essentially human nature and Islam propagate such an 
innate quality. As far as Muslims are concerned, one of the reasons for the 
sending of the Prophet PBUH to humans is to uphold the best of characters.231 
For Muslims, the best characteristics are the characteristics exhibited by the 
Prophet PBUH. His characters, as described by the Quran, is one of glorified and 
exalted characteristics (khuluq azim).232 Aisyah R.A, the wife of the Prophet 
PBUH, also described His characters as the characteristics of the Quran, 233  
which is perceived as meaning fully following the teaching of the Quran. 
6.4.2 Ethics and Law in Islam 
Ethics and law in Islam are intertwined and intersecting domains.234 In fact, ethics 
or morality, is the essence, propagated by Shariah law. The conception of right 
and wrong in moral domains are invariably in line with Islamic legal domains.235 
As far as Muslims are concerned, upholding moral values is the highest regard 
of life in all aspects, including the legal aspect. In terms of dominion, the morality 
domain might be broader and more diversified as opposed to the legal domain; 
something that is morally wrong might not be against the law, but anything that is 
unlawful is surely morally impaired.236 This is due to the fact Shariah law functions 
as a controlling device of the moral domain that is impactful to Muslims, 
personally as well as collectively.  
 
                                            
229 Sulayman Asyqar, Khasais al-Syari’ah al-Islamiyyah (Maktabah al-Falah 1982) 94. 
230 Manna’ Kattan, al-Tashri’ wa al-Fiqh al-Islam (Wahbah Publisher 2001) 21. 
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232 Ibn Kathir (n 15) vol 10 103. 
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Fikr 2003) no 1623, 341. 
234 Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten, Business Ethics (3rd OUP 2010) 5-6. 
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Introduction to Islamic Law (CUP 2009) 9. 
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Morality and law in Islam is also about the configuration of what is and what ought 
to be since neither are static.237 Both are the regulatory preference for Muslims 
but come with different sanction magnitude.  Morality provides the values of what 
a person should and should not do. Meanwhile, Shariah law is mostly focussed 
on what a person ought not to do, as listed in hudud and qisas laws in Shariah 
criminal law, and as in the prohibition of riba and extensive uncertainty in Shariah 
financial law. The main differences between the two might be at the level of the 
cost of the sanctions provided. Morality involves virtuous feeling and praise if the 
act is approved or good, and guilt and disapprobation if the wrong acts are 
involved. To some degree, the sanctions of moral approval or disapproval are not 
tangible, rather it is resolved in terms of internal appreciation or devaluation. 
Shariah law, on the other hand, provides a more tangible sanction mechanism, 
such as monetary, custodial and death penalties. 
 
In a common Muslim community, morality remains the optimal domain if it has 
the capability to control the conduct of the population, and legal enforcement is 
absent. In the case of the ‘what should be done’, if the good and praised 
moralities are present and detectable in the public, legal enforcement is 
unnecessary.238  Likewise, in the case of what should not be done, if there are 
immoral actions done by a certain group of members of the public, that is not 
contagious and still under the control of the majority, enforcement of the law might 
not be required. However, if the praiseworthy actions are undetected and immoral 
actions are dominant and effecting to the population, legal enforcement from the 
authorities is crucial to bring back the good conducts. It is worth mentioning that 
in the situations ,involving actions that breach the personal rights of the members 
of the public, legal enforcement must be the prevalent remedy, regardless.  
 
Muslims believed that they are answerable to any actions they take in life. 
Answerable means those actions are the subject of judgement by God on the day 
of Judgement as to whether they were good or bad deeds. It is also means that 
there are certain actions answerable to humans’ authority, especially if the 
actions give rise to negative impacts or breach the right of others, as recognised 
by Shariah law. Regarding this, akhlaq does not see the consequences of the 
actions as the factor that determines whether it is right or wrong, as the 
consequence theorist may think.239 The preposition of right or wrong is the 
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subject before any sort of action is taken by Muslims. It might not involve the 
human authorities at the time, but it is surely under the divine surveillance.  
 
To exemplify this, we examine the case of one person fulfilling a promise (wa’ad) 
to another. It is morally Islamic but not necessarily a subject for Shariah legal 
concern. However, when the promise is made based on mutual agreements with 
impactful negative causes to the relevant parties if it is not executed, the Shariah 
sees it as morally and legally incumbent. In the context of the relationship 
between directors and shareholders, the pertinent moral judgement is that 
directors must be judged as trustworthy by the shareholders. They ought to 
exercise their duty with care and loyalty. However, this moral basis for judgement 
does not mean that the both parties cannot put forward a contractual relationship 
to ensure the said duties from the trustees are performed. This is because, the 
shareholders face the risk of loss without tangible rights, especially following due 
process, if the relationship is only the incumbent on a moral basis. The 
contractual terms stipulated by the relevant parties can also clarify the boundaries 
of the trust to help the dictation of sanctions in the case of that trust being breach.  
 
Other than that, the prohibition of riba is another clear example to elucidate how 
morality and law are the intertwining factors of consideration in Shariah law. One 
of the moral reasons for the prohibition is, the interest charged on the loan given 
is regarded as the exploitation of the labour force.240 Those with a deficit econimic 
status are vulnerable and at risk of manipulation by those with a surplus. By 
exploiting this vulnerability, a person is beyond the bounds of courtesy and 
kindness.241 Furthermore, charging of interest taking is also downgrades the 
value of labour. How those expended endeavours end up with minimum 
monetary freedom as a result of the additional cost over the principal, without fair 
risk-sharing mechanisms from the debtors, is blatant evidence of this immoral, 
manipulative scheme.242. The rights of the debtors as the owners of the principals 
who lost the right of use of the money as claimed by the capitalists is a failure of 
labour allocation. This is due to the Shariah legal maxims that state liability 
accompanies gain (al-ghunmu bi al-ghurmi) and benefit goes with liabilities (al-
kharaj bi al-daman),243 where the one who expects profit must accept 
responsibility in the case of loss.244 On top of the alluded meanings, as deduced 
from the texts of the Quran and the Hadith, the said moral considerations are also 
reckoned as the supportive rationales for the prohibition of riba. These 
elementary prepositions are even more easily understood by the members of the 
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public than the legal statements of the prohibition itself. This is due to how it could 
inflict the people at their interpersonal level as moral-based organisms. 
6.4.3 Functions of Akhlaq 
There are, amongst others, three main roles of the akhlaqic ethical codes that 
are relevant to our discussion on the Shariah governance. Firstly, akhlaq-based 
ethics provides a universal acceptable conceptualisation of morality. Secondly, it 
functions as the propeller of the actions of the IFIs’ governance constituents, 
towards the goal of achieving Shariah compliance. Last, but not the least, it 
stands as the reference for the business ethics of the IFIs. 
6.4.3.1 Unify code of best conduct 
As stated in the relativism theory, ethics and morality are rather diversified and 
flexible; they will change due to time and space.245 What is ethical today in a 
certain location is not necessarily the same in the past or in the future, or even at 
the same time in other localities. Therefore, the need for an anchor that could 
pacify such changeability is of prominent importance. This sensible controlling 
mechanism is rather indicative to the IFIs, as something despised as immoral in 
the past somehow gaining the merit of morality and appreciation by some in the 
present. For instance, greedy, a concept somehow associated with bad affliction, 
to some degree is today an acceptable justification for business judgement under 
the flagship of the maximisation of the capital value.246 A similar change has 
happened to the prostitution. This disgraceful action has somehow shifted into 
becoming a woman’s right, or even economically moralised, due to the changes 
in time and circumstances. The question is, up to what point do we want to let 
this continue before all of what makes us different with our primate cousins is 
totally diminished? 
 
Since the determination of morality is rather flexible as compared to what is right 
or wrong under the law, Shariah furnishes universality in order to understand 
what the best of conduct is, so humans do not end up debating the establishment 
of right and wrong, such as honesty and justice, as well as deceit and injustice. 
This uniformity will also gives conformity to reconcile the debates of the morality-
based business judgements of the stakeholder theory.247 In this sense, the akhlaq 
morality model standardises a morality that is referable globally.  
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As a preference, akhlaq provides universality by referring to the sources of Islam, 
thereby standing as a normative model of morality. The overriding values exist 
due to cultural backgrounds being remedied by the acceptance of the Islamic 
sources as the final preference. This process reduces the number of 
unacceptable and confusing descriptive moralities, thereby minimising the 
potential for moral-juggling decisions by the directors.248 Anything that does not 
contravene the concept of good character (husn khuluq) will remain part of good 
akhlaq. By that, the intersocietal contradictions of morality no longer circumvent 
the process of getting free from unacceptable moralities but rather help us learn 
the moralities of other societies, since they are already something in compliance 
with the concept of akhlaq. It is to be perceived that akhlaq only unifies the 
standards, but it is not the way to achieve it, which may vary depending on how 
the society puts it forward. 
 
The abovementioned is based on the understanding that morality is established 
through a long process of civilisation. The well-established moralities are 
somehow learnable as well as transferable where the esteem of certain morality 
values are heightened in the process, as a result of a wider and cross-societal 
acceptability. The understanding of this notion is exemplified by the globalisation 
of certain moralities in our modern world. From the formation of trending food to 
market direction, global morality values are fashioned somewhat towards value 
unification, through a learning process caused by the borderless world. Out of 
propensity, people revalue local values, so they could become in line with the 
values of the people on the other side of the world. 
6.4.3.2 Propellant of Shariah Compliance 
Akhlaq functions as the first propellant channelling behaviour towards Shariah 
compliance. The conformity of Shariah compliance might need the informational 
input, as the evidence to determine whether it has been achieved or not by the 
relevant governance constituents. The process ending in endorsement for 
sanction or gratitude is rather a thorough procedure. To ensure the said notion is 
going to be strived, even before the exhaustive process is required, an internal 
self-mechanism is of vital importance. The governance constituents that hold the 
internal sanction or gratitude in advocating Shariah compliance could be the most 
consequential element in its legal achievement. Put differently, the imposition of 
akhlaq would not only bring about people complying with Shariah law out of legal 
requirement, but also because they do believe so. By saying that, the endavour 
strived by the IFIs to comply with Shariah law should already fulfilling all moral 
judgements where any Shariah compliant products and services are morally 
approved. 
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As far as Muslims are concerned, compliance with Shariah law is a direct result 
of piety. Piety is about practicing what is ordered by God, and avoiding what is 
forbidden, either secretly or publicly.249 To reach that state, a Muslim must abide 
by the moral and legal aspects of Shariah. Since akhlaqic morality and Shariah 
law are deduced from the similar sources, for many reasons, each is in alignment 
with the other. As a result, in deducing the process of the law, Shariah scholars 
have the tendency to enclose the moral basis or the virtue of the law. However, 
not all Islamic moral values are legalised as law to give sanction or gratitude to 
the doer. In most cases, individual rights are under the subject of morality, whilst 
most of the legalised law is in relation to injurious actions.  
Apart from piety, Muslims are taught to develop the virtue of ihsan as their self-
esteem. As mentioned by the Prophet PBUH, ihsan is submitting to God as if He 
is seen in front of you and if not, as if He sees you. It is the feeling of being 
accountable to God in everything.250 This self-accountability is what beautifies 
ones’ actions, which makes the people adhere to the law, not out of legal 
requirement, but rather because they believe so. 
6.4.3.3 Akhlaq as Source of Business Ethics  
As mentioned above, akhlaq is the reference to decipher the code of best of 
conduct. This code also could be utilised as the source of the ethical attitude of 
the IFIs as business entities. It is also the answer for the discussion of the ethical 
preference in business as opposed to the separation theory, which sees business 
ethics as an oxymoron.251  On many occasions, akhlaq and ethics are 
interchangeably defined. However, the meaning of akhlaq is wider and tends to 
evaluate ethical values in a broader sense. Considering this, the concept of ethics 
is perceived as being sheltered by akhlaq in its narrower sense. 
 
In this case, akhlaq stands as the umbrella of ethics determination, accepted by 
the IFIs. The deployment of akhlaq as the preference to perceive the acceptable 
business ethics is the IFI’s eccentricity. This is the fundamental distinction 
between the IFIs and their conventional counterparts. Most importantly, it clarifies 
why certain business operations are denounce by the IFIs, despite their legality 
under the conventional law. It also reveals the partial and temporal elements of 
ethics: that something that is believed as ethical by certain groups of people, 
might not be similarly acceptable to others. 
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As the source of business ethics, akhlaq functions as a universal Islamic 
comprehension of good characters. It is then narrowed down into several specific 
codes that will describe the meaning of akhlaq in a practical manner on the 
account of respective aspects subsequently. For instance, a person with good 
character must be somebody that is trustworthy (amanah), honest (sidq), just 
(adl) and decent (layyin). These values are then quantified by code of conduct 
into the actions that are in line with the respective notions: for instance, being 
transparent and accountable when reporting. These codes of good conduct are 
the business ethics of the directors towards the stakeholders that is subsequently 
supporting the notion of amanah. Upholding the amanah as ethics also demands 
that directors to execute their duties with care and loyalty.  
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter is a principle-based explicator of the practice of, as well as what 
should be practised by the IFIs. The comprehension of these principles works as 
the main reference to envisage the duty held by Shariah governance 
constituents. It provides the epistemological fundamentals that could introduce a 
new model of thinking to the governance system: namely, catering to the IFIs’ 
characteristics. The worldview of Shariah governance that based on tawhid, is 
believed to be capable of enabling the IFIs to see the natural resources in a 
different manner as opposed to the interpretation from classical economic 
theories. With the awareness that humans are not the sole owners of the earth, 
they would see themselves as utilisers and managers of the resources, rather 
than as manipulators or exploiters. The resources are not the objective, but the 
tools to achieve the objective instead, which to seek equilibrium in the economic 
ecosystem. 
 
This chapter has also elucidated how Shariah governance constituents give high 
regard to the divine sources to govern the legal aspects of business actions. 
Commencing from the grip on tawhidic epistemology, the IFIs choose to operate 
and offer the products and services in line with the divine law known as Shariah 
law. Despite the prohibition of riba, most of the virtues of Shariah financial law 
remains uncontroversial when adopted by the modern financial market. Other 
than that, Shariah governance is also similar with conventional ideas in many 
respects, especially the organisational mechanisms. Like its conventional 
counterpart, Shariah governance addresses accountability, transparency, risk 
mitigation, customer confidence and so on. Perhaps one of the most intriguing 
parts of the principles of Shariah governance is the intertwined aspect of morality 
and the law. Morality, in the eyes of Shariah, is the propellant to achieve Shariah 
compliance. Muslims are not simply committing to the idea simply out of legal 
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tawhidic epistemological wisdom. Any economical or business judgement taken 
by governance constituents must adhere to this as a belief so the issue of moral 
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Chapter 7  
 
Shariah Governance Mechanisms 
7.1 Introduction 
After having the pleasure of excavating the underlying principles of the Shariah 
governance, which has made clear the reasons why it is unique compared to the 
conventional corporate governance system, this chapter will put the focus on the 
Shariah governance mechanisms. In order to substantiate those mechanisms 
from the Shariah governance perspective, this chapter will appreciate the given 
principles deductively, along with the literature sprinkled throughout the research. 
Note that, this chapter is also overlaps in terms of the themes but is a more 
analytical comprehension. It seeks to depict how those principles are put into 
actions by the IFIs.  
 
In the conventional corporate governance system, there are internal and external 
governance mechanisms. Likewise, for the IFIs, a similar form of mechanism also 
exists to work hand-in-hand to achieve its objective, which is Shariah compliance 
in operating financial business. Shariah governance mechanisms include the 
monitoring system to control the actions, policies, practices and corporate 
decisions, the agents and the affected stakeholders. The governing law, the 
supervisory system and the audit regime are three Shariah governance 
mechanisms that are always interrelated with internal and external constituents. 
Whether it is to be conceived as the private affairs of the institutions or otherwise, 
internal constituents play a consequential role in the robustness of the Shariah 
governance. The willingness of the management to uphold this notion is crucial 
to the institutional stability; therefore, it is credited as one of the factors to 
enhance external supports, which comes from customer confidence.  
7.2 Governing Law 
In Islam, law is the mechanism to seek justice.1 It is the supreme virtue and 
conferred as one of the overriding objectives in Maqasid Shariah, derived from 
the belief in the Oneness of the God (tawhid). However, since Shariah is a law 
exclusive to Muslims lands, therefore at some point alien to many others, it is 
mostly viewed and known for its severe punishments in some remote cases. 
Noted that, research in Shariah law is a worthwhile pursuit and a fascinating 
experience. Perhaps a minor presentation on the law deduction procedure 
(ijtihad) in the upcoming topics of this chapter could speaks for itself.  
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Under the Shariah governance purview, justice in economics is achievable 
through Shariah compliance. To achieve that, Shariah could not be left as a mere 
conception without a solid grounding. Apart from that, to provide an effective 
supervision on the IFIs, there must be preconditions necessary to fit the purpose.2 
Additionally, bringing the best quality of the respective governance mechanisms 
is mostly manifested by the authority externally as well as any self-regulation 
initiatives which plays a supportive role internally. Therefore, the Shariah 
regulatory spectrum must be sufficient and supportive for the IFIs to be governed 
without rolling out any conventional requisites as financial institutions, except for 
the interest-free model of financial products. In relation to this, thus far, the IFIs 
are operating under three different types of jurisdictions: fully Islamic, as in Iran 
and Pakistan; parallel system, as in Malaysia and Bahrain; and conventional, as 
in the UK.3 Each jurisdiction offers diverse legal issues due to numerous variables 
such as market power and institutional internal affairs. 
7.2.1 Rationales for Regulating Islamic Finance  
Islamic finance is a form of banking and financial system where the respective 
financial institutions have given their commitment to run the business in 
accordance with a certain notion known as Shariah compliance. It also indicates 
that such a system involves a contractual agreement between many parties 
relevant to the subjects, assembling and mix-matching a certain form of 
contractual relationship, diverse again to its conventional counterpart. According 
to the principles discussed in the previous chapter, this sort of banking system is 
not merely based on innovation but rather a complex and well-established 
financial concept. Therefore, it is perhaps sensible to note here that this eccentric 
financial system is in need of a legitimate legal authority to govern the system as 
an assurance to protect the rights of the relevant parties from the inherent risks, 
to project the system towards its full potential and to secure justice. Accordingly, 
the approach of these regulations needs to reflect the nature of the risk to which 
the IFIs are exposed and the financial infrastructure desirable for effective 
regulation and supervision.4 
To date, the main focus of the existing regulations has been mostly on the 
licensing and the procedural aspects of the formation of the IFIs.5 On top of that, 
the jurisdiction of the Shariah supervisory system is also included. This effort is 
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more of a preface than the attemt to tackle the real challenges of the Islamic 
financial market as a whole; it is still far from its full potential. This development 
has to some extent only brought Islamic finance out of the shadows. Therefore, 
a holistic regulation including the formation of the Shariah financial law as 
reference for both industry and the judiciary is not only rhetoric, but rather an utter 
demand. Many cases have shown real intimidating regulatory challenges faced 
by the IFIs.6 If these are not to be sorted out soon, those challenges, it is believed, 
will impede the future development of the industry: namely, in the markets where 
Muslim customers are not dominant. Given this fact, having a well-regulated 
environment for the IFIs to operate in is not a remote idea. There are numbers of 
rationales imaginable to justify a designated law to govern the IFIs’ operations. In 
this part of the chapter, we will explore amongst others, four rationales for 
regulating Islamic finance: namely, to justify Shariah legal authority; to mitigate 
the risk; to protect the stakeholders; and to codify Shariah financial law. 
7.2.1.1 To justify Shariah legal authority 
There must be regulations to legitimise the authority of Shariah legal and 
supervisory issues to designated regulatory and supervisory bodies. This is to be 
done either by enhancing the function of the existing bodies or commencing 
anew, out of the proportion with the jurisdictions. Thus far, as already noted on 
multiple occasions, the authority to ensure Shariah compliance is held by the 
Shariah committee, either internally or externally. It is done by the internal 
Shariah committees of the respective IFIs and the external Shariah committees 
of the central banks.7 The legality of the contract lies in this type of regulation and 
supervision in terms of its legal endorsement where in some jurisdictions, such 
as in Malaysia, the court has to make reference to such.8 This procedure, among 
others, still lacks of two aspects: the authority of the court to adjudicate the cases 
and the redundancy of the Shariah committee supervisory opinions. This 
regulatory loophole somehow has forced the IFIs to imitate the conventional 
counterpart through mix-matching methods to reduce the costlier procedures of 
product offering due to legality issues with the Shariah contracts.9 It has extended 
to a more complicated implication, which started from the legal requirement of 
the Shariah-compliant products under the eyes of the regulatory perspective.  
 
This is in part because, in many jurisdictions, the law was made without concern 
on financial products from which the Shariah-compliance business model is 
                                            
6 See also H Hesse and others, ‘Trends and Challenges in Islamic Finance’ (2008) 9 (2) 
World Economics 175. 
7 The structure differs from one jurisdiction to another as discussed in prior chapters. 
8 See also Islamic Financial and Services Act 2013 (Malaysia). 
9 Mabid Ali MM al-Jahri, ‘An Economic Theory of Islamic Finance Regulation’ (2016) 24 
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excluded. In this vein, the question arises as to whether interest-free-based 
product is controversial or not from the respective regulatory view point.10 Under 
the former jurisdictions, the upcoming challenge is a regulatory supportive 
infrastructure. Meanwhile, under the later jurisdiction, Shariah-compliant 
products have to find a mechanism that adheres to the regulatory requisites at 
the same time. As the result of these twin challenges, the mix-matching product 
structuring strategy is the best alternative solution thus far, as approved and 
supervised by their Shariah committees. In addition, the uniqueness of the IFIs 
has to certain degree impaired the industry within the existing regulatory system. 
From product structuring to the litigation of disputes between the relevant parties 
in the Islamic financial industry, the IFIs are invariably on many occasions 
exposed to legal risk. 
 
Apart from the above, the enforceability of Shariah-compliant forms of contract 
and therefore their effectiveness, also requires justification. It is imperative to note 
here that the general principle conferring validity of contracts is the consent of the 
contractual relating parties.11 However, some cited cases related to Islamic 
finance mentioned that the only party falling under Shariah compliance is the IFIs. 
This is due to the article of association of the IFIs, which they are obliged to 
uphold.12 Whether or not the customers or other relating parties are obliged to 
comply with Shariah law under the circumstances is still optional. As observed, 
the absence of regulation to enforce the interest-free contract form has given rise 
to the issue of the choice of law to the litigants.13 The rights of the contractual 
parties to the choice of law to govern their contracts without having a sound and 
solid regulation to attend the case, could end up with the case being adjudicated 
largely with unprecise interpretation and therefore, false judgment. In addition, 
the fact that the non-black-letter Shariah law is referred to as ‘unqualified’ as 
reference to the contractual parties ‘therefore meaningless’, is a grave fact about 
the potential of the future cases to be put aside from the accurate Shariah 
contractual framework. To make it worse, it has consequens to the institutional 
stakeholders as well as to the protection of consumers’ rights as far as this 
research is concerned.  
 
In addition to that, the court ought to have a clarification of its jurisdiction to 
adjudicate Shariah related cases. It will justify the court’s jurisdiction to interpret 
the contracts construed under the Shariah law. As referred to BIMB v Adnan 
                                            
10 Hesse and others (n 6) 179. 
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Omar in the Malaysian jurisdiction.14 The defendant contented that the Malaysian 
Civil Court has no jurisdiction to hear the case. Other than that, cases such as 
Beximco v Shamil, has shown that non-Muslim dominated jurisdiction especially 
British court is not escapable from disputes in Islamic finance.15 Notwithstanding, 
the arguments of the cases might not be similar, but the concern of the related 
parties somewhat on the similar legal issue. In connection to that, the issue of 
whether the judges are familiar with the case facts is also amusing. Judgment 
ishould be based on knowledge and understanding.16 It is a prerequisite to the 
judge to ensure justice for the disputing parties.17 This judicial support is one of 
the crucial infrastructure required for effective regulation of a resilient and robust 
Islamic financial market.18 
7.2.1.2 To mitigate the risk 
The relationship between the depositors and the IFIs as compared to the 
conventional counterpart is somewhat inconsistent. The contracts between the 
depositors of the conventional institutions are based on lending which is already 
under the protection of credit risk through depositor protection scheme. On the 
other hand, owing to profit and loss sharing (PLS) contracts, the depositors of the 
IFIs, are not the creditors and the institutions are not the borrowers. They are in 
fact investors to the IFIs, whose as the agents therefore fairly share the rate-of-
return risk with the institutions.19 As a result, the conventional depositor protection 
scheme on credit risk is inapplicable to the IFIs’ depositors in many respects due 
to this inherent incoherence.20 If the IFIs’ depositors are to be bundled together 
with the conventional depositors, it might give rise to the question of Shariah non-
compliance risk.21  
 
Additionally, the PLS-based products, as in mudarabah and musharakah 
financing, are vulnerable in terms of the information asymmetric on the potential 
                                            
14 Bank Islam Malaysia Bhd v Adnan Omar & Ors [1994] 3 CLJ 735; See also Ruzian 
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rate of return.22 Rate of return is utilised by the IFIs to predict the profitability of 
their investments as well as financings. As required by Shariah financial law, for 
PLS products, the IFIs are allowed to predetermine the profit ratio but the rate of 
return of the investment is the subject to be determined only after the end of the 
investment period. Due to this, the expectation of the IAHs might be higher or 
mismatched with the profit earned from the investment.23 To avoid the investors 
from withdrawing the funded capital, the IFIs might need to waive their right to 
the dividend, which could give rise to displaced commercial risk (DCR).24 This 
problem is closely related to the IFIs in their way of ensuring effective asset and 
liability management on the balance sheet, which, if not diligently reconciled, 
could cause reputational risk for the institutions. The mentioned risks are 
amongst other risks that are uniquely faced by the IFIs and are to be identified, 
measured, evaluated, monitored, reported and controlled to mitigate the effect. 
By saying that, a comprehensive, robust and sound regulation and supervisory 
legal system is an undeniable requisite. 
 
In this sense, it is also worth mentioning that the modes of the conventional risk 
mitigation techniques are not fully compatible with the Shariah compliance 
requirements. This is a result of the PLS relationship.25 In contrast to the 
conventional model, instead of transferring the risk to the borrowers, the 
depositors of the IFIs are investors, therefore they are sharing the risk of their 
investment with the institutions as the agents.26 Coherently, to mitigate the risk of 
loss to the institutions and to ensure the deposited amount is returnable, the 
institutions offer the customers products with the same principle. Another type of 
risk-mitigation mechanism is through asset-and equity-based risk management. 
The way the IFIs fabricate the mechanism is indeed unique and inconsistent 
compared to the conventional model which might also be legally incapacitated in 
many respects. However, this sort of economic strategy is technically what makes 
the IFIs unique and has bonded a close link between Islamic finance and the real 
                                            
22 Zakaria Bahari, ‘The Changes of Products Structure in Islamic Banking: Case Study 
of Malaysia’ (Paper presented at Conference on Islamic Perspective on 
Management and Finance organised by School of Management, Leicester 
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Bank 2008) 175. 
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Finance’ (2015) 23 (2) Islamic Economic Studies 85. 
26 See also Hossein Askari and Abbas Mirakhor, Risk Sharing, ‘Public Policy and 
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economy.27 The advantage of such a system is believed to be illustrated during 
the crisis, as the assets are retrievable to regain the capital lost. It is not a wishful 
thinking, since the 2007 financial crisis has witnessed the robustness of the IFIs 
in facing the turbulence in contrast to the interest-based financial system. It is in 
fact one of the main factors that has drawn the attention of the conventional 
market to the Shariah compliant financial system. 
7.2.1.3 To protect stakeholders  
The objective of Shariah governance is to optimise institutional value and 
ascertain sustainability to the institutions for the sake of the stakeholders. It is to 
protect the firm from failure and the stakeholders, especially the finance users, 
from the firm’s insolvency as well as profit instability.28 Sustainability is about 
fulfiling the need of today’s stakeholders without comprimising the future 
stakeholders in economic, environmental and social aspect.29 This is somehow 
what is promulgated by the the objective of Shariah, which is to preserve good. 
In doing so, the IFIs have to take into account the fact that their stakeholders are 
characteristically unique. The existence of shareholder alike stakeholders such 
as the IAHs, for instance, has distinguished the list of the stakeholders in many 
respects. The IAHs at some point represent the real conflict of this complex 
relationship. The challenge faced by the IFIs in managing IAHs as stakeholders 
is the power of the IAHs as depository investors with the contractual nature of 
shareholders. As the investors, they are entitled to a certain percentage of profit 
and keen on the highest margin possible, in a relatively short term compared to 
the shareholders. To make it more consequential, the IAHs are also depositors, 
who enjoy the right to withdraw their investment in a short run if there is a 
mismatch between the profit earned and what has been expected.30 In order to 
ease that, the IFIs could waive their profit portion to the IAHs to avoid the 
withdrawal risk. In this case, it is should be apparently managed diligently or 
otherwise, it would minimise or even threaten the overall rate of profitability, 
claimable by the shareholders as residual claimants in the long run. Adversely, if 
the shareholders see the given waiver as favourable to the IAHs, it could bring 
up the potential problem of shareholders selling their share. 31 
 
Apart from that, the IFIs are also facing an information asymmetry issue in a 
dissimilar way as compared to the conventional counterparts, owing to the fact 
                                            
27 Abdul Karim Abdullah, Economic Benefit of Risk Sharing, Islamic and Civilisation 
Renewal (IAIS Malaysia). 
28 Al-Jahri (n 9) 2. 
29 Thomas Dyllick and Kai Hockerts ‘Beyond the Business Case for Corporate 
Sustainability’ (2002) 11 (2) Business Strategy and the Environment 130. 
30 Greuning and Iqbal (n 24) 178. 
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that Islamic finance products are mostly based on PLS and multilayer sale 
arrangements.32 In terms of rights, the PLS-based contract widens the numbers 
of the stakeholders who are entitled to the information, which is conventionally 
conceived as one of the exclusive rights of the shareholders. Additionally, the 
way the PLS contracts behave posits the risk of being shared by the firm and the 
customers. By granting a symmetrical right to the customers, the IFIs are unable 
to fully burden the customers in the case of default and the relevant parties have 
the right to be made aware of such a risk with sufficient information. This 
contractual structure demands a more delicate due diligence process to be 
executed by the institutions on possible customers, and by the stakeholders on 
the institutions: namely examining the information to access whether or not the 
invested funds are retrievable and profitable. For instance, the lack of information 
on the customer’s ability to pay the predetermined price could increase the credit 
risk in differed payment sale-based products, which is the most important feature 
to be screened prior to disbursement.33 
 
On top of that is the understanding of the notion of Shariah compliance by the 
stakeholders.  It should not merely appear on the form of the contract but include 
the virtue of the Islamic contract as well as its operational aspects. For instance, 
let us observe the fact that an IFI as mudarib is liable to guarantee the invested 
capital in the case of any misconduct and negligence.34 This is one of the reliable 
approaches of insuring shareholders’ investments. From its Shariah legal 
perspective, it is Shariah compliance, which would simply be endorsed by the 
Shariah committee. On one hand, it is the best way of protection imaginable for 
the sake of the shareholders. However, the IFIs as agents in a more complex 
relationship will absorb the risk on behalf of them and put it on the shoulder of 
other stakeholders. The customers, for instance, would suffer with higher rates of 
return required by the institutions stated in their financing agreement in order to 
allow the institutions to enjoy potentially higher returnable margins 
commensurate with the absorbed risk. Some cited cases put forwards in their 
argument the large or even abusive margin of profit gained by the IFIs.35 It might 
be justified by a calculation as per agreed upon by the relating parties; however, 
the high payment obliged to the customer once a contract is sealed could be 
perceived as non-Islamic.36 
                                            
32 Greuning and Iqbal (n 24) 197. 
33 M Kabir Hassan and Mervyn K Lewis, Handbook of Islamic Banking (Edward Elgar 
2007) 145. 
34 AAOIFI, Shariah Standard no (13) Mudarabah in AAOIFI (eds) Shari’ah Standards, 
(Almainan Publication and Distribution, Manama 2015) 384. 
35 Affin Bank Bhd v Zulkifli bin Abdullah [2006]3 MLJ; See also BIMB v Adnan (n 15). 
36 Some argue that this argument is due to the IFIs’ transparency requirements on the 
final price of the sold asset. The policy mentioned that to be compliant with Islamic 
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If cases are observed more closely, the stakeholders are at great risk due to 
effects of externalities brought by the actions of the relevant parties, especially 
the agents.37 The Shariah-compliant resolutions taken by the IFIs are most 
noticeable. The fact that many litigations came up with arguments on the illegality 
of the contracts under the Shariah law, thus unenforceable is an afflictive 
evidence in this particular issue.38 It might not be correlated with the point whether 
or not the Islamic financial system is well regulated, but the potential for such an 
excuse being most frequent deployed in the cases of default payment is worth 
mentioning. There are many stakeholders at stake if this is not going to be 
addressed diligently by the authorities by offering robust regulatory remedies. 
Furthermore, minimising the risk binding onto the stakeholder is the objective of 
having a robust Shariah governance system. A solid regulation system could 
function as risk mitigation by putting forward a well-developed system to be 
adhered to by the institutions.  
7.2.1.4 To Codify Shariah Financial Law 
This justification might be more reasonable in a Muslim-majority market. This is 
acknowledged on the basis of multiple application of Shariah legal schools 
adopted by the IFIs in construing the contracts, which gives rise to the Shariah 
nonc-ompliance risk. Some disputes highlighted the contentious facts, offered 
mainly by the defaulting parties, in their attempts to quash the contract, that the 
Shariah principles applied to disputed products are contradictory in terms of their 
legality, owing to the multiple different Shariah opinions, and therefore invalid.39 
For instance, a contract might be construed based on a certain Shariah legal 
school. The stipulated characteristics could be differentiated from other Shariah 
legal schools. To some extent, the contract might be lawful according to the 
Shafie legal school but rendered otherwise by other schools. This is what 
happened with the Bay Bithaman Ajil (BBA) products as witnessed in the 
Malaysian court cases. The BBA is a product construed based on the Bay al-Inah 
contract, which was legal according to the Shafie legal school, but considered a 
trick to backdoor riba by the majority of other schools. This type of contention also 
recently conceded in the case of Dana Gas v Dana Gas.40  
 
                                            
when the agreement take place. This final price is not an issue in the conventional 
financial system since it is a subject to change due to annual interest fluctuation, 
which is a gharar and therefore unlawful in the eyes of Shariah law. 
37  Shelagh Heffernan, Modern Banking (John Wiley and Sons  2005)174. 
38 See also Beximco v Shamil Bank (n 12). 
39 Affin v Zulkifli (n 35). 
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These indefinite feature could be remedied by the enforcement power of the 
authority. On the basis of the Shariah legal maxim, the opinion prevailed by the 
authority transcends the legal school contradictions, any multidimensional 
opinions on the case are irrelevant and the prevailed opinion is the one chosen 
by the authority as referral.41 Additionally, if the contracting parties are made 
aware of the existence of other opinions, and chose to go with the stipulated 
items, other legal opinions are no longer a choice and therefore are irrelevant 
during the dispute. However, the issue of a lack of unification of Shariah legal 
approach is not to be abundant. The fact that is has given rise to Shariah legal 
ambiguity should be attended to diligently. To do so, the authority must justify the 
chosen legal school under its jurisdiction for the IFIs to accommodate.42 Other 
than that, it could also be done by commencing standard procedures for legal 
justification if there are Shariah salient issues due to legal school contradictions.43 
Additionally, the issuance of Shariah parameters is also considered a good 
strategy.44 The objective is clear, which is to achieve harmonisation of the 
concepts and application among the Shariah committees, so it could avoid 
contradiction and inconsistency regarding the implementation of  fatwas.45 
 
To conclude this discussion, there is an inexorable need for the respective 
jurisdictions to ensure their legal environments are conducive for the Islamic 
financial market to flourish. Due to the justifications put forward, the relevant 
question here is not why but rather what and how. While perspectives on what 
constitutes the right mix of regulations and governance models may vary between 
jurisdictions, the view believed to be widely shared here is that an agile and 
responsive regulatory ecosystem will allow the IFIs to thrive to their full potential 
while minimising the risks embarked on by the customers therefore ensuring 
stability and prosperity to the market. However, it is worth noting here that the 
regulations seeked here must be in line with the virtues promulgated by Shariah. 
                                            
41 Shihabuddin AI-Qurafi, al-Furuq (Dar al-Salam 2001) 540. 
42 This was the way of the Islamic governments during the time of caliphates. One 
mazhab will be chosen by the authority as a referree, whilst other mazhabs are in 
liberty to be accommodated in personal matters or when agreed upon by the related 
parties. It is cited that there were also regional courts, that applied certain mazhab 
which was not the national mazhab, based on their local requirements; See also 
Abu al-Hassan Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah 
(Dar al-Hadith 2006). 
43 There are numerous researchers regarding this, mostly done by Shariah experts. In 
most cases, the focus is on finding the best Shariah solution for the issues that have 
arisen due to the mix-matching approach. 
44 Malaysian Central Bank (BNM) through its Shariah Advisory Council has been 
publishing in a timely manner, numbers of Shariah parameters for the IFIs as 
reference.  
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7.2.2 Virtues of Shariah Law46  
It is utterly vital that the virtues of Shariah law are adopted under the 
circumstances. This is to avoid non-Islamic virtues taking their place in the so-
called Shariah compliance notion.47 These objectives stand as the preferences 
of the Shariah law and the Shariah legal principles. Based on the previous 
discussion, it is conceivable that Islamic corporate governance is about the 
existence of additional mechanism to ensure compliance in IFI operations, 
especially in Shariah matters. Shariah compliance in terms of contractual 
agreement seems to be the main concerns of such mechanisms. However, it is 
worth mentioning that when we deal with Shariah matters in products and 
services, the knowledge of the objectives of Shariah is a crucial factor. Since 
composing Shariah resolutions is about striving and seeking the underpinning 
meanings behind the texts of the Islamic sources, a deep understanding of the 
objectives of Shariah is inseparable from a Shariah scholar who carries out such 
a duty.  
 
The name for the virtue of Shariah law is Maqasid Shariah.48 Maqasid Shariah 
refers to the overall goals and meanings aimed by Shariah law to accomplish 
under the principles of realisation of benefit and prevention of harm. This 
intertwined concept is embedded into Islamic jurisprudence regulated from 
Islamic sources since Shariah law comes with reasons and explanations. As said 
by scholars, there are five general objectives of Shariah which are the 
preservation of faith, life, posterity, wealth and intellect. These objectives are 
regarded as the general objectives that cover the whole system of human life at 
the macro level. Under each general objective, there are many other specific 
objective acting as the support objectives to ensure all the elements of the 
general objectives are achievable at the micro level and could cover the smallest 
part and parcel of human life. From regulatory perspective, specific objectives 
should support the scholars to look into specific provisions for specific cases in 
order to come up with the resolutions that could uphold general objectives. This 
means each topic in Shariah will have its own objectives at the lowest level as 
the point of reference that does not contradict the general approaches of the 
Shariah as a whole system.  
                                            
46 This topic is closely related to as discussed in Chapter 2, under the characteristics of 
the Shariah law: Maqasid Shariah. 
47 Affin v Zulkifli (n 35); See also Markom and others (n 15) 11. 
48 The words virtue and objective are interchangeably used for this topic. It is because, 
in common usage, Maqasid Shariah is translated as the objective of the law. 
Considering the vast discussion of the topic, the word objective is rather literal in 
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At the micro level, recent developments in Islamic finance have witnessed many 
attempts carried out by scholars such as Laldin and Furqani to cater for the need 
of deep understanding of the applications of the objectives of Shariah.49 
Preservation of wealth is regarded as the point of reference on this topic. It is 
imperative to say that the preservation of wealth is about the encouragement to 
generate, accumulate, preserve and distribute the wealth in a just and fair 
manner.50 It is also the promulgation of the concepts of economic wellbeing, 
universal brotherhood and justice, equitable distribution of income, and freedom 
of the individual within the context of social welfare.51 In this part of the chapter, 
four objectives of Shariah related to the corporate governance will be brought 
upon for discussion: namely, transparency of deal; preservation of contract 
validity; wealth as instrument not goal; and fair distribution and circulation. Most 
importantly, these objectives are specific in nature if we consider them as part of 
the method to achieve the notion of preservation of wealth. On the other hand, 
corporate governance constituents, especially those who are sitting in the higher 
governance organisational hierarchy, serve as helicopter viewers of the company 
to some extent naturally deal with general approaches that move the company 
towards its goals. Therefore, these same objectives also general in nature in the 
corporate governance corpus. It is vital that such a notion is embraced in order 
to assist the understanding of this topic.   
7.2.2.1 Transparency of Deal 
The conventional corporate governance corpus has been discussing information 
asymmetries that occur between shareholders and managers. In Islamic finance, 
such issues extend to customers and other stakeholders as some of them are 
considered as shareholder alike stakeholders, especially the IAH.52 In this regard, 
transparency is the essence of each Islamic financial contracts. All contracts must 
clearly stipulate terms and conditions and the contractual parties ought to be 
notified. Having knowledge and understanding of such during the deal process is 
consequential in quantifying the consent of the relating parties. Items such as 
price, payment method, period of the deal and other reasonable terms and 
conditions are encouraged to be expressed in an explicit manner in any kind of 
dealings entered into by the IFIs. Any ambiguity is considered gharar 
(uncertainty) which could render the contracts to be null in the eyes of Shariah 
                                            
49 Muhammad Akram Laldin and Hafaz Furqani, ‘The Objective of the Shari'ah in Islamic 
Finance: Identifying the Ends and the Means’ (2013) New Horizon 26. 
50 ibid 
51 See also Muhammad Umer Chapra, Towards a Just Monetary System (The Islamic 
Foundation, 1986). 
52 Since the investment account holders are bonded with mudarabah and musharakah 
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law.53 Therefore, the governance constituents of the IFIs must work to observe 
this notion, especially when it comes to the products and services offered to the 
customers. It is not only because of the need to gain the customer’s confidence 
but also to uphold the objectives of Shariah in financial transactions. 
 
This objective of Shariah is traceable in the prohibition of extensive uncertainties 
present in any transactions that normally occur because of the inadequate 
information. For instance, if we go back to the practices showed by the Prophet 
PBUH, it is narrated that when the Prophet PBUH permitted the people of Medina 
to proceed with the Salam contract, He emphasised the need for the contract to 
stipulate the explicit date of delivery and the exact amount of price.54 Other than 
that, in murabahah-based products - an Islamic mark-up price instrument 
implemented for asset financing - the IFIs are strictly required to mention 
purchasing price and the profit generated by them from the agreement before 
stating the selling price to the customer. The same principle is applied to the Bay’ 
Inah financing where specific amount taken and offered by the IFIs from and to 
the customers must be explicitly stated in the agreement.55This action somehow 
triggers customer’s awareness of the exact amount of profit taken by the IFIs, 
which on the other hand also revealing the uncertain amount generated by the 
same nature of interest-based products offered by conventional financial 
institutions. 
7.2.2.2 Preservation of Contract Validity  
Other than focussing on the permissibility of the contracts, the Shariah committee 
should also put their attention and effort into preserving the validity of the 
contracts. Any contract, especially those which are fabricated based on general 
provisions and do not contravene any specific provision from the Islamic sources, 
brought to the committee should be presumed as permissible and valid, 
respectively. This is a crucial notion in dealing with financial institutions since a 
non-compliant contract could compromise or even nullify the agreed deals. The 
impact of non-compliance could not only affect the IFIs internally, but also 
diminish customer’s confidence in the IFIs adversely.  
This objective of Shariah in this particular matter is moulded based on the 
presumption of continuity. It means that each closed deal should be presumed in 
continuation of both the positive and the negative until the contrary is established 
                                            
53 Al-Mausu’ah al-Fiqhiyyah al-Kuwaitiyyah (1st eds Dar al-Safwa 1993) vol 31 150-154. 
54 Bayʿ al-salam, which refers to a sale contract in which payment is made in advance 
by the buyer and the delivery of the goods is deferred by the seller. The date of 
delivery and accurate description of goods must be given in the contract. 
55 Bay’ al-‘Inah is the crux of the Bay’ Bithaman ‘Ajil (purchasing with deferred payment) 
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by evidence.56 It is also based on the maxim that any financial transaction is 
considered as licit until proven as illicit.57 A transaction is normally considered 
illicit if there is evidence of interest (riba), extensive uncertainty or gambling. As 
long as there is no involvement in an interest-based agreement, the uncertainty, 
if any, is under control as adviced by the experts, and no gambling products or 
services offered, the contracts should be scrutinised by serving the objective of 
preserving their validity.  
 
The source of the present objective of Shariah is apprehensible from the tradition 
of the Prophet PBUH. When the Prophet PBUH and His companions arrived at 
Medina, He recognised the transactions that had been practised by the local 
people, called Salam, despite the fact that such a contract was construed without 
the existence of an item for purchase during the deal. He also urged Muslims to 
not to waste the wealth they possessed. Wealth is wasted when it is spent 
unwisely, or on non-permissible transactions. To avoid such a condition from 
happening is to uphold the objective promulgated by Shariah. 
7.2.2.3 Wealth as Instrument Not Goal 
Commencing on the epistemological worldview of a Muslim on the meaning of 
life on earth as the Caliph of God, a Muslim believes that a human is the steward 
of God managing the earth according to His will. The sole absolute owner of the 
wealth is God Himself and humans are His vicegerents, possessing the right to 
earn wealth through permissible means. Technically, everything in this universe 
has been made subservient to Him.58 In this relationship, humans ought to use 
wealth to fulfil their needs as an instrument to attain the other general objectives 
of Shariah. Such a worldview also distinguishes the Shariah governance point of 
reference from its conventional counterpart, where wealth maximisation is 
considered as the main goal, especially for the advocates of the shareholder 
theory. 59 
 
To this end, it is imperative for the Shariah committee to ensure that any strategic 
approach taken by the management of the IFI for the sake of the institution does 
not only consider profit generation as well as its adherence to Shariah law. They 
                                            
56 Muhammad Hashim Kamali, Principles of Islamic Jurisprudence (The Islamic Texts 
Society Cambridge 2003) 384. 
57 This is based on the maxim, ‘the thing shall remain as it was originally’, - meaning, if 
it was originally permissible, it will remain permissible until proven otherwise; Al-
Majalla Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah, Part II. Maxims of Islamic Jurisprudence, no. 5. 
58 The Islamic Economic System: A Few Highlight (Pakistan Institute of Development 
Economics, 1981) 5. 
59 Andrew Keay, ‘Ascertaining the Corporate Objective: An Entity Maximisation and 
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should also encourage the management to look beyond such horizons, namely 
to the sustainability and capability of the institutions to serve the ummah for a 
longer period of time and a wider group of stakeholders. Only in that way will the 
wealth generated by the IFIs serve its purpose as the instrument for the prosperity 
of the stakeholders as well as to obtain other objectives of Shariah. 
 
The present specific objective of Shariah is traceable from the condemnation of 
the rich people who gathered the treasure without spending it in a righteous 
manner. Shariah law also provides various instruments such as mudarabah, 
musyarakah, muzara’ah, musaqat and many others that are capable of 
supporting people with surplus funds to invest their capital in order to generate 
the economy. 
7.2.2.4 Fair Distribution and Circulation 
To achieve the objective of preservation of wealth, Islamic governance 
constituents ought to put their attention onto the wealth creation, distribution and 
consumption process so that the wealth is not circulated only among the rich in 
the society.60 It is worth mentioning that financial activities in Islam are not about 
wealth concentration, but rather concern with how to create and circulate the 
wealth in the best manner of distribution, as promulgated by Shariah. Income 
created from the economic activities should be distributed in a just and fair 
approach, regardless of the economic status of the recipients.  
 
In this regard, it is imperative to say that the meaning of justice encapsulated by 
Shariah is not about equality but rather putting everything in its righteous place. 
Therefore, making everybody rich is not considered justice in Islam. Other than 
wishful thinking, such an effort also denies the fact that each person has different 
potential. What we need to do is to create optional as well as compulsory 
mechanisms that will collect the wealth from those with surplus funds for the 
benefit of the people who are in need. 
 
This notion is demonstrated in Islam by the encouragement of charity or sadaqah 
and the enactment of compulsory alms or zakah from those with surplus funds. 
The collected resources are then distributed to those with deficit funds 
possessing a certain characteristic to ensure everybody gets what they need. For 
instance, poor people with income less than 50% of their daily needs will be given 
more compared to the poor people who earn more than 50% of their daily needs 
                                            
60 Muhammad Umer Chapra, Islam and Economic Development (The International 
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but less than the minimum daily threshold. Sometimes, rich people who go into 
debt in order to help others are considerable as eligible to receive zakah. 
 
As a conclusion, it is believed that a clear understanding of the specific objectives 
of Shariah in corporate governance is the key towards the preservation of wealth 
as propagated by the general objectives of Shariah law. Apart from this general 
guidance, the Shariah committee should also takes advantage of specific 
objectives in each cases that comes before them in the committee meetings to 
find the best solution possible. This is due to the fact that these specific objectives 
are deemed to assist the achievement of the general principles through the 
realisation of benefits and the prevention of harm. It is important to note that, 
being able to deploy these specific objectives in the relevant cases will be the key 
to demonstrating the real soul of the Shariah law, beyond its literal expression. It 
will also manifest the feasibility of the Shariah law, passing through the spatial 
and temporal factors. It is believed that after combining all of these aspects, the 
true potential of the Islamic financial market will be more visible to stakeholders. 
7.3 Shariah Supervision Mechanism 
After discussing the governing law and its virtues, we will proceed with the second 
part of Shariah governance, the supervision mechanism. From the governance 
viewpoint, there must be a sound supervision mechanism ensuring the IFIs 
operate in adherence with the required conventional financial regulations and the 
same time the Shariah compliance principles. This supervision mechanism 
should have the capability to enhance the performance of the IFIs and mitigate 
the potential threats that could weaken the institutions. In order to do so, this part 
of the present chapter will focus on the duty of the governance constituents, 
namely the Shariah committee and its managerial supporting system, in ensuring 
Shariah compliance. It will discuss the duty of the directors as the fiduciaries to 
the stakeholders, especially the shareholders, and the role of ijtihad in the 
executing of their duty of care and due diligence. Be noted that other general 
duties perceived as the nature of the IFIs as financial subsidiaries are not in the 
scope of this discussion due to the objective of the research and its limitations.  
7.3.1 Fiduciary Duty of IFIs’ Directors 
Broadly speaking, the duties of the directors of the IFIs are similar to those of 
their conventional counterparts. Whether they are executive or non-executive 
board members, the duty of care and loyalty are mandatory. Arguably, the starting 
point of this fiduciary duty is moulded according to the nature of the relationship 
and the facts of the case.61 As prescribed by a mudarabah contract, the IFIs are 
the agents (amil) and the shareholders are the principals (rabb mal), where the 
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directors, as the persons responsible for the actions and inactions of the IFIs, are 
the agents to the institutions. The main distinguishing feature is the fact that they 
carry out the business in compliance with Shariah law, concurrently with the law 
of the land in which they are operating. In the IFIs, the contracts of the directors 
and their Shariah committee members are construed based on trust or amanah. 
In a contractual sense, amanah is the underlying essence of the agency contract. 
The first reference is to be made in the expressed terms of the agency contract 
of the board respectively. It is then extended to the accountability of the board 
towards the stakeholders and the Shariah, as the law referred to by the IFIs, 
alongside with the law of the land. This multi-dimensional interrelation shapes the 
peculiarities of the Shariah governance fiduciary model.  
 
On the way towards Shariah compliance, a notion specific to the IFIs’ operating 
mode, the directors are accountable to ensure its success, which is a challenge 
closely supervised by the stakeholders. In the real world, experts who possessed 
the capabilities to comprehend the notion is rather rare in business, let alone in 
the financial market. From there, the idea of having a designated committee, 
membered by a group of people with expertise in Shariah law, is the best option 
imaginable thus far. In organisational terms, this committee is a subsidiary to the 
board of directors, delegated with a certain level of fiduciary duty towards the 
institutions, in order to ensure Shariah compliance. Put differently, it is a 
modernised version of the duty of care and due diligence to fit the purpose of the 
IFIs’ operating systems. 
7.3.1.1 Fiduciary Duty of Shariah Committee  
There are many standards featuring the duties deemed to be discharged by the 
Shariah committee. Surprisingly, the focus is commonly on technical and 
procedural requirements or job prescriptions of those on the committee, which 
are mostly related to Shariah issues. As far as this research is concerned, a 
specific research on the respective duties from the viewpoint of Shariah experts 
as fiduciaries should be initiated. As members of a committee with power 
delegated by the board of directors, Shariah committee members, to some 
degree possess a similar fiduciary duty, as if they themselves were directors.62 
The only difference might be in the job prescriptions, which is mainly focusing on 
Shariah-related matters. This is to support the idea that the board should be able 
to exercise independent judgement on corporate affairs.63 In this vein, it is done 
by having a unique board structure, consisting of the Shariah committee directly 
under the board of directors, supervising and observing Shariah matters on 
behalf of the board. As a subsidiary to the board, the Shariah committee reports 
                                            
62 IFSB, (Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services 2009) 7. 
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to the board on any Shariah-related issues in a timely manner or if deemed 
necessary.64 
 
Additionally, based on the concept of amanah, by virtue of agency contract, the 
power given by the shareholders and the implied duty to the stakeholders, the 
governance constituents of the IFIs, including the Shariah committee, must 
exercise their duty in-line with the objective of the institutions, to optimise the 
value and ascertain the sustainability of the institution.65 Therefore, apart from 
ensuring Shariah compliance, the Shariah committee are subject to fiduciary 
duty, which consists of the duty of loyalty and duty of care. The most important 
task executed by Shariah experts here is to ensure the IFIs, as the nexus of 
implicit and explicit Shariah compliance contracts, would uphold such a virtue at 
any time and at any permissible cost. 
7.3.1.1.1 Duty of Loyalty of Shariah Committee 
Shariah committee members are a group of people with a special set of skills 
entrusted to be the IFIs’ safeguarding mechanism for the stakeholders from any 
misinterpretation of the Shariah law.66 In fact, their existence is to protect the 
rights and interests of the stakeholders as clients from any Shariah misconducts 
possibly executed by relevant governance constituents. As trustees, the duty of 
loyalty is applicable to them, a notion conceived from their contracts as agents. 
The idea is that they must act in accordance with the best interest of the 
institutions and for the best sake of the stakeholders. It is to ensure the idea that 
has brought the IFIs into existence is upheld unconditionally. In order to do so, 
they must act with undivided loyalty, within the delegated power given by the 
institution, which is in Shariah-related matters. For that reason, in jurisdictions 
with higher numbers of talent, like Malaysia, a Shariah expert cannot be 
appointed to be the member of multiple Shariah committees in the same industry 
at the same time.67 This is to avoid the occurrence of a conflict of interest that 
could possibly be detrimental to the beneficiaries.  
 
                                            
64 See also CBO, Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework (CBO 2012). 
65 Amanah based contract means the contract that construed based on trust, whether it 
is explicitly or implicitly mentioning about the delegated tasks to be executed. The 
agency contract for instance is one of the contract with implicit tasks, and the 
mudarabah contract is a contract with an explicit task entrusted to the agent as 
trustee.  
66 A Shariah committee, an independent body of specialised jurists in Islamic commercial 
jurisprudence; See also AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. (1): Shariah 
Supervision Body, Appointment, Composition and Report Standards in AAOIFI 
(eds) Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards (Almainan Publication and 
Distribution, Manama 2015) 885. 
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From a governance viewpoint, the Shariah experts are also subject to 
accountability and transparency. As gate-keepers, they are accountable for the 
effects of any actions and decisions taken within the delegated power towards on 
the shareholders, as the contractual owners, and to the stakeholders, as implied 
through the reason of the existence of the IFIs. In this sense, the mutual interest 
of the stakeholders of the IFIs, especially the shareholders, rests on the idea of 
Shariah compliance. Apart from that, they are required to be transparent. All 
actions and decisions ought to be clearly recorded and timely reported to the 
relevant parties respectively.68 Any incidents of Shariah non-compliance, for 
instance must be promptly reported for immediate actions.69 However, be noted 
that the institutional loyalty of Shariah committee does not simply means that they 
should favour the clients at any cost. In executing their duty as fiduciaries, they 
are to be independent in order to act and decide in accordance with the best 
virtues of the Shariah law. If the resulting decisions and actions are in conflict 
with such a notion, it is actually an act of disloyalty as fiduciaries to the 
stakeholders as beneficiaries and could be perceived as a blatant breach of 
contract. The main function of the Shariah committee members here is somehow 
to play the role of Shariah law practitioners. Whether the law is as codified as the 
law of the land or provided by the standard setter as a followed standard, Shariah 
experts are the catalysts who have the capability to interpret Shariah law into 
action by ensuring it adhered to by the relevant parties. 
 
It is also imperative to note here that, the nature of loyalty of institutional Shariah 
committees is heterogeneous with the central Shariah committee. The central 
Shariah committee is a supportive authoritative body, assisting the central bank 
in Islamic financial policy-making and implementation supervision. That is the 
reason why it functions as a referral to institutional committees in the case of 
unresolvable issues at institutional level. On the other hand, institutional Shariah 
committees within the IFIs play the roles of market-players. Their function as 
advisors or supervisors in Shariah-related matters should not be perceived as 
policy making-process as if they are in the central bank. On the account of this, 
their decisions and actions are subject to confidentiality.70 
7.3.1.1.2 Duty of Care of Shariah Committee 
The duty of care of the Shariah committee indicates a task to make a prudent 
judgement when taking decisions in Shariah-related matters.71 Each Shariah 
                                            
68 The G20/OECD Principles of Governance requires stakeholders to have access to 
relevant, sufficient and reliable information on a timely and regular basis regarding 
the firm, regardless of the nature of the business. See also OECD (n 63) 34. 
69 IFSB, (Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions Offering 
Islamic Financial Services 2009) 6. 
70 See also BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 20; OECD (n 63) 34. 
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issue should be attended to with full effort in capacity and fair in judgement. In 
doing so, they ought to possess a ‘fit and proper’ criteria of knowledge in Shariah 
law, especially in fatwa deduction procedures. This is to enable the committees 
to conduct adequate Shariah reviews on the IFIs’ business affairs with the correct 
Shariah perspective. In doing so, it is an unavoidable requisite that a member of 
a Shariah committee ought to master skills in ijtihad. Ijtihad is a mandate given 
by the stakeholders to Shariah committees to discharge under the umbrella of 
duty of care and due diligence. This process is rather sensible from the customer 
perspective as a fatwa deducted by ijtihad conducted by Shariah experts has the 
capacity to relieve ordinary customers from the burden of doing such a Shariah-
related due diligence procedures.72 This fatwa endorsement is believed to be a 
crucial means in enhancing customer confidence, that such a product or service 
has already gone through a due diligence process and adheres not only to the 
relevant governing laws but has also been scrutinised by the experts on its 
compliance with Shariah law.73 That is the reason why any fatwa endorsed by 
respective Shariah committees is a binding verdict for the representative IFIs.74 
In this vein, Ginena and Hamid emphasise the authority possessed by the 
Shariah committee, especially, at the central bank level, on the Shariah matters.75  
 
Taking this into account, all Shariah committee members, whether individually or 
collectively, are required to have the capability to act in good faith with their full 
capacity. The capability of executing ijtihad to determine Shariah perspective on 
a certain product or service is one of the key elements of the success of the IFIs 
thus far. Since Islamic finance is exploring many grey areas of Shariah-compliant 
financial approaches, this task is rather exhaustive and requires a thorough 
execution. Therefore, the upcoming part of this chapter will be dedicated to a 
deeper excavation of ijtihad, so it can be substantiated in a more proper manner, 
to support the objective of this research. 
7.3.2 Shariah Committee Functions 
Since the reason of the existence of the IFIs is to operate in compliance with 
Shariah law, there must be a governance mechanism committed to ensuring this 
                                            
72 Yusuf Talal Delorenzo, ‘Shari’ah Compliance Risk’ (2007) 7 (2) Chicago Journal of 
International Law 397, 398. 
73 See also Malek Marwan Yousef Injas and others, ‘The Importance of Shariah 
Supervisory Boards (SSBS) in the Islamic Banking System’ (2016) 9 (2) South East 
Asia Journal of Contemporary Business, Economics and Law 25. 
74 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 1: Shariah Supervision Body, Appointment, 
Composition and Report Standards in AAOIFI (eds) Accounting, Auditing and 
Governance Standards (Almainan Publication and Distribution, Manama 2015) 885; 
Central Bank Act 2009 (Malaysia). 
75 Karim Ginena and Azhar Hamid, Foundations of Shari'ah Governance of Islamic 
Banks: The Role of Sharia Supervisory Boards, Internal Audit and Advisory 
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to happen. In doing so, there comes the Shariah committee, an independent body 
of jurists specialising in Islamic commercial jurisprudence.76 It is entrusted with 
the duty of directing, reviewing and supervising the IFIs where the role of the 
utmost importance is ensuring the implementation of Shariah compliance in the 
IFIs’ operational systems, especially on products and services offered to the 
market. As far as this research is concerned, recent developments of this type of 
governance mechanism have shown positive enhancement, namely in terms of 
the roles of the Shariah committee and its organisational arrangement.77 In this 
vein, as mentioned by many standard-setters, the Shariah committee role is 
carried out through Shariah review and Shariah audit of the IFIs’ Shariah-related 
matters, supported by internal Shariah division, consisting of internal Shariah 
review, internal Shariah research and internal Shariah audit.78  
7.3.2.1 Shariah Review Role 
On many occasions, the Shariah review role is described in technical and 
organisational terms.79 The Shariah committee is, amongst others, responsible 
for advising the board and the IFIs, especially on matters to be reported to the 
central bank Shariah council, endorsing Shariah policies and procedures, 
endorseing and validating relevant documents, assessing the work of the internal 
Shariah department and providing Shariah opinions.80 In terms of execution, the 
Shariah committee will have Shariah meetings with internal Shariah department 
in a timely manner or if deemed necessary. Some standard-setters require the 
meetings to be held at least once in every two months.81 Decision-making is 
based on a majority vote by Shariah background members, if the committee also 
membered by other background experts.82 Apart from that, the Shariah 
committee may also nominates one of the members, commonly its chairman, to 
carry out consultation if the case is urgent.83  Any non-compliance issue if 
occurred should be recorded and reported to the board. During this event, the 
                                            
76 It is also known as the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) by AAOIFI Shariah 
Governance Standard; See also AAOIFI, Auditing Standard No. (1): Objective and 
Principles of Auditing in AAOIFI (eds) Accounting, Auditing and Governance 
Standards (Almainan Publication and Distribution, Manama 2015) 885.  
77 The discussion on the related multilateral bodies responsible for the development was 
depicted at the earliest stages of this research. 
78 See also IFSB, (Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services 2009) 18-19; BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 20. 
79 See also also the discussion on the standards issued by the AAOIFI, IFSB and BNM 
in the previous chapters. 
80 BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 35. 
81 ibid 36. 
82 AAOIFI Standards suggest the attendance of the experts of relevant areas to enhance 
the capability of a Shariah committee. 
83 If there is any Shariah decision taken through consultation, it must be reported to the 
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Shariah committee is responsible for providing and suggesting the best solutions 
possible for the rectification process.  
 
From the Shariah perspective, the reviewing function executed by the Shariah 
committee is an exercise of ijtihad or a deduction procedure of Shariah law to 
derive and apply fatwa on financial matters.84 The principles referred to by the 
exercise are as thoroughly discussed in the previous chapter. However, there are 
two different methods apprehensible as far as this research is concerned, which 
are the Shariah-compliance and the Shariah-based. In terms of operations, the 
IFIs are commonly assembling and mix-matching two or more Shariah financial 
contracts to construct an alternative product that behaves similarly to a 
conventional product.  
7.3.2.2 Internal Shariah Compliance Department 
As mentioned by many standard-setters, the internal Shariah division consists of 
the internal Shariah review, internal Shariah research and internal Shariah audit. 
The internal Shariah division is the eyes and ears of the Shariah committee in the 
IFIs’ day-to-day operations. This function allows the IFIs to endure Shariah issues 
on a daily basis which sometimes might well in need to prompt decisions and 
actions from the respective governance constituents. In this vein, some 
researchers argue that the Shariah governance organs have intermingled 
functions, active and reactive.85 Perhaps the most comprehensive model of the 
recent application is the Malaysia Shariah governance structure, as promoted by 
the Shariah Governance Framework 2010 (SGF).86  
 
                                            
84 This issue will be discussed further to make it more comprehensive in the upcoming 
subtopic. 
85 International Shariah Research Academy for Islamic Finance, Islamic Financial 
System Principles and Operations (2nd edn ISRA Publication 2016) 731. 
86 The Malaysian Shariah Governance model is favoured by many researchers as a 
reference. This is due to its comprehensiveness, and clarity in terms of its 
operational aspect. Therefore, as far as this research is concerned, the 
understanding of this part of the chapter will be more conclusive if such a model is 
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By looking at the above Shariah governance structure, we can see that the 
organisational arrangement of Shariah compliance consists of the Shariah 
committee as the highest reviewer, assisted by the internal Shariah review, 
internal Shariah research and internal Shariah audit. It also shows that the 
Shariah committee is situated directly under the board of directors. Due to the 
fact that the delegated power is only on Shariah-related matters, whereas wholly 
institutional oversight such as business strategy remains with the board members 
to decide, the board of directors is still on the highest hierarchy holding overall 
responsibilities. As long as the Shariah committee is independent from the 
board’s influence, this type of organisational arrangement is believed to be 
adequate to execute the obligatory duty diligently with true and fair judgement. 
The functions are carried out with the support of the internal Shariah division. 
Under this model, there is a direct connection between the internal Shariah 
division with the Shariah committee, which is also a two-way communication, 
whilst the communication with other governance constituents is more on 
procedural and managerial aspects. Notably, the interaction between the Shariah 
committee with the internal Shariah audit is rather limited. Under the SGF model, 
the internal Shariah audit reports to the audit committee and may communicate 
with the Shariah committee, but the deliverables are subject to audit committee 
approval to ensure standards of reporting as required by accounting standards.87 
                                            
87 Zurina Shafii and others, ‘Post Implementation of Shariah Governance Framework: 
The Impact of Shariah Audit Function Towards the Role of Shariah Committee’ 
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Interestingly, at Central Bank of Oman (CBO), the internal Shariah audit unit 
presents its report to the Shariah committee known as the Shariah Supervisory 
Board with a copy should be presented to the audit committee of the board.88 
This feature is considered evidence of the flexibility in terms of the implementation 
of AAOIFI Shariah governance and auditing, which is commensurable with the 
market proportionately. One size does not fit all after all. 
7.3.3 Role of Ijtihad 
In order to comprehend the notion of Shariah compliance, it is imperative to 
further investigatie on the role of ijtihad, which is the primary instrument to 
achieve it. Ijtihad is an action involving maximum effort expended by Shariah 
scholars to master and apply the principles of Shariah jurisprudence as to 
discover the law from Islamic legal sources.89 Ijtihad is, especially in the case of 
Islamic finance, a living example of the scholarship of Shariah scholars on 
jurisprudence, extended from the early era of Islam until now.90 With regards to 
the task of the Shariah committee, ijtihad is the procedural requisite to seeking 
for the Shariah rulings of the products or services that are about to be offered. 
This is the ‘behind the scene’ of Shariah compliance matters. It is the duty of care 
and due diligence of the Shariah experts towards Shariah and therefore, to carry 
it out, they ought to be equipped with the wisdom of a deep understanding of 
Shariah sources.  
 
Ijtihad is one of the authorities in the hands of Shariah scholars. This is in part 
because, the fatwa or verdict deduced by a mujtahid has a great influence in the 
legal, political and social dimensions of the Muslim life.91 Therefore, to allow a 
Shariah expert to devote himself to ijtihad, a strict prerequisite quality as 
qualification is a necessary duty to be embarked, so he could be recognised as 
a legitimate mujtahid with a ‘fit and proper’ criteria. 92 This is due to the fact that 
the Quran and the Hadith do not specify the law as it might be stated in a detailed 
manner, but merely a set of rulings and indications that lead to the illah (ratio 
                                            
(2013) 13 Middle-East Journal of Scientific Research (Research in Contemporary 
Islamic Finance and Wealth Management) 7, 8. 
88 CBO, General Obligations and Governance in CBO (eds) Islamic Banking Regulatory 
Framework (CBO 2012) 26. 
89 Kamali (n 56) 468. 
90 See also Wael Hallaq, ‘Was the Gate of Ijtihad Closed?’ (1984) 63 International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 3. 
91 Ginena and Hamid (n 75) 318. 
92 A mujtahid must be an expert in Quranic and hadith interpretation relating to Shariah 
law, the list of the consensus of the scholars, conditions of qiyas, Arabic language, 
text abrogation, and so on; See also NA al-Baidawi, Minhaj al-Wusul ila ‘Ilmi al-Usul 
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decidendi).93 Commencing from these indications and remarks, mujtahids carry 
out ijtihad by employing, for example, the procedure of analogical reasoning 
(qiyas) to discover rulings for unprecedented cases.94 The effort to acquire an in-
depth understanding of Islamic jurisprudence is somehow more important than 
the effort to understand the substance of Islamic law itself.95 The comprehension 
of the Islamic financial law is merely the surface of Shariah and scholars are in 
need of deepening their skills in other aspects of Shariah law: namely, its 
procedural and jurisprudential principles.  
7.3.3.1 Objective of Ijtihad 
The chief objective of ijtihad is to understand the effect of communication of the 
divine messages or to determine which rules apply to the real world.96 It is an 
effort by the Shariah scholars, who are humans, to find the connection between 
the divine aspects of the Shariah and the reality of human life. The human realm 
is not a perfect world, or rather it is its imperfection that makes the world perfect. 
Therefore, it is important to note that the process of law deduction in Shariah is 
the process to bring down the divine nature of the messages to earth by fitting it 
into human reality so it could be as close as it is ideally prescribed by God. The 
more the understanding obtained by the scholars in the messages, the closer the 
Shariah gets to the subject. In the process, as assurance of a definitive 
deliberation, the authentication of the messages is at the most important 
procedure, before jumping into the interpretation step as well as the conclusion.  
 
The prohibition of riba for instance, has triggered concern amongst the 
conventional economists that it could bring failure to the institutions offering 
products in compliance with such a notion. As mentioned before, it might be the 
most controversial feature of the IFIs in the modern interest based financial 
system. In this vein, the task of Shariah experts therefore is not merely to bring 
up the proofs of these prohibitions or the admissibility. They are also duty-bound 
to manifest how the IFIs might survive in a market that is moving in the opposite 
direction from what they uphold, so the market could put confidence on such a 
business approach. This is the reason why ijtihad is considered as an exhaustive 
task that would take all of the disposable mental effort, an expert could confer.  
 
                                            
93 Kamali defined illah as effective cause. See also Kamali (n 56) 275; See also Hallaq 
(n 90) 4. 
94 Examples on qiyas application will be articulated in the subtopic on the prohibition of 
riba. 
95 Imran Khan Nyazee, Theories of Islamic Law (The Other Press, Kuala Lumpur, 2002) 
xi. 
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7.3.3.2 Shariah Committee Ijtihad Mechanism 
To date, there is no specific writing depicting the method of ijtihad conducted by 
the Shariah committee. Other than general explanation on fatwa deduction 
process or ijtihad, it remains at the discretion of the experts in the field, owing to 
the complexity of the skills. In relation to this, thus far, there are international 
Shariah standards issued by the AAOIFI. These standard are considered as one 
of the compendia of contemporary Shariah law in Islamic finance.97 The 
publication of the compendium is done through its Shariah board, which is 
composed of nearly twenty members of fiqh scholars or Shariah experts, who 
represent both the central or institutional Shariah committees of the respective 
members globally. By having such a wide range of experts, the Shariah standards 
should achieve harmonisation and convergence in the concepts and application 
among the Shariah committees, in order to avoid contradiction and inconsistency 
between fatwas.98 At the national level, the central bank Shariah committee 
adopts the standards proportionately to market behaviour and the local Shariah 
legal school. Despite flexibility in adoption, the AAOIFI’s Shariah standards, have 
provided referral fatwas for the IFIs as a benchmark of their Shariah committees’ 
ijtihad processes.  
 
By looking at this multilevel referencing system, and as depicted in Shariah 
governance models,99 perhaps it is worth noting that the ijtihad process at 
institutional level is more of an adoptive ijtihad (ijtihad tanzili). In most cases 
especially after the formation of the multilateral standard-setters and the issuance 
of national standards by the central bank, the ijtihad of the Shariah committee is 
not an attempt to start from square one anymore. However, under the shadow of 
this complexity, there are two methods recognisable from the literature: the 
Shariah-compliant and the Shariah-based.100 By applying the Shariah-compliant 
method, the notion of this research, the Shariah committee will review the 
products by looking at any non-permissibility in terms of the given principles, and 
if any, rectify the non-permissible features. On the other hand, the Shariah-based 
method is an initiative to formulate a financial product from the desired virtues 
promulgated by Maqasid Shariah, which is mostly by building the contract based 
                                            
97 Other than AAOIFI, the fatwa compendium endorsed by Dallah Baraka and Kuwait 
Finance House are also recognisable as the international references. 
98 AAOIFI, Sharia’ah Standards (Almainan Publication and Distribution, Manama 2015) 
28. 
99 See also Chapter 3. 
100 Some experts such as MB Bakar and ER Adawiyah considered the segregation of 
the both methods as quite paradoxical and more to academic purposes. To 
determine the right Shariah perspective on any financial product hence its 
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on certain Shariah financial principles rather than combining it or resolving on its 
compliant aspects.  
 
As far as this research is concerned, whether the Shariah-compliant or the 
Shariah-based method, the both approaches will end up with the combination of 
multiple Shariah contracts either way in order to make them operational. This is 
in part because the segregation of the Shariah financial contracts is done by the 
jurists for the sake of theoretical development. The reality is, when it comes to 
the formation of an operational product, the scattered topics will be brought 
together into one place. This is the crucial part of the understanding of the nature 
of the fiqh discussion, especially in the case of real-world applications. For 
instance, looking at the mudarabah partnership principles, at first glance, this 
PLS-based contract stands alone without needing any supportive contract to 
make it operational. However, it should be noted that, the agent (amil) is a person 
who would manage the business on behalf of the investor (rabb mal). At this level, 
the investor is actually delegating his right to manage his wealth to another 
person who works for him as an agent. Whether or not it should be confirmed in 
black and white, as documented proof, the agency contract is applicable.  
 
Apart from that, determining compliance is a continuous responsibility for 
Muslims. The Quran and the Hadith on most occasions depict general principles 
for humans to follow and it is up to them to make decisions on those bases. It is 
an unavoidable feature of life. Let alone the nature of financial market, which 
relentlessly evolves and behaves with unimaginable changeability. Whether the 
Shariah-compliant or the Shariah-based approaches are involved, the both are 
invariably in need of innovation in order to stay relevant, whereas Shariah is 
believed to be always relevant. As far as this research is concerned, the methods 
are merely the effects of Shariah’s multi-dimensional approaches to a certain 
aspect of human action. Whether the action is a product fabricated from a well-
depicted Shariah principle, or an idea to be evaluated from the Shariah point of 
view, as long as the result remains under the same umbrella, which is Shariah 
compliance, the strategy is to be left to humans to choose.   
 
To wrap up, Shariah supervision is the key to Shariah compliance. The governing 
law might be the mechanism to define what Shariah compliance is, but the real 
deal depends on the supervision mechanism available as a profoundly 
fundamental tool to uphold the rule of law. However, due to Islamic finance 
peculiarities, the fiduciary duty of the Shariah committee in this vein is not 
completely similar to the conventional counterparts. Ijtihad as the centre of 
Shariah supervision is crucially significant to carry out the due diligence role to 
secure IFIs’ adherence to Shariah law. It is because of this that the IFIs are in 
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governance still to be observed by another layer of a check-and-balance 
mechanism, which is the Shariah audit. This third mechanism is an attempt to 
ensure not only the flow of funds to be in accordance with Shariah but also that 
the Shariah compliance process goes beyond on paper requirements. 
7.4 Shariah Audit Mechanism 
As far as Shariah is concerned, Shariah audit is based on the principle of hisbah. 
It is an operational mechanism, derived from the Shariah virtue to preserve 
goodness and prevent harm. Under the Shariah purview, hisbah is a vital 
mechanism in ensuring public safety, including monitoring the market.101 Classic 
implementations of hisbah include internal and external mechanisms. As an 
internal mechanism, hisbah is one of the main structures to supervise and monitor 
the market. Any misconducts carried out by a citizen is under muhtasib’s 
jurisdiction. It possesses the power to protect the citizen from malpractices done 
by business associates.102 
 
As an external mechanism, the hisbah institution is an audit mechanism to 
monitor the government. The head of the hisbah department is one of the 
members of the highest council in the government. He is empowered to monitor 
the decisions and actions taken by the caliph to ensure that it is complies with 
Shariah law.  Ibn Taymiyah asserted that hisbah is the monitoring mechanism 
carried out by authorities to supervise the personnel or institutions under their 
jurisdictions, which is mostly accommodated by the military, police, governors or 
even treasury officers.103 It executes the duty to assure the implementation of 
supervised areas to follow the pre-proposed conception. If we look it from a 
governance perspective, hisbah could be perceived as a supervision and audit 
mechanism, to oversee the relevant division as assurance of its adherence to the 
predetermined virtues respectively.  
 
On the basis of the discussed principles, the Shariah audit is defined in two 
approaches, value-centric and financial plus Shariah-centric, due to the 
interconnected profit and non-profit nature of the IFIs.104 Under the former 
approach, the Shariah audit is defined as an independent assessment that is 
conducted on a periodical basis in order to improve the degree of compliance and 
to ensure a sound and effective internal Shariah control system for Shariah 
                                            
101 Abdul Karim Abdullah, ‘Harking Back to Hisbah, Accountants Today’ (April 2010) 12, 
13. 
102 MA Khan, An Introduction to Islamic (Economics International Institute of Islamic 
Thought and Institute of Policy Studies 1994) 83-84. 
103 Ibn Taymiyah, al-Hisbah fi al-Islam (Dar al-Fikr 1992) 11. 
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compliance in the institution.105 On the other hand, under the latter purview, it is 
conceptualised in terms of the peculiar need of the IFIs for specific methods of 
accounting to cater to Shariah compliance.106 Both approaches however are in 
agreement that it is a process of assuring the integrity of the Shariah compliance 
supervision. It includes the administrative division of the supervision, the fatwa or 
ruling deduction procedures and the implementations of the endorsed rulings. As 
repeatedly mentioned by this research, the IFIs are operating with adherence to 
Shariah law. To satisfy with such a specific objective, the Shariah audit 
mechanism has to be the governance constituent that works as the controlling 
function to conform the achievement of such a notion.107 This is the benchmark 
of the confidence of the shareholders and other stakeholders in the IFIs.  
 
As observed, Shariah compliance process has a connotation of interiority. This is 
in part because as the main function of the Shariah committee is to review the 
practice of the IFIs from a Shariah perspective,108 the conformity with Shariah is 
monitored from the ex-ante process where any non-compliance is the 
responsibility Shariah committee.109 Such a stage should ensure that any 
approved product offered to the market has already been scrutinised and granted 
its Shariah permissibility by the committee internally. On the other hand, despite 
the existence of the internal Shariah audit department, Shariah audit functions 
are, arguably, exterior. As the third defence of a check-and-balance mechanism, 
the exteriority of the Shariah audit is crucial as an assurance that represents 
independence in the assessment since the audit is associated with independent 
verification of the truth and fair scrutiny of the information.110  
The Shariah audit mechanism differs from the conventional auditing system in 
terms of its foundation. Aside from merely focusing on auditing the technical 
aspects, such as verifying the accounting and transactional accuracy, the Shariah 
audit supersedes this by looking forward to the operational and financial reviews, 
with commentary on the strategy, performance and quality of management.111 It 
has a larger scope of auditing, which from the conventional concept of attesting 
                                            
105 BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 23. 
106 See also Moustafa F Abdel-Magid, ‘The Theory of Islamic Bnking: Accounting 
Implications’ (1981) 17 (1) International Journal of Accounting 79. 
107 BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 23. 
108 AAOIFI, Governance Standards no. 3: Internal Shariah Review in AAOIFI (eds) 
Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards (Almainan Publication and 
Distribution, Manama 2015) 899. 
109 See also Zulkifli Hassan, ‘A Survey in Shariah Governance Practices in Malaysia, 
GCC Countries and the UK’ (2011) 4 (1) International Journal if Islamic and Middle 
Eastern Finance and Management 20, 36; Ginena and Hamid (n 75) 329-335. 
110 See also Aasmund Eilifsen and others Auditing and Assurance Seriveces (3rd Eds 
McGraw-Hill 2014). 
111 A Banaga and others, External Audit and Corporate Governance in Islamic Banks: A 
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and authority to reporting on various social and economic aspects of business 
organisations.112 As asserted by Kassim, it is expected to be extensive, detailed 
and complex, expressing opinions on honesty, regulatory, economy, efficiency or 
effectiveness, or reporting any incidences of fraud, malpractice in administration, 
or failures to attain a goal.113 
7.4.1 Shariah Audit Objective 
The objective of a Shariah audit is supposedly in-line with Maqasid Shariah, 
which to preserve goodness and prevent potential harm from occurring, to 
ascertains institutional sustainability. Therefore, the extensiveness of the Shariah 
audit is beyond the conventional model, as mentioned above. As observed, the 
objective of the Shariah audit is to enhance the credibility of the financial 
statement. It is done by having an external auditor to give opinion on the financial 
statement with true and fair views. Additionally, through independent assessment 
and objective assurance, the Shariah audit is designed to value add the degree 
of compliance with the objective to ensure a sound and effective internal control 
system for Shariah compliance is in place.114  
 
The objectives mentioned earlier are attained through ensuring the flow of funds 
is in accordance with Shariah. Sources of funds must be originated from 
permissible activities, and they should be spent in the same way. Most 
importantly, it must not have any direct connection with activities deemed as non-
compliant with Shariah.115 The most important focus is on the zakah expenditure, 
which is consisting of 2.5% of the profitable margin, to be given to a group of 
people who are in need, as assigned by Shariah. Other than that, the auditors 
are to assert the choice of contracts applied to products and services. The 
contracts must be appropriate and capable of accommodating the nature of the 
transaction. In this vein, it is best for the Shariah auditors to justify the available 
choices of contract, so it might well be referred to for future transactions or even 
in the case of potential disputes. 
 
Somehow, the Shariah committee is on most occasions prior to the formation of 
such mechanisms only given a chance to look at the product structure, legal 
                                            
112 Abu al-Hassan Ali bin Muhammad bin Habib Al-Mawardi, Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah 
(Dar al-Hadith 2006) 367. 
113 Nawal Kassim et al, ‘Assessing the Current Practice of Auditing in Islamic Financial 
Institutions in Malaysia and Indonesia’ (2013) 4 (6) International Journal of Trade, 
Economics and Finance 414, 415. 
114 BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 23. 
115 See also Muhammad Akram Khan, ‘Role of Auditor in Islamic Economy’ (1985) 3 (1) 
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documentation and the marketing collateral related to the product.116 Therefore, 
as an effort to improve the Shariah audit mechanism, Shariah committee 
members are required to play a more interactive role. This is done by enhancing 
the reviewing function of the Shariah committee which at a certain point is akin to 
an advisory role rather that a monitory role.117 By enhancing their role in Shariah 
audit process, Shariah committee members would be able to engage and 
become involved with the operational aspect of the IFIs, rather than merely in a 
theoretical aspect. 
7.4.2 Shariah Audit Scopes  
The scopes of audits are part and parcel of the standards issued by the Islamic 
finance standard setters, notably the AAOIFI and the BNM. At the international 
level, the AAOIFI Auditing and Governance Standards state that the audit scope 
refers to the audit procedures deemed necessary by the auditors, in order to 
achieve the objective of the audit. The standard also emphasises that the auditors 
should determine the appropriate requirement by Islamic rules and principles 
(Shariah compliance), the Auditing Standard for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(ASIFI) and the International Standard on Auditing (ISA) in executing the audit 
process.118  
 
By virtue of this, national standard-setters have issued their own Shariah audit 
scopes through relevant standards, taking into account the peculiarities of the 
market proportionately. In this vein, in the case of Malaysia, for instance, the 
Shariah auditing scopes as suggested in BNM Shariah Governance Framework 
2010 include the audit of the IFIs’ financial statements, compliance audit on 
organisational structure, people and process, and reviews of the adequacy of the 
Shariah governance process.119 On the other hand, in the case of Oman, under 
the CBO Islamic Banking Regulatory Framework, the scopes of Shariah audit 
encompass the examination and evaluation of the adequacy and effectiveness of 
the Licensee’s (bank) system of Shariah compliance and the quality of 
performance in carrying out the responsibilities.120  
 
Regardless of market uniqueness, it is not an overstatement to say that the 
existing scopes thus far are focusing mostly on the financial technicality, namely 
the financial statement, as this type of discipline has been developed from such 
                                            
116 Shafii and others (n 87) 8. 
117 ibid 10. 
118 AAOIFI, Auditing Standard No. (1) (n 76) 816. 
119 BNM, (SGF 2010) (n 67) 24 
120 Central Bank of Oman, General Obligations and Governance in CBO (eds) Islamic 
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an industry. Without denying the importance of the conventional auditing system, 
a Shariah audit scope should be more ‘engaging’ with Shariah issues endorsed 
by the Shariah committee and other relevant parties. It should include different 
elements of focus which could lead to auditing the ‘Shariah compliance’ rather 
than merely the ‘Shariah compliance process’.121 In order to do so, there must be 
an emphasis on ruling implementation, which secures the Shariah not merely by 
letter but must also by virtue.122  
 
Complying with the ruling in terms of its permissibility, for instance, has been the 
focus of the relevant Shariah governance constituents. However, the IFIs still 
facing a crisis of trust especially in the eyes of Muslim communities. There has 
been a perseption that IFIs as backdoor riba institutions. Regarding this, as 
financial institutions, the IFIs were somehow viewed as manipulators of the 
Islamic financial contract in order to achieve the same goal as the conventional 
financial system. One of the reasons is the lack in Shariah virtue in the Shariah-
compliant contracts. The products might already be Shariah-compliant in 
technical terms, but similar to the conventional products in substance. By that 
token, it is imperative to note here that the duty of the Shariah audit is not to put 
aside the virtue and substance of the Shariah ruling endorsed by the Shariah 
committee. It is the responsibility of the auditors to pick up this loophole, if any, 
especially in the products and services offered to the market. 
 
As a conclusion, the Shariah audit is a profound mechanism of Shariah 
governance. It functions as a mechanism to double check, not only the IFIs’ 
accounting system but also the Shariah compliance process. The objective is to 
gain and enhance stakeholders’ confidence, especially of those Muslim 
customers who see Shariah compliance assurance done by the Shariah 
committee as their way to be released from the burden of doing so themselves. 
In terms of its structural arrangement, Shariah audit resembles the conventional 
model yet deploys specific additional tasks. As for that, traditional auditing skills 
are not fully sufficient to carry out the prescribed duty. To that end, the regulators, 
as one of the stakeholders, need to be made aware of this, so they can be ready 
                                            
121 Other issue of the utmost concern in Shariah audit is the lack of numbers in the talent 
pool of Shariah auditors. This is due to the infancy of the discipline, which is closely 
in collaboration with the younger age group in the Islamic financial market compared 
to the conventional counterpart. Empirical study has revealed that one of the 
reasons for this is the incoherence between the auditors’ talent pool and the need 
of the Islamic financial market. The Shariah auditors are mostly educated either in 
Shariah or conventional audit, separately, whilst the market needs an auditor to be 
an expert in both, conjointly; See also NA Ali et al, ‘Competency of Shariah Auditors 
in Malaysia: Issues and Challenges’ (2015) 4 (1) Journal of Islamic Finance 22-30. 
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with a more agile regulatory framework to facilitate such a characteristic in the 
Islamic financial industry.  
7.5 Conclusion 
Shariah governance mechanisms are structurally similar to their conventional 
counterparts. Owing to Islamic finance’s unique principles, Shariah governance 
mechanisms have provided constructive supports to the IFIs towards achieving 
their organisational objectives. Close observation of these mechanisms has 
revealed the contributions of Shariah principles to the expansion of the corporate 
governance corpus. It also has proven the possibility of the intermingling of 
Shariah virtues with the system regardless of its religious inspiration. The search 
for enrichment of the values to be adopted into corporate governance research 
should not disregard such a potential.  
 
In this vein, the governing law is the pillar mechanism of the Shariah governance. 
Without it, the idea of Shariah compliance would not be attained in the way it is 
supposed to be. It procures a cohesive framework in the way that how business 
institutions should be managed and controlled to make them achieving the 
sought-after virtues. Since the Islamic financial system is still in its infancy, its 
operational aspect must be observed and supervised under the scrutiny of the 
Shariah experts to ensure compliancy. As per discussed, the focus is on  whether 
to secure Shariah compliance or to form the products from the Shariah-based 
conception. However, in the long run, the desired outcome is to make Shariah 
the solution for economic uncertainties, namely in the financial sector. That is the 
reason why the third mechanism, which is the audit system, has to be in place as 
well. Each layer of Shariah governance mechanisms somehow act as a defence 
mechanism that walks towards the same objective, which is to optimise firm 
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Chapter 8  
 
Adopting Shariah Governance System into the UK Islamic 
Finance Market: Remarks and Observations 
8.1 Introduction 
After excavating the underlying principles of Shariah governance and the 
mechanisms relevant to ensure its implementation, this part of the research 
explores the possibilities to apply such principles and mechanisms into financial 
institutions offering Shariah compliant products and services in the UK. Broadly 
speaking, the UK is not a country dominated by its Muslim population and its legal 
system is based on the doctrine of secularism. However, due to its flexibility, 
English law is one of the choices made by the IFIs as reference for their 
contractual agreements. As seen in the case of Beximco v Shamil, English 
Common Law along with Shariah law are referred to by the contracted parties to 
govern their contracts respectively. Other than that, the UK Islamic financial 
market is progressing at a promising pace despite its non-Islamic legal and 
market environment. By saying that, there are aspects to be discussed under the 
purview of this research. The objective is to find out the way for the UK financial 
market and its relevant regulatory system to facilitate Shariah governance within 
the institutions offering Shariah-compliant products and services.  
 
In order to do so, this chapter will be begun with the analysis of the recent 
development of Islamic finance in the UK. It is done by collecting the documents 
provided by several sources relevant to the discussion, especially reports 
published by authorities in Islamic finance in the UK. The focal point is on Shariah 
governance practices in the market to see what is happening in order to form a 
comprehensive understanding of the issue within grasp. Other than that, related 
legal provisions are also analysed to uncover the obstacles and challenges facing 
Islamic finance. Therefore, this chapter will discuss market and regulatory 
milestones of Islamic finance in the UK. It then will be pointing out remarks and 
observations relevant to the respective aspects in order to raise problematic 
issues for the implementation of a Shariah governance system and offer relevant 
insights as refinements. 
8.2 Islamic Finance Footsteps in the United Kingdom  
In general, the UK Islamic financial market is growing at a promising pace. The 
UK legal and regulatory system is a secular-based, and it is a non-Muslim 
dominant demographical region; nevertheless, the Islamic finance has proudly 
managed to tap into the UK financial market with astonishing achievements. Thus 
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It is argued that the development of the UK as a centre for Islamic finance has 
been the result of a range of supportive UK government policies which have 
created fiscal and regulatory frameworks intended to broaden the market for the 
IFIs to flourish in.1 
 
1970s Shariah-compliant aviation leasing contract offered in London. 
London market brokers offer wholesale liquidity management 
using commodities. 
1980s Earliest Islamic mortgages offered in the United Kingdom by 
Albaraka Bank. 
1997 Islamic mortgages offered in the United Kingdom by United Bank 
of Kuwait (Ahli United Bank). 
2003 HSBC Amanah launches Islamic mortgages and bank account in 
the United Kingdom. 
2004 Al Rayan Bank plc authorised (former Islamic Bank of Britain). 
Court case of Beximco vs Shamil Bank of Bahrain establishes 
principles that secular authorities cannot opine on Shariah 
compliance. 
ABC International Bank offers Islamic mortgages under Al Buraq 
brand. 
2005 Children’s Mutual launches Shariah-compliant Child Trust. 
Lloyds TSB offers Shariah-compliant current account 
2006 European Islamic Investment Bank plc authorised (converted to 
investment firm in 2014-Rasmala plc, no longer authorised). 
2007 Bank of London and Middle East plc authorised. 
Investment firm Amiri Capital authorised. 
FSA outlined regulatory approach to Islamic finance in ‘Islamic 
finance in the United Kingdom: regulation and challenges’. 
2008 QIB (UK) plc authorised (former European Finance House). 
Gatehouse bank plc authorised. 
British Islamic Insurance Holdings/Principles Insurance 
authorised (dissolved in 2015). 
Consultation paper CP-8/22 outlines the liquid asset buffer 
requirement for all banks. 
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2012 ADIB (UK) Ltd authorised. 
HSBC Amanah exited UK market. 
2013 Cobalt Underwriting authorised. 
2014 UK Government issues its first sovereign sukuk. 
Investment firm Arabesque Asset Management authorised. 
2015 Islamic Insurance Association of London established 
Bank of England commences Shariah-compliant facilities (SCF) 
project. 
2017 Shariah-compliant crowd-funding firm Yielders authorised. 
Table 8: Islamic Finance in the UK: Timeline of Selected Events2 
 
By observing the table above, the growth of Islamic finance can be addressed 
along two mapping viewpoints: market expansion, and legal and regulatory 
reform. Those two aspects are inseparable within a body of the discursive 
comprehension of the respective subjects under the purview of the Shariah 
governance mechanisms. The legal and regulatory aspects represent the 
approach of the governing law regime on the Shariah-compliant financial 
schemes and the market developments exhibit the confidence of the market 
players in the resiliency of the existing governing law to accommodate IFIs as 
legitimate institutions offering legal and legit financial products and services.  
8.2.1 Market Expansion Milestones 
The UK has proven to be conducive for both Islamic retail and wholesale finance. 
To date, there are five standalone institutions, offering Islamic finance, having an 
aggregate balance sheet of approximately 3.2 billion pounds sterling. On top of 
that, there are also 20 conventional financial institutions, offering Shariah-
compliant windows, investment managements, and advisory and insurance 
sector institutions.3 Assets of the UK-based IFIs are estimated as up to 4.5 billion 
pound in total at the end of 2014.4 The UK is in first place in Europe and in fourth 
place among non-Muslim majority nations, after Singapore, Sri Lanka and South 
Africa.5 
 
                                            
2 Bank of England (Islamic Banks and Central Banking in Quarterly Bulletin 2017 Q3) 
159. 
3 ibid 157. 
4 TheCityUK (The UK: Leading Western Centre for Islamic 2015) 4. 
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Islamic finance made its first appearance on British soil back in the 1970s and 
has been no stranger ever since. Firstly, there was an Islamic aviation leasing 
contract offered in London. A significant progress was made in the 1980s with 
the earliest Islamic mortgages offered by Al Baraka International Bank Ltd. In 
1982, Al Baraka Bank started its operation by taking over Hagrave Securities.6 
Despite impressive accomplishments in early 1990s, Al Baraka Bank stopped its 
operations, due to, as asserted by al-Dohni, institutional structuring issues, rather 
than regulatory incompatibility or business failure.7 In 1997, United Bank of 
Kuwait, currently known as Ahli United Bank, started to offer Islamic mortgages 
in the UK. Apparently, through its manzil financing scheme, the United Bank of 
Kuwait managed to tackle the need of those seeking Shariah-compliant property 
financing, the gap left by Al Baraka Bank.8 
 
In the following millennium, the IFIs have participated more aggressively in the 
UK financial market. In 2003, HSBC Amanah entered the market, offering Islamic 
mortgages as well as current accounts. This was followed by the establishment 
of Islamic Bank of Britain in 2004. The two banks ,however, experienced closure 
and rebranding. Considering Islamic finance as outside of ‘our risk appetite’, the 
HSBC Amanah stopped its operations in 2014.9 In December of the same year, 
the Islamic Bank of Britain changed its name to Al Rayan Bank Plc, to reflect the 
status of its new parent company, Masraf Al Rayan, the fifth largest Islamic bank 
in the world. From a business strategy point of view, this was to explore a new 
and wider group of customers as the number of non-Muslim investors has 
increased.10 This strategy has delivered promising results through the bank 
increase its profit before tax year-on-year up to 32% annually.11  In 2005, the 
Lloyds TSB launched its Shariah-compliant current account to the customers.12 
The first wholesale Islamic investment bank in the UK, the European Islamic 
Investment Bank (EIIB), also known as Rasmala plc, was established in the same 
year. In 2007, another wholesale Islamic investment bank, the Bank of London 
                                            
6 Rodney Wilson, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Islamic Banking and Finance in the 
West: The United Kingdom Experience’ (2000) 7 (1) Islamic Economic Studies 35, 
40. 
7 Abdul Karim al-Dohni, ‘The Quest for a Better Legal and Regulatory Framework for 
Islamic Banking’ (2015) 17 Ecc LJ 15, 34. 
8 Wilson, ‘Challenges and Opportunities for Islamic Banking and Finance in the West’ (n 
6) 49 
9 This closure is regarded as one of the major business restructuring strategies taken by 
HSBC, which it happened globally. 
10 <www.cityam.com/1414071782/islamic-bank-britain-gets-rebrand> accessed 20 
February 2018. 
11 Al Rayan Bank (Annual Report and Financial Statement 2016) 8. 
12 <www.mediacentre.lloydstsb.com/media/pdf_irmc/mc/press_releases/2005/feb/ 
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and Middle East plc (BLME) was granted its licenced by the FSA. Rasmala Plc, 
however has recently lost its authorisation to operate by the FCA. 
 
In 2008, two consecutive banks were authorised to operate Shariah-compliant 
banking, Qatar Islamic Bank (UK) plc and Gatehouse Bank plc. Since its first 
appearance, over 6,500 homes in the North West and the Midlands are currently 
being financed by a 700 million pound investment by Gatehouse Bank.13 On the 
other hand, QIB (UK) plc was formerly operated through European Finance 
House (EFH) before being rebranded as QIB (UK) plc.14 This was to bring the 
identity of EFH under that of its parent bank, QIB, the world’s fourth largest 
Islamic bank in terms of assets. In 2012, Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank plc (ADIB) was 
authorised to start its operations in the UK. The focus of ADIB Bank is the 
customers from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) countries.15 As one of the newest Islamic banks in the UK, ADIB 
Bank is still on its early stages but progressing in exploring the market. In 2014, 
the UK government issued a 200 million sukuk, the first sovereign sukuk issued 
by the a government outside the Islamic world.16 Maturing in 2019, the 
corresponding sukuk is considerably small as to the size UK financial market 
accumulatively, but this development has demonstrated the readiness of the UK 
government to explore Islamic finance as one of its future economic tools and the 
possibility of creating UK as a base for the Islamic financial market. This is proven 
by the second UK sukuk issued by the first British Islamic Bank, Al Rayan Bank 
plc, in 2018. The 250 million pound sterling denominated issuance is backed by 
UK mortgages with a maturity in 2052.17 
 
The latest progress regarding the Islamic financial market in the UK is the 
authorisation of Yielders plc, a Shariah-compliant crowd-funding company. It is 
recognised as the first UK financial technological (fintech) company to gain a 
Shariah compliance certification from the FCA.18 Yielders is the latest form of 
banking and finance using the latest online fintech in offering their services. The 
first innovation brought by Yielders is a fully integrated proposition with 
                                            
13 TheCityUK (The UK: Leading Western Centre for Islamic 2015) (n 4) 3. 
14 QIB (UK) plc received authorisation to operate from FSA on 29 January 2008. 
15 Abu Dhabi Investment Bank (ADIB Annual Report 2016), 33. 
16 <www.gov.uk/government/news/government-issues-first-islamic-bond> accessed 26 
February 2018. 
17 <www.sukuk.com/article/first-british-bank-issues-sukuk-6774> accessed 26 February 
2018. 
18 <www.crowdfundinsider.com/2017/04/98411/yielders-claims-uks-first-islamic-fintech-
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investment selection, acquisition, value creation and placement on the platform 
to crowd investors.19 
 
As a conclusion of the above, the UK market is apparently open to the Islamic 
finance to participate. Its religious identity somehow is not a detrimental factor for 
an IFI to gain market confidence and flourish. The uptrend in achievement stands 
as a solid proof of the great potential of what the UK market has to offer to the 
Islamic financial industry in the future. However, it is worth mentioning here that, 
based on the data shown, most of the IFIs that managed to tap into the UK market 
are Middle East-based financial and banking companies. One obvious possible 
reason to be highlighted here is their capital capabilities, which is akin to petrol-
cash. As far as this research is concerned, this development has a direct 
connection to the governance system. It will be further explained in the upcoming 
topics.  
8.2.2 Legal and Regulatory Developments 
In terms of legal and regulatory aspects, despite the fact that Islamic finance 
started its operation in the UK since 1970s, there were no impactful 
developments until the early 2000s. In this regard, the Bank of England 
established the Islamic Financing Working Group chaired by Lord George, to 
investigate the obstacles faced by the Islamic finance industry and enable the 
development of Islamic finance in the UK.20 It is under this occasion that the 
Finance Act 2003 was amended to allow stamp duty and land tax to be relieved 
for those who are utilising alternative property financing. To realise that, the FSA 
introduced the Home Purchase Plan (HPP) as a regulated mortgage contract, to 
regulate Islamic home-financing arrangements.21  
The IFIs are financial business institutions, sharing similar features as to their 
conventional counterparts. Leading from that, the IFIs are likely to be bundled 
together with conventional companies or corporations offering deposits and 
financing despite their Shariah compliance principles. Other than the local legal 
frameworks where they operate, the IFIs are also subject to Shariah law as 
upheld in the Shariah compliance notion.22 Therefore, if we are to contemplate 
how would the IFIs might tap into the UK financial market, the knowledge of the 
English legal and regulatory approach to financial institutions with religious-based 
business arrangements is required. Regarding this, the regulations relevant to 
the IFIs are the Companies Act 2006, Finance Act 2003 and Financial Services 
                                            
19 <www.yielders.co.uk/our-story> accessed 26 February 2018. 
20 Further discussion addressed in the UK Trade and Investment report in 2014, UK 
Excellence in Islamic Finance. 
21 Financial Conduct Authority (The Perimeter Guidance Manual) 14. 
22 Rodney Wilson Legal, Regulatory and Governance Issues in Islamic Finance 
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Act 2012.23 Other than that, the IFIs are also the subject to related corporate 
governance codes to ensure best of practice accordingly. In this vein, it is 
necessary to note that the English legal system is the mother of the common law. 
Despite a close historical relationship to Christianity, the current English legal 
system is by far a secular-based law. As frequently happens in the common law 
system, there are small numbers of codified laws as oppose to a civil law, which 
it is developed instead by the judges through the doctrine of legal precedent.24 It 
is by this virtue, on most occasions, the UK regulatory regime provides both, black 
letter and soft governing laws for the financial institutions to operate in its 
jurisdiction.  
 
In connection to this, the UK regulatory system observes Islamic finance within 
the same unitary and principles-based framework as the conventional financial 
system. The institutions offering Islamic finance are not subject to dual 
regulation.25 Therefore, in terms of licence, for instance, the IFIs have no 
exception. They are under the sphere of the Companies Act 2006 as well as other 
relevant financial regulations.26 Accordingly, to establish a financial intermediary, 
first and foremost, application to obtain authorisation must be made to the 
relevant authorities. In this regard, all companies must be registered with the 
Companies House where the IFIs enjoy nothing less.27 Additionally, as per the 
Financial Services Act 2012, regardless of their Shariah-compliant nature, the 
IFIs must obtain formal authorisation from and must meet the threshold 
conditions at all time as underlined by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) 
and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).28  
 
Other than that, the mode of corporate structure must be decided, which is likely 
to reflect the business conduct proportionately.29 By virtue of the Companies Act 
2006, the IFIs must comply with the same provision in terms of corporate 
governance as adhered to by their conventional counterparts. In addition to that, 
                                            
23 These governing laws have direct connection to the Shariah governance. 
24 Joseph Dainow, ‘The Civil and the Common Law: Some Pints of Comparison’ (1966-
1967) 15 (3) The American Journal of Comparative Law 419, 425. 
25 Bank of England (Islamic Banks and Central Banking in Quarterly Bulletin 2017 Q3), 
158. 
26 Abdul Karim Al-Dohni, ‘Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance: 
The Dilemma of the Shari’a Supervisory Board’ (2008) 29 (5) The Company Lawyer 
156. 
27 <www.companieshouse.gov.uk> accessed 6 March 2018 
28 The PRA and FCA carry out the functions formerly executed by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA), the former authority regulated by the Financial Services and 
Markets Act 2000. 
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the UK Corporate Governance Code is applicable in this case.30 To some extent, 
the Combine Code 2016, just like its predecessors, provides general guidance 
and it is up to the institutions to find out their way to comply with the outlined 
features where non-compliances, if any, should be adequately explained.31 Put 
differently, the institutions, including IFIs, are encouraged to self-regulate to 
achieve best practice and if they do not, they ought to provide sufficient 
explanation. Perhaps, the relevant governance issue under concern here is the 
Shariah governance supervision mechanism. The UK corporate governance 
structure is a unitary board model, applying monitory and supervisory functions 
concurrently by having non-executive members alongside with the executive 
members.32 The presence of the Shariah committee within the IFIs has given rise 
the question of how this type of governance arrangement is going to be reflected 
under Combine Code 2016. In this regard, it is argued that there is no legal 
contradiction barring the Shariah governance system from being adopted within 
the institutions.33 This is supported by years of implementations by the IFIs 
operating in the UK without having significant concerns. Despite there being 
some issues for the sake of argument, Shariah committees are seen within the 
organisational structure of the IFIs.34  
Other than incorporating the institutions, we can also witness how the UK legal 
and regulatory regime reacts to the way the IFIs construe their contracts. As 
observed, UK legal footsteps are moving towards securing a level playing field 
for the IFIs. This is done by looking at the legal provisions that match the IFI 
product arrangements or taking appropriate actions with regulatory amendments 
to reduce the legal obstacles accordingly. As for the former, for instance, since 
the murabahah-based product arrangement meets the necessary conditions, it is 
included under the regulated mortgage contracts. As for the latter, the FSA has 
introduced home purchase plans (HPP) to regulate ijarah and diminishing 
musharakah. The FSA, as a regulatory authority, explicitly incorporated HPP, into 
the Finance Act 2003. Section 72 of the act depicted the implementation of ijarah 
and section 73, the diminishing musharakah arrangement.35 Both financing 
modes are applying buy and let processes which to some extent are subject to 
double taxation on the asset under transaction. Prior to that, there were no 
regulated activities taking into account such Islamic financing modes in which the 
IFIs need to endure additional taxations. Double taxation has been one of the 
main challenges that hit the IFIs’ notorious mix-matching mode in countless 
jurisdictions. This amendment allows relief from stamp duty and land tax for those 
                                            
30 It will be known as the Combine Code 2016 henceforth. 
31 Andrew Keay, ‘Comply of Explain in Corporate Governance Codes: in Need of Greater 
Regulatory Oversight?’ (2014) 34 (2) Legal Studies 279, 287. 
32 Further discussions in the upcoming topics. 
33 Al-Dohni, ‘Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance’ (n 26). 
34 The relevant arguments will be brought forwards in the upcoming topics. 
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who are using alternative property financing. Since the IFIs are utilising multilayer 
contracts to structure a product, this tax relief is essential to secure a conducive 
market for the IFIs to operate in and considered as one of the keys that has 
stimulated the UK Islamic financial market.  
 
The latest progress to exemplify how the English regulatory regime plans to 
cement a level playing field for the Islamic finance is on the establishment of the 
Shariah-compliant liquidity facility (SCF). The IFIs are not exempted from overall 
liquidity adequacy role. They must ensure that their liquidity resources contain an 
adequate buffer for higher quality, unencumbered assets and maintain a prudent 
funding profile.36 It is further described as the liquid asset buffer (LAB). The IFIs 
must include in their LAB only high-quality debt securities issued by governments 
or central banks, securities designated by multilateral development banks, 
reserves in the form of sight deposits with a central bank or investments in a 
designated money market fund. The problem is, those are not provided in a 
Shariah-compliant market, thus far. Therefore, the SCF will help the UK’s IFIs to 
meet the LAB as required by Bank of England as well as the Basel III. A Shariah-
compliant open market operation (OMO) will be introduced, using amongst others 
commodity murabahah and wakalah instruments.37 To realise this, the Bank of 
England commenced a preliminary survey in 2015. This development as far as 
this research is concerned, is rather progressive for a non-Muslim-majority 
market. This is a solid proof of a supportive effort by the English Law to 
accommodate Islamic finance, in its own way.  
 
Apart from the governing laws to regulate Islamic finance, having robust dispute 
resolution procedures in place is another crucial part of the overall Islamic 
financial legal framework. In this regard, the English judiciary system is 
apparently the first jurisdiction outside the Muslim realm to gain trust in handling 
disputes occurring in Islamic finance. It is argued that, the UK legal infrastructure 
provides the best practice for alternative dispute resolution.38 To date, there are 
four referable cases standing as precedents in English courts.39 As clearly 
delivered by the verdicts of the cases, the sensible approach is that the English 
judiciary is not to interpret Shariah rulings provided by the Shariah committees of 
                                            
36 Financial Conduct Authority, BIPRU 12.2.9  
37 Bank of England (Islamic Banks and Central Banking in Quarterly Bulletin 2017 Q3) 
157-160. 
38 Umar A Oseni, ‘Alternative Dispute Resolution’ in the Islamic Capital Market in ISRA 
& Thomson Reuters (Islamic Commercial Law Report 2017) 52. 
39 Islamic Investment Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Ltd v Symphony Gems NV & 
others [2002] ER (D) 171;  Beximco Pharma v Shamil Bank of Bahrain EC [2004] 
APP.L.R. 01/28; The Investment Dar Co KSCC v Blom Developments Bank Sal 
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the respective banks. Other than the fact it is a complicated process, Shariah law 
deduction is not the expertise of the English judges.40   
 
As happened in the market, it is possible to conclude that the English regulatory 
system is also open to the operation of Islamic finance. Perhaps, it is not an 
overstatement to say that the maxim ‘everything which is not forbidden is allowed’ 
is applied here. In many respects, the Islamic financial system is rather operating 
in an alternative way rather than working on the opposite of what is legal and 
what is not. Therefore, as observed, finding the way to accommodate and 
facilitate Shariah-compliant products and services has a greater weight than 
liberating the existing regulations to allow Islamic finance to operate.  
8.2.3 Supervision and Audit Authorities  
By and large, there is no specific body focussing a particular kind of attention into 
observing the Islamic financial market, especially on the Shariah compliance 
process. No special treatment has been accepted by the IFIs in scrutinising their 
Shariah characteristics. Likewise, the implementation of the Shariah governance 
system is based on the decentralised model, which is left to the individual bank, 
under the purview of self-regulation as the way to achieve best practice in 
governance.41 This is in part because Islamic finance is observed under the same 
unity supervisory mechanism as to the conventional counterparts. That is the 
reason why there is no national body designated to function as a central Shariah 
authority to oversee the overall practices of the institutional Shariah committees.  
 
As for the fact that IFIs are financial intermediaries, prior to 2013, the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) was regulated by the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, taking the roles of regulating and supervising financial institutions,42  
including those that operate with Shariah compliance. Currently, following the 
Financial Services Act 2012, FSA’s roles have been undertaken by two separate 
bodies: the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), and the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority (PRA).43 One of the major steps taken by the FSA with regards to 
Islamic finance was the regulation of HPP. It had expanded the room for the 
offering of Islamic mortgages schemes. Other than the tax relief given under 
SDLT as prior discussed, this measure is exhibiting how the English legal system 
could accommodate Shariah principles in its own way. However, since the 
English legal system is also detached from any religious purview, there is no 
                                            
40 Beximco v Shamil Bank (n 39). 
41 For further discussions, refer to Chapter 3 on Shariah supervision models. 
42 Financial Services Market Act 2000 s1.  
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provision emphasising the requirement of having a designated body to oversight 
business matters related to Shariah.  
 
In terms of corporate governance practices, the Combine Code 2016 has neither 
explicitly approved nor disapproved of the IFIs adopting Shariah compliance 
process within their institutional structure. However, it is essential to note here 
that the aim of this code is to deliver high quality corporate govrnance with in-built 
flexibility for companies to adapt their practices, taking into account their 
particular circumstances.44 To ensure effectiveness, the board and its 
committees should have the appropriate balance of skills, experience, 
independence and knowledge of the company, to enable them to carry out their 
duty effectively.45 Accordingly, the Companies Act 2006 requires board members 
to be qualified to exercise the duty,46 which, as far as the IFIs are concerned, is 
the task carried out by the Shariah experts. In this sense, the existence of the 
Shariah committee is by virtue in-line with the said notion in many ways. 
Coherently with the Combine Code 2016, the IFSB and AAOIFI Shariah 
governance standards emphasise that the persons sitting in as Shariah 
committee members must fulfil a ‘fit and proper’ criteria, as a qualification.47 As a 
result, we might concede that Shariah governance codes are akin to ensuring 
best practices of Shariah-compliant business arrangements. Despite its Islamic 
origin, the ethical principles of the Shariah governance are reflecting the same 
concerns as the conventional corporate governance codes in many respects.48  
 
From a structural point of view, it is observed that Shariah committees to some 
degree share similarities with the two-tier boards system. In a direct way, it seems 
to be in contradictory with the UK unitary board model. However, the ‘two-tier’ 
concept of Shariah governance is not entirely identical to the European two-tier 
board model. Under the purview of this research, the Shariah committee carries 
out specific duties delegated by the board of directors, which is why it is conferred 
as an additional governance structural arrangement, in accordance with the 
definition of ‘committee’. The respective ‘two-tier’ conception also to explains the 
existence of the central Shariah committee as a ‘check and balance’ mechanism. 
This type of governance strategy is more to empowering the board, a sentiment 
supported by the Combine Code 2016 rather than a contradiction of it. On top of 
that, it is argued that the functions carried out by the Shariah committee members 
                                            
44 Financial Reporting Council, The Corporate governance Code 2016 (The FRC Limited 
2016) 2. 
45 ibid 10. 
46 Companies Act 2006 s 170-177. 
47 IFSB (Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance Systems for Institutions offering 
Islamic Financial Services 2009) 5. 
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are similar to those of the non-executive board members.49 Both have the power 
to influence business decisions and the operation of the institutions in their own 
ways.  
 
In terms of the accounting regime, as a corporation, the UK financial institutions 
are given the chance whether to adopt the International Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) or UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (UK GAAP).50 Likewise, 
the IFIs have nothing less in this regard. From the observation of the legal and 
regulatory approach, accounting and auditing regime seems to take a similar 
point of view. There is no special treatment for such an alternative financial plan. 
Apart from that, an audit on Shariah related matters also lacks of clear statement 
as to how it should be practised within the UK market. There is no either internal 
or external Shariah audit model on-tap for the UK’s IFIs to refer to.  
 
To wrap up, the UK financial market is more than ready to adopt any peculiar 
features in Shariah audit to function as a check-and-balance mechanism in 
Shariah matters. Known as a frontier in a conventional auditing regime, 
establishing this additional requirement is rather not a big deal since what is 
already there is not an issue. On top of that, due to market flexibility, thus far the 
Shariah audit is relatively left to the respective IFIs to sort it out within their 
institutional level. It is their moral responsibility towards their Muslim stakeholders 
after all. However, the potential of this Shariah governance feature to expand is 
not to be taken for granted if the UK is going to take a more significant role in the 
Islamic financial industry. As repeatedly mentioned, what is important for the 
Shariah governance system here is consistent and robust mechanisms to 
interconnect and work together to formulate a solid ecosystem. 
8.3 Factors Contributing to Islamic Finance Market Expansion 
and Regulatory Reform in the UK  
The search for the potential of offering of Islamic financial products by the UK 
market is driven by many factors. Under the purview of this research, there are 
three factors, believed to have been contributing to the market expansion and 
regulatory reform in the UK: the Islamic financial market exploration and 
expansion, legal and regulatory flexibilities, and economic uncertainties.  
 
                                            
49 Al-Dohni, ‘Islamic Banking Challenges Modern Corporate Governance’ (n 26). 
50 To be exact, the Companies Act 2006 state the accepted accounting standard is in 
accordance with the International Accounting Standard (IAS), and the UK GAAP is 
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8.3.1 Islamic Market Exploration and Expansion 
Islamic finance is a global phenomenon and has gained popularity with the 
members of the public regardless of its religious backgrounds. Evidently, we have 
witnessed the emergence and rapid developments of the IFIs with constant 
growth over the last few decades. The assets of IFIs have grown exponentially 
and reached double-digit rates during the past decade, from about USD200 
billion in 2003 to USD1.6 trillion at the end of 201251 and USD1.88 trillion at the 
end of 2015.52 The amount of full-fledged Islamic banks, subsidiaries and 
windows is worth approximately USD1.5 trillion as at the end of 2015.53 As 
discussed in the earlier chapters, the IFIs have not merely shown strength in 
growth, but have also proved to be resilient against the global financial instability 
throughout the last decade.54  
 
Eventually, this expanding market has turned its attention to the UK, especially 
the London financial market. The depth and breadth of London’s capital markets 
play the role of access to a wide pool of investors and secondary market liquidity. 
Apart from that, London is also the home for countless numbers of legal firms, 
accounting and business consultation companies, and many others. The fact that 
the UK hosts more than 60 courses relating to Islamic finance has made the UK 
the largest provider of Islamic finance academic courses, which has made a good 
example for the Islamic financial players to reach out. Back in the 1980s, the 
London Metal Exchange used to apply a significant volume of commodity 
murabahah to give liquidity to Middle East companies and other investors that 
now have the potential to foster the development of a wholesale market in the 
UK.55 Nowadays, business parties from the Middle East are more likely to invest 
in the UK as a result.56 We could see the use of a sizable amount of Islamic 
financing schemes to invest in major infrastructure projects all over the UK. For 
instance, development finance for The Shard, Battersea Power Station 
regeneration, London Gateway, the Olympic Village and the redevelopment of 
Chelsea Barracks.57 
                                            
51 IFSB, (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2013) 7. 
52 IFSB, (Islamic Financial Services Industry Stability Report 2016) 7. 
53 ibid 9 
54 Feisal Khan, ‘How Islamic is Islamic Banking?’ (2010) 76 Journal of Economic 
Behaviour & Organization 805; Hussein Elasrag, ‘Corporate Governance in Islamic 
Finance: Basic Concepts and Issues’ <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2442014> 
accessed 6 August 2016. 
55 FSA (Islamic Finance in the UK: Regulation and Challenges 2007) 6. 
56 This could be credited to the existence of multiple wholesale Islamic investment 
institutions in the UK, such as the Rasmala plc and BLME. Other than that, giant 
Islamic investment groups like Masraf Al Rayan are also getting involved in retail 
financial services. 
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The astonishing growth of the Islamic financial market is also aided by its sukuk 
market. By the end of 2016, the accumulative value of sukuk or Islamic bond 
issuance was estimated to be USD 856, 718 million.58 Despite experiencing a 
decrease in terms of annual issuance between 2012 and 2015, the sukuk market 
is believed to maintain its positive momentum over the upcoming years. This is 
due to the increase of total international sukuk in 2016, which stood at USD 31.56 
billion, an expansion of USD 10.68 billion from USD 20.88 billion in 2015.59 This 
expanding market makes an impact in the UK is proven by the issuance of the 
first UK sovereign sukuk in 2014. Due to the strong demand, the UK marked a 
more active involvement in early 2018, through Al Rayan Bank plc, the first UK 
bank to issue a sukuk.60 UK participation in the sukuk market is economically 
strategic. The UK gilt market’s reputation for huge numbers in value could mean 
it becomes a sought-after destination by fresh Muslim investors if it could only 
open its window for the Shariah-compliant bond package.61 
 
Other than that, the increasing number of Muslims in the Western region has also 
significantly impacted on the UK financial market. In 2011, the Muslim community 
grew up to 2.7 million, consisting of 5% of the UK’s total population, a 48% of 
increase since 2001. 62 This number escalated to 3 million in 2014 and is 
constantly enlarging in the more recent years due to the 50% of birth rate. Bear 
in mind that this excludes non-permanent Muslim residents like asylum seekers, 
foreign students, business communities and tourists. The domestic increment of 
the Muslim population with a growing wealth, has pressed the demand for a more 
comprehensive range of Islamic retail financial products and services. The fact 
that Muslim customers are reluctant to use interest-based finance due to their 
religious beliefs, a concept thoroughly discussed in the previous chapters, has 
made Islamic finance a new core of the UK financial market.63  The UK 
government has sought to take strategy to broaden the range for regulated 
mortgage products and HPP as the answer to the said demand. 
 
                                            
58 International Islamic Financial Market, (A Comprehensive Study of the Global Sukuk 
Market 2017) 2. 
59 ibid 5. 
60 <https://www.sukuk.com/sukuk-new-profile/hm-treasury-uk-sovereign-sukuk-plc-
2057/> accessed 14 March 2018. 
61 The UK debt portolio gross value is up to 1,600 billion pound; see 
https://www.dmo.gov.uk/media/15606/apr-jun18.pdf accessed 15 September 2018. 
62 See also the report published by the Muslim Council of Britain; MCB, (British Muslims 
in Numbers 2015). 
63 See also Abdul Karim Al-Dohni, ‘The Emergence of Islamic Banking in the UK: A 
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8.3.2 Legal Flexibilities  
Due to its secular background, the English legal system is flexible in many ways, 
including in adopting new features to catch up with the latest market trends. 
Perhaps the best example to demonstrate such a notion is by looking at legal 
developments pertaining to Islamic finance in the UK itself. Since 2003, we could 
see numerous amendments made by the UK government as supportive 
measures to make the English legal and regulatory regime more conducive for 
the IFIs to tap into and flourish. The approach is simply to give the Islamic finance 
a level playing field with their conventional counterparts. Apart from that, a clear 
message was delivered by the relevant case laws, as seen in Beximco v Shamil, 
which established that an English court should not interpret Shariah rulings 
provided by the Shariah committees of the respective banks, which is also 
sensible as the official judiciary approach in this matter. As far as this research is 
concerned, this is a great opportunity for the IFIs to posit themselves as qualified 
players to compete with other well-established counterparts. 
 
One of the peculiarities of the UK legal framework is the self-regulation approach. 
By virtue of this, rather than looking for a way to control how Shariah committees 
execute their duties, the IFIs have the advantage to turn the tables and make it 
an instrument to gain customers confidence. Under the corporate governance 
purview, the board is responsible to ensure that good governance practices are 
adopted by the institutions. Good governance is when a business entity is 
operated, regulated and controlled by well-designed risk management policies, 
processes, corporate regulations, rules and laws that lead the entity to achieve 
its ultimate goals.64 In this case, having independent Shariah experts, a clearly 
stated Shariah governance framework, adopting the requirements proposed by 
international and national standard-setters or coming up with clear explanations 
in the case of non-compliance, are amongst the practices that are reckoned as 
good governance practices, as far as this research is concerned.  
8.3.3 Economic Uncertainties 
In a nutshell, economic growth has not been invariably on the uptrend but rather 
fluctuating between periods of expansion and contraction due to multiple 
variables. In this sense, the government holds the upper hand in power to ensure 
mitigation plans are in place to protect the economy domestically from potential 
turbulences. As for the UK, there are two recent events that have made significant 
impacts on its financial ecosystem, the 2007 financial crisis and Brexit.  
 
                                            
64 Imran Minhas, ‘Shariah Governance Model (SGM) and Its Four Pillars’ (2012) Journal 
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During the 2007 crisis, the UK financial institutions were not immune from turmoil. 
‘The Run on the Rock’ expression was a notorious moment in the history of the 
crisis at Northern Rock, a ‘too big to fail’ bank in the UK, set up in Victorian times, 
that experienced liquidity problems as a result of the crisis. The failure of Northern 
Rock, amongst others was attributed to the lack of supervision from the relevant 
authorities. As mentioned in the report, the FSA did not supervise Northern Rock 
properly, anf the procedures available were inadequate to supervise a bank 
whose business grew so rapidly. Apparently, the authority did not seem to have 
carried out the task with the skill and diligence one might have expected.65 The 
Banking Act 2009 was the most important legislative response owing to the 
lessons learned from the crisis. The act contains several provisions for checks 
and balances to oversee any potential concerns within the institutions.66 From the 
Shariah governance viewpoint, the origin of that crisis could be pinned down to 
excessive risk, reckless lending and speculative trading supported by an interest-
based financial system, a notion believed to be remedied by Shariah-compliant 
financial arrangements.67 
 
After the 2007 financial crisis, the UK is experiencing another economic 
uncertainty surrounding Brexit, the decision to leave European Union (EU), the 
world’s largest trade and economic association. The EU has a membership of 28 
countries from the European continent. In terms of economic and finance, the EU 
has provided the UK with frictionless access to a vast market at a low cost and 
vice versa. It is done by having Euro as a single currency of trade and lowering 
controls on border access for the member countries. The EU is the UK’s major 
trading partner, accounting for 44% of exports and 53% of imported of goods and 
services in 2015.68 In the same year, the UK exported 223 billion and imported 
291 billion pounds sterling of goods and services to the EU.69 The main issue is 
the future of this trade is unclear until the procedure of leaving the EU procedure 
is concluded, a two-year process following the initiation of article 50 in 2017.  
 
As a result of Brexit, it is believed that the UK economy will lose its perks as an 
EU member and be treated as if it is a total stranger to the market despite long 
trade histories.70 One of the significant facts under consideration here is the 
                                            
65 HM Treasury (The Run on the Rock) 34. 
66 Internatinal Bar Association (A Survey of Current Regulatory Trends) 63. 
67 Al-Dohni, ‘The Quest for a Better Legal and Regulatory Framework for Islamic 
Banking’ (n 7) 23. 
68 House of Commons Library, In Brief: UK-EU Economic Relations (Briefing paper no 
06091, 13 June 2016) 3. 
69 ibid 5. 
70 Chris Giles, ‘What has EU Done for the UK’ <https://www.ft.com/content/202a60c0-
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impact of Brexit on the UK’s financial industry. After Brexit, the UK is potentially 
to lose liquidities benefiting from the EU financial subsidiaries. In addition, those 
financial institutions were one of the reasons why the UK is preferable as the 
doorway to access the EU’s financial market. This economic privilege, enjoyed 
by the UK for years in the past is now faces an indefinite future. As phrased in 
the HM Treasury analysis, the UK would be permanently poorer after leaving the 
EU, and alternative plans need to be tabled in the nearest time possible.71 This 
is not a rocket science to comprehend. Whether it is to stimulate inward or 
outward flows, UK trades and investment must be more diversified than it used 
to be. Therefore, alternative prospects for financial subsidiaries are to be 
encouraged to operate in order to bring back inward investments to replace 
liquidity loophole caused by Brexit.  
 
Despite the fact that the UK will probably suffer severe economic stress, post-
Brexit also means that the UK will have more liberty to go after new strategic 
partners. There is no more EU or non-EU treatments for potential foreign direct 
investments. One of the markets that has received less attentions from the UK 
government is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries.72 With a bilateral 
trade worth 30 billion pound in 2015, the GCC is not to be sidelined without any 
consideration. Gulf countries offer a sizeable amount of petrol-cash with a 
Muslim-dominated market, and Brexit actually offers a golden opportunity for the 
UK to secure free trade deals with the respective market.73 Arguably, Islamic 
finance is a crucial tool to attract the attentions and trigger new prospects for 
inward cash flow to the UK economy. Other than the GCC, the Commonwealth 
countries are also an alternative not to be taken for granted. Some 
Commonwealth members such as Malaysia and Pakistan are major players in 
Islamic finance globally. They might not have significant economic capabilities to 
offer, but the fact that those countries are rich with experts in Islamic finance and 
their legal origin are close to the English legal system, is a promising source of 
knowledge and legal transplant ideas if the UK is to move forwards at a faster 
pace in Islamic finance. 
 
 
                                            
71 HM Treasury, ‘The Long-term Economic Impact of EU Membership and the 
Alternatives’ (Report Presented to Parliament by the Chancellor of Exchequer by 
Command of Her Majesty in April 2016), 8. 
72 The Gulf Cooperation Council consist of six gulf Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, 
United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman. It is one of the economic 
associations similar to the EU that exist around the globe. 
73 <www.cityam.com/250987/britain-has-golden-opportunity-leapfrog-eu-and-secure-
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8.4 Islamic Finance in the UK: Remarks and Observations 
After exploring what the UK financial system has to offer in terms of its regulatory 
regime and what has been shown by its growth and market progress, this part of 
the present chapter will extensively analyse the aforementioned legal and market 
highlights in order to point out remarks and observations relevant to the topics. 
The objective is to raise problematic issues in the implementation of Shariah 
governance system under English jurisdiction and offer relevant insights for 
refinements. It is done whether by offering relevant explanations applying the 
principles underlined by this research, highlighting related regulations or provide 
insightful recommendations.  
 
First and foremost, as repeatedly mentioned on many occasions, English 
Common Law is a secular-based law. Although historically it is part of a Christian 
teaching, those days have been left far behind as witnessed through its long 
regulatory experience.74 On the contrary, IFIs are offering products and services 
that are fabricated to comply with Shariah law, a religious teaching. Therefore, as 
the way to facilitate Islamic finance in the UK, the attempt to adopt religious notion 
into this regulation system, if any, is fairly challenging, perhaps impossible to 
some extent. This is the important point that needs to be grasped and accepted 
by the stakeholders of the IFIs. In saying that, any legal reform to secure a level 
playing field for the IFIs to operate supposedly more on deregulation of the law 
that grants a privilege to interest-based financing. The goal is to broaden the room 
for other types of financial models under a shadow, including the interest-free 
model, to surface without eminent threats.75 As discussed in Chapter 6, Islamic 
finance is a system derived from the belief that wealth must be managed in the 
way approved by God as its sole owner. This individual religious belief is viewed 
as the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, guaranteed by Article 
9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).76 From this point of 
view, the IFIs possessed neither an advantage nor disadvantage. However, this 
religious belief is at liberty to be manifested in democratic ways without 
disregarding the protected rights and freedom of others. Leading from this, the 
market plays an impactful role where it is sensitive and cautious when dealing 
with customers’ trends. If demands for Shariah-compliant products and services 
escalate, the market will respond accordingly. This trend on many occasions will 
be followed by regulatory reform, especially if there are legal obstacles whereby 
the IFIs are supposed to take this as an important note.  
 
                                            
74 Bowman v Secular Society Limited [1917] A.C 406. 
75 Shadow banking is a banking system offering financial products and services outside 
the regulated mode. 
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In this regard, the feature required by the IFIs in terms of English regulatory 
regime is the liberty to operate in the way they believe the best way of doing 
business. From this point of view, the deregulation of interest-based law should 
not to be perceived as an endeavour to uphold the conception of the rule of 
Shariah law. It is simply a legal liberation process to accommodate new financial 
market trends. This is due to the fact that any financial transaction is to be 
enacted as licit until proven otherwise by Shariah law.77 In other words, 
everything which is not forbidden is allowed. The illicitness of a financial product 
is only apparent when it is involved with riba, gharar and other prohibited 
activities.78 Furthermore, as for akhlak based ethics, the local legal propensity is 
already supportive rather than combative against this religious-origin best of 
practice. The existing corporate governance codes, despite the absence of the 
Shariah governance emphasis, encourage self-regulation and improvements to 
secure stakeholders’ rights. The question of the most concerned is on legal 
loopholes caused by the IFIs’ financial mode of product structuring and 
contractual relationship. The IFIs are notoriously applying mix-matching method 
to construe their products. This has caused the IFIs and the customers a great 
deal of inefficiencies, such as double taxation on a single product, unclear legal 
protection and unenforceable agreement in the eyes of judiciary.  
 
Secondly, the absence of a national authority to oversee the Shariah compliance 
process exercised by the IFIs represent a lack of ’check and balance’ to supervise 
the institutional Shariah committees.79 Earlier in this research, it is observed that 
the central bank Shariah committee undertakes the functions of the highest 
supervisory authority as a ‘check and balance’ mechanism in Shariah-related 
matters. Since the UK government is looking at this particular issue from a secular 
point of view, the absence of such a governance supervision mechanism is rather 
not an overarching concern. However, the gravity of this governance loophole is 
fairly substantial, as far as the stakeholders may concern. Without central 
authority, institutional Shariah committees operate with no central supervision to 
hold them responsible for any malpractice or mismanagement in the Shariah 
compliance process, which is likely to rise Shariah’s systemic risk. It is worth 
noting that being responsible to God in ensuring Shariah compliance does not 
mean that the Shariah committee is out of human reach. The fact that the Shariah 
committee members are the subject to duty of loyalty to the institutions, has puts 
their credibility under judgement by stakeholders in many ways. Therefore, an 
                                            
77 This is based on the maxim, ‘a thing shall remain as it was originally’, meaning, if it 
was originally permissible, it will remain permissible until proven otherwise; Al-
Majalla Al-Ahkam Al-Adliyyah, Part II. Maxims of Islamic Jurisprudence, no. 5. 
78 For further discussions, refer to Chapter 5 on Shariah Compliance. 
79 The accountability of Shariah governance elements is not only to the stakeholders, as 
listed traditionally, but include accountability to the Divine as the Islamic law-maker 
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independent supervision body is a crucial governance organ in this regard from 
a Shariah governance perspective, especially to ensure accountability. 
 
Perhaps the relevant question here is, what is the best solution within reach 
considering the nature of the UK’s regulatory and market? To answer that is by 
looking at the underlying principle of the Shariah governance supervision 
mechanism. It is rather straightforward, which is to ensure there is effective 
independent oversight of Shariah compliance.80 The governance structure is 
flexible depending on the local legal propensity and market practices. By 
considering all the relevant standards and market experience, two possible 
choices are available. The first is forming a central Shariah supervisory body as 
a subsidiary of Bank of England as frequently seen in other jurisdictions, and 
second is appointing an independent institution with relevant expertise to 
exercise timely evaluations. As for the former, the suggested supervisory body 
would be regulated with the power similar to the PRA and the FCA. It could also 
be carried out by either, or the FCA in particular, through a designated committee 
with specific duties. Most importantly, the person drawn to be in charge must be 
sufficiently qualified.81 The latter option, however, is brought about by considering 
the latest market development of the Shariah consultation firms. It is observed 
that the numbers of Shariah firms providing Shariah legal expertise to the IFIs is 
increasing globally. Most of these firms are run by Shariah experts with in-depth 
knowledge and experience in Islamic finance in multiple jurisdictions. Their 
functions are similar to external auditors who carry out the task independently.82 
This independent body is an ad-hoc authority, which is still under the flagship of 
a decentralised Shariah advisory system, which is a more sensible model under 
suggestion.83 
 
Thirdly, other than the aforementioned issues, the absence of a central Shariah 
supervision mechanism could cause fatwa inconsistency, hence Shariah opinion 
contradictions and unintegrated product arrangements.  It is to some extent has 
the potential to affect the validity of the contracts construed by the IFIs. To 
exemplify the magnitude of this particular remark is by looking at the Shariah 
perimeters on product requirements. Some authority such as Bank Negara 
Malaysia (BNM), considers bay’ al-‘inah as a Shariah-compliant instrument, 
implementing the opinion of the Shafie legal school. The respective instrument, 
                                            
80 IFSB, (IFSB-10) (n 47). 
81 The required qualifications are similar to the membership of the Shariah committee. 
82 Karim Ginena and Azhar Hamid, Foundations of Shari'ah Governance of Islamic 
Banks: The Role of Sharia Supervisory Boards, Internal Audit and Advisory 
Firms (John Wiley and Sons  2015) 363. 
83 Mushtak Parket, Practices of Shariah Governance in the Islamic Capital Market in 
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however, is conferred as not a Shariah-compliant by other jurisdictions, especially 
Middle Eastern countries based on the majority of other Shariah legal schools.84 
As a result, a particular scheme may be granted Shariah compliance under 
Malaysian jurisdiction but conferred as otherwise by another. Therefore, bay al-
‘inah was widely used by Malaysian authorities in their sukuk structure and at the 
same time criticised by others. Since the UK’s financial market is in fact a meeting 
place of the IFIs that originated from countless jurisdictions, the absence of such 
a single code for the IFIs to make reference would be damaging. In addition to 
that, the UK experience of disputes related to Islamic finance could also be 
considered as a good example. 
 
The solution for this particular issue is in the hands of the government, as policy 
maker to choose its preferred Shariah legal framework. As mentioned in Chapter 
7, one of rationales of regulating Islamic finance is to ease Shariah legal 
contradictions. It is in the government’s power to remove undesirable legal 
opinions and endorse a desired framework. The UK regulatory regime might be 
a secular-based, but it does not mean it cannot seek for consultation from Shariah 
experts to determine the best solution to such a matter. Other than that, 
incorporating the available international Shariah standards published by 
multilateral bodies such as IFSB and AAOIFI is another imaginable option. 
Whether it is to be adopted as an advisable standards as in ‘comply or explain’ 
or to be incorporated into the existing regulations, it is a choice for the UK 
government to make a sensible decision. 
 
Fourthly, missing the referred Shariah governance code could also cause a 
conflict of duty for the institutional Shariah committee members. This is due to 
the fact that there is no restriction on a Shariah expert being appointed to sit on 
more than one Shariah committee within the same industry at the same time. 
Thus far, it has depended on the IFIs’ initiative to structuralise their Shariah 
governance, which is mainly reflects the original jurisdictions of their parent 
companies. As observed, due to this non-appearance, the UK IFIs have so far 
never put a high regard on this particular matter. Based on the table-9, five out 
five IFIs under observation have experts who are the members of multiple 
institutional Shariah committees at the same time.85 Some of the experts are even 
sitting together as members of more than one Shariah committees 
simultaneously. This is also as a result of the fact that the UK is a global hub for 
financial subsidiaries. Parent companies might not be originated from the same 
jurisdiction, where as far as they are concerned, this is not an issue. Other than 
                                            
84 Saiful Azhar Rosly and Moh Sanusi, ‘Some Issues of Bay’ al-‘Inah in Malaysian Islamic 
Financial Markets’  (2001) 16 (3) Arab Law Quarterly 262. 
85 So far there are five full-fledged Islamic banks in the UK and by considering their 




- 240 - 
that, if there is no limitation from the related jurisdictions where the parent 
companies originally come from, this sort of issue is rather irrelevant from their 
perspective. For whatever reasons imaginable, since Shariah experts are 
carrying out fiduciary duty delegated by the board, the duty to avoid conflict of 
interest is extremely crucial to highlight.  
 
No. Bank Shariah Committee Members 
1 Bank of London and The 
Middle East86  
Dr Abdul Aziz Khalifa al-Qassar 
Dr Essam Khalaf Enezi 
Dr Mohammad Daud Bakar 
2 Gatehouse Bank Mufti Muhammad Nurullah Shikder 
Sheikh Nizam Muhammad Saleh Yaqoobi 
Dr Abdul Aziz Khalifa al-Qassar 
Dr Essam Khalaf Enezi 
3 QIB (UK) plc Sheikh Walid bin Hadi 
Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah 
Dr Mohamad Ahmaine 
4 Al-Rayan Bank87 
 
Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah 
Sheikh Nizam Muhammad Saleh Yaqoobi 
Mufti Abdul Qadir Barkatulla 
Dr Samir Alamad 
5 ADIB (UK) Ltd Sheikh Muhammad Taqi Uthmani 
Prof Jasem Ali Salem Al Shamsi 
Sheikh Issam Mohammed Ishaq 
Sheikh Nizam Muhammad Saleh Yaqoobi 
Dr Muhamed Elqari 
Table 9: Shariah Experts in the UK Full-fledged Islamic Banks88 
 
To ease possible conflict, it is sensible to apply the virtues of the relevant 
provisions from Companies Act 2006.89 In a due manner, it is the duty of the 
members who by any way, directly or indirectly, have a conflict of interest on a 
certain arrangement or transaction, for the reason that he/she is the member of 
                                            
86 <https://www.blme.com/about-blme/investor-relations/corporate-governance/sharia-
a-supervisory-board/> accessed 2 March 2018 
87 Former Islamic Bank of Britain, the first established Islamic Bank in Britain in 2009 
88 This is based on the latest annual reports of the banks. 
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the Shariah committees of the contracting parties, to make reasonable 
declaration. The fact that the Shariah committee has no direct involvement with 
business strategy does not mean it does not have consequential impact on the 
situation. The dealing parties might have different choices of Shariah instruments 
at hand be up to their proportionalities. Any choices of possible instruments to be 
deployed are submissive to the institutional practices and business strategies. A 
certain product structure might be exploited so it could be advantageous to a 
certain party and detrimental to another if not delivered in a proper manner, 
regardless of its Shariah-compliant nature. To exemplify the magnitude of this 
case, the Dana Gas v Dana Gas case in English court is worthy of an 
investigation.90 The case thus far might not cause by the present of the same 
expert within the involving institutions but a slightly reckless judgement, like ‘fatwa 
shopping’ on the related Shariah matters can adversely affect the whole 
arrangement or transaction, as it could be invalidated.  
 
Fifthly, diverse composition of the board members with relevant skills, experience 
and knowledge is considered as one of the factors for effectiveness. It helps the 
institutions to have a dynamic business approach in order to follow market trends. 
The Shariah committee is no different in this regard. However, since the authority 
has never put any emphasis on such a matter, the composition of the Shariah 
committee members of the existing IFIs in the UK suggests that they have a little 
option of experts. This is due to the fact that the IFIs operating in the UK are 
mostly owned by Middle Eastern parent companies as shown in the table-10. As 
observed, Middle Eastern IFIs have the tendency to elect those who are 
respected and well-recognised as experts in Shariah or Islamic studies as their 
Shariah committee members and give little attention to other relevant fields of 
expertise. This pattern affects the composition of Shariah committees. However, 
such a management strategy is rather on the basis of market practice, which puts 
a high regard on the Shariah background person to sit at such a position. 
Additionally, the Middle Eastern regionis  also rich with talents in Islamic studies 
who are eligible to take other management positions within the institutions. Other 
than that, as mentioned by the IFSB-10, in the case of the IFIs include experts 
from other professions as their Shariah committee members, they must ensure 
that those members must not hold the right to vote on Shariah issues, the number 
of the Shariah experts must be the majority of the quorum and the present of 
those experts as consultants should not delude the value of the decision made 
by the Shariah experts.91  
 
 
                                            
90 Dana Gas PJSC v Dana Gas SUKUK Ltd [2017] EWHC 2928. 




- 242 - 
Bank Parent Bank/Company Country of Origin 
Bank of London and The 
Middle East 
Originally sponsored by 
Boubyan Bank, Kuwait 
Kuwait 
Gatehouse Bank Independent England  
QIB (UK) Plc Qatar Islamic Bank Qatar 
Al-Rayan Bank92 Masraf Al Rayan Qatar 
ADIB (UK) Ltd Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank United Arab Emirates 
Table 10: UK's Islamic Bank Ownerships93 
 
Arguably, this is not really the case if the IFIs are to operate in the UK market. 
The market puts a high regard on a dynamic board’s composition as well as its 
committees, with a balance of skills, experience and knowledge, to discharge 
their duty effectively and avoid problems arising from ‘groupthink’.94 Since a 
Shariah committee is exercising a part of the board’s duty on Shariah matters 
due diligence, the same principle is applicable, as far as the UK’s market is 
concerned. Furthermore, the UK market trend is more challenging owing to its 
location as one of the world’s largest financial hubs. Therefore, it is imperative for 
the IFIs not to take this sort of remark for granted, if they are to have a brighter 
future and compete with other giant financial institutions, which mostly do not 
offer Islamic finance. Other than a sensible business strategy to enhance market 
confidence, the dynamic composition of the Shariah committee is also substantial 
for the IFIs in order to encourage constructive debate between the members on 
the issues at hand and seek expert consultation to comprehend local market 
practices, based on the maxim, ‘local custom is an arbitrage’.95 This is due to the 
fact that Shariah-related decisions are not merely religious verdicts, but rather 
rulings witha real impact on institutions with millions in investment value.  
 
Sixthly, the present implementation of the Shariah governance system has also 
brought about the question of how independent a Shariah member is. We have 
discussed the fiduciary duty of the Shariah committee which also consists of the 
duty of loyalty and duty of care as if they were board members.96 We also have 
put emphasis on the structural arrangement viewpoint that the duty carried out 
                                            
92 Former Islamic Bank of Britain, the first established Islamic Bank in Britain, 
incorporated in 2009. 
93 This is based on the available reports, prospectuses and official websites of the banks. 
94 FRC (n 44) 2. 
95 Muhammad Akram Laldin and Munzir Kahf, ‘Islamic Banks: The Rise of a New Power 
Alliance of Wealth and Shariah Scholarship’ in Clement M Henry and Rodney Wilson 
(eds), The Politics of Islamic Finance (Edinburgh University 2004) 17-36. 
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by the Shariah committee is delegated by the board as the source of power. 
Therefore, perhaps a relevant question here is to what extent is the Shariah 
committee independent from the influence of the board? Under a jurisdiction 
where there is no emphasis on such a matter as required by IFSB-10 Shariah 
governance code, the integrity and credibility of the Shariah committee seems to 
be compromised under the governance purview. Independent oversight is a 
crucial element of the Shariah compliance process to ensure objective judgement 
on Shariah-related matters at hand.  
 
To some extent, the fact that the Shariah committee members are taking the 
functions of non-executive directors, as asserted by Al-Dohni, is the key to 
resolving the issue at hand. As non-executive members, they do not have any 
interest over the corporate internal affairs but rather merely what the Shariah 
perspective is on the matters submitted to them. Perhaps, the issue of the utmost 
concern here is the absence of a transparent standard operational procedure for 
Shariah committees. Therefore, as one of the self-regulation parameters, the 
authority might need to make Shariah committee statements on the Shariah 
compliance process as a required standard.  
 
Seventhly, as observed, none of the UK’s IFIs, have made explicit declarations 
on their internal Shariah compliance structures to carry out day-to-day functions. 
As drawn by the standards, the internal Shariah department or at least an internal 
Shariah officer is considered as one of the operating procedures for the Shariah 
committee to work as the secretariat of the committee. Having an officer to 
monitor the day-to-day process is rather crucial as a Shariah governance support 
system. Other than monitoring the implementation of the endorsed fatwa, it can 
assist the IFIs to address Shariah non-compliance and report it to the relevant 
governance organs for them to take action of rectification accordingly.97 There 
are no explicit indicators on the present of in house Shariah department. None of 
the corresponding banks seen in the table-10 above enclose Shariah risk in their 
annual reports. The non-existence of such a report is presumable due to the 
absence of an internal Shariah compliance mechanism. It does not, however, 
mean that such a process does not take place. This is due to the fact that 4 out 
of 5 of the banks are owned by full-fledged IFIs with solid internal Shariah 
compliance mechanisms in place.  
 
Eighth, the UK financial institutions are given the chance to adopt International 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) or UK Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
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(UK GAAP).98 Thus far, there is no concern of any sort regarding special attention 
on Shariah compliance accounting and auditing standards. The absence of such 
a standard, designed to cater to Islamic finance characteristics is potentially to 
ignore the AAOIFI code of conducts. This is on the account of conventional 
banking largely relies on contractual liability to recover monies exchanged as loan 
and deposit, together with an interest margin for the lender. Meanwhile, the IFIs 
require physical assets or trading transactions and are more familiar with profit 
lost sharing business preposition.99 The IFIs are prohibited from getting involve 
with non-compliant activities and any non-complaint revenues must be 
channelled in a proper manner as required by AAOIFI standards. How the IFIs 
manage non-compliance assets and cash flow is crucial in this sense. On top of 
that, the multilayer contracting arrangements are due to be scrutinised diligently 
in terms of accounting reports. Steps taken and parties relevant to the 
transactions must be audited to ensure their existence and functions under the 
circumstances.  
 
Therefore, without having an explicit accounting standard to be complied to by 
the IFIs, the UK IFIs especially those offering Islamic financial windows, are at 
risk of Shariah non-compliance, as far as this research is concerned. One of the 
issues under discussion is the separation of the Shariah-compliant and Shariah 
non-compliant revenues. Other than having a clear report on a distinguishable 
accounting, the rectification procedure of the Shariah non-compliant revenue also 
needs to be well reported and audited. The solution, however, does not need a 
significant change to the accounting regime. It is argued that IFRS could properly 
reflect the Shariah compliance accounting requirements without compromising 
Shariah principles.100 Furthermore, the Shariah Accounting Standards endorsed 
by the AAOIFI adopt the IFRS accounting standards.101 Most importantly, there 
must be a framework to ensure sensible and appropriate explanations disclosed 
by the institutions in their financial reporting regarding Shariah-related matters.  
8.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, there are three points standing as the beacons of the chapter. First, 
Shariah governance is not a total stranger to the UK corporate governance 
system. Owing to the nature of both, the Shariah-compliant financing and the UK 
                                            
98 To be exact, the Companies Act 2006 state the accepted accounting standard is in 
accordance with the International Accounting Standard (IAS), and the UK GAAP is 
a statutory terms in the UK Taxes Acts; Companies Act 2006, s 386. 
99 PricewaterhouseCoopers (Open to Comparison, Islamic Finance and IFRS) 3. 
100 ibid 4 
101 AAOIFI, Auditing Standard No. (1): objective and Principles of Auditing in AAOIFI 
(eds) Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards (Almainan Publication and 
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market practices, which are rather flexible and dynamic, adopting Shariah 
governance system into the UK IFIs is not wishful thinking. The UK legal flexibility 
is the tipping point of this endeavour. However, such a reform should take into 
account local legal and market practices, which do not regard religious tenets as 
a compass for business arrangements. Having said that, the IFIs should be more 
creative and adaptive, which at some point might mean operating with a different 
Shariah compliance process, depending on the jurisdiction. It is essential for the 
Shariah governance arrangement to be more diverse without jeopardising the 
underlying principles while complying with the local legal requirements. At any 
rate, the IFIs must ensure that their Shariah governance systems are fully 
functioning at their full potential.  
 
Secondly, in order to allow Shariah governance to hit a bigger punch onto the UK 
financial markets, the aspects of the above remarks and observations are not to 
be taken for granted. Regardless of the Shariah supervision model, the UK 
government needs to publish its own Shariah governance code in order to ensure 
a robust Shariah compliance process is in place. By looking at the remarks above, 
this code should be compatible with both, the governance aspects of the IFIs and 
local market practice, respectively. This could be the answer to the mentioned 
ambiguities regarding the Shariah compliance process within the UK’s IFIs. Local 
stakeholder sentiment is the key element in formulating the respective Shariah 
governance code. The emphasised corporate governance concerns could be the 
starting point to addressing the sentiment. The idea whether to have a designated 
central body or an independent ad-hoc body to timely oversee Shariah 
compliance process within the institutions depends on the government to make 
a sensible decision. It is not an attempt to undermine the existing system, but 
merely to empower the Shariah governance functions. 
 
Thirdly, the Muslim population in the UK is growing; however, it remains as a 
small portion of Islamic finance users. The fact that Muslims represent merely 5% 
of the total population makes the local Islamic financial market rather share a 
minimal size of the economic slices. Let alone the readiness of the Muslim 
communities to accept a Shariah-compliant financial system from a non-Islamic 
government. This situation can improve only if the UK’s IFIs are ready to put a 
focus on tackling the customer confidence using a Shariah compliance flagship.  
The aim is to draw the attention, and hence the confidence of Muslim customers 
who are reluctant to use conventional financing in order to make Islamic finance 
a trusted alternative. On top of that, the UK government also should also take an 
action to educate members of the public to increase awareness about the 
Shariah-compliant finance. However, it should consider a rebranding strategy in 
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This chapter is the final chapter of this research. It will summarise areas that have 
been the focal point of the discussions thoroughly put forward by this research, 
discuss the research originality and contributions as well the recommendations 
as far as this research is concerned. The summary provides responses to the 
research questions asked in Chapter 1. Note that, under research 
recommendations, there are suggestions for possible further research that are 
meant to be the most useful contribution of this research. Last but not least, 
primary take-home points will be mentioned as the overall conclusion at the end 
of the chapter. 
9.2 Research Originality 
The originality of this research can be seen in four dimensions. First, this research 
offered an in-depth philosophical explication of the Shariah governance as a 
subject matter. It drew the worldview surrounding Shariah compliance, a 
notorious idea of the Islamic financial market. Since technical and applicable 
approaches are more likely the trend in the area, this research is one of the first 
attempts to posit a philosophical approach into the Shariah governance corpus. 
Second, it also offered a comprehensive combination of multiple disciplines of 
knowledge in a single discussion. Legal studies, Islamic finance and corporate 
governance are intermingled. As a result, every discussion has formulated a new 
and stand-alone understanding of the subject at hand. The discovered themes 
thus far might not be as well-developed as their conventional counterparts, but it 
is undeniably shedding light on the relevant grey areas. Third, the fact that this 
research chose the UK as the case study is unique. Most of the Shariah 
governance issues happen to take place in Muslim-dominated jurisdictions, as 
far as this research is concerned. Given the fact that the UK is the host of many 
corporate governance standards since the 1990s and Islamic finance has been 
operating within the market since its first appearance in the 1970s, research on 
the applicability of Shariah governance should not be abandoned. If the UK 
experience is to be accounted for, Shariah governance could potentially expand 
if it manages to catch the eye of the right party. Fourth, this research is also 
original in terms of its high regard of the fundamental aspects of Shariah 
governance. Most standard-setters such as the IFBS and the AAOIFI focus on 
managerial and organisational aspects to ensure Shariah compliance. Likewise, 
the majority, if not all, of the researchers have done no less. As repeatedly 
emphasised, the virtues of such are equally consequent, as far as this research 
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9.3 Research Findings 
The findings of this research are in response to the research questions, arisen 
from the research statement in Chapter 1. They are as below. 
9.3.1 Shariah Governance Definition, Characteristics and its 
Relationship to Conventional Corporate Governance 
Regarding this, this research defined the word ‘Shariah’ and ‘governance’ 
discretely to hint at the similarities as well as the dissimilarities of Shariah 
governance as opposed to conventional corporate governance. Shariah as a 
fundamental conception in the Islamic worldview is defined through its features 
that are closely related to governing the Islamic finance. Frequently, it is 
conceivable as the Islamic law, but it is also in fact connoted by the scholars as 
the teaching of Islam as a whole. Both comprehensions make irrevocable impacts 
on the IFIs’ operating systems. Whether it is a law or a holistic teaching, it is the 
concept fully upheld by the IFIs’ systemic and operational arrangements. As a 
result, the existence of the Shariah governance is a distinctive element of the IFIs 
as a way to ensure Shariah compliance at all costs. 
 
As a set of laws, Shariah upholds the balance between rigidity and flexibility as 
its characteristic. In many cases, the fundamental aspect of each chapters of the 
law will be rigid, as in the prohibition of riba. As repeatedly mentioned, it is 
perhaps that this is the most controversial element within the discussions of 
Islamic finance. Other than that, Shariah law is flexible, namely in prescribing 
legal approaches to tackle innovative financial expansions as long as riba is not 
involved. In this respect, one of the primary objectives of Shariah under spotlight 
is to preserve the wealth and prevent it from any harm. The way to achieve this 
might be dissimilar to conventional approaches. However, the essential idea is 
that it is not to restrain the potential of the financial market, but to facilitate an 
alternative to the existing system. As far as the stakeholders are concerned, this 
could be another choice that the Islamic financial industry has to offer and they 
are free to make a choice. 
 
In defining the word ‘governance’, this research embraced the approach of the 
mainstream schools of thought on viewing what corporate governance truly is. 
This is to emphasise that Shariah governance is not to deviate from the course 
of what are already established. It is somehow a contribution from the Islamic 
financial industry towards the betterment of the corporate governance corpus. 
Similar to the conventional corporate governance, the Shariah governance 
system is highly concerned with accountability, transparency, enhancing 
stakeholders’ confidence and so forth. To make it more sensible, this research 
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about increasing firms’ value, but on its own terms. Instead of focusing only on 
shareholder wealth maximisation, the installation of the Shariah governance 
principles refines the respective notion by diverting it to an alternative, which 
looks to optimising the firms’ value. It might similar to the former conception but 
optimising as far as this research is concerned denotes a new paradigm of the 
firm’s existence. Due to this, there is no ingenuity in increasing the value of the 
wealth to the maximum if such an action could jeopardise the stakeholders. The 
wealth is only optimised if it is beneficial to the stakeholders because that is what 
preserving wealth is truly about.  
 
Following the comprehension of the both terminologies is, what is the definition 
established by the Shariah governance standard-setters. As mentioned by the 
IFSB, Shariah governance is a system through which there is an independent 
mechanism to ensure Shariah compliance. The primary concern is how the 
governance constituents of the IFIs execute their functions since they play a 
pivotal role to give assurance to the stakeholders that the IFIs are operating in 
accordance with Shariah precepts. With this notion, a Shariah committee, which 
is consisted of a group of Shariah experts, was introduced to IFIs’ organisational 
structures. As an advisory board, the Shariah committee, with the assistance of 
the internal Shariah department, will evaluate the products and services before 
their execution in case of any non-compliant aspects to the preceding Shariah 
rulings. The existence of such a committee is a crucial evidence of the IFI’s 
endeavour to ensure the adherence of their products and services to Shariah law. 
 
Looking at the relationship of the Shariah governance to the conventional 
corporate governance, it could be concluded that neither concept is alien to the 
other. By observing the standards published by the IFSB, AAOIFI and BNM, 
Shariah governance turned out to be well integrated within the existing corporate 
governance system. In this vein, Shariah governance functions as an additional 
system to empower what is already there to support Islamic finance’s 
peculiarities. Seemingly, Shariah governance has also managed to widen the 
horizon of the corporate governance comprehension namely in its ethical division. 
As far as this research is concerned, it is an interesting development of our 
modern world, which is far more complicated than the year when the debates on 
corporate governance first took place. 
9.3.2 Conventional Corporate Governance Theories under Shariah 
Purview  
To explain this, this research has chosen two widely recognised theories in 
corporate governance: the shareholder wealth maximisation theory, and the 
stakeholder theory. There are many other theories available, but since the two 




- 249 - 
disposed and adopted by several multilateral standard-setters such as the 
OECD, it is worth utilising them as the points of reference for this research to 
illustrate the underlying principles of Shariah governance.  
 
Islam is tolerant of ideas and innovations.  In fact the very fabric of its teaching 
puts a high regard on knowledge and scholarship. Muslims are urged to explore 
the universe in order to understand what is happening around them and to make 
their lives easier through science and technology. As in economics, what makes 
humans prosper is welcomed and well-accepted. This is the general approach 
taken by Islamic scholars when dealing with theories originating from the non-
Islamic world. This intellectual discourse is the culture of Islamic scholarship for 
more than a thousand years. The approach is, everything is permissible or licit 
until it is proven as non-permissible or illicit by the Islamic sources. That is the 
exact method taken by this research when dealing with corporate governance 
theories. 
 
By and large, those theories have been developed to ensure economic prosperity 
and wealth is well-generated and preserved. As shown, it should be understood 
that not all of the conventional corporate governance theories should be 
eliminated from the equation. The dialogues on the respective narratives have 
procured many aspects, some of which are acceptable and some of which are 
not. Some are fundamental and some are rather supplemental. More importantly, 
this research has located the dialogue of the Shariah governance within the 
breadth of corporate governance discourse. From the beginning of this research, 
we have seen many aspects of Shariah governance, either in conjunction with 
conventional corporate governance or otherwise. There are three angles of 
explanation chosen to explicate the timeless principles, and three mechanisms 
to be utilised as the way to bring those principles into action.  
 
As commonly happens in the debates between corporate governance schools, 
Shariah governance has provided the viewpoints that make it peculiar. This is 
unavoidable since the installation of the Shariah compliance concept into a 
corporation makes an impact on how the business should be understood. It 
includes how it views wealth and the ways of generating it and maximising its 
value. As we can see in the counterbalances, the most prominent point, amongst 
others, is how the IFIs, under the Shariah purview, perceive the managers, wealth 
and business ethics. Firstly, as the managers ought to act with good faith on the 
wealth trusted to them, the shareholders should also see the managers as 
trustworthy. This heart-to-heart communication is actually denying the 
fundamental convictions of conventional corporate governance theory, wherein 
managers are perceived as untrustworthy. However, it does not necessarily 
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to that mistrust are inappropriate at all. That is to say, those controls can function 
as the last resort in the case of a breach of trust. It also widens the narrative of 
who matters most in the managers’ decisions and actions: the shareholders or 
the stakeholders. Secondly, increasing wealth especially through shareholders’ 
wealth maximisation is not the most fundamental issue in business as wealth 
ownership is diversely viewed. It is rather how the generated wealth is going to 
make an impact to the stakeholders. From this standpoint, the stakeholder theory 
seems to have a closer ground to Shariah. This is due to the fact that, as 
stakeholder theory appreciates multiple stakeholders who should benefit from the 
wealth, Shariah is no different. The debate might come by discussing the actions 
and the inactions of the managers; the outcome however is undeniably about 
how they manage the wealth. This is where the third aspect comes in, the 
business ethics. Islam, as a religion with a very tight relationship to ethics, makes 
a stand against the separation theory. In this respect, the stakeholder theory as 
excavated here is appreciating ethics as fundamentally consequential in business 
decisions and actions. However, this does not mean that there is no rooms for 
improvement available from the Shariah perspective. 
9.3.3 Shariah Governance Principles 
The third finding exposed that there are three dimensional principles that underlie 
the Shariah governance system: the worldview, the legal approach and the 
ethics. The comprehension of these timeless principles works as the pillars to 
envisage the duty held by Shariah governance constituents. It provides the 
fundamentals that could induce a new way of thinking to the governance system, 
especially catering the IFIs’ characteristics. These principles are formulated from 
a vast literature developed by the scholars from the Islamic sources, the Quran 
and the Hadith. 
 
The first principle emphasises how the faith in Allah as the only God under the 
unity of God conception (tawhid), gives an impact on the Muslims’ daily lives, 
including their business decisions and actions. Most importantly, this worldview 
describes the conception of wealth ownership where humans as the vicegerents 
of God are not the sole owners of the earth but the agents with power delegated 
by God to manage it on His behalf. Becoming conscious of this, humans would 
see themselves as utilisers and managers of the resources, rather than as 
manipulators or exploiters. The resources are not the objective, but the tools to 
achieve the objective, which is to seek equilibrium in the economic ecosystem. In 
terms of business management of the IFIs, according to this worldview, the IFIs 
should firstly never deem the managers as untrustworthy and waste their labour 
production talents. Secondly, the IFIs should also be delicate and creative in 
business strategies, as they are the passionate vicegerents of God managing the 
available resources entrusted to humans. Thirdly, the IFIs should serve as 




- 251 - 
balance ownership. The last point, but not the least, is the IFIs should promote 
this notion to their conventional counterparts and find a way to merge the both 
systems for everybody’s benefit. 
 
The worldview of Shariah governance is believed to be what is capable of making 
the firms to see the natural resources in a different manner as opposed to the 
classical economic theories. It might seem non-substantial, in a way, as faith is 
an individual, internal affair. However, when it comes to institutional applications, 
this faith is not merely individual any longer, but a responsibility upheld by those 
who have the power. It is imperative to understand here that this worldview is not 
what dictates the institutions but an understanding possessed by the institutions 
of the way of thinking of the Muslim customers in the market. It is for this reason, 
the IFIs are needed, to ensure a resilient Shariah compliance process is in place, 
since it is a direct impact of the indicated worldview. 
 
The second principle of the discussion is being Shariah-compliant. As the crux of 
the research, this research supplies the demand for the matter under the 
discussion. Since Shariah is not a written law in most jurisdictions, Shariah-
compliance is conceptualised in a way it could bring about the essence of the law 
as derived from the Islamic texts. It is a set of laws regulated by the Shariah 
scholars, from the Quran and Sunnah, through a cautious jurisprudence and 
implemented by the government in power. In a financial sense, Shariah-compliant 
means that the institutions are following the standards derived from the sources 
of Shariah in financial activities. In this respect, in many cases the most 
controversial component is the prohibition of riba. On this score, this research 
chose to address a technical approach to understanding the issue of riba. Based 
on the discussion, despite being complicated, riba can be addressed structurally, 
whereby instead of looking at it as a sacred religious verdict, it is in fact 
economically sensible. If interest is not the heartbeat of our modern economic 
systems, riba might not an issue at all, as far as this research is concerned. This 
is due to the fact gharar (uncertainty) and non-permissible activities, no matter 
how diverse they are, based on jurisdictions, are common issues that exist in 
finance. Above all, a learn off argument here is, Shariah-compliant is actually a 
propagation of an alternative economic approach, formulated from a religious 
teaching. Whether it is going to be taken as a belief ones must adhere to or as 
nothing of concern, Shariah-compliance prevail as a successful propeller of the 
Islamic financial industry. Market penetration of this industry thus far might be a 
tiny fraction of the whole system, but the potential is undeniable nonetheless. 
Therefore, this research stands as a gateway to comprehending the issue in hand 
so that when it is time, those who may be concerned, namely regulators could 
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The third principle involves the Islamic conception of akhlaq as the depiction of 
ethics. Islam as a religion never fails to prove ethics as its fundamental element. 
However, as disclosed, it is not the only feature of Islam. It is a supplementary 
element of Islam as a whole, which comes after righteous belief and compliance 
to the rules depicted by the texts. Perhaps one of the most intriguing parts is the 
intertwining concept of morality and law in Islam. Ethics is the propellant of legal 
compliance which makes legal actions only as the last resort as far as Islam is 
concerned. The important point here is how akhlaq serves as a unification tool of 
humans’ diverse interpretations of the best of conduct to overcome moral hazard. 
By sidelining the false understanding on what is ‘good’ or ‘best’, as probably 
defined by humans’ multicultural backgrounds, akhlaq upholds intercultural 
goodness. That is the reason why, similar to the conventional counterpart, 
Shariah governance addresses accountability, transparency, risk mitigation, 
customer confidence and so on. This is what brings together Muslims from all 
over the globe, including when it comes to business matters. Note that this 
threefold fundamental truth is the basis that forms the counterbalances as 
discussed. It is also the articulation of Shariah governance principles, formulated 
from genuine Islamic texts, using well-recognised methodological approaches. 
9.3.4 Shariah Governance Mechanisms 
After excavating the timeless principles of Shariah governance, this research 
addressed the fourth finding that depicted Shariah governance mechanisms to 
ensure applicability of the respective principles. Frequently, the available 
discussions on Shariah governance are philosophical and theoretical and less 
attentions is given to its mechanisms of implementation. As demonstrated, the 
mechanisms to implement the principles of Shariah governance are dynamic and 
flexible, depending on the market and jurisdiction. In this regard, this research 
proposed three sensible mechanisms, which are the governing law, the 
supervision and the audit.   
 
As far as this research is concerned, having governing law that appreciates 
Shariah-compliant requirements is a prerequisite to a resilient Shariah 
governance system, owing to the fact that it is the raison d’être of Shariah 
governance. There are inexorable needs for a conducive legal environment for 
the Islamic financial market to flourish in. As we can see, regulating Islamic 
finance is to justify Shariah compliance in the relevant jurisdiction, mitigate the 
risk, protect the customers, and codify the implementation of Shariah-
compliance. Not to mention that it is believed an agile and responsive regulatory 
ecosystem can assist the IFIs to thrive to their full potential while minimising the 
risks embarked on by the customers. All those are the key factors that are 
believed to be consequential if Islamic finance is to expand and reach its full 
potential and ensure stability and prosperity to the market. More importantly, the 
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is to avoid rule-based Shariah-compliance without a consideration of the 
underlying virtues.  
 
On top of that, the present legal mechanism that values Shariah compliance is 
extravagant if its implementation is not supervised in a proper manner. In fact, 
this has been the focal point of Shariah governance standard-setters such as the 
IFSB from the beginning. Shariah supervision carried out by Shariah committee 
is the key to Shariah compliance. Since Shariah compliance is in its infancy, there 
are many features unknown to the stakeholders, including, to name some, the 
managers, the customers and legal practitioners. Furthermore, the governing law 
might be the mechanism to define what Shariah-compliance is, but the real deal 
is the supervision mechanism available as a profoundly fundamental tool to 
uphold the rule of law. As for this reason, setting up a robust Shariah supervision 
mechanism is a demand to the corporations in general and the IFIs in particular. 
To explain what this is truly about, this research described how close this role is 
to the fiduciary duty of the relevant governance constituents. As deeply explored, 
the Shariah committee plays the role of due diligence to ensure not only the 
prescribed conventional corporate governance standards but also Shariah 
governance standards are fully complied with by the institutions. Ijtihad as the 
centre of this due diligence process is crucial in ensuring adherence to Shariah 
law. It is for this reason, IFIs are in need of Shariah experts. Nevertheless, the 
supervision functions of the Shariah governance still to be oversight by another 
layer of the check-and-balance mechanism, which is the Shariah audit.  
 
Apart from the two mechanisms above, the audit in Shariah-compliant processes 
serves as the third mechanism of defence in the Shariah-compliant saga. It 
functions as a mechanism to double check, not only the IFIs’ accounting system 
but also the Shariah-compliant process. The objective is to gain and enhance 
stakeholders’ confidence, especially that of Muslim costumers who see Shariah-
compliant assurance done by the Shariah committee as their way to be released 
from the burden of doing so on their own. In terms of its structural arrangement, 
the Shariah audit resembles the conventional model yet deploys specific 
additional tasks. To demonstrate how this should be done, the Malaysian Shariah 
governance framework was chosen. Similar to the conventional corporate 
governance audit mechanism, the Shariah audit has to be internal and external. 
The scope, however, is concentrated on the Shariah-compliant process. It is an 
additional feature of the existing audit system, which puts more focus on 
accounting, whereas in this relationship, the Shariah audit is somehow 
interrelated to such. To reiterate, in a way, Shariah governance mechanisms are 
structurally similar to the conventional counterpart. Owing to its unique principles, 
Shariah governance mechanisms work as forces to provide constructive support 
to the IFIs towards achieving their organisational objective, which to optimise the 
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9.3.5 Jurisdictional Compatibility 
The fifth finding exhibited the compatibility of Shariah governance to be adopted 
by the institutions regardless of their jurisdictions. As observed, this research 
excavated the possibilities of adopting the Shariah governance system into the 
UK IFIs. The fact that this research is constructed based on existing practices of 
the IFIs is sufficient as an answer. However, this research underscored the 
importance of preserving the comprehension of Shariah governance from its core 
principles, where such a knowledge could widen the horizon of the policy-makers, 
regardless of their legal approach. Furthermore, it could stand as a solid 
evidence, manifesting how an in-depth understanding of a particular matter could 
give more flexibility and bring less rigidity to the written standards when it comes 
to the implementation since one size does not fit all. Above all this research might 
be looking at the UK market, but the compatibility issue is not restricted to such. 
Other markets, especially, the Muslim-dominated markets, are also within the 
scope.  
 
Starting by addressing the positive developments with regard to the UK Islamic 
financial market and relevant legal aspects, we can see that Shariah governance 
is truly a big deal, even in the UK. However, there are many challenges and 
issues that could hinder the process should it be overcome by the IFIs. Thus far, 
the finding showed that the UK is adopting decentralised approach where Shariah 
governance is left to the institutions to make it happen. Due to the fact that the 
UK IFIs are mostly foreign-based institutions, the existing practices are akin to 
their home market norms. Perhaps the biggest issue here is the Islamic financial 
market penetration is still small in size to put a significant pressure to the policy 
makers to look at it with a decisive manner. As depicted, there are significant 
factors to be put under consideration for the UK policy-makers to be more 
decisive. For the time being, the demand might still considerably small, but the 
fact that the fraction is growing is not to be abandoned unobserved. Either way, 
there will be a time when the UK Islamic financial industry has a bigger and more 
indicative market penetration. Furthermore, the UK policy-makers are interested 
in making the UK a global Islamic finance facilitator by providing alternative 
dispute resolution. In achieving that, they have to be well-prompted with relevant 
data and sufficient knowledge of the matter in hand. 
9.4 Recommendations 
Throughout the three years of research, there are a few recommendations worth 
mentioning here. To make it easy to understand, it will be divided into three 
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9.4.1 Academia 
Recommendations relevant to academia are surely on possible future researches 
on the subject under the discussion. First, research on the principles of Shariah 
governance is still in its infancy. The attempt taken by this research to fill up the 
gaps in fact only represents a tiny part of the whole area. Alternative 
conceptualisations to contemplate Shariah governance are welcomed so this 
research field could have a well-rounded aspect of discussions in the future. The 
approach suggested by this research, which is to integrate Shariah governance 
into conventional corporate governance is believed will be able to generate more 
upcoming researches, especially in the ways to understand the existing market 
phenomenal. Second, since this research adopted doctrinal study that collects 
the data from documents, not from fieldwork, research to compare market 
practices based on provided principles is required. In this regard, a relevant 
question here is ‘are the IFIs’ stakeholders aware of those principles?’. Third, if 
we look at the conventional corporate governance corpus, demonstrations to 
exhibit practices in multiple jurisdictions are common. The fact that Shariah 
governance also possessed diverse models adopted by different jurisdictions, 
means a similar demonstration is possible. This means, there is a great potential 
for researches in newly explored markets. Japan’s financial market, for instance, 
as one of the major markets discussed in corporate governance corpus, is 
exploring the possibility of offering green banking and taking part in the 
international Islamic financial market. Shariah governance is an unavoidable 
issue for them to tackle in the near future. 
 
Other than addressing possible future research, academics are entailed to obtain 
a sufficient cross-field knowledge with regard to Shariah governance. As learnt 
by this research, experts are truly in need of looking at the Shariah governance 
issue through a principle base lens. To do so, they must be competent in legal 
studies, namely in corporate law and Islamic studies, especially in Islamic finance 
and corporate governance, collectively. Similarly to the conventional counterpart, 
the knowledge development for this area is time-consuming. Therefore, the effort 
must begin from now. Perhaps a designated subject committed to Shariah 
governance should be taught by universities or even academic centres with 
specific attention given over to this corpus is a sensible idea, as far as this 
research is concerned.  
9.4.2 Policy Makers 
Policy makers relevant under discussion are the standard-setters, especially the 
IFSB and the AAOIFI, and the central banks which Islamic finance is operating 
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As for standard-setters, whether explicitly or implicitly they ought to adopt a 
principle-based approach within their Shariah governance standards. This 
research has relentlessly demonstrated the magnitude of this approach. As 
revealed, existing Shariah governance standard-setters are akin to the 
stakeholder theory and when it comes to Shariah governance standard, a rule-
based approach is favourable. Despite ‘one does not fit all’ is applied, a rule-
based approach which comes in detail on how to behave seems to take place in 
most part of the standards and frameworks published. To ensure long term 
resiliency, the IFSB and the AAOIFI, for instance, are recommended to modify 
the approach. This is to give room to stakeholders to comprehend the Shariah 
governance issues that have arisen in hand. It is believed, the principle-based 
model could provide them with the background of a certain standard, so they 
would obtain the bigger picture of such. To exemplify is by looking at how 
shareholder value maximisation and value optimisation justify managers’ 
decisions and actions. In the case where shareholders are the sole subject under 
managers consideration, any consequences enjoyed or suffered by other 
stakeholders are not of concern. As long as the shareholders are satisfied and 
there is no breach of law, other matters are not an issue, and the managers 
mostly enjoy a great compensation as a result. This is where self-dealing could 
be happening. Under Shariah governance principles, the shareholders are not 
who or what matter most. Regarding this, the institutions, the customers, the 
employees, even nature, to name some, are the real subject matters in the 
boardroom. The value of wealth generated by the institution should not be 
calculated solely on an accounting basis, but non-accounting aspects should also 
be appreciated as well. Most importantly, decisions and actions that could 
preserve the institution in the longest run in order to bring goodness to the 
stakeholders as a whole are what truly matter. Therefore, Shariah governance of 
the future should go beyond Shariah-compliant procedural periphery, as far as 
the standard-setters should concerned. 
 
As for the central banks, there are two market dynamics available, Muslim-
dominated jurisdictions and non-Muslim dominated. In Muslim-dominated 
jurisdictions, Shariah-compliance might well be a great deal to uphold. However, 
as demonstrated, the Islamic financial system is sophisticated and complicated 
thus understanding it could be trouble. Therefore, an attempt to increase 
awareness amongst the stakeholders should be initiated. This is due to the fact 
that customer demand for Shariah-compliant products over merely religious 
sentiment would open the market to the risk of manipulation as far as this 
research is concerned. In this respect, ignorance and negligence are no longer a 
choice. It is also holding the key for the IFIs to go beyond Shariah compliance, 
which is Shariah-based. It is not wishful thinking to hope for an emergence of a 
market that functions based fully on Islamic teaching as a result of collective 
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ummah, not merely fractions of members of a community with different agendas 
and interests. 
 
As for non-Muslim-dominated jurisdictions, the objective is to facilitate Shariah-
compliant products and services, so they could be offered by financial institutions 
at will. In this respect, facilitating Shariah compliance does not mean a dictation 
of Shariah law as some might perceive. It is an appreciation of market diversity 
within the free market system that also supports value optimisation and 
ascertains firm sustainability. As reported, the Islamic financial market has shown 
tremendous growth. From about USD200 billion in 2003 to USD1.6 trillion at the 
end of 2012, the market had achieved USD1.89 trillion at the end of 2016 and 
USD 2 trillion in 2017. More importantly, Islamic finance is no longer operating 
remotely in Muslim dominated jurisdictions, where it has triggered global demand 
including markets outside the Muslims region. Rather than a religious imposition, 
non-Muslim demand for Shariah-compliant products is considerable as a positive 
market push instead. As a result, policy-makers in non-Muslim-dominated 
markets such as in the UK have shown their interest to take part and supply the 
demand in kind. In their way to ensure righteous actions and strategies are in 
place, a deep understanding of the Shariah governance is a great advantage. 
They may begin with the most fundamental and controversial aspect of Islamic 
finance, which is the prohibition of riba, then moving towards other areas that are 
flexible to the market, proportionately. In this case, when interest charge is only 
a matter of choice for financial institutions whether to take it or not, other 
challenges are not an issue anymore. As we can see in the UK cases, issues 
such as double taxation are fairly minor and resolvable when interest-free based 
products are already legalised. Furthermore, the notion under a secular-based 
legal system that looks at religion as a personal choice is to some extent a great 
opportunity for the IFIs. Above all, this is merely a financial alternative for the 
customers to freely go for it or not. If not Islamic finance, other types of financial 
systems might as well emerge and spread all over the systems.  
9.4.3 Financial Institution Practitioners 
Islamic financial institutions are the hosts of the subject matter of this research. 
In fact, they are the centre of discussion. In this respect, these are a few sensible 
recommendations for them. 
 
First, members of Shariah committee are to improve their understanding of the 
Shariah governance system. As discussed, their roles are not merely to issue 
Shariah verdicts on Shariah-related matters, but also to act as fiduciaries of the 
stakeholders. This conception urges them to master other issues surrounding the 
products or services respectively and to put a thorough analysis to the affected 
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are also believed to be under Shariah committee’s boardroom concern. Ignoring 
this would just spread an impression that Shariah compliance is merely a dictation 
of Shariah financial law, and the Shariah committee is the one and only all-
knowing committee on such a matter. Efforts to enhance stakeholders’ 
confidence in Shariah compliance must be initiated. In this respect, better 
transparency of Shariah compliance processes and well-regulated external 
Shariah audits, amongst others, are sensible means to highlight as target areas 
of improvement. 
 
Second, as for the external Shariah audit, senior Shariah experts are the most 
eligible group of experts to begin with as external Shariah auditors. This is due to 
the fact that the Shariah audit is one of the latest features of Shariah governance 
mechanisms. It is believed that their invaluable experience is extremely fit for 
purpose as auditors of the Shariah-compliant process. If this is not to be done, 
there will be a paradoxical situation where inexperienced auditors will be auditing 
the work of more experience experts. This situation will jeopardise the integrity of 
the respective IFIs and could be detrimental to the industry as a whole. Other 
than that, training and educating new generations of Shariah experts is to be 
escalated to supply the demand of the market for Shariah advisors, Shariah 
auditors, Shariah officers and other positions relevant in Shariah governance.  
 
Third, members of IFIs’ boards of directors are to put stakeholders into 
consideration in their boardroom because they are not merely shareholders’ 
proxies. It is important to emphasise here that they are also accountable to the 
stakeholders. It is not because it makes sense, but is securely plugged in to their 
subconscious mind as Muslims. They believe that they are accountable to God, 
as in the Unity of God, in every decisions and actions they take. It is through this 
concept, the board should act accordingly with Shariah requirements, even when 
black letter Shariah law is in absent. Other than that, moral consideration should 
also be well represented in business strategies. No matter how easy it is to say 
and how hard it is to comply with, the IFIs should take the role of changing the 
mindset of business entities as a whole. Whether it is going to be a success or 
not is not our concern because this is the never-ending course promulgated by 
Islamic finance founders decades ago.  
 
Fourth, improvement of the managers’ knowledge of Shariah governance 
principles is a must. In other words, IFIs’ managements ought to acquire this new 
dimension of corporate governance for the sake of their institutions. If not all, 
most managers are already well aware of corporate governance special 
treatment needed by their institutions. Regarding this, IFIs as financial institutions 
ought not to take similar approaches as the conventional institutions. They are 
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maximisation. IFI corporate strategies must take into-account the impacts of their 
decisions and actions on the stakeholders and ummah as a whole. Therefore, 
the IFIs’ economic equilibrium, if not totally, is differently defined as opposed to 
the conventional counterpart. Wealth optimisation is perceived as prioritising the 
benefit of wealth to the stakeholders rather than looking at its numerical 
indication. Apart from annual increase in terms of revenue, the valuation should 
consider how it has increased stakeholders’ value at the same time. In other 
words, Islamic finance is not merely a brand, but it is a set of financial systems 
that offers alternative financing which is believed to be better than the 
conventional counterpart. 
9.5 Overall Conclusion 
This research has examined the principles of Shariah governance. This has been 
done by looking at the relevant extent literature in legal studies, Islamic studies 
and corporate governance. Regarding this, there are three points to be reiterated 
as take-home notes. First and foremost, the main objective of Shariah 
governance as observed is to optimise the value and to ascertain the 
sustainability of the institutions in a way that complies with Shariah law. In doing 
so, Shariah governance is not to contradict the mainstream approach as 
generally taken by corporate governance system. It offers an alternative for 
involving constituents to adopt it in their governance systems. To ensure that to 
happen, experts are to look at the common grounds of the both systems before 
proposing the solutions for any diversified areas. Second, the principles of 
Shariah governance stand on the epistemological worldview as in the unity of 
God, Shariah-compliant and akhlaq-based ethical codes. Belief in the unity of 
God is the key propulsion that has built up the way of the IFIs business direction. 
From such a worldview, IFIs are contemplating wealth as a tool rather than a final 
objective. This is what allows them to go beyond shareholder value maximisation 
and even the stakeholders’ interest, where they give consideration to other 
aspects that are also matter in their decisions and actions. Under this, the agents 
are the most trustworthy partners of the shareholders. In this relationship, 
necessary controls function as the last resort, especially in the case of breach of 
trust, not as the tools to dictate or control the agents so they would work solely 
for the shareholders’ best interest. The key performance index of the agents is 
not merely on the annual financial increment, where how the generated wealth 
makes impacts to those who are at stake is also essential. To ensure those 
fundamentals are well upheld involves a Shariah-compliant process. In this 
regard, the IFIs, propelled by self-awareness, have been willingly upholding the 
responsibility to supply the demand in kind. This is the very factor that has brought 
Shariah-compliant products and services to its success as seen today. Well-
regulated or not, the IFIs have penetrated the market, regardless. Third, there 
are three mechanisms consequential to Shariah governance: the governing law, 
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investigate other mechanisms that might as well exist and be effective in 
supporting Shariah governance. Further research on the mentioned mechanisms 
is also welcomed to find answers within grey areas unattended by this research. 
This is just a beginning from which Shariah governance is yet to reach its full 
capacity. It is also imperative to note here that Shariah governance is not a 
peculiarity that could only operate within Muslim-dominated jurisdictions, but 
could operate within other jurisdictions as well. It is to this account, that IFIs 
should not restrict themselves but expand and make new discoveries about the 
potential of the Shariah governance in the future so this corpus of knowledge 
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